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ABSTRACT 
Enos John Nganani Mabuza‟s life and work is used as a case study to highlight the 
conceptual and methodological theories and challenges in academic biographical writing 
regarding history, memory and legacies. This thesis answers the question: Who was Mabuza 
and what is his place or relevance in South Africa‟s history? We over-simplify and stereotype 
people because it is convenient. We judge others but there is no saint without a past or a 
sinner without a future. Mabuza reconciled with the main liberation movements and moved 
from a maligned position on the political fringes to a respectable one within the emerging 
black economic elite. History, like reference systems and values is not calcified or static.  It is 
prone to interpretation, adaptation, modification, invention, manipulation, decomposition and 
re-composition.  
Bourdieu‟s habitus-field analysis, theory or logic of practice, notions of capital (symbolic, 
political, social, cultural and economic) is used together with Latour‟s actor-network theory 
as the basis of analysis of the social contracts and trust bonds that Mabuza was able to create 
and which enabled him to navigate South Africa‟s socio-political and economic milieus 
during apartheid and the transition in the early 1990s. As people or actors, we believe in the 
mantra, nothing ventured, nothing gained. We exercise agency and take risks every day. We 
make choices and those choices have consequences. Mabuza‟s choices in the fields of 
education, politics and business had implications for how he is perceived or has been written 
into history. His choices put notions of identity, citizenship, power, legitimacy, ambition, 
elite accommodation, class, personal and professional networks, popular struggles, agency 
and structure under the spotlight.  
Mabuza‟s involvement in Bantustan politics, for instance, is contextualised in terms of a 
historical overview of the unpopular role played by traditional authorities in South Africa 
before and during colonialism and apartheid. His later foray into the world of business, 
however, was facilitated in part, by the personal and professional contacts that he made whilst 
he was in politics and the opportunities which opened up during the country‟s political 
transition. Mabuza adapted to changing circumstances and demonstrated a level of versatility 
which other Bantustan functionaries did not or could not exercise. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Focus and Justification 
As actors, we are confronted by different choices at every step of any historical route and we 
choose a course of action from possible alternatives, no matter how limited they might be. 
Political opinions and attitudes change over time. Compromises and accommodations are 
made in response to changes in circumstances and other imperatives. The late Nganani Enos 
John Mabuza‟s life story reads like a fairy tale yet he is an obscure figure in the minds of 
most South Africans. This thesis is a critical engagement with Mabuza‟s life and career. It 
forms part of the race-class debate which is an integral part of South Africa‟s painful and 
complex history. Mabuza came from a poor mining background and rose to relative 
prominence and respectability in education, politics and business; particularly his 
contradictory role as a Bantustan leader within apartheid administrative structures on the one 
hand, and in the struggle against it on the other. This thesis is an appraisal of Mabuza as a 
person (his character) and as a leader and the circumstances of his leadership before 
presuming to judge him based on emotions like disappointment, shock, resentment or anger. 
Actions either have positive or negative consequences and Bantustan leaders were seen as 
greedy, corrupt; sell-outs who betrayed their own people and had a propensity for violence in 
defence of ill-begotten gains. 
Individuals who were involved in apartheid structures (mainly traditional authorities/chiefs) 
were viewed with great suspicion or regarded as traitors because many of them became 
feared instruments of the vicious apartheid state, especially in the 1950s and 1960s after the 
passing of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (Ntsebeza, 2002; Ribot, 2001:4; Mamdani, 
1996; Callinicos, 1992; Mufson, 1990:286-310). The agendas followed by Bantustan elites 
and the reasons why they did so are still the source of much tension and conflict with 
ordinary people as they were with the liberation movements because of the divide and rule 
motive which was at the root of the Bantustan policy. However, it is a generalisation or 
simplification to say that all Bantustan leaders were greedy, corrupt, violent and short-
sighted. This discussion tries to establish whether Mabuza did the unacceptable, inexcusable 
or unconscionable in light of the decisions that he made. 
Enos Mabuza‟s participation in Bantustan politics was a choice and this choice is at the 
centre of this discussion for the same or similar reasons discussed by Bowden and Rooksby 
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(2006). The thesis considers what made Mabuza different, if at all, from other Bantustan 
politicians, as well as the nature and extent of his relationship with the African National 
Congress, United Democratic Front, the Mass Democratic Movement and other progressive 
organisations and individuals. The aim of this study is not to re-write history or to be 
sympathetic and make excuses for Mabuza but to learn and understand why he made the 
choices that he did.  
Mabuza‟s career did not happen in a vacuum and this thesis uses a constructionist or 
historical perspective to gain insights by situating him in a particular place, time and socio-
political processes. Relational theory and power discourses are employed to infer what his 
priorities and inspirations were and why. Tracing the political, business and conservation 
phases of his career shows how he set out to achieve certain goals and with whom he did so. 
He had a chequered career and this thesis traces the issues, processes, controversies, the 
ambiguities and incompatible or disagreeable things which propelled, sustained or 
conditioned it. Bowden and Rooksby (2006:241-256) discuss the supposed tension between 
judging and understanding; whether understanding tempers judgment and punishment and the 
role of determinism and our claims about knowledge, truth, morality, free will, responsibility, 
accountability and blame. They contend that particular people judge particular objects which 
are framed by particular contexts, relationships, social and official norms and expectations1 
(Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:245). They argue that:  
“we can condemn or be condemned for particular actions or goals, for roles we 
create or assume, for exercising discretion in those roles, for outcomes for our 
actions and consequences that ensue from those outcomes, for attributes, 
dispositions, habits and traits” (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:244).  
They consider reasons/motives, contexts, explanations or justifications which lead people to 
commit particular moral transgressions. In doing so, they try to humanise the act in order to 
show the human fallibility in all of us. Condemning has a regulatory function but as Bowden 
and Rooksby (2006:245) note, “to condemn is to affirm another‟s agency and responsibility, 
and one‟s own, to acknowledge both of us as participants in a shared project”; a position 
which fits in with the relational or interpersonal assumptions which underpin actor-network 
theory and social network analysis which is used as the theoretical framework for this thesis.  
                                                 
1 Explicit and implicit assumptions and expressions of agency and responsibility. 
2 Ciraj Rassool, Andrew Nash, Jan Coetzee, Sikhumbuza Mngadi, Ashwin Desai, Fred Hendricks, Luli 
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The thesis considers whether Mabuza was called to account or censored - judged negatively 
and if anyone demanded retribution or negative sanctions against him in a way that was 
proportional to what he did and for what he was responsible for with respect to his 
participation in the Bantustan system. This entails an assessment of the degree to which he 
was responsible for the evils of apartheid, the Bantustans system and particular suffering, 
incidents or costs to the welfare of the people in KaNgwane specifically; and the struggle 
generally. He was a cog in a causal chain that he did not set in motion and one whose 
excesses he supposedly tried to mitigate in KaNgwane at the request of certain Swazi chiefs. 
His agreement to assume this position was perhaps misguided, naïve or idealistic but he did 
not bully the people like other Bantustan leaders did. This thesis assesses the intentions or 
causal connections of Mabuza‟s acts or omissions as well as the significance (intensity or 
severity) of the harm or injury that he personally caused to his „charges‟ in KaNgwane. The 
final analysis concerns how Mabuza‟s work or contributions were received and how relevant 
he is in the Mpumalanga lowveld or Eastern Transvaal where he came from as well as on a 
national level. 
There are many stories that can be told about a person because of the layered identities and 
roles which they assume concurrently or consecutively (Eakin, 1999:70, 85). In the story of 
Hadji Murat, Tolstoy (1977) explores the fluidity of human character by depicting man in the 
many, often incongruous, facets of his nature or character (alternatively villain, angel, sage, 
idiot, strong man, courageous, loyal, dignified, weakling). This versatility that Tolstoy 
explores in the character of Hadji Murat is fascinating and relevant for our attempts to 
understand Mabuza and how his career unfolded by analysing the context in which it 
happened. Mulholland and Ludlow (1992) note that history is not simply about finding out 
what or when something happened. It is also about finding out the reasons for people‟s 
actions (why) and the material circumstances (time, place, the socio-political, cultural or 
economic contexts of the period) surrounding the relevant actors and events. Eakin suggests 
that we need to study the “situated self” as a product of a “particular place and time.” 
According to Paris (2001) and Mulholland and Ludlow (1992), history is often a 
controversial and keenly contested terrain because of different interpretations which are 
influenced by prejudices and stereotypes inherited from the partial histories that are given of 
the past. People judge things (and people) from different perspectives (religious, educational, 
political or nationalistic) and these perspectives inform our differing experiences of reality. 
Accounts of events can be given from the perspective of winners, losers, the powerful or the 
Page | 4 
 
weak, the rich or the poor. Mulholland and Ludlow (1992) note, however, that none of these 
perspectives is necessarily correct or incorrect even though they often differ. 
Different people hold different opinions about the positive or negative contributions that were 
made by Mabuza but he was not the cowardly “yes man” that it is convenient to label him as. 
Mabuza‟s political role was ambiguous and controversial and he was not the embodiment of 
the anti-apartheid struggle, humanitarianism or philanthropy but he tried to redeem himself 
through his deeds in ways that others who were in similar positions did not. His general 
goodwill is demonstrated, for instance, by the fact that he was the second Bantustan leader to 
open discussions and establish a working relationship with the African National Congress (as 
the future government of the country) (Mabuza, 1991:12). He was not apathetic but tried to 
make a difference by taking charge of his own destiny. Despite working within apartheid 
structures as a Bantustan leader, Enos Mabuza did not hide his opposition to apartheid 
(Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Mabuza, 1983). His actions and what he 
accomplished for himself and for others should not be negated because he made some 
questionable choices along the way. 
Mabuza‟s life and career can be traced in four main spheres that he was involved in; namely 
education, politics, conservation and business. What can be interpreted as his subjective, 
individual experience was also partly the experience of those around him. Regarding the 
political aspects, Mabuza‟s impact can be understood through his interaction with the 
KaNgwane people and the Inyandza National Movement (of which he was President) and 
vice versa, his relationship with the ANC, UDF and IDASA.  Investigating the complexity of 
these interactions  and attendant ambiguities posed by Mabuza‟s political choices also shed 
light on on-going debates regarding the incorporation of traditional authorities into South 
Africa‟s government structures after 1994, despite such authorities having been labelled 
collaborators and oppressors in the past (Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2002; Mufson, 1990:286-
310; Walshe, 1987).  
1.2 Key Questions 
The following questions are used to discover and explain the factors that determined the 
course of events in Enos Mabuza‟s life and career at different stages: 
 What was his family background?  
 What was his schooling experience?  
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 What influenced his life philosophy and career?  
 How did he get to participate in Bantustan politics? 
 How did he manage his roles as a Bantustan leader and president of the Inyandza 
National Movement and his alignment with the African National Congress?  
 Was he ambitious, opportunistic and self-serving as Bantustan leaders/traditional 
authorities have been characterised?  
 What role did his family play in his successes or failures? 
 Who were his friends, colleagues, acquaintances and confidantes? 
 Where Mabuza‟s involvement in business, conservation or the founding of Penryn 
College better received than his political exploits?  
 What were the conservation issues that Mabuza championed? 
 Why was he appointed to so many company boards? 
 What is his legacy and how is he remembered nationally and in his home area? 
1.3 The Research Method Used 
According to Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:4), history tries to establish what is known about 
a person or event; what can be proven; what is not known about it; what has been omitted 
from the account of it; whose memories have been recorded; whose memories are reliable 
and whose interests are served by that particular account. Most of the history of Africa, for 
instance, has been told from a colonial, Eurocentric perspective because of white dominance, 
conquests and selective recollection at the expense of the knowledge of the trials, endeavours, 
insights and successes of other people who were considered to be inferior minorities. There 
are several complexities and challenges involved in interpreting the human personality or life. 
Every social field has its own culture, structure, rules and material conditions which affect the 
character of the relationships among its members (heroism, martyrdom, conformity, bitter 
struggle). When it comes to focus on the individual, biographical research is criticised or 
discredited for being too subjective; implying that biographical examinations of the single 
case lack reliability and external validity. Despite such reservations, social scientists across 
the disciplines have shown increased interest in, and acceptance of biographical and 
autobiographical approaches over the past two decades (Bertaux, 1981; Elms, 1994; 
McAdams, 2006). 
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An interdisciplinary workshop on the art or craft of biography was held at Rhodes University 
on 22-23 May 2008 with sponsorship from the National Research Foundation (NRF). The 
workshop was attended by many notable academics2 who presented papers based 
predominantly on their own experiences or those of people close to them. The papers 
examined how the individuals have been written into South African history and how their 
experiences resonate with those of many other people. Many biographies, especially political 
biographies have been written since the end of apartheid3 but they are generally in the mould 
of the cult of personality and hero-worshipping of the lives and sacrifices of venerated 
struggle icons such as Oliver Tambo who was president of the ANC in exile. However, it was 
lamented that the general tendency (as in Strachey‟s Eminent Victorians, Carlyle‟s On 
Heroes and Hero Worship or Emerson‟s Representative Men), is still to focus on prominent 
political and social figures with purported moral vision and stature even if some of them were 
bullies, tyrants, neurotics, philanderers and adulterers. Cecil Rhodes is a historical figure 
associated with British empire-building and his beneficiation through the prestigious Rhodes 
Scholarships. His name is ubiquitous in Oxford, Cape Town, Grahamstown, Kimberly, 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively) and over twenty five 
biographies have been written about him. In addition, there are numerous plays, movies and 
memorials which variously portray him as a hero and a villain. Although Rhodes is often 
remembered as an initiator and innovator, Maylam (2005) questions this and notes that 
Rhodes was also an ambitious and opportunistic manipulator and egotist.  
The papers presented at the workshop all focused on what motivates or propels people to do 
X and not Y. The intrigue is heightened when the subjects are politicians. Other themes raised 
in the workshop were family, marriage, society, career, politics, religion, power, ego, wealth, 
identity, agency and structure, the meaning of life itself and how these link history, the 
private and the public interface (the individual and the societal or collective). The importance 
of context in historical and biographical work was highlighted and it became apparent that 
people are often steered by currents beyond their control. Alternatively, history is made but 
not usually under conditions of our own choosing. The workshop echoed the methodological 
issues, challenges and concerns discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the purpose or value of 
                                                 
2 Ciraj Rassool, Andrew Nash, Jan Coetzee, Sikhumbuza Mngadi, Ashwin Desai, Fred Hendricks, Luli 
Callinicos, Elinor Sisulu, Mark Gevisser, Jeff Pieres, Laurence Wright, Dan Wylie, Fackson Banda, Lynette 
Steenveld, Pregs Govender, Zubeida Jaffer, Chris Kabwato, Peter Mtuze, Russell Kaschula and Paul Maylam. 
3 Luli Callinicos‟ Oliver Tambo: Behind the Engeli Mountains and Mark Gevisser‟s Thabo Mbeki: A Dream 
Deferred are just two examples. 
Page | 7 
 
biographical research and the different sources that can be use when conducting biographical 
research. Other concerns revolved around problems with memory and subjectivity and the 
researcher‟s mediation of knowledge production through their interpretation and bias. 
Another concern is the role of ideology in the way biographical writing is framed and how 
heroes and legends are made or invented and distinguished from ordinary people. There is 
also the tendency for linearity in discursive practice around biographical writing which is 
aimed at giving lives order, unity and coherence but in reality, very few lives can be neatly 
packaged in such a manner. 
Various speakers advocated a nuanced approach to analysis within the field because the 
stories that are to be told are layered, not static or monolithic. Elinor Sisulu‟s biography of 
her in-laws Walter and Albertina Sisulu is entitled Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In Our Time. 
It gives a feminist twist to the Sisulus love story, their domestic setting and political activism. 
Most biographies have one subject or individual as the focus but this one examines two lives 
in one but manages to give them their individuality. Gevisser‟s (2007) biography of Thabo 
Mbeki is a psycho-political exposition of his encounters with Marxism, Leninism, 
Africanism, Black Consciousness, Afrikaner nationalism and liberalism. It chronicles 
Mbeki‟s rise to power at home and in exile through strategic alliances, concessions and 
cooptation as well as his subordination of the personal to the political for most of his life. 
Mbeki was Mandela‟s deputy and successor and is a very influential person in his own right. 
He is described as a brilliant, diligent but unpopular and flawed man who is also considered 
to be a symbol of modern Africa and its renaissance. 
Several speakers at the workshop questioned whose stories should be told or considered 
significant enough for the national record in South Africa, for example, struggle or liberation 
stories of those that went into exile, those that were banned or imprisoned and others who 
also suffered and sacrificed in small ways but did not go into exile or prison. Many of the 
speakers advocated for a humanising history which includes the stories of ordinary people, 
for example, indentured Indians in South Africa that first arrived in 1860 (1860 Heritage 
Foundation). Apartheid forced people, especially blacks, to make difficult choices everyday 
and Mtuze‟s autobiography entitled An Alternative Struggle is deliberately written to 
chronicle the struggles of an ordinary person. Mtuze worked as a court interpreter, radio 
announcer for Radio Bantu, a Foreign Affairs protocol officer for the Ciskei government, a 
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publishing representative for Via-Afrika, lecturer and professor at various institutions 
including the University of South Africa, University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, a qualitative research methodology was adopted for the 
study because it is better suited for hypothesis-generating research and provides a deeper 
understanding of social phenomena (meanings and actions) (Silverman, 2000:2 & 8; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994:8). Explorative, semi-structured, narrative interviews were used for data 
collection. Amongst those interviewed were Mabuza‟s widow Esther and son Sandile, his 
sister Margaret, colleagues and others who knew him, for instance, David Wylde, Michael 
Mndawe, Dr. Rob Snaddon from the Penryn Trust, Simeon Gininda of the Mpumalanga 
Legislature and businessman Mr Elias N. Ginindza. Interview guides traced the subject‟s 
basic life story, including the development or evolution of attitudes and significant events in 
their chronological or historical sequence and in relation to events in see Appendix 4.  
Multiple sources of information were used for this study ranging from primary sources 
(original documents) to secondary sources (published documents, newspaper editorials, and 
interviews) in order to cross-reference for validity. Internal validity refers to the ability to 
draw conclusions about causal relationships from the available data. A study has high internal 
validity when strong inferences can be made that one variable caused the other. External 
validity is the extent to which the results can be generalized to other populations and settings 
but it is not a major concern for biographies because they are essentially case studies whose 
findings are not generalised to a wider population. In terms of reliability, it is difficult to 
ensure that the findings or conclusions of biographies can be replicated because the 
interpretation and analysis is subjective or speculative depending on the researcher‟s bias and 
the theoretical framework they adopt. However, the data and information gathered is 
triangulated to check for or eliminate distortions and inconsistencies (Bertaux, 1981; Elms, 
1994; McAdams, 2006).  
Maurois (1929:71) maintains that a person‟s own account of events has “a particular tone, a 
particular shade of significance, which no paraphrase can preserve.” Further, Maurois 
(1929:70) notes that “nothing is an adequate substitute for the personal impression to be 
obtained from direct contact with a man‟s letters or diary.” For this reason, interview data 
was cross-referenced and supplemented with Enos Mabuza‟s personal documents (personal 
and business correspondence) (Denzin and Lincoln, 2001:xxxvi; Gottschalk, Kluckhohn, and 
Angell, 1945), which, according to  Maurois (1929:73) represent “exceptional moments” in a 
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person‟s life.” However, Mulholland and Ludlow (1992:3) note that when people write about 
their own actions or important things they have experienced, they often do not give the real 
reasons for the way things happened. Public archival documents and other secondary sources 
such as books, political organisations‟ archives and newspapers were also used to 
compliment the memories or oral accounts of interviewees which tend to deteriorate or be 
selective of facts over time (Thompson, 1998). 
There are usually no simply explanations for human experience because human beings and 
events (actions, intentions and meanings) are influenced by many variables that form a 
complex chain over time (Miles and Huberman, 1994:146; Marcus, 1994; Maurois, 1929:30). 
These variables need to be examined and explained if we are to understand people‟s actions 
and decisions. We cannot ignore the impact of social relations or their context in a given 
society if we wish to retain the explanatory value of information obtained about people‟s 
actions and the possible reasons for those actions and their consequences (Mulholland and 
Ludlow, 1992:5, 8 & 29). It is better to analyse or interpret the lives of historically significant 
personalities in context in order to get an enriching, critical, reflective and interpretive 
outcome that enhances our understanding of lived human experience (Benton, 2005:206-226; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2001:xi-xxv; Eakin, 1999; Marcus, 1994). Mulholland and Ludlow 
(1992:29) maintain that people do not make choices in a vacuum, thus “it is necessary to see 
individuals choosing and acting within a context and to examine the context as well as the 
actions.” Mabuza led the KaNgwane people at a time when institutionalised segregation 
meant that black people were oppressed and disenfranchised. It was also a time when the 
power of the racially exclusive apartheid state was at its zenith and any form of resistance 
was brutally crushed, for example, the series of states of emergencies under the Internal 
Security Act from 20 July 1985 until 1990 (Gish, 2004; Maylam, 2001). 
Sociological theories that pertain to social networks and network effects explore the 
interaction between the individual and the group; the interrelatedness of personality and 
society; the environment and events. People occupy positions within economic and social 
structures. They may be members of religious groups or political parties on top of family or 
regional loyalties. They may be educated or illiterate, rich or poor and all these factors 
influence the decisions they make. One has to examine these dimensions to understand why 
something happened or why people chose to act as they did because it is important in trying 
to analyse information in an interpretive framework or paradigm (Mulholland and Ludlow, 
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1992:1 & 3). However, one should be careful not to reduce historical accounts to a simplified 
version of good and evil or distort history by over-emphasising one variable (Mulholland and 
Ludlow, 1992:22-25). Bertaux (2003:39) and Roos (2003:32-33) state that the context of 
events is important to sociological analysis because it enables us to understand and explain 
events by anchoring them in lived social-historical realities as an integral part of people‟s 
lives which cannot be separated from the subjective aspects of their personality and 
behaviour. By taking into cognisance the influence of context, we are able to identify the 
dynamics (power, conflicts, constraints, alternatives) that emanate from these because they 
combine to shape the courses of individual lives by preventing or enabling certain actions 
(Bertaux, 2003:40 & 43).  
Pierre Bourdieu‟s conceptions of habitus, field and different forms of capital (1992; 1998) 
and Bruno Latour‟s (1999) actor-network analysis are used for this study to analyse Mabuza 
as a person who lived in a particular context and responded to it in specific ways. Latour 
(1999) argues that distinguished personalities like Albert Einstein and Louis Pasteur did not 
necessarily possess special features that made them successful. Latour maintains that the 
secret to understanding these individuals‟ achievements lies in understanding the principles 
that determine intellectual networks, or any other networks. Bourdieu explains habitus as a 
system of durable and transposable dispositions, orientations or behaviours (meaningful 
practices and meaning-giving perceptions) acquired through primary socialisation, as well as 
other skills acquired later in life to create structure in our lives. Habitus can also be explained 
as a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating structures within several 
underlying structures (Bourdieu, 1998: 15 & 18). It is important to note, however, that the 
habitus is not uniform. Some people‟s habitus is more extensive and adaptable in different 
fields (contexts) than others. 
Bourdieu and Latour‟s analyses offer an alternative way of reading and analysing biographies 
or treating and portraying their subjects as normal people. Latour (1999) and Benton 
(2005:206-226) object to the myth that people who become distinguished possess exceptional 
creativity or talent and suggest that we should analyse real people and real life experiences in 
a more holistic and encompassing way. This study is an investigation of how an individual is 
situated in a particular context and how that context moulds him or her. Bourdieu and 
Latour‟s theories have been used to explain the particular course that Enos Mabuza‟s life took 
within the socio-political context of South Africa at that time. 
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1.4 Who is Enos Mabuza’s and what did He Achieve? 
The late Nganani Enos John Mabuza was born in 1939 on the Anglo-Vaal Group‟s Sheba 
Gold Mine in the Barberton District of the then Eastern Transvaal where his father was a 
miner (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). As a black South African, Mabuza had first-hand 
experience of deprivation. The Mabuza children struggled to get an education because the 
family could not afford it. According to Sandile Mabuza (Interview June 2007), the Mabuza 
family led a humble, pastoral lifestyle. Enos was the eldest child in a family of four children 
and used to herd the family‟s livestock, mainly sheep. His father worked at Sheba Gold Mine 
in Barberton and like most mineworkers, he visited the family at fixed periods. His mother 
was a housewife and raised the children with the assistance of their paternal grandmother 
(Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). Mining did not pay well and Mabuza‟s father took 
a second wife which meant that he had to stretch limited resources in order to support another 
family. Consequently, Enos Mabuza‟s grandmother and aunt took responsibility for his initial 
education and sold some of their livestock (cattle and sheep) in order to do this. Enos did his 
primary education at Sheba Gold Mine were his father worked (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 
June 2007; Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007) and he was part of the first generation of 
black South Africans to experience the disempowering impact of Bantu Education (he was 
nine years old when the National Party came to power and fourteen years old when the Bantu 
Education Act was passed). 
From this humble background, Mabuza rose to earn the respect, and often the hatred, of those 
who knew him and this thesis focuses on the significant roles he played in education, politics, 
conservation and business (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Mabuza had a sixteen-year career in 
education as a teacher and education inspector in the Eastern Transvaal. Later, he served on 
several educational boards. Mabuza stepped into the political arena following the 
establishment of the KaNgwane Bantustan and was appointed Chief Executive Councillor of 
the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly in 1978. He became KaNgwane‟s first Chief Minister 
when KaNgwane was declared a self-governing territory in 1984 and resigned from this 
position in April 1991 (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). In 1978, Mabuza co-founded and served as 
President of the Inyandza National Movement until his resignation from politics (van Wyk 
Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1991). One of the highlights of his political career was his 
successful fight against the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. After he 
resigned as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Mabuza was involved in the first Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) multi-party constitutional negotiations in 1991 
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(Mayibuye, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:51-52). The convention brought together the government, 
Bantustan leaders and liberation movements to discuss South Africa‟s future (Pityana, 2005; 
Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Gish, 2004:138; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11).  
Mabuza was instrumental in driving environmental conservation initiatives in KaNgwane 
where he helped establish three nature reserves. He advocated the conservation of natural and 
other resources and served on several environmental and community trusts, including the 
Independent Development Trust and the National Parks Board (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 
2005; Phosa, 2005; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 1992; Mabuza, 1990).  
Van Wyk Smith (1993:11) describes Mabuza as a “keen Methodist” and a humble and 
peaceful man who was committed to non-violence. He (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11) notes that 
religion influenced Mabuza‟s work and conduct, for instance, he valued the meaning of 
family (Mabuza, 1992; Mabuza, 1991). Penryn College which was initiated by Mabuza and 
others is linked to the Methodist Church and imparts Christian principles to develop the 
spiritual life and humility of learners (Penryn College‟s Mission Statement and marketing 
brochures, 2006). At the time of his death, Mabuza was a director on the boards of several 
companies, among them, Standard Bank South Africa, South African Breweries and the 
Anglo-Vaal mining group (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; Van Wyk Smith, 
1993:11; Mabuza, 1992:3). He also ran his own consultancy business called Enos J. Mabuza 
& Associates which was launched at the beginning of August 1991. Further, Rhodes 
University recognised his contributions in 1993 by awarding him an Honorary Doctor of 
Laws (LLD) degree (Van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). 
1.5 Background to the Role of Traditional Leaders within Apartheid Structures   
Traditional leaders or authorities included paramount chiefs, chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen 
and they held positions of public trust over specific areas or locations (jurisdiction).  
Traditional leaders had “immense moral and political authority” in the maintenance of “civic 
morale and social order” in accordance with customary law (Sklar, 1994:1 & 2). Chiefs 
occupied the highest office and appointed councillors from the ranks of kinsmen or elders (or 
both) to assist and advise them. Authority was delegated through a hierarchy of sub-chiefs 
and headmen and the principle of government was based on consultation, discussion and 
consensus (Koyana, 1998:120; Lodge, 1995:1). Colonial powers (and later the apartheid 
system) exploited the trust that was vested in this traditional institution (Sklar, 1994: 1 & 2).  
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Investigating and explaining the rationale behind the Bantustan system sheds light on the 
ambiguities posed by Mabuza‟s political choices and debates regarding the incorporation of 
traditional authorities into South Africa‟s government structures after 1994 (Oomen, 2005; 
Ntsebeza, 2002; Walshe, 1987). 
Indirect rule was a divide and conquer tactic employed by the British in their colonies by 
exploiting ethnic divisions (or the rural-urban divide) among different groups of people in 
order to expand and maintain white domination, for instance, British colonists capitalised on 
divisions among Xhosa chiefdoms in the Eastern Cape (Mufson, 1990:307). Tribal 
Authorities whose authority was originally rooted in the fusion of various powers or 
functions (judicial, legislative, executive and administrative) were co-opted into 
administrative positions by colonial administrations (Koyana, 1998:120; Mamdani, 1996; 
Lodge, 1995:3). Indirect rule in South Africa functioned in a context in which traditional 
authorities controlled 13% of the land which constituted the native reserves before apartheid 
was instituted. A series of statutes including the  Glen Grey Act of 1894, the Native Land Act 
of 1913, the Native Affairs Act of 1920 and the Native Administration Act of 1927 (Ntsebeza, 
2002:41-42, 47,52; Hendricks and Ntsebeza,1999) set the tone for the compromised position 
of traditional authorities by systematically curtailing their functions and powers. The French 
followed slightly different policies of assimilation or association in their colonies (Mamdani 
1996). 
1.6 The Bantustan System and Eligibility 
The Bantustan system was established as an extension of the apartheid state‟s divide and rule 
strategy towards the black majority. It was also designed to control the influx of blacks into 
urban areas as well as to provide a pool of cheap migrant labour (Ntsebeza, 2002:47; 
Mamdani, 1996:22-24; Callinicos, 1992). Ten Bantustans were created - Bophuthatswana, 
KwaZulu, Venda, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Transkei, Ciskei, Lebowa, QwaQwa and 
Gazankulu (Ntsebeza, 2002:74; Mufson, 1990; Mulholland and Ludlow, 1992:24). Not all 
Bantustan leaders were traditional leaders in the conventional sense like chiefs. This post was 
not ascribed or hereditary according to chiefly lineages but was created as an administrative 
function forcing traditional authorities to become salaried officials accountable to the 
government. Many Bantustan leaders were not elected by the people but imposed from above 
and to ensure that the system worked, some chiefs were created where they did not exist 
before (Ntsebeza, 2002:36). Some opportunistic traditional authorities who wanted to ensure 
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their political survival made alliances with the apartheid state as their original powers were 
systematically undermined or curtailed (Ntsebeza, 2002:60). 
The Separate Representation of Voters Act was passed in 1951, together with the Bantu 
Authorities Act of 1951 which recognised the authority of chiefs and other tribal authorities, 
including people that had been appointed by the apartheid state, as legitimate rulers in Native 
Reserves or Bantustans. The Bantu Authorities Act made it almost impossible for traditional 
authorities to escape being co-opted into the apartheid machinery or to be neutral within the 
administrative arm of the state when they were mandated to implement hated government 
policy which included forced removals, taxes, livestock limitation or culling as well as land 
re-division into grazing, cultivation and residential areas (land tenure and administration 
under the auspices of conservation or Betterment Schemes). The result was that traditional 
authorities alienated themselves from their subjects by enforcing these policies (Ribot, 
2001:4; Mamdani, 1996; Callinicos, 1992). The Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959 
was aimed at establishing self-government and separate constitutions in the Bantustans. Many 
people resisted this but it was forced on them and four of the ten Bantustans eventually 
became „independent.‟ Transkei became self-governing in 1976, Ciskei in 1981 and 
KaNgwane in 1984 (Ntsebeza, 2002: 74 & 82).  
Forced removals were used to push the black population into the Bantustans from the 1960s 
until the 1980s. The Bantustans became over-crowded, lacked adequate resources and 
infrastructure and offered little economic opportunities (Gish, 2004:40). Most of the 
responsibilities of traditional authorities were passed onto the Bantustan leaders such that 
they became responsible for policing pass laws, development and service delivery (roads, 
water, education), work contracts for migrant workers and pensions for the elderly (Ntsebeza, 
2002:69, 80, 87). Bantustan leaders, like the hijacked traditional authorities which preceded 
them, were generally unaccountable and corrupt and thus did not have legitimacy in the eyes 
of the rural communities which they ruled over (Bank and Southall, 1996:408, 425-427).  
As apartheid and the Bantustan system became established, it also became “difficult to 
discern where the power of apartheid‟s black faces began and ended” (Mufson, 1990:287). 
According to Gish (2004:40), Bantustan governments were often more brutal than the 
apartheid government itself in rooting out opposition as some corrupt black civil servants in 
those governments viewed their employment in the Bantustan governments as a way to 
enrich themselves. Various inducements or enticements such as economic resources, prestige, 
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authority and politico-legal means of power were used to lure ambitious individuals, whilst 
traditional authorities that refused to collaborate or failed in their functions were deposed and 
new, cooperative or compliant ones were appointed in their place (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; 
Ribot, 2001:74; Ray, van Rouveroy and van Niewaal, 1996:25). The disdain towards blacks 
who worked within apartheid structures was once summed up by Mosiuoa Lekota‟s dismissal 
of them as “fools, crooks and eunuchs” (cited in Mufson, 1990:286).  
The Bantustan system was very unpopular when the government introduced the 1970 Bantu 
Homelands Citizen Act which forcibly grouped blacks along ethnic lines (Mufson, 1990:286). 
Blacks still could not vote and they had limited rights in these ethnically-based Bantustans 
(similar to Native Reserves in former British colonies or the Reservation camps for Native 
Indians in the United States). The apartheid government considered blacks as citizens of these 
Bantustans and not of South Africa itself. As a result, the Bantustan system was never 
accepted by most black South Africans (Gish, 2004:40) and traditional authorities became 
targets in the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s, for instance, in Lebowa in the Northern 
Transvaal and KwaNdebele in the Eastern Transvaal after the 1976 Soweto Student Uprising 
(Ntsebeza, 2002:72; Lodge, 1983). 
Despite the evils of the Bantustan system, traditional authorities did not relate to the apartheid 
state in the same way and some managed to retain some degree of legitimacy and autonomy. 
Not all traditional authorities became oppressive intermediaries of the apartheid state or 
conduits to control blacks in the rural areas; although it became increasingly difficult for 
them to criticise the same apartheid policies that they were forced to implement (Ntsebeza, 
2002:60; Bank and Southall, 1996). Individual leadership style, competence and personality 
distinguished those that were tolerated and the few that were respected by the people, for 
example, Paramount Chiefs Sabata Dalindyebo of the Tembu (who joined the ANC in exile 
after being deposed and forced out of the country) and Morwamoche Sekhukhune in the 
Northern Transvaal (Lodge, 1983), Chief David Dalindyebo and Chief Victor Ndamase, 
Chief Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela (Ntsebeza, 2002:60 & 78). 
Part of this enquiry is to establish what mandate, authority or legitimacy Mabuza had as a 
Bantustan leader. He became a Bantustan leader even though he did not belong to a ruling 
house or chieftaincy. Although many Bantustan leaders were imposed from above by the 
apartheid state, this was not the case with him. Instead, some Swazi chiefs persuaded him to 
accept this position on their behalf. He was requested and later elected to join the traditional 
Page | 16 
 
leaders before he became a part of the Bantustan system. The Swazi chiefs wanted him to 
lead because he was literate (understood English and could read the fine print) whereas many 
of them were illiterate or semi-literate elderly people (Interview with Mrs Mabuza on 4 May 
2006; van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Mabuza accepted his appointment; “humbled” by the trust 
that the KaNgwane people had placed in him (Interview with Mrs Mabuza on 4 May 2006). 
Although Mabuza, as the leader of a small and relatively insignificant Bantustan, was not in 
the same league as people like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Desmond Tutu 
and others, he tried to follow their non-violent doctrines of negotiation, forgiveness, 
reconciliation and duty to others. Like the traditional authorities in Zimbabwe who supported 
the freedom fighters and the country‟s liberation struggle (Spierenburg, 2002), Mabuza also 
supported the anti-apartheid struggle by working with the exiled ANC and the UDF (Mufson, 
1990:209 & 304). Mabuza used his leadership position, albeit within apartheid structures, as a 
platform to speak out against injustice and the KaNgwane people, trusted and respected him 
for it. 
1.7 The ANC, Traditional Authorities and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle 
The ANC did not contest the history or legitimacy of traditional authorities in the rural areas 
when it was established in 1912. Traditional authorities were supportive of the ANC (mainly 
financially, the most prominent being traditional authorities from the Northern Transvaal, 
North-East Transvaal and the Swazi Regent) and in turn they enjoyed respect from the 
organisation until the 1920s when traditional authorities came under increasing pressure to 
ally themselves with the colonial government (Walshe, 1987:210). The ANC adopted a new, 
more radical constitution in December 1943 which, amongst other things, eliminated the 
House of Chiefs and from then on, the ANC no longer held a uniform view regarding the 
relevance of Traditional Authorities (Tabata, 1952:6 & 7). In contrast to the ANC‟s earlier 
position, the All African Convention (AAC, established 1935) and the Non-European Unity 
Movement (NEUM, formed 1943) opposed traditional authorities and their institutions. These 
two organisations were founded on the principle of non-collaboration with, and boycotting of 
government created structures (Tabata, 1950:103 & 105) and they opposed traditional 
authorities because they saw them as collaborating with the state in oppressing Africans in 
the rural areas (Tabata, 1952:6 & 7). 
Despite these shifts in opinion, Callinicos (2006:40) observes that the ANC was not a 
“monolithic” organisation and tried to be non-racial and inclusive of all people who wanted 
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to contribute to the struggle. The anti-apartheid struggle was a “Herculean, multi-faceted 
task” (Callinicos, 2006:26) that required a broad, multi-faceted liberation movement and 
traditional authorities came into the fray, despite being widely considered devious and 
opportunistic (Ntsebeza, 2002). The ANC‟s alliance partners included the white Congress of 
Democrats from as early as the 1950s (Callinicos, 2006:3) and Traditional Authorities 
became important again to the ANC and the SACP when the two organisations were banned 
in 1960. According to Mufson (1990:190), the ANC became “a broad church of resistance 
with room in its pews for capitalists and communists, white and black, young and old.” The 
country‟s biggest trade unions, anti-apartheid organisations and student organisations all 
adopted the ANC‟s Freedom Charter. The inclusive nature of the ANC was summed up when 
Oliver Tambo Oliver who led the ANC‟s overseas operations in the 1960s said:  
“the ANC is the parliament of the people,… home of any number of political 
positions which are opposed to apartheid. So, don‟t paralyse your ability to 
communicate effectively in that parliament, by rigidifying your ideological 
and political position” (cited by Neo Moikangoa in Callinicos, 2006:17).  
Nelson Mandela was the main proponent for the strategy of working with Bantustan leaders 
such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi whilst others like Govan Mbeki vehemently opposed the idea; 
arguing that their institution was unrepresentative and undemocratic and a strategy of 
working with traditional authorities was desperate, naïve and dangerous (Ntsebeza, 2002:98-
112). Mbeki and others like Patrick Lekota of the UDF and the Northern Transvaal People‟s 
Congress (NOTPECO) did not trust traditional leaders who were not affiliated to the main 
liberation movements to faithfully fight apartheid from within the system even though leaders 
like Buthelezi and others had pledged to do so at various times (Ntsebeza, 2002:99). They 
maintained that the conflict of interest or contradictions were too great to ignore (Mbeki, 
1996:92 cited in Ntsebeza, 2002:98) and their misgivings about such an alliance were 
confirmed by the fall-out between the ANC and Buthelezi in 1979 and the bloody conflict 
that ensued in the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s (Ntsebeza, 2002:111-112; Mufson, 
1990:298-299, 307).  
It has been argued that the Tribal Authorities‟ alliance with the UDF and the ANC was a ploy 
to ensure that they enjoyed another lease of life, although this did not deter the ANC from 
seeking the assistance of “progressive traditional authorities” by forging short-term alliances 
with them in the fight against the apartheid state when the ANC and the UDF had a weak 
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rural base (Ntsebeza, 2002:96). This inclusiveness was meant to incorporate as wide range of 
people into the struggle as possible and Lebowa‟s leader Nelson Ramodike even joined the 
ANC (Ntsebeza, 2002:114). The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) was launched on 20 September 1987 as part of the ongoing struggle for a 
free, non-racial South Africa and the ANC hoped that it would help mobilise the rural masses 
(Ntsebeza, 2002:101). However, this did not happen to the extent that had been hoped 
because members of the organisation were an elite that did not permanently reside in the rural 
constituencies. However, in the early 1990s, some ANC leaders reiterated the role of patriotic 
and heroic chiefs who were affiliated with the ANC as part of the coalition of forces 
struggling for national liberation. The ANC was still in exile and needed chiefs to be its main 
representatives in the rural areas (Ntsebeza, 2002:105).  
Traditional authorities rose to significance again during the political transition which 
eventually led to South Africa‟s first democratic elections in 1994. Delegations of Traditional 
Authorities from the former Bantustans were part of the multi-party CODESA constitutional 
negotiations with the National Party after the un-banning of the ANC and the SACP and the 
release of political prisoners (Ntsebeza, 2002:107-109; van Rouveroy, van Niewaal and 
Adriaan, 1996). In terms of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 12: Traditional 
Leaders), Traditional authorities have reclaimed a semblance of their original importance, 
dignity and respect within the new post-apartheid constitutional dispensation (at provincial 
and local government level) but many political commentators, authors and academics are 
sceptical about the role played by this institution in the past and the role it can continue to 
play in a democratic society (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed account). 
1.8 Saints and Sinners: Some Comparisons  
There is a saying that the past is never dead and Golding (2001:278) states that “men can die 
of shame” because of the things that they do or fail to do. In politics, individual contributions 
generally do not make or break a revolution but individuals add or subtract something to the 
collective voice. Mabuza‟s contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle were not conventional 
but his behaviour or response to oppression and domination (working on both sides) was not 
unique. His contributions are not taken seriously because he was not a radical anti-apartheid 
activist in the military or revolutionary sense but not everyone took that route. He was a 
Bantustan leader at a time when blacks were losing patience with the idea of a peaceful, non-
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violent approach to ending apartheid and they were becoming angry with those who 
collaborated with the system (Mayibuye, 1984. No.5:8).  
Mabuza, like other Bantustan leaders, was criticised, discredited and condemned because of 
his association with the apartheid government but he was also admired by those who knew 
him closely. By his own admission, he was a member of the ANC and supported the 
principles and objectives that the ANC stood for (Mayibuye, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:52). Many 
black liberation theories abounded at the time and everyone tried to make their contribution 
to the anti-apartheid struggle as they saw fit. Mabuza was optimistic about working with 
anyone who opposed apartheid, including white liberal allies, towards eventually dismantling 
the apartheid edifice. However, most people were sceptical about the efficacy of negotiating 
with such groups and maintained that they had no business working together because they 
stood on different sides of the fence. Desmond Tutu did not believe in or support violence in 
the anti-apartheid struggle and some people said that he was naïve for trying to negotiate with 
the enemy; a government that was so hostile to black interests (Gish, 2004:60 & 82). Tutu 
defended his stance in his eulogy to black consciousness leader Steve Biko by commenting 
that “being pro-black is not the same thing as being anti-white” (Gish, 2004:68). Similarly, 
Mabuza defended his political views with the words: “…unity should not mean conformity. 
Difference should not be equated with dissidence…” (Mayibuye, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 3:52). 
Mabuza‟s position did not automatically mean that he pandered or deferred to the apartheid 
government‟s every whim. 
Mabuza‟s contributions to the struggle were noted by the ANC‟s Mayibuye publication in 
1990 which commented that he was “actively pursuing a patriotic path” (Mayibuye, 1990 No. 
1:15). When he received an honorary doctorate from Rhodes University, Mabuza explained 
his decision to join politics as a selfish one, motivated by his concern for the proper education 
of his people (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). He was conscious of his precarious position as a 
Bantustan leader but he was committed to the mandate to represent the interests of those that 
put him in that position. He believed that Bantustan leaders and others with recognisable 
political constituencies had a role to play even if opinions differed (Mayibuye, 1990 Vol. 1 
No. 3:52; Fabricius, 1990). 
From a comparative perspective, the creation of Tribal Trust Lands or Reserves/Reservations 
for indigenous populations in different countries was similar to South Africa‟s Bantustan 
system (Fogel, 2003; Fredrickson, 1995).  In terms of political personalities who occupy 
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ambiguous or unpopular positions in history, parallels can be drawn between contradictions 
in Mabuza‟s political roles and contradictions in Booker T Washington‟s career (Fredrickson, 
1995:33, 35-36; Malan, 2006:15). Other examples can be drawn from the political careers of 
prominent figures like Tom Mboya in Kenya (Shachtman, 2009; Wafula Okumu, 2001: 99-
123; Kaarsholm, 1995:33-44; Maré and Hamilton, 1987; Goldsworthy, 1982:3-8, 11-13, 18-
22; Mboya, 1970; Rake, 1962: 28-34, 54-75, 99-102, 147-156, 170-184) and Bishop Abel T 
Muzorewa in Zimbabwe (Mufson, 1990:293; Mayibuye, 1992 Vol. 3 No.7:34-35; Southern 
Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Report, 1979). In South Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi is 
one figure that springs to mind as actively antagonising or sabotaging the efforts of the 
liberation movements and being responsible for many incidences of violence (Gish, 
2004:106-107, 126, 137-142, 165; Ntsebeza, 2002; Hamber cited in Paris, 2001:459; Mufson, 
1990:295-308; Mayibuye, 1992 Vol. 1 No.2:6-7; Mayibuye, 1990 Vol. 1 No. 2:8; Mayibuye, 
1989 No.2:4)  The individuals mentioned above are just examples of leaders in different 
political milieus who are often regarded as divisive figures who betrayed their respective 
causes because of ambition, greed or divided loyalties. They have been labelled traitors and 
other unsavoury names and their legacies are controversial and contested as much as 
Mabuza‟s. They are caught between ethnic, populism and nationalism ideologies and in some 
quarters they are considered to be men of fleeting consequence or failures. 
1.9 Conclusion: Outline of the Thesis 
This chapter introduces the research topic and subject and justifies why they are worth the 
enquiry. It outlines the research methodology used; the subject, Enos Mabuza and the socio-
political context in which his career developed. Deliberate emphasis is on how the Bantustan 
system worked and the peculiar position that Enos Mabuza occupied within it. The chapter 
also looks at the ANC, as South Africa‟s main liberation movement, and its early relationship 
with traditional authorities in the anti-apartheid struggle. The rest of the thesis is in thematic 
chapters as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review which discusses the pertinent conceptual 
and methodological challenges in the field of biographical research within the context of new 
or alternative histories. It also highlights issues regarding the choice of biographical subjects, 
sources and materials which can be used and common themes. Chapter 3 provides the 
conceptual framework for analysis which is hinged on Mamdani (1996; 1999a; 1999b) and 
how he historicises colonial indirect rule, power and responses to it. This particular 
framework is relevant for this thesis because traditional authorities, Native Authorities and 
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Bantu Authorities in rural South Africa were the basis for the Bantustan system which 
Mabuza participated in. The problems and contradictions presented by these institutions 
forms the backbone of this evaluation of Mabuza and his contribution to or place in South 
African history because they also have implications for the current role of traditional 
authorities under the democratic dispensation; a role which came out of compromise and 
accommodation as a result of the country‟s negotiated transition and the need for 
reconciliation. 
Chapter 4 is the theoretical framework adopted for the analysis of Enos Mabuza‟s career. The 
interpretive paradigm is used and it focuses on the role and power of networks in social 
mobility. Networks and their norms and rules, social capital, trust, reputations and agency are 
culturally constituted processes. Networks are relational and reciprocal and individuals gain 
power based on the strength of those networks as well as positive and negative aspects of 
associations within them.  This psychology informs people‟s practices and mobility within 
given networks and it gives relational theories their enduring application in the social 
sciences (see Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu1998; Bourdieu, 
1992a; Bourdieu, 1992b; Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Latour, 1996, 
Latour, 1987; Latour, 1986; Latour 2005, Mutzel, 2009; Somers, 1994; Granovetter, 2002; 
Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca, 2009). Apart from his own competence and decisions, 
Mabuza had friends, colleagues and associates who made his life and career possible through 
the different types of capital or value which they contributed. 
Chapter 5 is the first of the substantive chapters for this case study and it covers Mabuza‟s 
experiences as a student and his contribution to the field of education in the former Eastern 
Transvaal where he was a teacher and education inspector for sixteen years before he joined 
Bantustan politics. Later, Mabuza was one of several individuals who co-founded Penryn 
College as a way of  addressing some of the problems in South Africa‟s schooling system 
which were caused by the apartheid government‟s policy of under-educating blacks 
(Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Fleisch, 2002; Snaddon, 2006).  
Chapter 6 focuses on Mabuza‟s conservation initiatives in KaNgwane from the 1980s and his 
other activities in nature conservation circles throughout his career by placing the key debates 
that were taking place at the time in historical perspective. Efforts were being made to 
address the racial imbalances that were fostered under apartheid, for example, the exclusion 
of blacks from national parks. Mabuza was a member of numerous organisations whose focus 
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was conservation and encouraging communities to participate in taking care of their 
environments, not just for themselves but for future generations. He also served as the 
chairman of the then National Parks Board (now SANParks). 
Chapter 7 covers Mabuza‟s political career from his election to Bantustan politics and the 
challenges and opportunities that it presented, given the perceptions that the public had of 
Bantustan functionaries in general and the reputations that many of them created through the 
choices they made. The Bantustans were partly designed to create and maintain ethnic 
cleavages within the black population and this resulted in varying degrees of ethnic 
chauvinism (Maré and Hamilton (1987). Mabuza co-founded the Inyandza National 
Movement which represented mostly Swazi interests although it was not restricted to them. 
Inyandza/Mabuza cooperated with the exiled ANC even though he was also a member of the 
South African Black Alliance which represented mostly Bantustan leaders and other fringe 
politicians. Mabuza rose to prominence in 1982 during the abortive land deal in which South 
African authorities wanted to cede KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland. The Bantustans 
were also associated with mismanagement, greed and corruption and Mabuza was not left 
unscathed. However, to his credit, there were few incidences of violence in KaNgwane at a 
time when violence was escalating in the rest of the Transvaal between 1985 and 1995. The 
chapter concludes with an exposition of how Mabuza prepared for the political transition and 
paved the way for his shift into business circles when other fringe politicians were bracing for 
a show-down with the main liberation movements and making alliances with conservative 
white groups.  
Chapter 8 shows Mabuza‟s rise to corporate prominence and his new role as an ally for 
established white businesses as well as emerging black businesses which were aligned with 
the ANC during the transition and beyond. Political change was to be accompanied by 
economic transformation, restructuring and empowerment which were part of the 
reconstruction and development goals to benefit the majority of the masses that had been 
deliberately excluded in the past. Mabuza established his own socio-political consultancy 
firm to assist with this economic transition when he resigned from KaNgwane politics. 
Through this firm, he was able to advise businesses about their corporate images, labour 
issues, affirmative action and other relevant topics. Mabuza stayed in business and held 
numerous directorships until his death in 1997. 
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Chapter 9 briefly covers Mabuza‟s private or domestic life in so far as it informs the broader 
sociological study, since the family is the nucleus or primary site of social reproduction. As a 
Bantustan functionary, Mabuza faced challenges because of his politics and the support, 
encouragement and comfort given by his family, friends and community played a big role in 
his being able to stay in an otherwise unpopular political role for over a decade. The section 
also explores Mabuza‟s personal and professional influences, including the role of religion in 
his life. Chapter 10 concludes the study by pulling together Mabuza‟s attributes. He was able 
to traverse different arenas or fields on his own competence but also with the help and 
support of those around him. He held public office during a very difficult time in South 
Africa‟s history but he managed to put his controversial politics behind him when others did 
not or could not do so. He has a tainted legacy and credibility as a politician but he assumed 
other roles which were less controversial. Mabuza has been commemorated and celebrated by 
a varied group of people including the ANC, the Mbombela Municipality in Nelspruit, 
Penryn College and Rhodes University but does he deserve such recognition? His 
involvement in government-created structures and patron-client relationships relegated him to 
the undignified and unenviable position of a turncoat. Many would say that he was an 
imposter comrade who mocked, humiliated, degraded, vitiated or prostituted the true meaning 
and efforts of the struggle and that any claims to the contrary should be disregarded but he 
reconciled with the ANC and that endorsement cannot be overlooked. In the means-end 
debate Mabuza‟s legacy remains a contested one. He is not a hero or comrade in the regular 
sense but he did not commit any transgressions that would warrant the same amount of 
indignation as Buthelezi or Mangope, for example4.  
The struggle was not the monopoly of a select few so whilst Mabuza may have been 
opportunistic or strategically played certain situations to his advantage, his cooperation with 
the ANC and UDF and his defiance of the apartheid state over the Swazi land deal show that 
he could stand up for what was right and good if the conditions were right. Justified distrust 
and fear, frustration and despair prevailed in South Africa under apartheid but individuals 
found ways to make a difference. 
All the people interviewed for this project describe Mabuza‟s demeanour, candour and 
treatment of those around him as gentle and soft spoken. They believe that he had the best 
                                                 
4 (see articles in Mayibuye, November 1992. Vol. 3 No.10:18-19; Mayibuye, October 1992. Vol. 3 No.9:12-13; 
Mayibuye, October 1992. Vol. 3 No.9:17; Mayibuye, February 1992. Vol. 3 No. 1:13-14; Mayibuye, September 
1990. Vol. 1 No. 2:22; Mayibuye, July/August 1990. Vol. 1 No. 1:34-36; Mayibuye, 1991 Vol. 2 No. 9:17; 
Mayibuye, 1984: No. 5:8). 
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interests of his constituency at heart but that remains a point of conjecture. Apart from what 
is available in the public records, we might never know why he did certain things the way he 
did or why things unfolded as they did in his personal and professional lives. At best, we can 
draw our own conclusions from his actions and their consequences, within the context in 
which they occurred. Mabuza might not be everyone‟s here but he is also not a victim. 
 
Figure 1: Enos Mabuza circa 1989 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Biographical research recognises the interconnectedness of race, class, gender and the role of 
ideology. Stories of war survivors, refugees and others provide interesting examples of how 
these issues impact different people, for instance, in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, 
South Africa under apartheid and under democracy, life in the Nazi concentration camps or 
life after natural disasters. There is much that remains controversial and ambiguous, for 
example, some Holocaust memorials and their meaning but biographical research puts them 
and the issues they raise on the intellectual radar. Individuals, their relations with others and 
their place in history is fore grounded in this conjunction of history and the Self; the public 
and the private, the individual and the communal, the personal and the social. This chapter 
explores the relevance and uses of biographical research to different disciplines and sub-
disciplines, the merits of the case study method, the researcher‟s role and importance of 
reflexivity in biographical research, competing theoretical frameworks that can be applied, 
the significance of context in analysis, the relationship between individual lives and social 
structures and methodological concerns regarding evidence, truth, comparability, identity, 
memory, selectivity and recollection. The chapter is a survey of past and current trends in 
biographical research in different fields or academic disciplines to show the relevance and 
popularity of biography writing and life history research in its many incarnations over time. 
Biographical research in its many guises has the common purpose of understanding the 
individual and their context or circumstances, from their own point of view. It attempts to 
explain the existential predicament by elucidating the human condition, conduct and potential 
by exploring lived experience and giving meaning to existence (Robert, 2002).  
Human lives are storied and conceived in terms of settings, scenes, characters, plots and 
themes and these stories reflect who we are and where we fit in the world in which we live 
(McAdams, 2006:473). Biographical research is popular because researchers and audiences 
identify with the issues they raise whether it is the lives of the rich and famous or ordinary 
people whose biographies become best-sellers in bookshops. Human stories are told in a 
variety of ways including movies, documentaries and biopics, soap operas, plays, music, 
folktales, legends, myths, epics, history and pantomimes. Everyday news coverage on the 
internet, television, in newspapers, tabloid magazines and radio broadcasts is replete with 
human interest stories which highlight the appeal of the life story not just for academia 
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(McAdams, 2006:390-393, 464-465). The popularity of the genre shows the pull of the 
human story and its potential to up-lift those in despair and other hardships. Oftentimes, we 
are drawn to biographies in a voyeuristic fashion. We are intrigued, riveted or appalled by the 
inner lives and actions of others and the similarities, connections, inconsistencies or human 
failings that we can empathise with or find endearing or appealing (Roberts, 2002:52-72; 
Marcus, 1994; Denzin, 1989).  
Biography is a life history written by an author who may or may not involve the cooperation 
of the subject of the biography. Biography is preoccupied with the historical and social – the 
lived realities of individual lives in relation to certain times and events which act as the focal 
points. Biographies also focus on the distinct and unique nature of the individual. No two 
lives are identical and there are numerous ways to reveal or express lived experience using a 
social-historical paradigm which emphasises a holistic description of the subject and 
highlights the interplay of different processes and contexts. A person‟s life or history has 
many components such as their occupation, significant relationships with spouses, parents, 
children, and friends as well as the different roles they assume in various contexts. The 
circumstances and meanings of relations with work colleagues, community, religious 
affiliations and state institutions also have relevance (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; 
Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson et al, 1978; 
Levinson, 1996).  
Different interpretations are possible and even desirable and the researcher plays an 
empathetic, collaborative but reflexive role instead of the traditional objective, detached 
enquirer, interpreter and presenter of the finished product. Biographies situate the subject 
within various social contexts such as class, religion, ethnic, race, culture, occupation, family, 
political system and occupational structure in a bid to understand their relevance to the 
subject. These are contrasted to the subject‟s own moral values and ideals, fantasies, wishes, 
conflicts, anxieties, aspirations, talents, skills, character traits, modes of feeling, thought and 
action and they are weighed against the subject‟s achievements, failures and regrets  
(McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; 
Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 
1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).  
 
Page | 27 
 
Biographical research encompasses people‟s hopes, struggles and despairs, their love, 
suffering, anguish, fear and hatred. People are immersed in the social, political and moral 
crises of their time which produce complexity and richness, disquieting aspects, perplexity 
and doubt and researchers give reasons for these, weigh the evidence and consider alternative 
interpretations for these. Biographical research attempts to reconcile the objective and the 
subjective, the absolute and the relative, the timeless and the historical through reconstruction 
whilst trying to avoid over-simplifying complex political, social, moral, theological or 
psychological issues. The different accounts generated offer the individual subject‟s own 
unique standpoint, which questions the notion of a singular objective reality. What is referred 
to as the „biographical turn‟ aids our understanding of major social shifts by examining how 
new experiences are interpreted by individuals and institutions (Roberts, 2002:5). 
An individual selectively uses and is used by his world, through their evolving relationships 
and roles. Biographical research in its different manifestations – biographies, 
autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, narrative/discourse analysis, feminist 
writings and other genres which explore how individuals interpret experiences and social 
relationships have an interdisciplinary appeal for the study of racism, xenophobia and 
religious persecution. Biographical research is also useful in the study of old and new 
nationalisms, ethnic and national identity formation, democracy, migration studies, education, 
community history, political change, family studies, work/careers/professions, abuse, sexual 
orientation, health, illness, disability, aging/gerontology, gender studies, class, deviance and 
delinquency. Further, biographical research can be used in longitudinal or generational 
studies with different age cohorts (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-
358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson et al, 1978; Levinson, 1996).  
Autobiographies/biographies are a serious field deserving serious consideration because it 
adds to a society‟s codified memory and collective history through the lives of capable, 
innovative, productive and competent individuals. Biographical research can be regarded as a 
kind of archaeology which allows us to read about the people that we admire or who have 
survived adversity and from whom we draw the strength and courage to dream bigger and 
demand better from our lives because they were able to do so (McAdams, 1988:1-18; 
McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 
1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 
1990:57-69). 
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Biographers, however, are often criticised for focusing on prominent and privileged people 
while ignoring the experiences of ordinary people. Famous people or those with status or 
power as well as the seemingly obscure, unheard and marginalised, for example, refugees all 
hold significance or relevance for someone else – their families, friends, colleagues or 
countries. All lives are important and worthy of study, depending on the purpose, whether the 
subjects are literate or not. There is growing interest in the life course, identity construction 
and how best to present them. Clifford (1962: xix) observes that there is no perfect biography 
because it can never be complete, exhaustive, completely objective, impersonal or detached.  
According to Sir Sidney Lee (cited in Maurois, 1929:33), “the aim of biography is the 
truthful transmission of personality” and in a bid not to diminish, distort or suppress elements 
of the subject, the biographer attempts to draw a true portrait of that person without knowing 
what the finished portrait will be. Biographies and autobiographies are not meant to 
caricature the individual but are preoccupied with the individual‟s values, motives, actions 
and their consequences, duties (prima facie or otherwise), moral philosophies and their 
relation or interaction with those of a particular society and time. According to Maurois 
(1929:63), “Objectivity and detachment are the supreme aesthetic virtues…the biographer 
must expose and not impose.” The biographer should not judge but moral judgment may be 
hinted at (Maurois, 1929:127). 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first one discusses biographical research 
within the interpretive paradigm. It begins with an outline of international biographical 
resources and repositories in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, followed by 
the South African History Online as examples of the vast array of subjects and disciplines 
that biographical research covers. The South African History Online (SAHO) is the closest to 
an online biographical repository available for South Africa but more academically oriented 
biographical research is currently being conducted across the country to make up for the 
deficit. In the social sciences, the interpretive paradigm draws on numerous definitions, 
concepts, methods and grand narratives or theories to explain social phenomena and human 
behaviour. Current debates and approaches are explored in so far as they are relevant to 
biographical research. Next, the value and advantages of academic biographical research, 
related approaches and concepts5 are given. Their similarities and differences are explained 
                                                 
5 Biographies, autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, life narratives, memoirs, histriographies 
and ethnographies. 
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followed by an explanation of the general structure and themes which are central in academic 
biographies.  
The next section outlines how academic biographical subjects are chosen, followed by an 
exposition of psychobiography as the dominant or most popular form of biographical 
research at South African universities. The next sections cover methodological and practical 
considerations in conducting biographical research and other forms of archival writing, the 
merits of the case study method in the study of individual lives and the types of primary and 
secondary sources used in biographical research. The introductory section ends with some 
criticism or limitation of biographical research and its contribution to knowledge production. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on political biographies and themes. It begins with an 
explanation of the analogy of politics as a game before summarising some of the academic 
biographies (theses) that have been written at South African universities in the fields of 
history and politics. This overview includes the biographies of noteworthy politicians, 
political activists and statesmen such as Isaac Bangani Tabata, Alfred Bitini Xuma, Raymond 
Mhlaba and John Xavier Merriman. This discussion sets the tone for biographical research on 
South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders within the context of the Bantustan policy, how it 
was marketed and defended by the apartheid state and its agencies, the deplorable social 
conditions and cycles of violence which characterised it. This is followed by a survey of 
existing literature on specific Bantustan personalities such as Lennox Sebe and Oupa Gqozo 
of the Ciskei, Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and the Transkei‟s Matanzima brothers and Bantu 
Holomisa and their legacies. The section ends by introducing Enos Mabuza, the subject of 
this biography and former leader of the KaNgwane Bantustan who some believe was a double 
agent for working with both the ANC and the apartheid state. 
The level of pessimism, optimism, nostalgia and sentimentality about what was good or bad 
about the Bantustans and their leaders varies according to who you speak to or which books 
you read, and when they were written (Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976; Bank, 1988; 
Bates, 1987; Buthelezi, 1979; Buthelezi, 1990; Charton, 1980; De Wet and Leibbrandt, 1994; 
De Wet, 1985; De Wet, 1995; Els et al, 1971; Gitywa, 1988; Hattingh, 1979; Holomisa and 
Meyer, 1999). As part of the apartheid regime‟s divide and rule strategy, the Bantustan 
system deliberately created regional and ethnic loyalties instead of a united national identity. 
Bantustan leaders were seduced by the promise of power. Discrimination, marginalisation 
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and underdevelopment underscored the Bantustan system and people had negative attitudes 
and perceptions about the black administrations in the Bantustans.  
The political economies of the Bantustans were in shambles, wages were meagre and welfare 
was non-existent. Pretoria controlled the budgets and used carrots and sticks tactics to compel 
Bantustan leaders to do their bidding in return for budgetary concessions. Poverty was an 
everyday reality of neglect by the central government which was compounded by 
mismanagement or corruption by the Bantustan administrations. Further, the majority of 
households in the Bantustans were female-led because of the migrant labour system which 
took men to the cities for most of the year, creating a gender skew in Bantustan populations 
(Kotze, 1975; Mager, 1999; Mangope, 1988; Mangope, 1978; Maré and Hamilton, 1987; 
Maré, 1992; Matanzima, 1976; Meyers, 2008; Mzala, 1988; Proctor- Sims, 1978; Rogers, 
1976; Sebe, 1980; Smith, 1988; Southall, 1983b; Streek and Wicksteed, 1981; Switzer, 
1979).  
The effects of the Bantustan system and attendant maladministration, as well as their 
dismantling in 1994 are still felt in those areas today and the resentment or stigma towards 
individuals who participated in these structure still lingers, regardless of whether those 
individuals are alive or not or they are still active in politics or not. It is for this reason that 
Mabuza‟s biography is still relevant for history, politics and the memories of the people who 
live in the areas where Bantustans existed. The discussion might seem passé as far as popular 
memory and official records are concerned but it is not insignificant for the people in those 
localities who see and feel the legacy of the Bantustan system everyday (Temkin, 1976; 
Temkin, 2003; Tessendorf and Boult, 1991; University of the Witwatersrand Development 
Studies Group Southern African Research Service, 1982; White, 2008; Yawitch, 1982). 
2.2 International Biographical Resources  
The life of any nation is told through the lives of its people in order to inspire future 
generations to follow their examples of courage, determination, honesty and willingness to 
work (Simonton, 1994). This history is not only told through the lives of famous people but 
also through the infamous as a cautionary tale or deterrent. This section shows biographical 
research as having a long tradition in America and Europe. Biographical repositories in the 
USA profile the lives and contributions of that country‟s founding fathers, slaves, 
abolitionists, presidents and first ladies, vice presidents, secretaries of state, governors, 
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senators, justices/judges, religious/spiritual leaders, civil rights activists, pacifists, scientists, 
businesspeople, humanitarians, educators, filmmakers, Oscar winners, athletes and socialites 
(Simonton, 1994). The 24-volume American National Biography is a biographical 
encyclopaedia with approximately 17 400 entries of people from all eras and walks of life. It 
was published by Oxford University Press in 1999 as the successor to the Dictionary of 
American Biography which was first published between 1926 and 1937 (www.anb.org). This 
resource is updated and revised quarterly. 
The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography is a multi-volume collection of 
biographical articles and portraits of Americans published since the 1890s. It has over 66 500 
entries in 63 volumes. It is more comprehensive than the Dictionary of American Biography 
and the American National Biography but less scholarly because it does not provide 
bibliographies or citations for the original sources used. It relies primarily on questionnaires 
which were sent to subjects or their relatives, as well as other information supplied by the 
subjects‟ families. 
Appletons‟ Cyclopaedia of American Biography is a six-volume collection of mini-
biographies of famous Americans which was originally published between 1887 and 1889 
and republished in 1968. It includes the names of over 20 000 native and adopted citizens of 
the United States from different eras. It also includes the names of several thousand citizens 
of other countries in North and South America with the aim of embracing all noteworthy 
persons of the New World, including nearly 1 000 people of foreign birth who were closely 
identified with American history and contributed to its culture. Although deemed unreliable 
or inaccurate in some instances, this resource provides a vibrant picture of America‟s history 
as defined by the diversity and inclusiveness of the men and women it profiles. The portraits 
capture the richness of American life from pre-colonial times onwards – from missionaries to 
musicians, social workers to statisticians, cowboys to chemists and Vikings to astronauts. 
The African American National Biography (AANB) is a comprehensive eight-volume 
repository which was compiled as a joint project of the W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African 
and African American Research at Harvard University and Oxford University Press using 
public records, private writings, published works, reference resources and primary 
scholarship. It was born out of a need to document and record black lives and a desire to 
deepen the overall understanding of the African American contribution to American history 
and culture because of a general tendency for history to ignore or document only those 
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individuals and facts which are deemed important as seen through particular lens and 
ideologies. The need for an African American national biography devoted exclusively to 
black lives cannot be over-emphasised in a country whose history of slavery, racial 
segregation and all manner of exploitation, degradation and deprivation still lingers today. 
The AANB was published in a print edition in January 2008 and covers a mosaic of over 4 
100 African American lives from every discipline, profession and walk of life (slaves, blues 
musicians, political activists, philanthropists, entrepreneurs, scientists, mathematicians) as a 
representation of part of American history through the immediacy of personal experience. 
The repository includes great and famous African Americans who are known throughout the 
world as well as a selection of others who are all but forgotten. The AANB website claims to 
recover lost dimensions of the African American experience by acknowledging the influence 
of African Americans on America‟s history and culture; thereby restoring to history the 
achievements of thousands of ordinary and exceptional African American men and women 
whose stories would have otherwise been lost (W. E. B. Du Bois Institute for African and 
African American Research). 
The United Kingdom and Europe also have a number of biographical repositories. The 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) online contains approximately 57 258 
biographies of people who shaped the history of the British Isles and beyond6. It is an 
illustrated collection of specially written authoritative biographies of the men and women 
from around the world who have shaped different aspects of Britain‟s past. This resource is 
updated three times a year and is available as a 60-volume print edition. Biographical 
references in the United Kingdom and Europe generally profile actors, aristocrats, artists, 
comics, explorers, holocaust survivors, innovators/inventors, monarchs/royalty, musicians, 
Nobel Prize laureates, poets, politicians, prime ministers and cabinet ministers, 
philanthropists, publishers and writers/authors (Simonton, 1994; http://www.oxforddnb.com). 
The World Who‟s Who Europa Biographical Reference contains biographical information on 
more than 60 000 famous and influential men and women in all fields. Eminent persons 
included in the reference range from Heads of State, key ministers, politicians, diplomats and 
religious leaders, those famous and successful in business, finance, technology, film, music, 
literature, fashion, sport and many other professions (http://www.worldwhoswho.com). 
                                                 
6 England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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2.3 The South African History Online (SAHO)  
The South African History Online (SAHO) is the closest to an online biographical repository 
available for South Africa. It celebrates the courageous men and women who were involved 
in the struggle for democracy and the lives of South African nation builders in different 
fields. As a historical resource, it seeks to explore the diversity of South Africa‟s people, 
places and histories. It does so by providing biographical information about national symbols 
and heritage sites, key personalities including anti-apartheid activists, politicians and trade 
unionists, innovators in science and medicine, literary and philosophical minds, community 
and religious leaders, architects, sculptors, photographers, Nobel prize winners, celebrities, 
sports stars and musicians. It provides useful historical timelines, information on 
people/biographies (from Jan van Riebeek to Nelson Mandela and beyond), politics and 
governance, culture and society (http://www.sahistory.org.za). 
2.4 The Interpretive Paradigm and Biographical Research 
Biographical research is related to several well-known paradigms, namely social-
constructivism, interpretivism, post-modernism and the narrative paradigm. There are 
numerous methodological and theoretical developments in the study of lives in the fields of 
sociology, social policy, communication studies, cultural studies, organisational studies, 
human geography, political science, psychology (behavioural, cognitive, psychoanalysis), 
criminology, oral history and anthropology/ethnography regarding the collection and 
interpretation of material, the uses of biographical research as oral or written accounts, the 
interview relationships between subjects and researchers, the construction and editing of the 
story, the question of memory and how it is tainted by the passage of time as well as the 
intergenerational transmission of stories, hidden ideologies in narratives, audience and the 
researcher‟s own biography. There are popular ideological conceptions of lives and life 
events, how identities are formed and grounded in spatial organisational and other structures 
(Roberts, 2002:151-166). The different social science disciplines and sub-disciplines 
mentioned in this chapter share common ground in epistemology, methodology, 
interpretation and theoretical frameworks, cross-fertilisation, pragmatism and eclecticism. 
Researchers find, or are encouraged to be receptive of new and creative ways to interpret the 
social world and the meanings that individuals give to it (Roberts, 2002:167-174). 
Researchers try to treat the individual not as an isolated figure but as one that should be 
understood in terms of social relations of the family and wider social structures or 
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institutions. The approach shows concern with the complete individual, their past, present and 
future because social action is both retrospective and prospective, with an attendant present-
time dimension.  
Grand narratives or macro-theories in Sociology, for example, are preoccupied with dominant 
ideologies, establishing patterns and regularities, the general rather than the particular. Such 
narratives or theories trace the role of customs, norms and values in the maintenance of social 
order, broad interpretive schemas for understanding, structure and agency and how 
individuals shape and are shaped by the world they live in. On the other hand, post-modernist 
approaches try to debunk grand narratives by focusing on the micro-level, its general 
acceptance of change, diversity and uncertainty, focus on the individual and the intentions 
and motivations which drive them to engage in particular forms of action as well as the 
parameters or constraints which determine the outcomes of such action and the meanings that 
individuals give to their experiences. The emphasis varies but both represent different ways 
of skinning the proverbial cat which are influenced by particular research agendas and 
traditions (Roberts, 2002). The individual (the specific or particular) is inextricably connected 
to society/the global (the collective or the general, including social structures) which puts 
doubt on the notion of the „self-made man‟.  
Hermeneutics is the theory, principles or science of interpretation or analysis and it is 
generally accompanied by phenomenology, for instance, Schutz‟s phenomenological 
perspective attempts to establish the meaning that the subject gives to X, Y or Z. Grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss) and analytic induction (Znaniecki) are more commonly suited to 
comparing multiple life stories because they have a realist orientation and involve a degree of 
empiricism and theoretical sampling (Roberts, 2002). The Chicago School‟s (University of 
Chicago‟s Sociology department) interactionism, Satre‟s existentialism and progressive-
regressive method and Weber‟s verstehen can be used to understand lived experience in the 
same way that pragmatism, realism and constructionism can, depending on the purposes and 
best fit.  
Reductionism focuses on internal (psychopathologies and other maladaptive behaviours) over 
external or environmental and historical considerations. However, describing the subject‟s 
behaviours, decisions and actions in purely psychological terms is limiting because it 
disregards the complexity of the human personality. It is therefore important to acknowledge 
that psychological explanations add to, rather than replace, our understanding of a person or 
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life if it is to be done in a holistic fashion (Roberts, 2002). Postmodernism challenges writing 
conventions and the inter-texuality of written as opposed to oral texts. It also challenges 
subjective and objective interpretive practice or evaluation, the role of language and how we 
understand cultures, experience, give meaning to events or experiences, especially in the face 
of competing or contested meanings. Discourse analysis, for example, examines language use 
and deconstruction focuses on the hidden or unspoken information in narratives. 
Philosophical and literary perspectives are also common in biographical research (Roberts, 
2002). 
Common themes and emerging concerns in the social sciences and related fields include the 
purposes and processes in biographical research, its uses, the function of time and social 
theory, history writing and power relations, identity formation and concepts of the self 
juxtaposed to collective or group portraits, subjective and objective realities, myths and 
memories, public memories (obituaries and commemoration), their construction and impact 
on private memories or personal contexts, reminiscence, different perspectives, public 
moralising and the construction of meaning. McAdams (2006:447) argues that there is no 
complete interpretation or single answer. Human behaviour has multiple meanings, and like a 
text, it can be interpreted on multiple levels. Much of what we do, say or experience is a 
product of compromise among conflicting forces and demands. Theorising in the social 
sciences can be a goal in itself (generating a new theory from data) or a means to a specific 
goal (testing, applying or modifying existing theory). This is typical of biographical research 
where theorising is geared towards generating new or validating existing theory, whilst 
gaining new conceptual insights and hypotheses about the human condition – behaviour, 
mannerisms, moods, voice, health or dress as well as people‟s travels, reputations, hidden or 
secret lives (Roberts, 2002:12). Different theories are used in biographical research to 
validate or challenge orthodoxies in academic discourse about how lives are written, 
constructed, presented or communicated and read or received by audiences.  
According to McAdams (2006), there has been an upsurge in biography writing in the past 
quarter century due in part to the growing acceptance of the value it can add to social science 
research. Since then, biography writing, as third person accounting, has been in flux as one of 
several ways of showing the variability and diversity of human experience and the challenges 
involved in making sense of individual lives. There has been an epistemological revival of 
biography writing in the social sciences which has been influenced by the work of Merton, 
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Mills, Weber, Mead, Satre and others who offer predominantly functionalist theories to 
explain the existentialist dilemmas that biographical research poses. In sociology in 
particular, according to Roberts (2002:175), this revival is marked by the work of Bertaux 
(1981) and Denzin (1989). The revival is evidenced by the growing number of research 
groups and journals on the topic, for example, the International Sociological Association‟s 
research block (RC38) which is dedicated to investigating or linking Biography and Society. 
This proliferation is shown by the journals devoted to biographical research below (Roberts, 
2002:73): 
Auto/Biography – Journal of the Auto/Biography Study Group of the British Sociological 
Association. 
Biography (USA) 
Biography and Society Newsletter – Biography and Society RC38 of the International 
Sociological Association. 
Bios: Zeitschrift fur Biographieforschung und Oral History (Germany). 
Current Sociology (1995) Special Issue: Biographical Research 43 (2/3) – Journal of the 
International Sociological Association focused on and consolidated the study of lives within 
Sociology building on the work of Bertaux, Plummer, Denzin and others.  
Oral History (United Kingdom) Journal of the Oral History Society. 
Oral History Review (USA). 
Sociology (1993) Special Issue: Biography and Autobiography in Sociology 27(1) celebrated 
the revival of interest in the use of biography and autobiography in sociology from the 1930s. 
The Narrative Study of Lives (London, Sage). 
Words and Silences – Bulletin of the International Oral History Association. 
Journal of Southern African Studies. 2004 Vol. 30 No.4 Special Issue: Writing in Transition 
in South Africa: Fiction, History, Biography. 
 
Biographies, autobiographies, life histories, life stories, oral histories, narrative/discourse 
analysis, feminist writings have a distinctly qualitative bias regarding theoretical orientations, 
assumptions, methods and practice and generally follow the life course approach to capture 
the storied nature of human conduct whether it is in an organisation or community. The 
interpretive paradigm contrasts the traditional scientific experimental or survey procedures 
and designs typical of a quantitative, positivist or realist orientation and its preoccupation 
with reliability, validity and representativeness (Roberts, 2002:151). This contrast partly 
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explains the prominence of the interpretive paradigm across the humanistic disciplines. The 
popularity of qualitative research and the interpretive paradigm in the social sciences shows 
the split between positivist, scientific hypothetico-deductive methods and non-positivist 
camps. Most notions of „science‟ disclaim certain things or choose not to problematise, for 
example, power. The testimony is a form of life history with the socio-political intention of 
communicating marginalised experiences or interpersonal histories directly to a chosen 
audience. They could be stories about exclusion, violence, resistance, oppression, persecution 
– the voices of socially or politically neglected or repressed groups (Roberts, 2002). 
Social, economic, cultural, political and historical forces shape lived experience (Goffman, 
1959; Bertaux, 1981; Denzin, 1989a). Autobiography, life stories, life narratives, life 
histories, memoirs, historiographies, ethnographies and case studies are all preoccupied with 
individuals and how they live their lives as well as what they achieve (Simonton, 1994). 
These approaches celebrate the uniqueness of an individual case, the relevance of socio-
historical contexts and acknowledge both subjective and objective realities. Autobiographies 
are stories about a person‟s life as recorded and described by the individuals themselves. 
Autobiographies are considered to be empowering, therapeutic or cathartic for the individual 
because of the occasion for review, taking stock, introspection and reflection which bring the 
private face to face with the public. The social aspects or motives behind writing, for 
instance, autobiographies are important. Autobiographies represent the public but private and 
are usually spurred by a variety of subjective reasons which might not be apparent. They are 
often written as a confirmation of the self or self-awareness but also to influence or flatter the 
audience (Barber, 2006).  
Biographical research highlights individuality and the diversity of meaning as the private and 
public (ideological world, the environment or social-political milieu) coalesce or merge into 
each other. One‟s identity – self, character and personality is weighed against what they 
represent in a community, nation or in religious or political contexts. However, 
autobiography is generally selective, biased and offers subjective accounts of lives and work 
even though the author/subject may refer to objective sources of information or facts. The 
focus of life histories is the similarities between or among identified individuals or cohorts in 
similar positions/circumstances or with a shared experience, rather than the uniqueness of a 
single life. Life histories use both subjective and objective data obtained from testimonies, 
observation and independent factual records. Life histories are mainly undertaken by 
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sociologists and anthropologists who search for commonalities within cohort groups in order 
to reconstruct or interpret a given phenomenon (Robert, 2002). Life histories and 
ethnography, for example, have been used as a research method for decades but the 
biographical method has become more significant or popular in social research in recent 
times because of disillusionment with arguably static approaches of data collection, rigid 
binaries, male bias and growing interest in the life course and lived experience 
(evolutionary). 
Life stories can be written or oral accounts of events, relationships and other circumstances in 
a person‟s life by the individual concerned (similar to autobiography). As such, life stories 
are necessarily subjective because they are limited to the depth and extend of material offered 
by the narrator based on personal thoughts and feelings. Life stories tend to focus on 
meanings attributed to circumstances and events rather than factual information (Cole and 
Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-
431; Levinson et al, 1978, Levinson, 1996). On the other hand, life narratives are accounts of 
a series of events with emphasis on description rather than explanation. They are told in the 
subject‟s own words and in this way they are similar to autobiographies but with an emphasis 
on description rather than evaluation. Historiographies entail research which utilises public 
records, government documents, confidential reports, newspaper editorials, photographs, 
films and artefacts to reconstruct information and provide a plausible historical explanation 
for a past event (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and 
Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 
95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69). 
Narratives entail the telling of a story regarding an entire life, a significant part of it or a 
specific event based on the respondent‟s lived experience. To this end, constant reference is 
made to life histories, passages and life cycles as natural history metaphors. There is 
variability in the context-bound discourses which constitute these stories or narrations 
because of constructed social realities. Because the individual is not abstracted from their 
context, the stories or narrations have plots or a trajectory describing human action, concerns 
with power relations and political goals as well as the adoption of political positions and the 
significance attached to human agency. This is in contrast to the positivist scientific paradigm 
and its emphasis on quantification, generalisability, hypothesis-testing, validity and 
objectivity.  Narrative analysis or discourse analysis is generally informed by the work of 
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Foucault, Derrida and Barthes and focuses on piecing together small or seemingly mundane 
details as well as the dramatic - deciphering meanings, motives, images, establishing 
coherence, style and different voices or multiple perspectives. One needs to be aware of 
ideological contexts and the specific ideologies hidden in narratives/oral history. Narratives 
have uses in literature, history, autobiography, psychology, sociology, cultural studies, 
education, linguistics, anthropology and even medical research despite being criticised for 
certain ambiguities, inconsistencies, relativism and subjectivity (Roberts, 2002:122-124). 
Biography is similar to the stories conveyed in folk tales, myths, legends, history, stage 
productions and films. Biographies are written in many disciplines and critical biographies 
have grown as legitimate areas of academic study at universities across South Africa and 
abroad across varied disciplines such as history, politics, psychology, theology/religion, 
literature, linguistics/languages, drama, art, music/entertainment, sports and so forth. 
Someone related to or not known to the subject undertakes to write the subject‟s life story 
using different theoretical approaches in order to analyse, understand and evaluate the 
subject‟s legacy and contribution (Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-
358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson et al, 1978; Levinson, 1996; 
McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988). 
Biographical studies are, by and large, qualitative case studies but they often have a 
comparative aspect whereby the subject is chosen for their contribution or significance in a 
given field and is compared to their contemporaries. Establishing or understanding the history 
or socio-political context in which a subject lived and worked is a crucial element to 
biography writing because it situates the subject and the issues which they grappled with in 
their politics, music, writing and so forth (Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; 
Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).  
 
2.5 The Value and Advantages of Academic Biographical Research 
Biographical research represents different voices with different agendas and shifting 
scientific, religious, moral, political and other discourses. Academic biography tries to 
understand not only individual lives but also their production within the social through the 
interplay of individual and social elements – dichotomies between the individual and society, 
action/agency and structure and how individuals, as social beings learn from, use and 
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interpret their experiences, many aspects of which usually resonate with audiences. 
Traditional Western biography has focused on elite or middle class white men whose 
political, military, scientific, artistic, athletic, religious or entrepreneurial achievements have 
made them famous and belies the power and status of the societies they live in. However, 
recent developments have seen the inclusion of traditionally marginalised or dismissed 
groups, for example, women, people of colour and other disadvantaged groups (McAdams, 
2006:473).  
Biographical research is coming into its own in terms of respectability as an academic 
pursuit. It is different to positivist or empirical research but its currency is that it avoids 
giving supremacy to a single point of view (polemics) or interpretation. It is just as valuable 
as other types of research especially for general biography and family research, racism, 
xenophobia, migration studies, religious persecution, women and gender studies, sexual 
identity or orientation, old and new nationalisms, ethnic and national identity formation, 
political change/transitions, democracy, social and community history, education, media 
studies, literary history, legal studies, work/careers/professions, health, abuse, illness, 
disability, gerontology, class, friendships, deviance and delinquency (Roberts, 2002). The 
goal of biographical research is to transform a life into a coherent and illuminating story and 
to understand the subjective lives of biographical subjects. Focus is on the career 
development, creativity, health and wellness, psychological development or psychopathology 
of the individual. In everyday language, metaphors are used to explain abstract concepts like 
life or the nature of being by relating them to something else. Similarly, academics use 
analysis and theory to capture the essential aspects of human life. In short, they extrapolate or 
infer meaning and draw conclusions in biographical research from available data which is 
mediated by their own interpretations of given situations.  
 
Biographies are usually about famous or infamous historical (deceased) figures but they can 
also be about people still living because they can tell us a lot about a particular time and 
place. The popularity of biographies betrays humanity‟s fascination with the pressures and 
pitfalls that life presents and how different people respond to them. However, we do not look 
at people with neutral glasses and judge so-called heroes and fools, pessimists and optimists 
with biting irony or unreserved admiration before we have walked in their shoes to get a 
better understanding of their motivations for doing certain things. Academic biographies try 
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to strike a balance between fact, social theory and subjective interpretation. One assumption 
that people make is that the more educated an individual is, the more balanced, tolerant, 
moderate or ethical they are but this is not necessarily true. On the other hand, one can find 
redeeming qualities in individuals deemed to be villains. Readers of biographies, like the 
authors/researchers, have to decide if their subject, famous or infamous, did the best they 
could with what they had in the face of prejudice, tradition, taboos, injustice, inequality, 
tragedy and other restrictions or privileges (Green, 2006; Levinson, 1994). They have to 
decide whether what is impressive and memorable about the subject has inspired them and if 
the subject‟s legacy benefits others today. 
Similes, analogies and metaphors are all parts of figurative language or speech which offer 
compelling descriptions and invite us to make comparisons or take action. Metaphors, for 
example, structure our thinking about and give coherence and insights into daily experiences, 
our world, interactions or relationships and ourselves. They function as heuristic devices to 
help us decipher the nature of being or the human condition (Weiner, 1992:11-14; Grothe, 
2008:40-59; Wilkinson, 2002). The human condition is such that we all need affection, 
approval, belonging, pleasure, passion, freedom, charity, humility, loyalty, power, prestige, 
recognition, security, status and protection to some degree. Most people are competitive and 
greedy at heart and many strive for excellence over mediocrity. We take risks and stake our 
reputations on them in order to win or get an advantage and thus do not respond well to 
criticism, failure, loss, rejection or ridicule which hurt our pride or force us to compromise or 
show weakness. Metaphors are pervasive in different contexts and for a variety of purposes. 
They are evident in everyday language7 and thought in fields such as linguistics/discourse, 
philosophy, motivational psychology and so forth. In the field of motivational psychology 
(Sigmund Freud, Spence, Clark Hull, Miller, Brown-Farber, Amsel, Maslow, Kurt Lewin, 
Fritz Heider, John Atkinson, Julian Rotter, Kelly), metaphors have been used to reveal the 
determinants of thought and action. They are used to explain why behaviour is initiated, 
persists or is terminated (the choices made and why). In psychoanalytic, cognitive, 
ethological, socio-biological and Gestalt theories emotions such as frustration, fear, shame, 
guilt, conflict, anger, rejection, anxiety, the need for achievement over failure, altruism and 
so forth are cited as drives that lead to certain actions (Weiner, 1992). Metaphors are rooted 
in different ideological views (and necessarily have a latent function) and are underpinned by 
a functionalist perspective. Consequently, metaphors communicate meaning, reveal the 
                                                 
7 Conversation, national news reports, popular science, magazine advertising, novels and poetry. 
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conceptual systems of different cultures and are often used to motivate us (Grothe, 2008:1-
20; Goatly, 1997:107-136, 283-328; Fairclough, 1989). 
The ego is a very powerful thing and influences male and female motivation or drives in 
different ways. Male identity and sense of self is often tied up with accomplishment, power, 
success, autonomy, efficiency, strength, competence, independence and the achievement of 
particular goals. These are greatly valued by men because they have a deep seated need to 
prove themselves to others as well as to themselves; otherwise they are regarded as not being 
good enough, impotent or failures. Most women, on the other hand, value and are motivated 
or empowered by different things. Women‟s sense of self is more embedded in what they feel 
and that is why communication and relationships seem to mean more to them compared to 
men. In other words, for women, relating, loving, supporting, cherishing and serving tends to 
be more important than other achievements or rewards. Women are generally more sensitive 
or emotionally aware. They are relationship-oriented than goal-oriented and value sincerity 
more. They feel validated or fulfilled when they get the approval, acknowledgment, 
appreciation, encouragement, reassurance and understanding of those around them or those 
they care about. Women want or need intimacy and companionship more and will approach 
things more delicately than men when they are cared for, respected or needed by others but 
these are all generalisations or normative ways of classifying or grouping the drives that 
motivate particular actions. Individual lives allow us to examine such motivations or 
combinations thereof and their consequences or potential consequences (Weiner, 1992; 
Maslow, 1987). 
A range of perceptions and inferences follow from metaphors and these in turn sanction or 
compel certain actions. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:51), for example, offer the metaphor of life 
or life situations as a gamble, walking on a tight rope or game like chess, poker, black jack or 
roulette, complete with winners and losers, rules, targets, goals and players because life 
involves taking chances or risks, betting against the odds, depending on the luck of the draw, 
playing your cards right, bluffing, winning big, upping the ante and sometimes playing one‟s 
cards close to your chest (Grothe, 2008:133,136). Life is also portrayed as a war or conflict 
with rivals or adversaries, mediators, power struggles, battle lines, campaigns, defence and 
offence, hostages, refugees, betrayals, treachery, loss, victory, victors and the vanquished. 
Life can also be taken as a business or trade with competition, negotiation, deals, 
compromise, accommodation, profit and corruption as individuals seek to gain an advantage 
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over others. Life is also described as a journey in which we get to explore different places, 
meet and interact with different people and experience highs and lows through the trials and 
tribulations that fate throws our way. It is a journey to be travelled no matter how bad the 
roads or accommodations along the route might be (Grothe, 2008:128). Other common 
metaphors describe life as a minefield full of the unpredictable or unknown. In this way, life 
is a puzzle which we have to figure out or unravel.  It is an adventure with thrills and spills, a 
roller coaster or a river with bends and rapids which test our endurance. There are also 
metaphors of life as theatre or a stage with a script, roles, performers, heroes and villains 
(Grothe, 2008:117-137; Wilkinson, 2002). All these metaphors reveal life to be a 
competition, contest or race - a contact sport (disguised combat) with players, rules, winners 
and losers and it is the dynamics and interactions of these, the human strengths and 
weaknesses that it showcases that make biographical research fascinating and fulfilling. The 
challenges that life throws at us can be regarded as opportunities to learn, grow, adapt, 
change, develop and become stronger or better people. Human beings are complex social 
animals and deciphering human nature by applying or testing social theories to ascertain why 
we do what we do is the bedrock of academic biographies. 
Biographies analyse and interpret the events in a person‟s life by finding connections, 
explaining unexpected actions and making arguments about the significance of the person‟s 
accomplishments or life activities. When all is laid bare about a particular life, we sit in 
judgment to decide if we consider the subject as someone to look up to as a role model or not, 
for instance, Bertrand Russell was a philosopher, educator, social critic, mathematician and 
political activist. We take into account whether or not they were misunderstood, successful 
and the factors which influenced the outcomes in their life as well as the positive or negative 
impact that the individual had on their community, country or the world. Karl Marx devoted 
his political ideologies to theorising about economics, philosophy and class struggle in the 
context of capitalism. Sigmund Freud is considered to be the godfather of psychoanalysis 
whilst physicist Albert Einstein contributed relativity theory and Charles Darwin is famous 
for giving the world natural selection or evolution theory. In coming to these conclusions, we 
also weigh out the lessons we learn from the oral and written records of the subject‟s life and 
whether or not we think that they could have done some things differently under the same 
circumstances. Ultimately, the evaluation is based on whether or not we think the world 
would have been a better place if the subject had not lived. 
Page | 44 
 
The mainstay of academic biographies as an analytical method is our interest in human 
agency and individuality vis a vis human sociability and interaction (socialisation, 
secretiveness, denial, avoidance, obsessions, reclusiveness, aggression, rationality, 
reciprocity). Academic biographies attempt to balance out individual qualities or 
characteristics with external environmental or social factors in explaining given actions and 
consequences. The aim is never to reduce a complex life, behaviour and experience to the 
point of caricature but to explore the many dimensions or facets of the individual‟s life and 
character within a particular social, cultural and historic matrix. However, the majority of 
biographies, authorised or otherwise, are still written as human interest stories devoid of 
rigorous theoretical explanations (not for academic purposes). Gish‟s (2004) biography of 
Desmond Tutu, Gevisser‟s (2007) biography of Thabo Mbeki and Maylam‟s (2005) 
alternative interpretation of Cecil John Rhodes‟ life are examples of this general interest or 
curiosity in leaders and the cult of personality. 
2.6 Structure and Themes in Academic Biography 
A chronological and/or thematic approach is the most common mode of writing biographies. 
Biographies are generally written following the chronological order of major events in the 
subject‟s life, which means that they follow a sequenced or logical format of presentation 
before an assessment of their importance or relevance is offered as a conclusion or final 
impression. Regarding time, the chronological or sequential narration of events is most 
common in biographical research but there are also instances where a-chronology or a 
labyrinthine chronology is used because the past, present and future are not always perceived 
in linear sequence (Roberts, 2002:84). Psycho-biographies, for example, use sequential life 
stages/lifespan or life cycle development theories such as Daniel Levinson‟s (1978; 1996), 
which is an integration of other theories such as those of Freud, Jung, Piaget and Erikson. 
Some biographies group time periods around major themes or specific topics such as early 
adversity, ambition or achievement. Typical things included in a biography are the most 
interesting facts about the person such as their date and place of birth, critical events in their 
life, for example, whether early childhood experiences such as absent or abusive parents or 
sibling rivalry influenced their adult achievements, significant world events  which occurred 
during the subject‟s lifetime to influence or change their life course, the mores or social codes 
of the time they lived in, people (heroes or role models) who influenced the subject in so far 
as they moulded their character by setting an example or encouraging them to pursue certain 
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goals. The subject‟s parents and their occupations  tend to be significant if they are important 
to later events in the subject‟s life, the subject‟s siblings and other close family members, the 
subject‟s social background regarding whether they were wealthy or poor, their educational 
background and early career or occupation (intellectuals, artists, politicians, musicians etc), 
colleagues, acquaintances, associates, peers and friends, their early goals in life, their 
marriage and children or relationships with significant others such as spouses or lovers, their 
place of residence, their death and cause of death and finally, their legacy. The life-structure 
approach takes cognisance of the individual‟s socio-cultural world (class, religion, family, 
political systems, historical era). 
A survey of biographies generally, academic or popular, shows that other common themes 
include traditional gender roles and expectations, patriarchy and its restrictions, marriage, 
sexuality, conceptions of masculinity and femininity, initiation, conformity and going against 
the grain (deviance), positive and negative sanctions for particular behaviours, expectations 
for oneself and from others, age and generational differences, piety and morality, friendship, 
companionship, feminism, racial and ethnic identity, racism, caste, class, different political 
ideologies, life philosophies and religious convictions (feminism, pacifism, Fascism, Nazism, 
populism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism, clientelism). Many such 
philosophies carry conservative, puritanical undertones which have implications for human 
rights, stigma and alienation on an individual and group level. Other themes revolve around 
change and stability, rewards and punishments, right and wrong, personality formation or 
socialisation, private and public personas, honour, hypocrisy or double standards and 
inconsistencies, what people say and do in their private or public capacities, relationships 
with authority figures, the subject‟s bad habits, destructive tendencies or vices such as 
compulsive gambling, drug addiction or abuse, alcoholism, promiscuity, the need for 
validation or approval, the quest for respectability, abuse of power or position (Robert, 2002). 
The list of what researchers deem interesting is limitless and only depends on their reasons 
for undertaking biographical work. The theses listed in the bibliography variously address 
themes such as deprivation, the loss of innocence, shame, guilt, respect, fear, anger, revenge, 
betrayal, obedience, ambition, fulfilment, self-actualisation, scandal, contradiction, fate, 
destiny, determinism, freewill or choice, the individual and society, duty and obligation, 
feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, rejection, abandonment, self-worth or self-esteem, trust 
and mistrust, vulnerability, compassion, the quest for autonomy, independence or control, 
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forgiveness, perceptions and misperceptions, the configuration of human relationships, love 
and support, how we deal with stress or criticism, abuse or neglect, frequent disruptive 
changes in residence (moving constantly), disability whether it is physical (blind, deaf, 
paralysed or crippled) or mental illness, empathy, acceptance, nationalist sentiment, 
patriotism, personal heartache, pain, grief, loss,8 depression, social conflict or tension and the 
things that act as catalysts for them pique a researcher‟s interest (Cole and Knowles, 2001; 
Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson et 
al, 1978; Levinson, 1996). The quest for order in society, stability, change or transition 
(revolutionary or gradual9 - social, economic, material, political), support and coping 
mechanisms, encouragement or assistance received in times of need and how individuals 
grapple with or find the meaning of life within parameters defined by dominant ideologies 
which form part of socio-political contexts and histories are all important components. These 
themes or their variants in different combinations recur in most biographies but might be 
depicted differently in different contexts. They are amplified when we examine the lives, 
reputations and legacies of individuals to determine their rightful place in history. 
Biographical research allows us to see how the subject grappled with such issues and how 
they impacted their lives. What is evident is that many of these themes are intertwined and 
difficult to isolate or compartmentalise (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 
2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 
1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69). 
 
2.7 Choice of Subject in Academic Biography 
Academic biographies are descriptive, analytical, comparative and evaluative in varying 
degrees. Respondents or subjects are chosen based on some outstanding feature which 
generates interest or has significance or relevance for the biographer or a given audience 
(Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 
1990:423-431; Levinson et al, 1978; Levinson, 1996). In other words, purposive or deliberate 
selection is commonly used rather than statistical sampling. Subjects are chosen because they 
represent certain historical periods or processes as part of a group, community, hegemonic 
                                                 
8 Job loss, personal illness or illness in close family members, death, or other major changes that radically 
change our lives. 
9 For example, apartheid in South Africa, a civil war, genocide, the Cold War, the Great Depression or the end 
of slavery or the Reconstruction period in the USA. 
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relationships or class consciousness (Roberts, 2002:106). Typical subjects of biographies are 
individuals of some historical importance because they have made an impact in their society, 
for example, state presidents/statesmen or politicians and their terms in office, political party 
affiliations and important policies or laws passed or introduced during their tenure 
(McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and Ochberg, 1988; 
Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 
1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69).  
The subject of biographies can be people famous for their major accomplishments and stand 
out from the crowd, for instance, courageous or brave war heroes, explorers, inventors, 
sportsmen and women and philanthropists. Biographies analyse the challenges or obstacles 
which the individuals faced or overcame, the risks taken in achieving particular goals as well 
as the role of luck or coincidence in their lives. They also highlight the subjects‟ weaknesses, 
failures, disappointments, frustrations, regrets, sense of morality justice and so forth – 
qualities which make them interesting and worth reading about. The different contexts of 
each life act as different frames of reference for what the individual did or did not do. 
Individuals who have made a name for themselves are popular research subjects as are 
individuals with handicaps but who manage to make noteworthy contributions or individuals 
with the clichéd rags to riches story. The interest of researchers as well as audiences/readers 
is drawn to the talented, unusual, peculiar, famous, infamous, deviant, disadvantaged, 
disgraced individuals as well as the ones that manage to redeem themselves because we all 
love a happy ending. McAdams (2006:138) agrees with Goffman (1968) that labels which 
denote success or failure and so forth also serve to control people or keep them „in their 
place‟ whilst at the same time offering a particular reading of a given situation or 
transmission of particular values. 
2.8 Psychobiography: The Dominant Form of Biography in South African Scholarship 
Psychobiography is a synthesis of psychological approaches and biographical data/sources of 
personal information. It presents the lives of famous, enigmatic or paradigmatic figures in 
terms of how well they fit the structures set out in psychological theories. The frameworks 
used to discern, discover or formulate the central story of the entire life from birth to death 
include psychoanalysis, object-relations approaches to personality, social learning 
perspectives,  behavioural, humanistic and existential psychology as put forward by Allport, 
Bandura, Cattell, Eysenck, Goldberg, Hull, Jung, Kelly, Loevinger, Maslow, McAdams, 
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McClelland, Piaget, Rogers, Skinner and others (McAdams, 2006:503-506). Levinson (1978; 
1996; in McAdams, 2006:508-517) has also put forward a popular life course approach to the 
study of lives in the field of psychology. 
Life is complicated and individuals have to contend with uncertainty, serious illness, 
unemployment, divorce, single parent households or financial difficulties. Careers, marriages 
and family life are not always forever or as happy and satisfying as people expect them to be 
and many marriages end in divorce or individuals lead double lives punctuated by infidelity. 
Individuals experience or feel different levels of fear, hope, depression, self-awareness, 
altruism, faith or empathy because of their different outlooks or philosophies about life and 
the Dreams they have for their lives in particular contexts, eras, periods or settings. 
Biographical research attempts to explain the linkages of all these variables and how they 
define specific individuals (Carlson, 1988:105-138; Cole and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; 
Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 1990:423-431; Levinson, 1978; 
Levinson, 1996; McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and 
Ochberg, 1988).  
In reality, most people play multiple roles or wear many different hats because they refuse to 
be bystanders on the stage of life. This constant adaptation is partly the reason why 
psychobiography is currently highly valued in life narratives in social research in South 
Africa. Psychobiography is biography told through the medium of psychological theories 
such as personality, trait, developmental and social psychological theories to collect, analyse 
and discern stories about people‟s lives; linking the personal with the historical and the social 
in the process. Personality psychology draws on brain psychology, evolutionary biology 
(Charles Darwin), cognitive science, sociology and cultural anthropology and the 
contributions of personality theorists such as Erik Erikson, Alfred Adler and Henry Murray 
(McAdams, 2006:27). Humanistic and behavioural psychologists, social psychologists, 
motivational theorists, social cognitive and self-developmental theories are preoccupied with 
personality dynamics10, processes, stability/continuity and change contextualised in time, 
space and roles. They are interested in human sociality and individuality and how we get 
along or ahead as individuals in a given society. An overarching interactionist perspective 
serves to link or explain individual behaviour as a function of the person (their traits, 
cognitive and motivational factors as well as their agency) in interaction with the external 
                                                 
10 Values, beliefs, goals, interests and social-cognitive adaptations or adjustments, similar to Bourdieu‟s habitus 
which determines how people perceive and interpret their world. 
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environment. Roberts (2002:474) points out that “even under the most oppressive 
circumstances, human agency is a strong force to be reckoned with. Even when situations 
appear hopeless, people make choices.” Psychobiography is by far the most common or 
popular approach currently used to understand individual lives in South Africa. This 
approach is based on the work of, among others, Freud (psychoanalytic theory), Piaget 
(cognitive development theory), Adler, Erikson (psychosocial theory), Marcuse, Brown, 
Lifton, Murray and Levinson (Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; 
Watson, 1976: 95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69). According to Biggs 
(2007:2), in South Africa alone, much research has been done in the field of psychobiography 
in the past decade, for example: 
The Life of Jan Christiaan Smuts: A Psychobiographical Study (Fouche, 1999);  
The Life of Helen Martins, Creator of the Owl House: A Psychobiographical Study (Bareira, 
2001);  
Bantu Stephen Biko: A Psychobiographical Case Study (Kotton, 2002);  
A Psychobiographical Study of Mother Theresa (Stroud, 2004);  
Karen Horney: A Psychobiographical Study (Green, 2006); 
A Psychobiographical Study of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (Claasen, 2007); 
Balthazar Johannes Vorster: A Psychobiographical Study (Vorster, 2003) and  
Cornelis Jacobus Langenhoven: A Psychobiographical Study (Jacobs, 2005). 
 
The first psychobiography is considered to be Sigmund Freud‟s (1910) psychoanalytical 
Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood. Numerous studies followed, for example, 
Lytton Strachey‟s biographical study of Florence Nightingale, Guttmacher‟s 1941 study of 
George III and Langer‟s (1943 but published 1972) The Mind of Adolf Hitler but Erik 
Erikson‟s11 biography of German-would-be-lawyer-turned Monk Martin Luther (1483-1546) 
who led the Protestant Reformist movement in Europe, George Bernard Shaw (1959) and 
Mahatma Gandhi (1969) attracted considerable attention to psychobiography as a plausible or 
                                                 
11 Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (1958) and Gandhi‟s Truth: On the Origins of 
Militant Nonviolence (1969). 
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legitimate research approach as contrasted to the long tradition of literary biography (Carlson, 
1988:105-138, Biggs, 2007:13; Green, 2006:14). It used to be rare for individuals to have an 
academic focus on biography writing but it has now become an established and formal area 
of academic pursuit supported by journals, conferences and other associations in certain 
American universities such as the University of California at Berkeley, North Western 
University and the Pacific University. In South Africa, the University of the Free State, the 
University of Port Elizabeth (now Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University) and Rhodes 
University are the institutions most synonymous with psycho-biographical research. Critical 
biography has also become established in sociology, politics and history. 
Levinson‟s life span development theory (1978; 1996) is commonly used in psycho-
biographical studies because the life structure is the framework within which internal aspects 
(subjective meanings, motives, conflicts, personal qualities) and external aspects (events, 
social contexts, roles, influences of all kind) are interwoven. According to this theory, in 
early and middle adulthood, individuals try to establish order, stability, security and control in 
their lives and choose a direction in which to strive with a specific sense or vision of the 
future in mind. This desired future is predicated on considerations about income, power, 
fame, authority, recognition, social standing/rank, quality of family life and social 
contributions. In later phases, seniority and adulthood have their own pressures and 
responsibilities as people settle down and age. Wisdom, good judgment, generosity of spirit 
and compassion are some of the qualities expected of individuals as they grow older, have 
fewer illusions and a broader perspective on things. Levinson‟s theory (1978; 1996) posits 
that at this stage, individuals are better positioned to reflect on and reappraise past choices 
and attempt to reconcile the sources of flaws and corruption in their life (themselves, their 
enemies and loved ones (Biggs, 2007:32). 
The biographies cited in this chapter contribute to the social, cultural, economic, political, 
military and popular portrait of the history and character of the countries and times in which 
the subjects lived. However, they also show a general bias towards white and/or male heroes 
and notables. A point worth making is that the writing of biographies for academic purposes 
usually translates into books which are sold or distributed for a wider audience. This is true of 
some of the biographies listed in the bibliography. On one hand, this conversion of theses 
into books demonstrates that the projects are undertaken because of a genuine curiosity and 
desire to investigate and know more about the human condition – the ambitions, motivations, 
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personal philosophies, morals, values and ethics, beliefs, doubts, hopes, attitudes, role 
models, limitations, rejection12, acceptance, failures and triumphs. Such fascinations with 
particular individuals might have limited appeal to wider audiences but there is no denying 
that they add to a body of knowledge about the individuals examined and the times in which 
they lived. The biographies or stories become conduits through which a specific version of 
the history of their time is told; a history which necessarily affects more people and possibly 
has implications for other situations in future. On the other hand, the conversion of 
biographical theses into books is a general trend, especially overseas (Germany, the USA, the 
United Kingdom, and Sweden). The popularity of such undertakings (commissioned or 
otherwise) shows that there is also profit to be made from our fascination with other people‟s 
lives, whether it is because we get to live vicariously through the narratives or we are simply 
inspired to greater things in their own lives. 
2.9 Methodological and Practical Considerations in Biographical Research 
Autobiography/biography is one of several ways to interpret, package or present the life and 
work of a chosen individual. The ethics of social research can be inhibitive, whether 
confidentiality is implicitly or explicitly promised. Regarding the ethics of biographical 
research, the general rules are that the researcher has to have the permission or written 
consent of the subject or their close family. It is a process that requires trust and is built on 
confidence, not exploitation and manipulation. Maurois (1929:15) is concerned with the 
amount of discretion used when writing favourable posthumous biographies because of 
loyalties or because one does not wish to offend the subject‟s family. It is possible for a 
famous or infamous subject to be overly idealised or disparaged.  On the same issue of 
research ethics, Thompson (1998:175) notes that biographers are usually cautious when 
writing biographies and often censor their work or findings because they have a responsibility 
not to expose their informants to potential injury, whether through publicising confessions or 
illegal activity or through the risk of countersuits for libel or simply the risk of scandal and 
ridicule. Conflicts of interest may arise regarding respect for individual dignity and rights and 
balancing these with confidentiality, avoiding harm to the subject or their surviving family, 
academic freedom and the public‟s right to information. This point is demonstrated by the 
controversy and embargo of Warmenhoven‟s (2006) biography of Hansie Cronje. According 
to Green (2006:50), the American Psychiatric Association issued guidelines pertaining to 
                                                 
12 Prison, drug rehabilitation, psychiatric hospitals or exile. 
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ethical issues in the field of psychobiography in 1976 and they recommend that ideally, 
psycho-biographies should be conducted on deceased persons, preferably ones that have been 
so for a long time, so that the surviving family is not embarrassed by any unsavoury 
revelations. Biographies on living subjects should be conducted with the consent of the 
individuals to interview, explore, speculate and publish the conclusions drawn. 
Maurois (1929) notes that there are problems inherent in writing records of human lives and 
these problems relate to historical accuracy and ethics because the great men and women of 
our times are often unreservedly admired, overly idealised, unfairly criticised or hated yet 
many of them are flawed, divided, conflicted and contradictory beings. The „great man‟ 
syndrome in auto/biographical writing before the twentieth century was synonymous with 
hagiographers who used the lives of famous or important people as moral vignettes to 
showcase exemplary character traits and virtue (honesty, courage etc) in leaders such as 
Julius Caesar. Christian scholars also wrote hagiographies to venerate the Saints; using their 
lives of suffering and martyrdom as moral and spiritual lessons (McAdams, 2006:50-5021). 
Biographical research is often criticised for focusing on prominent and privileged individuals 
at the expense of lesser-known figures. The eulogising of “great men” by family members 
and close associates offered flattering accounts which painted the individual in a good light 
regardless of any bad qualities and destructive forces which they may have had. Strachey‟s 
book Eminent Victorians (1918/1948) illustrates this reality as literary artists wrote 
biographies designed to be entertaining and artistically satisfying. Closer to home, Cecil John 
Rhodes, for example, is portrayed as a visionary, risk-taker and man of action but Maylam 
(2005) also shows the dark side of his many enterprises in Africa. 
Maurois (1929:12) maintains that although the modern biographer cannot be a completely 
impartial being, he or she needs to strive towards being honest and impartial in finding the 
truth about the people that he or she writes about. Great men and women are human like 
everyone else and also have doubts and weaknesses, yet they succeed in achieving something 
worthy of note. A good biographer sees both the good and the bad in their subjects and shows 
how people can succeed as well as fail (Maurois, 1929:32). Maurois (1929:31) refers to Plato 
to illustrate this point. Plato conceived of the human soul as perpetually drawn by two horses, 
one white and the other black. One horse drags the human soul up towards the best that it can 
be and the other Drags it down to the lowest of its nature and a biographer should be able to 
recognise and explore both aspects in their chosen subject. From the late 1980s, life story 
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sociologists in Europe argued that there is more than one possible model for archival work 
and its priorities can reflect the needs of research communities (as well as funders) and also 
have considerable intrinsic value to the public (Thompson, 1998:167 & 174). The biographer 
has to be “prepared to accept whatever contemplation of their subject will reveal and to 
correct it in proportion to new facts that are discovered on that journey” (Maurois, 1929:12). 
Thompson (1998:167 & 171) further argues that the American approach to social history 
research has been treated with suspicion because of its long history of recording the lives of 
„great men.‟ The prevalence of and motivation for privately funded archival projects is also a 
major reason for this suspicion. Maurois (1929:13-14) states that distortions and inaccuracies 
often arise because a biographer‟s judgment can be dictated by their preconceived ideas and 
prejudices, passions, fears, admiration and hostilities which can lead them to neglect some 
facts about their subjects‟ lives. One limitation of biographical research using the interpretive 
paradigm is that it is contaminated by researcher bias, which has a potentially negative 
impact on the value of the research. The researcher‟s personal experience (gender, class, 
religion, race, ethnic background, and age), personality, values, norms, expectations and level 
of involvement are at the root of this criticism. The researcher‟s social background or 
position, attitudes preconceptions, assumptions, intentions, prejudices and intellectual 
orientations influence certain judgments, expectations and motives which affect the research 
process; meaning that it is not as neutral as it might appear at first glance. Reflexivity or self-
accounting and examination by the researcher is one way that is advocated to make visible or 
apparent their motivations and interests where relevant or where they might mediate, edit, 
interpret or contextualise the voices of the researched, especially where the researcher 
disagrees with the values or perspectives of the respondents so that they do not condescend 
towards or patronise the researched (Roberts, 2002:106-108). 
Anthropology, for example, has oral roots and information is transformed by power relations 
and modes of representation by the media as spoken word becomes received text. Being 
consciously reflexive/self-monitoring is aimed at making researchers less self-indulgent as 
the „knowing researcher‟/sociologist/observer with a superior or privileged gaze and 
understanding because this affects how knowledge is created. The researcher‟s position in 
data collection, including possible contamination, evaluation, interpretation and the writing 
process is informed by meanings outside the research itself such that the researcher needs to 
be aware of when they dwell too much on moral and political issues, and why vis their 
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responsibilities or commitments to the researched in their alternative roles as advisor, 
advocate and of course the responsibility to do no harm (Roberts, 2002:151-166). The role or 
bias of the researcher can be evident in their field notes or diaries (like Malinowski) or they 
can be in the form of a confessional or auto-ethnographic acknowledgement of the different 
ways that the researcher sees or interprets things from the researched. Reflexivity is a form of 
self-monitoring or reflection which should ideally be part of all research because it can 
impact how the ethnographic researcher gains entrance or exits a research site (community 
etc) in which they are temporarily embedded for a period of time, explaining the difficulties 
encountered and/or overcome in that endeavour, mistakes made or avoided in the research 
practice. This is necessary because the researcher mediates between respondents/informants 
and an audience and their academic attachments and interests factor into that equation 
(Roberts, 2002:151-166). 
Researcher bias was a common occurrence with many Victorian biographers. Virginia Woolf 
(cited in Maurois, 1929:14) agrees with this general assessment that Victorian biographers‟ 
thinking was dominated by ideas of goodness, the noble, the chaste, the upright and the 
severe and thus presented worthy, virtuous people in this light. However, one should not be 
preoccupied with passing these types of moral judgments but with revealing the truth in a 
balanced manner even though our prejudices inform part of our evaluations and judgements 
in different ways (Maurois, 1929:27). With regards to autobiographies, Maurois (1929:145) 
criticises them for their tendency to “rationalise and create events, feelings or ideas which 
might have been the cause of the event, but which in fact are invented from memory after the 
fact…we discover lofty, heroic motives for actions which we have performed unwittingly and 
unconsciously” because our memories are not always accurate.  
Despite the shortcomings outlined above, the biographies and autobiographies of politicians 
and statesmen, authors, playwrights, musicians, sportsmen, religious leaders, philanthropists 
and humanitarians allow us to gain insight and understanding into the lives that they led as 
individuals and as products of a particular upbringing/socialisation, self-interest and 
prevailing ideologies. Some autobiographies/biographies are written with undue simplicity or 
undue complexity but individual circumstances cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is not just 
distinguished, famous or important people who should be or are written about but in practice, 
generally, few people are inclined to research or read about ordinary people with much care 
or empathy  (McAdams, 1988:1-18; McAdams, 1994; McAdams, 2006; McAdams and 
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Ochberg, 1988; Roberts, 2002; Runyan, 1984; Simonton, 1994; Linde, 1993; Watson, 1976: 
95-131; Fiske, 1988:815-833; Bujold, 1990:57-69). 
2.10 Merits of the Case Study Method in Studying Individual Lives 
Case studies have been widely used in anthropology, sociology and political science. 
Different factors affect our individuality and reactions or responses to different situations and 
the case study method allows us to examine variability in human psychological qualities and 
dispositional traits (social and emotional intelligence). In anthropology, the case study 
method may be applied to a particular culture or subculture whereas in sociology the focus 
may be a specific demographic group or organisation and in political science investigation 
may be on a single political institution or event. In all of these, the investigation is a single 
specific phenomenon studied in depth within its real-life context (McAdams, 2006:493; Cole 
and Knowles, 2001; Elms, 1994; Gronn, 1993:343-358; Kaplan, 1998; Kets de Vries, 
1990:423-431; Levinson et al, 1978, Levinson, 1996). Purposive sampling is the most 
common way to choose an individual life or case study for biographical research. The whole 
person or individual life is the ideal unit of analysis. The case study method is popular in 
personality psychology because each person is unique in many ways. No two people have the 
same life, experience of the world or personality even though they might have much in 
common with each other (McAdams, 2006:34). Case studies allow us to identify the 
uniqueness of the individual within the whole or socio-historical context (McAdams, 
2006:493-498).  
Conversely, it has been argued that the case study method leads to deficiencies of validity, 
reliability and difficulties of generalisation and replication of research. Some critics note that 
even with corroboration or cross-referencing, the question of the generalisability, replicability 
or representation of findings in terms of a wider population remains unresolved because of  
the variations from person to person, according to gender, generation and so on as well as 
inconsistencies or ambiguities in some of the accounts given by interviewees. The case study 
is sometimes deemed unreliable and subjective because of the focus on the idiosyncrasies of a 
single life (McAdams, 2006:493-498).  
2.11 Biographical Sources 
Biographical research strives to pay sufficient attention to the complex social, historical and 
cultural factors which influence people, for example, cross-cultural interactions (racial or 
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ethnic) and economic or class differences. There are advantages and disadvantages to using 
firsthand accounts (primary) and secondary sources when analysing the particularities of 
different lives. Both written and oral accounts are subject to bias even though they 
complement each other, especially when one or the other is missing or inadequate. There are 
also concerns about the reliability of oral evidence and the discrepancies that tend to arise or 
whether or not the instruments used provide the same measurement each time. Empiricists 
question the validity of the instruments (questionnaires or scales) used in the production of 
data, internal consistency and development of explanations or theories (Roberts, 2002). 
Important primary sources include oral or written testimony of the subject or eyewitnesses 
present at the time of an event. These include autobiographies, film documentaries, 
independent factual records from personal and business letters, logs, memoirs, diaries, wills, 
curriculum vitaes, journals, photographs, autobiographical internet web pages or social 
networking sites, any existing body of knowledge which is readily available to the public 
such as an extensive literary contribution (writers) or discography (musicians) and other 
personal artefacts including home videos, family memorabilia and heirlooms which are 
generally not intended for publication or public consumption but which are contemporaneous 
records that provide useful accounts of intimate experiences. Biographical fieldwork also 
includes in-depth or semi-structured interviews and sometimes participant observation which 
entails interaction with the subject/s over an extended period of time. The interview schedules 
used are both descriptive and explorative in content and form in order to elicit the most out of 
subjects regarding their lives, circumstances, daily events and the meanings they give to 
them. Emphasis is put on the dialogical nature of fieldwork in collaborative relation between 
the researcher and the researched. Individual lives are used as exemplars of particular social 
settings/contexts, processes, episodes or events. Secondary sources include the oral or written 
testimony of people who were not immediately present at a given event or experience. They 
represent second-hand or hearsay accounts of someone or an event. Examples of secondary 
sources include biographies, library and other archive material, reference books, textbooks, 
government documents, confidential reports, public records, newspaper editorials and written 
or oral histories of individuals or a group that provide information about the subject of the 
biography (Barber, 2006).   
Once all the sources have been exhausted and prioritised, personal and career data about the 
subject is collected and collated to get a comprehensive overview in order to explore and 
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discuss the consequences of their decisions, actions and choices within the particular social, 
economic and historical context in which they lived. The coding of information/data refers to 
encrypting, indexing, sorting and categorising in order to summarise or order material, 
establish connections, conceptual updates or theory. Material can be coded to denote 
explanations, descriptions, family or other relationships and social contexts. Data is arranged 
to reconstruct a meaningful, and hopefully accurate, explanation for past events (Roberts, 
2002:11). 
2.12 Criticisms and/or Limitations of Biographical Research 
Biographical research is not usually conducted on living subjects but deceased ones and 
because the life is „complete‟, it is easier to analyse and evaluate the consequences of various 
decisions and choices made by the subject in their lifetime. However, many biographies are 
written with unabashed adoration and focus on the remarkable or admirable aspects of their 
subjects‟ lives and the learning experiences encountered on this journey but they tend to 
overlook the less savoury facts such as ambivalence or hypocrisy for nostalgic or sentimental 
reasons. The singular orientation of biographies, the case study method and the lack of 
statistical sampling generally means that the findings or conclusions drawn from biographical 
research are not representative, comparable or generalisable (Roberts, 2002). 
Barber (2006) notes that there are concerns for some researchers around notions of truth, 
traditional standards of evidence and fabrication. Some researchers question the authenticity, 
authorship, credibility, factual accuracy, sincerity, editing, censorship, the origin and use of 
personal documents or artefacts such as the ones listed above, especially where the motive 
appears to be to justify or rationalise something.  It is argued that authors can put a positive 
spin on speeches, letters or interview responses with future audiences in mind (Barber, 2006). 
These concerns notwithstanding, memoirs, in particular, have proven to be indispensible in 
the study of war and other traumatic experiences including slavery in the USA, the 
Holocaust, totalitarianism in the Gulags of the former USSR, ethnic cleaning in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and apartheid in South Africa. They are also crucial for comparative 
studies and offer multiple voices (for instance, from victims or perpetrators of atrocities), 
texts and mediums (sound, print, pictures, internet).  
Biographical research reconciles the past/history, the present and possible future trajectories. 
We speak of popular memory, antagonistic memories, contested histories, remembrance, 
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recollection and the social functions of remembering but who makes history and how? 
Researchers have to question what is remembered, forgotten and why this is so (Paris, 2001). 
Accounts of people‟s experiences of slavery in American history, Nazism in Europe or any 
number of natural disasters differ significantly depending on who is giving them and their 
reasons for doing so. This gives the impression that there are different versions of history 
waiting to be discovered; depending on motive and ideological positions. South Africa‟s long 
violent past and different people‟s experience of it is no exception to this variability. Racial 
oppression and socio-economic inequality defined and continues to define, divide and distort 
people‟s conceptions of who they are and what they stand for or can achieve in future (Paris, 
2001:166-239). 
Roberts (2002:145), notes that the biggest criticism about memory and biographical 
research‟s reliance on it is that it is fallible. Memory is subject to the vagaries of power, 
emotions, unconscious desires and language. It is vulnerable to the imaginative construction 
of different elements into one coherent whole that is rehearsed as opposed to literal 
reproduction. Roberts (2002:147) observes that competing or changing historical discourses, 
dominant memory and the attendant oppositional forms including the commodified and 
repackaged forms on television tend to be conservative. Memory rewrites, recreates, selects, 
omits, reorders, reconstructs, distorts, alters and modifies reality and people‟s conceptions of 
themselves through reinterpretation, reassessment, suppression, loss or substitution of some 
memories. According to Freud (cited in Roberts, 2002:141), memory is inherently revisionist. 
Deliberate selective amnesia might attempt to eradicate or erase aspects of the past such as a 
heritage with particular political and economic conditions, values and ideals, for instance, the 
renewal of churches, the renaming of streets, buildings and towns. It can also be unconscious 
as part of sanitising, editing, refining, reformulating, censoring or culturally validating a 
legacy for the benefit of subsequent generations even though there may very well be different 
memories or accounts of the same events (Roberts, 2002:143). This selectivity and the 
questionable reliability or credibility of memory and the accounts of events that it generates 
over time, especially when they are corrupted by rumours, folktales and myths is a major 
concern when conducting research.  
Memories can be unpleasant, painful or traumatic, for example, political repression, religious 
persecution and dispossession. The researcher then has a responsibility to empower or be an 
advocate for their subject or respondents. Empathy is required over detachment but this can 
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be problematic as the researcher might become over-invested in the lives of the respondents. 
Asking respondents to talk about or remember such events or experiences forces them to 
come to terms with them, for example, South Africa‟s own Truth and Reconciliation hearings 
in the 1990s. The hearings were aimed at correcting historical records and healing 
communities in the spirit of nation-building but it is possible that they had the opposite effect 
for some individuals and communities. It is also possible that some details were omitted, 
underplayed or exaggerated in the accounts that were given (Roberts, 2002:93-113). 
However, despite these shortcomings or disadvantages, not everything that is remembered is 
fictitious. Birthdays, anniversaries, religious festivals, holidays and major political events 
help structure memories and how stories are composed and retold because individual lives are 
lined up against the course of history13, allowing us to say „I was doing this at such a place 
when X or Y happened‟ (Roberts, 2002:136). 
Biographical research is criticised for being time consuming, long-winded, cumbersome and 
deficient of methodological rigour or criteria according to positivist, objectivist scientific 
standards. The vagueness in approach and intent is one criticism that is often raised because 
the rational and the subjective are entwined. Further, the collaboration or interdependence of 
researcher and the researched means that the researcher is active in knowledge production. 
The researcher does not merely translate data for an audience, making this a concern for 
empiricists. With regards to the subject of a biography, individual motivations and societal 
influences are not easily distinguishable because of the interactional nature of social lives and 
the possibilities for merging the past with the present, fact and fiction, the private with the 
public, the self and the other, the subject and the object (Roberts, 2002).   
Another criticism is that analysing an absent/deceased subject or one that the researcher 
cannot have direct contact with can be limiting because they cannot be interviewed, tested or 
directly observed. Another problem with writing the biographies of deceased individuals is 
that they cannot be involved in data verification processes when the study is concluded. 
Biographical research methods generally rely on analytic induction and the data generated is 
criticised for lacking in accuracy, reliability and validity because it is based on essentially 
subjective evaluative criteria. However, the credibility, authenticity, plausibility or 
persuasiveness of interview accounts, oral histories and research findings can be enhanced by 
                                                 
13 The assassination of President Kennedy, the fall of the Berlin wall, news of the death of Princess Diana, the 
terror attacks on the Twin Towers, South Africa‟s first democratic elections in April 1994 and so on. 
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using multiple data sources known as triangulation or cross-referencing to give a composite 
picture which can usually be checked against other written, visual or oral accounts in order to 
understand the subject‟s behaviour (Roberts, 2002:8; Eakin, 1999; Marcus, 1994; Stanley, 
1993:41-52; Dex, 1991; Frisch, 1990; Geertz, 1988; Popular Memory Group, 1982; Bertaux, 
1981; Berger and Berger, 1975; Goffman, 1959; Goffman, 1968; Downes and Rock, 1995). 
Despite the limitations, sensitivities (privacy, confidentiality, anonymity) legal and ethical 
considerations that are designed to limit the cavalier use of facts, there is a wide variety of 
scientific uses to which life history may be put to illustrate the intersections of individual 
biography/experience and history in a given society.  
2.13 Popular Topics in South African History and Politics  
History generally acknowledges missed opportunities, pain, lapses of judgment, loss, 
mistakes, human failures and achievements over millennia. To this end, historians use tidy 
and confident moral judgments to explain causation or give meaning without necessarily 
understanding alternative views on gendered histories, ethnic minorities, gay or anti-
institutional movements. Conservative and pedagogic historiographies tend not to allow 
ordinary people to take centre-stage by favouring or glorifying the wealthy, famous, heroic, 
masculine, the white and the colonial whilst denigrating ordinary people (Jeppie, 2004:4). 
Similar criticisms is levelled against history at the iconographic level because of its focus on 
national events and figures at the expense of regional or community level ones or voices on 
the periphery which are unlikely to appear in the pantheon of nationalist heroes. 
Most literature on South African history recounts the way of life of indigenous Africans 
before the arrival of white settlers, the arrival of white settlers, the establishment of the Cape 
Colony, the frontier wars, the discovery of diamonds and gold, British imperialism, the 
beginning of segregation 1910-1948, apartheid from 1948-1978 and its crisis from about 
1978-1989, the political transition 1989-1994 and the dawn of a new South Africa from 1994. 
Certain key political figures are mentioned again and again in the official records but others 
never appear (Thompson, 2001) and the same is true of certain omissions in accounts of 
South Africa‟s Bantustans and their administrations. Meyers (2008) and Rogers (1976) are 
some of the authors who trace South African politics and indirect rule from native 
administration to separate development, the use of chieftaincies and later Bantustan 
administrations as proxies to control rural populations (disguising of political power and 
aggression), the retreat of white rule, negotiating the political transition and the meeting of 
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tradition and modernity in the new role of chiefs in a democratic South Africa. Changing 
social, political and economic contexts, challenges and possibilities bring up the need for 
historical correctives and re-evaluations of past interpretations. The notion of new histories 
and history from below is, therefore, designed to take account of or bring different 
constituencies, rationalities, subjectivities and temporalities into the main historical frame and 
fill some of the gaps in the records (Jeppies, 2004:1-15). 
2.14 Possibilities for New Histories 
Pluralism allows for new possibilities to cross-pollinate ideas and practices across disciplines 
and sub-disciplines. The overlaps between academic disciplines show how flexible and 
versatile biographical research is and the depth of personal commentaries of historical 
significance that a researcher can access through interviews or other direct contact with the 
researched (Roberts, 2002:73-92). History and its interpretation or reinterpretation is a 
pervasive constant across the humanistic disciplines and it can be retold through the lives of 
individual and the connections they have with their contemporaries in specific socio-political 
contexts. The social sciences are about the interchange of ideas and experiences, 
understanding the development of human societies and explaining socio-political or 
economic situations through situational analysis. In the South African context, a country in 
transition, Hendricks (2003; 2004) speaks of the dawn of democracy and how little things 
have changed in many respects. He highlights the pervasiveness of institutionalised racism, 
inequality, classism and the politics of knowledge production in South Africa since 1994. 
Many authors (Jeppie, 2004; Hendricks, 2003; Gilomee and Mbenga, 2007) on South African 
history, politics and government also recognise the need to reinterpret or revise history as we 
know it; to approach it from different perspectives in order to gain new insights and critical 
understanding. Their work and the notion of new history (Cameron, 1991; Jeppie, 2004) 
brings into focus different notions of history, memory or amnesia, the value of history in its 
humanising capacity, historical complexity and ambiguity and the continuing crisis of 
inequality and injustice which pervades South Africa‟s fledgling democracy. The old history 
was full of propaganda promoting a particular national identity and specific societal values 
which marginalised the majority of the country‟s population in a seamless web of political 
projects and dimensions of power which are not value-free or politically neutral.   
The debates and concerns highlighted in Hendricks (2004), Abe (2005:29-78) and 
Matshedisho (2005:1-28) point to the fact that the past has a place in the present and in the 
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practice (studying and teaching) of social sciences and social change. Reinterpreting and 
reconstructing the past, for instance, colonialism and post-colonialism, is part of the 
challenge to orthodoxies of the day. It is argued that social sciences and African Studies have 
been conceptualised by the West to study Africans but not by Africans themselves. White 
experience is taken as being superior or universal; forcing African social scientists, for 
example, into defensive transformation of disciplines (different manifestations of Africanism, 
Pan-Africanism or Africanisation) which is evident in the works of Mazrui, Mamdani and 
others. Many history projects undertaken on the African continent are an attempt to rewrite 
history and recast approaches to its study to undo the Eurocentric or Western intellectual 
hegemony, stereotypical thinking, prejudice or bias (Comte, Durkheim, Weber, Giddens, and 
Bourdieu) that prevails and is indiscriminately applied to African and other contexts and 
often portraying the locals as victims or losers. In the South African case, there is the reality 
of apartheid authoritative or official history which was foisted on the public towards 
particular racist ends. Hendricks (2004), Abe (2005:29-78) and Matshedisho (2005:1-28) 
assess the continuities, discontinuities and progress made in social science sub-disciplines 
such as journalism and media studies, anthropology, political studies, history, globalisation, 
rural and agricultural studies and higher education in this frame of mind. 
Public memory includes traditions, legacies and commemorations in different spheres in the 
life of a nation or groups within it. It is carried through imagery and interpretation which are 
mediated by state institutions, local government, the media, businesses, theatrical 
productions, museums, oral history projects, historical or heritage sites, historical theme 
parks and tourism operations (Roberts, 2002:145). The National History Commission, the 
National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999, the South African History Archive (SAHA) and 
the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) are all targeted at rewriting, 
rethinking and reassessing South Africa‟s history and national heritage. There is general 
consensus about the urgent need for this revision as evidenced by the South African History 
Project (SAHP) which was initiated by Professor Kader Asmal (then South Africa‟s Minister 
of Education) and launched in August 2001. This was followed by the Ministerial Conference 
on History, Memory and Human Progress held in Cape Town in October 2002 to look into 
creative ways or initiatives to reinvigorate interest and enthusiasm in history as well as to 
consciously preserve or retell different aspects of South Africa‟s history from perspectives 
other than the often sterile official or authorised ones. The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is cited as an example of contemporary oral history and 
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living memory through which ordinary people challenged official histories. The TRC 
hearings contributed to South Africa‟s public record, and to some degree, gave back 
recognition and dignity to ordinary people whose experiences would otherwise never have 
been heard. The hearings were a meaningful and significant symbolic gesture designed to 
expose painful and shameful truths and give some modicum of closure to both the victims 
and perpetrators of apartheid atrocities (Jeppie, 2004:1-15).  
Paris (2001) acknowledges that history and heritage or the past is part of the soul of a people 
or nation but whose history and whose memory appears in official records? It is hoped that 
new histories can uncover exceptions, nuances and subtleties that are part of the variation of 
human experience. A dose of doubt about the universality of official histories in not a bad 
thing if it encourages empathy with the experiences of others facilitates healing and symbolic 
restitution, though not necessarily absolution. New histories offer new opportunities and 
continuing debates in literary production by employing post-modernist relativism and literary 
theory and accommodating competing ideological and philosophical paradigms (Barber, 
2006). They promote research into oral traditions, histories, indigenous knowledge and 
customs which include intangible parts of national heritage such as skills, memories, songs, 
dance, rituals and stories which also give meaning to physical heritage (Jeppie, 2004:1-15). 
History matters for everyone for different reasons, not least among them that it tells us who 
we are and where we came from so that we can chart a course into the future. The apartheid 
state muzzled opposing views or different perspectives and it is for this reason that debates 
have been revolving around new or revised history curriculums in South African schools 
since 1994. Biographical research explores, consolidates, clarifies and complements other 
research methods through the insights gained into the meanings that people attach to actions 
in their lives. It validates personal experience and aids our understanding of psycho-social 
processes as well as our role or position in the world – making sense of it all. It can have a 
transformative, inspirational impact on other lives whilst also revealing the often artificial 
academic division of knowledge. Popular struggles, civil society, participation, leadership, 
liberation and democratisation can be very sensitive issues for localities because of the many 
dynamics at play but valuable lessons can be learnt from different experiences (caution, 
hope). Instead of focusing on one individual, Hruby‟s (1980) book profiles a series of 
influential intellectuals and communists who played significant roles in the former 
Czechoslovakia. He explores that country‟s history and politics in the context of a particular 
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brand of communism and government between the end of World War II in 1945 and 
Czechoslovakia‟s disintegration in 1992 to form the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic. The period under review was characterised by radical change, risk-taking, 
opportunism, violence and a constantly shifting balance of power and the book draws 
comparisons between Czechoslovakia and Cambodia‟s experiences and violent pasts.  
On the opposite extreme, objective, impartial or neutral history is a figment of our 
imagination because historians write from particular perspectives which are subjective and 
often blatantly biased. They also write for targeted audiences which also have specific 
prejudices and preferences. Many sanitized versions of history abound in which the ugly parts 
are omitted, villains become heroes and vice-versa. In South Africa, for instance, identities 
have been heavily racialised or ethnicised, or both, in the past and this influences how people 
relate to each other. Ranger (2004:215-234) observes with dismay that Zimbabwe‟s ruling 
party has manipulated what it terms „patriotic history‟ or the country‟s collective memory to 
legitimise its rule in its election campaigns since 2000. As a doctrine, „patriotic history‟ is 
distinct from nationalist historiography and is packaged as a form of Pan-Africanism and 
counterpoint to colonial history. It is politics in accordance with revolutionary tradition and it 
repudiates what Ranger (2004:215-234) terms academic history and western universalism. 
Patriotic history is disseminated in numerous ways including the president‟s vitriolic 
speeches, two key ministries; that of the Minister of Information and Publicity Jonathan 
Moyo and the Minister of Education Aeneas Chigwedere and youth militia camps. The ruling 
party has made youth training for school leavers compulsory in militia camps where they are 
indoctrinated in history which demonises the West and political opposition in the country. 
However, the rhetoric of the war veteran instructors oversimplifies history to that of 
revolutionaries and sell-outs and history courses and textbooks have been revised towards 
this end. The state-controlled media (television, radio and newspapers) is also used 
relentlessly to propagate „patriotic history‟, which is essentially propaganda in the form of 
documentaries and sound bytes about the liberation struggle and the atrocities committed by 
British colonial authorities. This experience in Zimbabwe shows that history is contested and 
is not immutable. It can be edited, rewritten and distorted by those with power to suit 
particular ends which obliterate the development of systematic and sustained counter-
narratives. Ranger (2004:215-234) cautions that history matters, especially to those to whom 
it is denied by the excesses of narrow, self-serving nationalist narratives of the past which 
amount to nationalist authoritarianism. However, he add that shared and persistent suffering 
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due to racism or other prejudice and repression  facilitated by state monopoly over the media 
and the use of violence does not translate into agreement on the means to end such suffering 
and gain dignity or equality (Ranger, 2004:215-234). 
2.15 Political Biographies and Themes: Analogy of Politics as a Game  
In the political arena or field, timing or procrastination (opportunity cost), over or 
underestimating a crisis or opponent, expectations, emotions, conventions, seemingly 
illogical or invisible forces all combine to determine success or failure. Ultimately, they can 
be very costly or rewarding in terms of individual reputations and legacies and that is at the 
heart of this thesis with regards to the actions or choices that were made by South Africa‟s 
former Bantustan leaders, particularly, Enos Mabuza of the KaNgwane Bantustan. Politics is 
often described as a chess game with numerous players who capitalise on cleavages in a 
society and make fixing them or exploiting them their mission, regardless of political 
persuasion14 (Grothe, 2008:127-128). Success in this game of contingency with its many 
obstacles and challenges to be overcome is often determined by the mundane/trivial and the 
extreme, including how the legitimacy of one‟s rule, how they assume power (elections, 
votes, imposed) and prevailing social, economic or political conditions or crises in vastly 
different political systems (police states, military dictatorships, one-party states, multi-party 
democracies).  
The political field can be enabling, restrictive and necessarily intrudes or infringes on the 
individual‟s personal life. There are also foreseeable and unforeseen dangers that come with a 
career in politics. An individual can be alienated or reified based on chance events or planned 
ones. As leaders and public figures, politicians become hemmed in by history, thus giving 
credence to the observation that people make their own history but under certain 
circumstances which are usually not of their choosing. Individuals become heroes or villains 
depending on their social class and the doctrines, philosophies or ideologies they subscribe. 
There is no strict code for manoeuvring the minefield that is politics but different systems and 
individual leaders are constantly being compared to each other. The actions of politicians are 
fascinating because they can affect entire regions, countries or the very course of world 
history. Politicians are either the protagonists or antagonists who play devil‟s advocate or 
gamble with people‟s destinies and we either approve or disprove their actions, paradoxes 
and end-games as progress or regression. They wield the power to include and exclude, 
                                                 
14 Black radicals, Marxists, revolutionaries, reformists or moderates. 
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marginalise, subjugate, dominate, discriminate and torture. Their policies determine identity, 
rights, and citizenship status which can precipitate superiority and inferiority complexes and 
divisions (Grothe, 2008:254-273; Wilkinson, 2002). 
Much interest is generated by the lives of politicians because we admire, are inspired by and 
want to emulate successful, influential or powerful people. The competitiveness, ruthlessness 
or vulnerability of figures such as Napoleon Bonaparte, Otto Von Bismarck, George 
Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John F. Kennedy, Charles De Gaulle, Benito Mussolini, 
Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Chairman Mao, Winston Churchill, Jawaharlal Nehru, Che 
Guevara, Juan Peron and Fidel Castro come to mind. We are also intrigued by the ebb-tide 
unpredictability of the political arena. It is an interactive and competitive field characterised 
by predatory Machiavellianism complete with constituencies, hierarchies and chains of 
command, accomplices, allies, rivals, enemies, adversaries, advisers, opposition, power15, 
ambition, smear campaigns or slander, arrogance, complacency, pedagogy, propaganda, 
patronage, treachery, violence, pre-emptive action, coups, opportunism, speculation, hostility, 
betrayal, hypocrisy, secrets, lies allegations, determination, perseverance, endurance, 
contradictions and controversies, disparities, plots, denials, cover-ups, justifications, 
liabilities, schemes, information and misinformation, disguises and deception, threats, 
inducements, strategies and stratagems to out-wit and out-last, collusion, brinkmanship, 
agreements, disagreements, dilemmas and conflicts. Political actions are based on a variety of 
assumptions, preconceptions and intentions. They also have consequences which can be 
interpreted in a myriad different ways. The political field affords individuals the opportunity 
to gain status and influence but politicians also tend to have chequered personal, public or 
professional lives which the media and critics live to scrutinise (Grothe, 2008:254-273).  
A political biography traces the relations between the part/individual and the whole in a given 
political system and questions the relationship between dependence and relative autonomy, 
goals, agency, virtue and politics, integrity, reputations and legacies. The popularity and 
effectiveness of political leaders is subjected to the litmus test of public opinion and many are 
exposed as frauds. Success in the political arena is a balancing act and we judge, criticise or 
praise politicians based on what we think are their intentions, motives, functions and the 
aggregate or significance of their actions (deeds and speeches) in a particular context. Such 
                                                 
15 Unequal power relations, powerlessness, the reality of power blocks and possibilities for consolidating power, 
shifting balances of power, power in its different dimensions or manifestations, for example, power over 
something or someone or power to do certain things. 
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an evaluation is both subjective and objective and is based on perceptions of their aspirations 
and visions as leaders, their image, personality, character, leadership style, credibility, ability, 
capacity, accountability, offensive or defensive action in times of crisis and its consequences, 
complicity in bad things, indecision, vacillation, inertia, successes and failures, defeats, 
scandal, ambiguities, guilt, regrets and comebacks. Political analysts, biographers and 
historians reflect on, investigate, contemplate and clarify the complexity, multiplicity, 
misunderstandings, distortions, myths, discontinuities and continuities of the above themes 
depending on the circumstances, contexts and what mediates them (historical relativism and 
the ruses of history). Politicians can be described as false prophets whose popularity has a 
shelf life. As part of the social contract they have with the people, they sell hope, change and 
prosperity but often times the smoke and mirrors are exposed when they fail to deliver in this 
fickle, dog eat dog world (Grothe, 2008:254-273). 
2.16 South African Academic Biographies (Theses) in History and Politics 
The academic biographies surveyed below offer a holistic understanding of how and why 
certain people came to be who history has recorded them to be. They offer critical, 
empathetic or sympathetic understandings, interpretations or perspectives which enrich our 
grasp of history and the subjects‟ role in it. 
Isaac Bangani Tabata  
Rassool‟s thesis (2004) is slightly different in structure from most that are surveyed here but 
it places intellectual, author and political activist Isaac Bangani Tabata (1909-1990) as a 
separate and autonomous individual who had views that did not always sit well with the 
mainstream political intelligentsia. There are different and contested narrations about Tabata 
as a leader, organiser and orator. Rassool (2004:323) analyses the contradictions and 
inconsistencies in I. B. Tabata‟s political career, for example, and one of the conclusions that 
he comes to is that loyalty to political ideals, not individual leaders, was understood as a more 
developed stage in the evolution of organised national resistance and national identity 
formation. The collective national memory (public) of him is framed in this light and his 
personal contradictions and versatility is interpreted by many as moral weakness but that is a 
harsh and short-sighted and only tells half the story. Naturally, his family‟s memory (private) 
differs from this cynical view. 
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Tabata is considered somewhat of a radical and controversial figure in the country‟s struggle 
history for some of his views but his political efforts cannot be overlooked. He was involved 
in the Cape African Teacher‟s Association (CATA), the New Era Fellowship (NEF) and the 
Society of Young Africans (SOYA). He helped found the Workers‟ Party of South Africa and 
he was the president of the Unity Movement of South Africa which formed a distinct segment 
in the struggle for liberation. The Unity Movement was founded in 1943 as the Non-
European Unity Movement but it was often characterised as Trotskyite. Tabata was active in 
the All-African Convention which was founded in 1935 and advocated the boycott of all 
racial structures which were proposed by the government. Tabata wrote several articles and 
books which were critical of how the struggle was being led by different groups, for example 
the ANC whose leadership he thought was too conservative. The relationship between the 
All-African Convention and the African National Congress, as the main liberation movement, 
was not always smooth and Tabata was contemptuous of the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the Communist Party of South Africa‟s methods and leadership styles. In 1961 he 
established and became president of the African People‟s Democratic Union of Southern 
Africa (APDUSA). Tabata‟s writing was also critical of the reserve system, the state‟s 
imposed betterment and rehabilitation programmes and stock culling in the Transkei and 
other places, the compulsion of migrant labour and the education system in South Africa, 
specifically the Bantu education system. Education was regarded as a central part in the 
emancipatory project and a moral code of behaviour was counter-posed with that of the 
enemy. Tabata was banned in 1956 and went into exile from 1963 to 1974 but never tired in 
endeavouring to enhance the awakening of the oppressed to different concepts and methods 
of struggle and different perspectives on the politics of race, nation and identity. Tabata‟s 
views and contribution as presented by Rassool (2004) offer a slightly different view of what 
is usually portrayed in the mainstream media because history is open to different 
interpretations in as much as individuals have choices and use different means and their own 
agency, for better or worse, to achieve their goals. 
Robert McBride 
Mokae‟s (2004) thesis focuses on the good, the bad and the ugly of South African history – 
the social conditions, government and resistance to apartheid. It focuses on McBride as one 
of many political activists in the period 1961-1994. McBride‟s life and experiences are used 
to typically represent South African Coloureds and the contradictions they had to deal with 
on a daily basis in terms of culture, fitting in, taking sides and the law. 
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Alfred Bitini Xuma 
Gish‟s (1994) doctoral thesis is on South African politics and government in the period 1909-
1948 (the beginning of apartheid). The thesis revolves around the life and contribution of 
political activist Alfred Bitini Xuma to the struggle that was fomenting during that period. 
Xuma was an influential thinker and leader and was elected president of the African National 
Congress in 1940 until 1949. He worked closely with Dr Yusuf Dadoo of the South African 
Indian Congress to create an alliance between Africans and Indians. 
 
Raymond Mhlaba  
Orie (1993) profiles anti-apartheid activist and trade unionist Raymond Mhlaba. Mhlaba was 
active in trade union circles in Port Elizabeth. He was involved with the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which led to his membership in the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). Mhlaba was also a member of the African National Congress and 
spent time in exile where he received military training. He became a commander of the 
ANC‟s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and was sentenced with Nelson Mandela and 
others in the Rivonia trial and subsequently spent 25 years in prison. He was elected ANC 
Premier of the Eastern Cape in May 1994. He was also instrumental in establishing the House 
of Traditional Leaders. Like many politicians after 1994, Mhlaba was involved in black 
economic empowerment circles. He later served as South Africa‟s High Commissioner to 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
Ethel Tawse Jollie  
Lowry‟s (1989) thesis is on the life and times of Ethel Tawse Jollie (1875-1950) and her 
experience (representing women) as a British colonial settler through Zimbabwe (Southern 
Rhodesia) and into South Africa. The thesis focuses on the challenges of adapting to a new 
and different environment as well as the cross pollination or transference of 
British/Edwardian social and political ideas to colonial settlements as part of the expansion 
and consolidation of the British Empire. Jollie was the first female parliamentarian in the 
British overseas empire. She was also a political activist and prolific writer on political 
matters (propaganda) towards the attainment of Responsible Government in Southern 
Rhodesia in 1923. 
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Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges 
Bekker‟s (1987) doctorate in history chronicles the life and contribution of South African and 
senior member of the then ruling National Party Theophilus Ebenhaezer Dönges (1898-
1968). Donges was South Africa‟s Minister of the Interior from 1948 to 1961. As such, he is 
considered one of the "architects of Apartheid.” He was responsible for introducing race-
based population registration and removing Coloured voters from the common voters‟ roll as 
a prelude to disenfranchising them altogether. Donges also served as Finance Minister (1961-
1966), acting Prime Minister of South Africa (September 1966) after Prime Minister 
Verwoerd was assassinated. Donges was elected State President in 1967 to succeed C. R. 
Swart but he did not take office due to illness after suffering a stroke and lapsing into a coma. 
He died aged 69 and Jozua François Naudé of the National Party succeeded him. 
Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom  
Basson‟s (1980) biography of South African statesman Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom is a 
historical and political account of the country‟s politics and government from the dawn of the 
Union in 1909 to the ascendency of the National Party in 1948. Strijdom was a lawyer by 
profession and an avid Republican active in the National Party. He was South Africa‟s Prime 
Minister from 30 November 1954 to 24 August 1958 and in 1956 he had Coloureds removed 
from the common voters‟ roll. He was an uncompromising Afrikaner nationalist and a 
proponent of segregation which led the way to Apartheid. He was closely identified with the 
policies of and loyal to D. F.  Malan. He also introduced various measures to make South 
Africa less dependent on Britain, for example, in 1957 he abandoned the two-pole flag 
policy, making the South African flag the only flag to be flown without the Union Jack. He 
also gave South Africa only one national anthem, „Die Stem‟. Under Strijdom the ideals of 
the Republic were achieved as South Africa now had one flag, one anthem and undivided 
citizenship (Basson, 1980). 
Tielman Johannes de Villiers Roos 
Brits‟ book (1979) is about South African politics, government and Tielman Johannes de 
Villiers Roos‟ (1879-1935)  role in it between 1907 and 1935. Roos was a right-wing South 
African politician and cabinet minister. He was a member of the South African Party which 
opposed the creation of the Union of South Africa by Louis Botha. He later joined D. F. 
Malan in the National Party as head of the party in the Transvaal. He was a popular figure 
and was able to build a following for the party among white workers (miners and the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers‟ Union) and persuaded the South African Labour Party 
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to share the vision of the National Party. Roos served as Justice Minister from 1924 to 1929 
and was a strong advocate of racial segregation. He spent three years as a judge in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (Brits, 1979). 
Donald Barkly Molteno  
Scher‟s thesis (1979) covers South African politics in the period 1909-1978. It covers inter 
alia race relations, legislators, government and the role or contribution of the South African 
Progressive Party and Donald Barkly Molteno. Molteno was a South African parliamentarian, 
lawyer, champion of civil rights and a prominent opponent of Apartheid associated with 
South African liberalism. He was a member of the South African Liberal Party before joining 
the Progressive Party. Among other things, Molteno served as the Western Cape regional 
representative on the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1936 and served as the 
institute‟s president from 1958 to 1960 (Scher, 1979). 
John Xavier Merriman  
Gruber‟s (1960) examination of Cape and South African statesman John Xavier Merriman‟s 
life and work (1841-1926) explores the politics and government dynamics of the time. 
Merriman was a gifted orator, parliamentarian, versatile administrator and veteran politician 
and he is compared to other prominent personalities such as Hofmeyr and Schreiner in the 
period 1836-1909 before the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. His career in public 
life stretched fifty-five years of South African history from before the granting of 
Responsible Government, the discovery of diamonds and gold, before Hertzog and Malan 
came to power and before the awakening of Afrikaner nationalism. Merriman was the last 
Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the largest and oldest settled community in South Africa, 
and heir to the Cape Tradition. He was considered a natural choice as Prime Minister of the 
Union which he helped establish but this did not materialise because he withdrew from active 
politics soon after he turned seventy. Gruber‟s examination raises various questions about 
how Merriman‟s contemporaries regarded him and his abilities. The thesis contributes to an 
understanding of the structure or nature of Cape Politics and the ramifications of various 
dilemmas faced in the colony as a Frontier territory which dealt with many wars and crises. 
The thesis also contributes to a holistic understanding of Merriman by studying his formative 
years and assessing his qualities in context in order to make some conclusions about the 
negative or positive aspects and impact of his contribution to South African politics. Gruber 
reconstructs Merriman‟s personality and analyses the nature of his statesmanship by 
examining the roles that he played in the years under review, as well as by assessing the role 
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he failed to play (becoming Prime Minister of the Union).This is done through the use of 
private correspondence (over 800 private letters dealing with family matters), newspaper 
articles and a large volume of Merriman‟s collected papers. In the process, many other 
sources16 were consulted but, according to Gruber, this was a frustrating experience because 
significant material was sparse (Gruber, 1960). 
2.17 Context for Biographical Research on Former Bantustan Leaders and How the 
Bantustan Policy was Marketed and Defended 
Bantustan leaders are believed to have been public enemy number one - ruthless, ambitious 
opportunistic Shylocks that were more than economical with the truth regarding their motives 
in assuming token political positions and power after making pacts a with the devil (the 
repressive apartheid state). However, the tragedy or farce that was the Bantustans was not a 
product of their own creation. The function or purpose of the Bantustans, the problems 
encountered in the Bantustans and their solutions all lay within the power of the apartheid 
regime in Pretoria, with the Bantustan leaders the convenient scapegoats, traitors or 
undesirables. Very few people ever stop to think about the possible crossroads that some of 
the Bantustan leaders found themselves in during this embarrassing era of South African 
history. The Bantustan system is described as a tragedy by the University of the 
Witwatersrand Development Studies Group Southern African Research Service (1982) and 
other critiques such that very few people today, if any, can defend the travesty, farce or myth 
that was the Bantustan policy in South Africa.  Traditional structures (chiefs and headmen) 
and ethnic identities were deliberately crafted into the design of the Bantustans as part of 
controlling rural black populations. Ambitious and some possibly well-meaning individuals 
were lured into inept Bantustan bureaucracies by the promise of power, status, class mobility 
and perhaps wealth. Unfortunately, because of the very design and purpose of the Bantustans, 
these individuals were effectively vigilantes for the apartheid state in the rural areas (Meyers, 
2008; Rogers, 1976). 
Although Bantustan leaders were not the masterminds of the Bantustan system, many acted 
like warlords or shadowy gangster godfathers similar to the mafias in underworld crime 
syndicates. The apartheid state gave them their own fiefdoms in which paternalism and 
                                                 
16 Molteno and Hofmeyr Papers together with Merriman correspondence in the South African Public Library. 
However, Gruber notes that the De Villiers Papers in private possession and the Atherstone Collection were not 
available for consultation. The Spriggs papers in private collection were also not available for detailed 
examination as were the Carnarvan Papers on colonial material. 
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corruption was rife, loyalty was rewarded and individuals were chastised for daring to 
question the legitimacy of any of it. Some of the leaders of the Bantustans bought into the 
fantasy of running their own countries but ordinary people did not. Bantustan leaders‟ 
collaboration with the state, corruption, treachery and the violence which many of them used 
to quash resistance rendered the Bantustans the Wild West of the apartheid era. Many 
Bantustan leaders had acrimonious relations with liberation movements or parties such as the 
ANC because to them, the apartheid state was the goose that laid their golden egg by giving 
them this opportunity to gain power, wealth and status. The divide and rule or indirect rule 
function of the Bantustans was merely the costuming or disguising of political power by the 
apartheid state. In order to defend their privileged position, real and perceived political 
enemies or rivals inside and outside the Bantustans were harassed, intimidated and often 
assassinated and the people‟s legitimate fears, the leaders‟ paranoia, narcissistic self-
indulgence, conspiracies, speculation, accusations and denials acted as catalysts for the cycles 
of violence (Meyers, 2008; Rogers, 1976). 
Kotzé (1975), like the majority of Afrikaner historians and political writers in the 1970s or 
heyday of the Bantustan system focuses on Blacks, Black politics, political parties and 
government in the Bantustans in the period 1961-1978, highlighting the positive 
developments or progress that was being made. A Development Conference was held at the 
Lennox Sebe Teacher‟s Training College in the Ciskei (Zwelitsha) in May 1978 and Proctor-
Sims (1978) writes a glowing report about the economic viability of separate development 
and the Bantustan policy citing successes or developments in the Ciskei as focal points. 
Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana (1988) compiled a log of his own speeches and those of 
other leaders from the Frontline State and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
complaining about the economic sanctions which were imposed on South Africa in the 1980s 
because of the violence and injustice that prevailed under apartheid. The speeches are based 
on opinion research on the matter and Mangope hoped to get a sympathetic ear against the 
sanctions. Before this, Mangope (1978) wrote glowingly about the so-called independent 
Bantustans being inclusive places where everyone could live and prosper. However, this 
could not be further from the truth because of the racial segregation, corruption and 
marginalisation that underpinned the Bantustan system. 
Many of the development corporations (Corporation for Economic Development, 1977-1980) 
which were formed to sell the viability of the Bantustan scheme as part of the grand plan for 
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separate development strenuously argue for the Bantustan policy‟s merits and successes. 
Bates (1987) covers the Ciskei‟s economic conditions, economic policies and tourism 
opportunities in this so-called tax paradise of Southern Africa during the rule of Lennox 
Sebe. Bates (1987) describes these developments and opportunities in the publication title as 
“spectacular evolvement”. In a similar vein, Crause (1982) writes about the Ciskei‟s welfare 
and social services. The work itself is dedicated to Lennox Sebe, then leader of the Ciskei and 
the first ambassador to the Ciskei, J. J. Engelbrecht. The general trend was to have the 
Bantustans Dressed as having huge potential for economic growth, as tax havens and ideal 
tourist destinations but industries were concentrated in white South Africa or on the edge of 
the Bantustans such that it was difficult for Bantustan residents to find jobs. Victimisation at 
work was widespread because employment opportunities were so scarce. Rural homesteads 
were already poor and mostly living off subsistence agriculture and relied heavily on 
remittances from family members that worked in white South Africa on the migrant labour 
system. Misguided rural development projects further reduced the people‟s quality-of-life as 
diseases associated with malnutrition, overcrowding and inadequate hygiene were rife. 
Els et al (1971) of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs Study Group of Fort Hare in 
co-operation with the Fort Hare branch of the South African Academy of Arts and Science 
conducted a general survey on the history, politics and government, economic conditions, 
religion, social life and customs of the Ciskei in order to establish the changes, positive or 
negative, that were taking place. The majority of commentators in the fields of history, race 
relations, politics, economics, geography, anthropology, development and policy studies, for 
example, Hattingh (1979) and the Africa Institute of South Africa (1976) have analysed and 
tried to address the various problems that plagued the Bantustan system from its conception, 
administration, dismantling in 1994 and beyond. De Wet (1995), De Wet and Leibbrandt 
(1994) and De Wet (1985), has researched extensively into social conditions in the former 
Ciskei where Blacks were forcibly relocated as part of Betterment Planning and Villagisation 
programmes or agricultural development projects which were aimed at managing or 
implementing responsible land uses and conservation. Rural populations and general 
conditions were very poor in addition to the disruptions of forced migrant labour which was 
savaging families, communities, social life and customs before Betterment schemes were 
introduced (Yawitch, 1982). In addition to the socio-economic consequences of forced 
removals, De Wet has also written about poverty, the demographic variables that affect 
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health, land and livestock, welfare development and the continued marginalisation of 
communities in the former Ciskei post 1994.  
Charton‟s book (1980) and Switzer (1979) also highlight the deplorable plight of many 
Ciskei residents (Xhosas/Fingos). They speak of the economic and social conditions as well 
as the politics and government of the Ciskei which fostered political and economic 
dependence in the cities and towns. According to Switzer (1979), the mass media in the 
Ciskei had a curious relationship with the state. More often than not, the media employed 
self-censorship to pacify the government instead of accurately reporting the news for fear of 
stirring the wrath of government officials by exposing heavy-handed or corrupt dealings. 
Mager (1999) writes about the social history of the Ciskei between 1945 and 1959. The 
Ciskei is used as an example of a typical South African Bantustan and the discussion centres 
around politics and government in the Bantustan, different gender and sex roles and the 
manifestations of human territoriality, ethnicity and race relations. The question of 
„independence‟ for the Bantustans was another sting in the tail which made an already bad 
situation worse. Most other commentators focus on variants of these themes because they 
were at the core of what was wrong with the homelands or Bantustans. More recent writing 
on apartheid focuses not just on the history or role of liberation movements but adopts a 
comparative slant in how they comment on the political transition or liberation as it unfolded 
or was negotiated in different localities, for example, in Stutterheim in the Eastern Cape 
between 1980 and 1994 or Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and resistance to the incorporation of 
Moutse into KwaNdebele between 1985 and 1987 (University of Cape Town Historical 
Studies Department, 2007). 
Southall (1983) examines the political economy of the Transkei (one of the four 
„independent‟ Bantustans) and surveys its politics, government, economic and social 
conditions since it was the first one to become „independent‟ and was supposed to be the 
beacon for the others to follow. In a similar vein, Bank‟s thesis (1988) reveals the 
opportunism and underhandedness which characterised most political and economic dealings 
in the Bantustans and uses QwaQwa, a Bantustan for the Sotho, as an example. Conducive 
conditions for the establishment of small businesses were artificially created and 
entrepreneurship was encouraged at the expense of the moral fabric and customs of the 
people in order to give the illusion that the Bantustans were viable and could sustain their 
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populations. Some people benefited from this but greed and corruption took root as did other 
social evils which left communities poorer for it. 
The realities are disheartening and the solutions to the problems are complex because the 
problems are layered. The Bantustans were designed to separate, marginalise and effectively 
ex-communicate thousands of black South African‟s by confining then to the most 
inhospitable places in the country. With all these complications, South Africa‟s democratic 
governments continue to grapple with redress issues in the former Bantustans, for instance, 
the consolidation of land holdings, land tenure, service delivery, reconciling dislocated 
communities, administrative and political divisions and duplications since the Bantustans 
were reincorporated into South Africa in 1994 (De Wet, 1995; 1985; De Wet and Leibbrant, 
1994). A reading of the literature above shows Bantustan leaders as shadowy figures with a 
propensity for violence, betrayal, murder, corruption and intrigue, almost without exception. 
They are portrayed as opportunistic men Driven by ambition and overrun with the need for 
power and status, no matter how artificial the foundation. However, these same men that 
were so lacking in integrity according to the official records and oral accounts were sons, 
fathers and husbands and their loved ones have a different story to tell about them as 
individuals and leaders or spokesmen for black South Africans who did not have a voice. 
Their participation in Bantustan structures is explained, as Enos Mabuza‟s case shows, as a 
duty or obligation to the people and that in so doing, they stepped up and made the necessary 
sacrifices that few were willing or able to make. Of course, there are many ironies and 
ambiguities within and between these different perspectives regarding how conservative, 
parochial, corrupt, oppressive and disruptive the whole system was. Lord Acton‟s (John 
Dahlberg) famous comment “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” 
(cited in Grothe, 2008:259) is both true and false in the case of South Africa‟s former 
Bantustan leaders. They were given some power and it did corrupt most of them but they 
never had absolute power. Unfortunately, collectively they are forever held in contempt by 
history, regardless of what they did or did not do as individuals. They are not seen as patriots 
but as tyrants who treated the Bantustans as cows to be milked or plundered at their whim. 
2.17.1 Survey of Existing Literature on Some Bantustan Personalities 
The previous section outlined how the conception or design of the Bantustan policy sets the 
context for a discussion of specific personalities that participated in the system and their 
biographies. The attention of scholars has centred mainly on the four „independent 
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Bantustans – Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda and the specific personalities, 
political parties and atrocities committed in those Bantustans but very little has been written 
about the six self-governing territories - Lebowa, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, QwaQwa, 
KwaNdebele with the exception for KwaZulu.17 Much time and effort has been devoted to 
KwaZulu and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and to a lesser extent on Bophuthatswana and 
Lucas Mangope because of the violence that plagued their territories from the late 1980s into 
the mid 1990s. There is a need for the history of the lesser known Bantustans to be recorded 
and debated before it is lost (White, 2008). The deficiency needs to be rectified as a matter of 
urgency because many of the official records or documents of that period have already been 
lost, burnt or otherwise destroyed in one way or another and some of the role-players of the 
period have died, like Enos Mabuza, and can no longer be interviewed and have their 
evidence recorded, whatever its worth. 
The Ciskei‟s Lennox Sebe 
Gitywa (1988) is one author that has written the biography of one of the many Bantustan 
leaders. His biographical study is on the life of Lennox Sebe, erstwhile President of the 
Ciskei who is portrayed as a statesman in his own right because he was leader of an 
„independent‟ Bantustan. White (2008:201) notes that Sebe was taken by flights of grandeur 
and wanted to leave his imprint and image all over the Ciskei, for example, through the 
construction of the Bulembu Airport and the Ntaba kaNdoda monument. Sebe (1980), like 
Mangope, Matanzima, Holomisa, Buthelezi and others writes about the plight of Black South 
Africans, the complicated or layered race relations, politics and government in South Africa 
under apartheid and where the „independent‟ Ciskei with its own dynamics and challenges fit 
in that milieu. He outlines black people‟s traditional attitudes to agriculture and resistance to 
what he considered to be worthwhile practical conservation policies under the aegis of the 
Betterment schemes (Sebe, 1980). Grootboom (2008) is amongst others who have written 
about Sebe focusing instead on Xhosa history, orature and literature and what can be 
                                                 
17 Cedric Phatudi (Lebowa), Nelson Ramodike (Lebowa), Enos Mabuza (KaNgwane), Mangisi Cephas Zitha 
(KaNgwane), Simon Skosana (KwaNdebele), Prince James Mahlangu (KwaNdebele), Gabriel Ramushwana 
(Venda), Patrick Mphephu (Venda), Hudson Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu), Wessel Motha (QwaQwa), Kenneth 
Mopeli (QwaQwa), Mangosuthu Buthelezi (KwaZulu), Lucas Mangope, (Bophuthatswana), Oupa Qgozo 
(Ciskei), Lennox Sebe (Ciskei), Kaizer Matanzima (Transkei), Botha Sigcau (Transkei), Stella Sigcau 
(Transkei), Bantu Holomisa (Transkei) and those that served as interim or acting leaders at various times, their 
different political party affiliations, for example, Chief Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party and what it 
represented or stood for. 
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considered or criticised as apolitical, fictional or mythical within it. Grootboom‟s thesis 
centres on the themes and techniques in Sebe‟s book (1982) entitled “Ucamngco”.  
The Ciskei‟s Oupa Gqozo 
According to White (2008), very few books cover the historical events that occurred in Ciskei 
during the regimes of Lennox Sebe and Oupa Gqozo. Consequently, his (White, 2008) thesis 
in History focuses on the Ciskei from the eighteenth century, its politics and government into 
the twentieth century, internecine struggles and betrayals, the constitutional development of 
the Ciskei, the attainment of independence in 1981, the harsh, autocratic and nepotistic rule 
of Lennox Sebe (1973-1990) and his replacement by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo through a 
military coup d‟état on 4 March 1990 (1990 to 1994). In the early months of his rule, Gqozo 
enjoyed the adulation and support of the apartheid government, the National Party and the 
Ciskei people. He also had the approval of the ANC including Nelson Mandela and Jacob 
Zuma because he did and said all the right things and welcomed and collaborated with the 
ANC alliance unlike his predecessor Sebe. White (2008) compares Sebe and Gqozo and 
concludes that as a leader, Gqozo was inept rather than evil. Whatever Gqozo‟s failings, he is 
considered to be the better of two evils compared to Sebe who is described as an autocratic, 
iron-fisted dictator who brooked no opposition or interference and had no qualms about 
imprisoning known or suspected political opponents (White, 2008:201). 
White (2008) casts Gqozo as a victim who was apparently misled, misinformed by his trusted 
advisors, Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink among them, who preyed on his paranoia and 
insecurities for their own ends. Nieuwoudt and Brink secretly worked for the SADF 
Intelligence Service as counterintelligence agents. White (2008:188-192) is also sympathetic 
to the fate of Gqozo after he was forced to resign as leader of the Ciskei in March 1994 and 
became indigent, depressed and neurotic, followed by a series of misfortunes. White 
maintains that Gqozo did not fit the popular conception or stereotype of a ruthless African 
dictator. White (2008) argues that Gqozo respected the rule of law and was generally free of 
corruption but he did not have the necessary academic qualifications, experience and ability, 
insight and foresight to rule a country. He became paranoid about his own safety and the 
possible overthrow of his government and he was too easily swayed by others compared to 
his predecessor. Gqozo was discredited the most when he was implicated in the killing of 
General Charles Sebe and Colonel Onward Guzana and because of his later opposition to the 
ANC which undid his initial reputation of exemplary leadership. The onset of civil war in the 
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Ciskei and the Bisho Massacre of 7 September 1992 in which soldiers opened fire on 
demonstrators also did not do his reputation or popularity any favours. In the end, Gqozo 
could not be everyone‟s knight in shining armour. He turned against the ANC and its allies in 
October/November 1990 and the ethos of jubilation and adulation that had initially 
characterised his rule changed to one of doubt and eventual rejection. In July 1991, Gqozo 
formed a new political party, the African Democratic Movement (ADM) with the express aim 
of opposing the ANC and he compelled civil servants, the security forces, headmen, teachers 
and others to join it (White, 2008). 
At the beginning of October 1993, Gqozo joined members of the Concerned South African 
Group (COSAG) who included Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha Freedom Party/the government of 
KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, the Conservative Party and the Afrikaanse Volksfront (a 
coalition of twenty-one conservative Afrikaans groups). COSAG was a negotiating alliance 
which opposed the National Party/South African government and the ANC‟s Drive for a 
unitary state and campaigned for strong regional states or full regional autonomy for each of 
the regions it represented and a weak central government as opposed to a strong unitary 
system. COSAG wanted to be left out of the negotiations between the ANC and the South 
African government because it did not agree with the direction that the CODESA talks were 
taking. Later COSAG was known as the Freedom Alliance and it was prepared to „go it 
alone‟ (secede, fight and die) if the demands for a future federal structure failed via mediated 
talks. Gqozo also opposed the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and pursued an 
isolationist policy to resist the reincorporation of Ciskei into South Africa (White, 2008). 
KwaZulu‟s Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
Smith (1988), Mzala (1988) and Temkin (1976; 2003) offer just a few of several biographies 
on Chief Buthelezi as one of many visible South African politicians. The biographies 
necessarily include a discussion of the history, politics and government of the Natal area, 
including KwaZulu since about 1961, Chief Buthelezi‟s role as KwaZulu‟s leader/statesman, 
what where or appeared to be his motives or agendas for doing certain things, Inkatha, the 
successes and failures, controversies and the wave of violence that swept Natal from the late 
1980s into the 1990s. In 1979, KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi published a book entitled Power is 
Ours which underscored the animosity which characterised South Africa‟s race relations 
between 1961 and 1978 but also chronicled his and Inkatha‟s relationship with the ANC from 
an amicable and cooperative one to being acrimonious and frosty. The works of authors such 
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as Maré and Hamilton (1987), Maré (1992) and Tessendorf and Boult (1991) can be seen to 
have built on this and similar publications as they revolve around KwaZulu‟s Chief 
Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the Inkatha Cultural Movement (Inkatha Yenkululeko 
Yesizwe) and its later evolution into the Inkatha Freedom Party. In 1990, Chief Buthelezi 
again published a book entitled South Africa: My Vision of the Future which revealed his 
ambitions and hopes for future political participation and leadership during South Africa‟s 
transition into a democracy. Buthelezi/KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and right wing 
Afrikaner groups (the Conservative Party and the Afrikaanse Volksfront) vigorously 
campaigned for a federal type of government in a post-apartheid South Africa because they 
believed it was the only or best way for them to retain some power, influence, control and 
status (White, 2008). He also commented on the economic sanctions which had been imposed 
on South Africa because he was publicly opposed to them and their negative impact on the 
economy due to rolling disinvestment by foreign capital. The common thread is Chief 
Buthelezi and Inkatha‟s political ambitions, their particular brand of nationalism, alliances, 
appetite for power and propensity for ethnic violence which is shrouded in a Zulu warrior 
identity and the attendant notions of masculinity which date back to Chaka Zulu and the awe 
he inspired (Golan, 1994). The situation in KwaZulu provides the foreground for a general 
discussion of ethnic identity and relations, Black political activity and internecine violence in 
South Africa in the build-up to the first democratic election in 1994. 
The Transkei‟s K. D. Matanzima, George Matanzima and Bantu Holomisa  
An autobiography by the Transkei‟s head of state Kaizer D. Matanzima (1976) chronicles the 
history of the Tembu people, the politics, government, attempted coup or mutiny and foreign 
relations of the Transkei Bantustan as well as its generally respectful relations with the ANC. 
Matanzima portrays the Transkei‟s independence as having happened on his terms – that he 
successfully negotiated the terms and conditions with the apartheid state and that it turned out 
not to be such a bad thing while it lasted. Of course this is open to interpretation and one is 
tempted to say is downright delusional or impossible based on the divide and rule strategy 
that the apartheid state set out to achieve through the Bantustan system and the granting of 
independence. This counts because it is Matanzima‟s own perspective as someone who was 
directly ensconced in the politics of that time. Streek and Wicksteed‟s Render Unto Kaiser: A 
Transkei Dossier (1981) also traces the leadership of Kaizer and George Matanzima in the 
Transkei but they highlight the political corruption which swept through the Bantustan as the 
leaders amassed as much personal wealth as they could at the expense of the people. In 
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contrast, Holomisa and Meyer (1999) write in a hopeful mood about the future prospects of 
Holomisa‟s political party the United Democratic Movement and the Transkei. Their book is 
a review of twentieth century South African history including the racial and ethnic issues, 
tribal or Bantustan government, political leadership and main political parties, social life and 
customs, the sympathetic reception of the ANC and its activities in Bantu Holomisa‟s 
Transkei and the role or significance of the Congress of Traditional Leaders in South Africa 
(Contralesa). The establishment of CONTRALESA symbolises the revival and recognition of 
the relevance of chieftaincies as traditional institutions in South Africa post-1994 (see 
Chapter 3). 
2.18 Introducing KaNgwane’s Enos Mabuza 
Enos Mabuza‟s odyssey begins in rural Barberton to political office and organisation and 
ends in numerous business boardrooms and now forms part of a particular region‟s history 
and heritage (the former Eastern Transvaal). Mabuza, like Gqozo, is described as charismatic, 
having a pleasant, disarming and attractive personality (White, 2008:198). Both men were 
full of hope, got along well with others and were dedicated family men and appeared to 
respect the rule of law; traits that have been confirmed by those that had contact with them. In 
some respects, Mabuza and the other leaders from the six self-governing Bantustans have 
been lost in the multitude and appear to have been merely biding their time within the system, 
not doing much to rock the boat either way. However, they had their backs against the ropes 
with all the others who were more prominent or conspicuous by their propensity for violence 
or political utterances. This thesis explores the life and work of Enos Mabuza who led the 
KaNgwane (Swazi) Bantustan in present-day Mpumalanga province. It shows that he used 
improvisation in his dealings with the people, other Bantustan leaders and the apartheid state. 
He composed his life by ear, feeling and instinct and tried to get through that phase of his life 
as honourably as was possible under the circumstances. He never did a volte-face or threw 
down the gauntlet to the ANC alliance like Buthelezi, Mangope or Gqozo did. Chief 
Buthelezi‟s belligerent treatment and vitriolic condemnation of the ANC and its supporters in 
the late 1980s and 1990s comes to mind. Instead, Mabuza was true to his words and left 
politics in the early 1990s when the ANC and other political organisations were unbanned 
like he always said he would. When he made the decision to resign from active politics, he 
joined the world of business which was opening up to more blacks in the early 1990s. 
Mabuza was one of few in a similar position who did not allow himself to be overtaken by 
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events and changing political tides. He may have been an inadvertent dictator whose faults 
were unintentional like White (2008) suggests about Oupa Gqozo but he had some redeeming 
qualities which kept him in power for so long. The South Africa government had quick and 
easy ways of disposing (military or police force, other black elites that had designs on power 
or the withholding of financial support/budgets) of uncooperative leaders but it did not get rid 
of him in KaNgwane, but not for lack of trying. The ANC wanted him and his Inyandza 
National Movement to act as a bulwark against the excesses of the state in KaNgwane which 
was in a strategic position between Mozambique and Swaziland and the South African 
interior. 
Consent for this research was given by Mabuza‟s family because the subject could not do so 
himself. The timeline for his life, career, achievements and accolades begins with his birth in 
1936 and his death in 1997. The subject lived in a different historical time and context from 
the researcher who is a black Zimbabwean female born in 1978 when the subject, a black 
South African Swati male born in 1936 was getting initiated into or entangled in Bantustan 
politics. The differences between the subject and researcher are obvious but this thesis is an 
attempt at a comprehensive examination of Enos Mabuza‟ life and achievements in politics, 
business, education and conservation, not just his participation in Bantustan politics, which 
he is generally known for. His life has not been recorded extensively for public access so the 
thesis traces Mabuza‟s upbringing in rural Barberton, his domestic life with his wife and 
children, his rise to political office in the Bantustan system, his modest attempts at reforming, 
for instance the labour laws of the KaNgwane Bantustan and the general atmosphere which 
prevailed in the Bantustan under his leadership. There is no evidence that he bought votes to 
keep himself in power. There is also no evidence that Mabuza was demanding, resentful, 
intolerant, judgmental or unreasonable as a leader, father or husband. He might have been a 
reluctant leader in a time of crisis which raised suspicion, conspiracy theories, questions of 
betrayal, manipulation, sacrifice and illegitimacy but he rose to the challenge and did not 
behave in a perfunctory manner even when he was perceived as an enemy of the people. 
Mabuza served as a board member for many companies in the early 1990s alongside many 
notable black and white businesspeople at the time who were chairmen, chief executive 
officers, directors, presidents or vice presidents of such organizations. Being a board member 
or corporate officer for so many organizations meant that Mabuza acquired an extensive 
knowledge of the different organisations‟ products or operations, specific industry 
information such as competitors, market data, company financials and labour relations. 
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Mabuza was able to reinvent himself and engage with people who had once been on different 
sides of the political divide. He avoided stagnation as he grew older and the political 
landscape changed around him. An outline of his life and career reconciles the different 
facets of a complex human life and highlights the different seasons or phases in it as he 
moved from one sphere to the other. 
Contrary to what conventional wisdom has to say about former Bantustan leaders, an 
argument can be made for Mabuza being a decent man in a bad situation. He was resilient 
and found opportunity in adversity and the accolades that he received are the gold stars on his 
life‟s balance sheet. Recognition gives us a sense of belonging, achievement, affirmation and 
satisfaction that we made a noteworthy contribution. He was one of few Bantustan leaders 
who knew when to quit and did not resort to secessionist positions. On 11 March 1990, 
Mabuza addressed the tenth annual congress of the Inyandza National Movement as Chief 
Minister of KaNgwane and leader of Inyandza. He appealed to KaNgwane residents to „set an 
example‟ and refrain from wanton and senseless damage to property such as that witnesses in 
Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei.  On 26 April 1990 he called for the dissolution of the 
KaNgwane Bantustan‟s government at the opening of the second session of the 1990 
legislative assembly, noting that serious attention was being given to phasing out the present 
assembly within a year (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990:502). 
Mabuza, like all the other individuals mentioned in this survey, has a claim in history; a place 
of significance for those whose lives they touched. Reflecting on his „rags to riches story‟ is 
in some ways also a reflection on different or marginal political experiences and maligned 
identities. It is hoped that a critical biography of Mabuza‟s life, his contribution in different 
fields and its significance within a wider context can add to the richness and diversity of 
South African history and experience as well as open new possibilities for political biography 
in South Africa. It is by no means a definitive account of the man and his work but it is hoped 
that it can form the foundation for further study on him and other lesser known or 
controversial South African figures from his generation and even those that are younger. 
2.19 Conclusion 
Very few things in life are coincidental or fortuitous. Realising one‟s potential or success 
requires character, intelligent risk-taking, confidence and competence but also depends on the 
bonds, relationships or networks that we form with others. Fortune favours the brave and 
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those who keep up with local and world events and trends. Asking for ideas or input greatly 
increases the odds of success in one‟s favour just as much as attracting and retaining 
influential people around oneself is a networking strategy which offers different 
opportunities. Everyone has an agenda for doing something, whether the reason is noble or 
selfish. The Shylock mentality of always thinking „what is in it for me‟ creeps into most of 
our decisions, attitudes and commitments. There is much public moralising in political and 
intellectual thought or dominant ideas that mould our perceptions but there are also 
alternative avenues for discussion, explanation and interpretation which acknowledge, instead 
of silencing, dissenting voices which challenge the status quo.  
One can not overlook the speculative dimensions of narrative biography and the 
shortcomings associated with it in the face of other explorations and competing explanations 
for varied purposes. Despite this, however, biography research adds to the body of knowledge 
and history of specific fields which are of interest to different people. Scholarly biography is 
the study of lived lives and experiences by famous, infamous, well-known and obscure 
personalities, all of whom are flawed in some way but remain relevant. It is evident from the 
biographies mentioned in this chapter that identity is not static in the same way that 
circumstances/contexts change over time. The common questions or threads in all the 
biographies outlined above are who, when, how and why subject X did Y. Biographical 
research highlights the place of narration in the formation of identity whilst also showing that 
biographies are rarely seamless narrations. Specific relations and conditions of each 
biographic production or reproduction are important and should be acknowledged when we 
assess individual lives as balance sheets or records of achievements and failures (Rassool, 
2004). Biographical research offers us an opportunity to make sense of different life courses. 
It also makes us appreciate the bio-psycho-social character of human beings. People continue 
developing, changing, evolving and adapting throughout their lives, hence the popularity of 
the life-span approach to studying human development and growth (the cumulative effect of 
external/environmental, social and internal factors on physical as well as psychological 
growth). 
White (2008) laments that one finds no more than passing discussion of the history of the 
independent Republics of Transkei and Ciskei, or of their leaders, but in reality, one is even 
more hard pressed to find more than cursory mention of the six self-governing Bantustans, 
their leaders and specific internal dynamics. However, this does not or should not mean that 
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the events that transpired there or the personalities that were involved are not part of South 
Africa‟s history or are so inconsequential that they should be relegated to the dustbin of 
history. There are many stories that can be told from contested pasts such as these but they 
presently rely heavily on interviews with key role players during that time as well as 
newspaper reports. 
Thriving, prosperous and peaceful Bantustans were never a real possibility but a utopian ideal 
that carried the Dream of the apartheid state and their lackeys who aided and abetted it. The 
Bantustans represented strife, doubt, misery, injustice, violence and rejection. For a long 
time, during and after the end of apartheid, former Bantustan leaders were the untouchables 
of South Africa‟s political stage because of how they were used in the apartheid state‟s divide 
and rule strategy against their own people, the violence and repression that characterized 
most of their tenures and their non-co-operative stance during the political negotiations and 
transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the tensions that developed over this 
subsided with the re-incorporation of the former Bantustans into South Africa, without the 
federal government that many of them had demanded. The re-absorption of the Bantustans 
neutralized whatever power the Bantustan leaders had enjoyed and gotten accustomed to by 
denying them a power base or constituency. However, even though their clout is now 
significantly reduced, regional and ethnic identities and loyalties endure and some of the 
former Bantustan leaders have managed to retain enough support in their former 
constituencies to allow them to remain in active politics, as part of the opposition. The 
Transkei‟s Bantu Holomisa and KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi are examples of former 
Bantustan leaders who are members of parliament and leaders of their respective political 
parties, internal power struggles notwithstanding. 
Goodman‟s book (1999) acknowledges the different routes or journeys that different groups, 
communities, organisations and individuals took to get into the new South Africa. His book 
charts through South Africa‟s modern or contemporary (twentieth century) history, its politics 
and government, social conditions, complaints against the police, issues regarding land titles, 
land reform, dispossession, relocations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The 
more one reads about history, power, interpretations and the different levels at which they 
operate, the more unstable or unreliable historical sources appear. The contingent nature of 
facts is also uncovered but access to discernible fragments of the past afford us layers of 
understanding and make different interpretations of the past possible, hopefully free of the 
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excesses of abstraction history, expediency and convention. South Africa today has a vastly 
different political landscape but former Bantustan leaders seem to have smoothed over the 
rough edges, gotten rid of the excesses of the Bantustan heyday and earned a modicum of 
respectability along the way. Whether or not they have been rehabilitated or have repented or 
should be forgiven for what they did or represented remains a matter of personal opinion and 
debate. The jury is still out but the political structures appear to be more accommodating, 
tolerant and even reconciliatory towards these individuals in much the same way that they 
have been towards the new role and position of traditional authorities and chieftaincies in a 
democratic South Africa. 
Ultimately, life or its meaning is an unanswered question for most of us. It is a puzzle or 
maze that we have to figure out as we go along. It is an experiment in which we make choices 
and live with their consequences. We take what seem like the desirable middle courses 
between ineffective extremes and hopefully learn from our mistakes. This chapter set out to 
advocate or support a multidisciplinary approach which acknowledges diversity and plurality 
in the social sciences and other disciplines, as well as an open mind to the study of individual 
lives, which forces us to revisit issues that we or others are eager to forget or erase from 
memory or historical record. Oral traditions and other means are being used more and more 
to uncover previously hidden histories in this sensitive but crucial national undertaking of 
nurturing historical consciousness, human values and morality, including tolerance, for each 
person‟s assertions of dignity and independence (Jeppie, 2004: 1-15). The practice of social 
science, its uses, effectiveness and contribution towards meeting contemporary challenges 
depends on such an open and challenging mind and reflexive control of knowledge 
production beyond sterile empiricism because things are often not what they seem.  
It is hoped that this chapter gives a sense of the difficulties encountered in conducting 
biographical research, the progress that has been made, the value of biographical research the 
potential that it has for multidisciplinary projects as well as the required competence of 
researchers trying to understand human behaviour. The aim is not to become an apologist or 
start a crusade to change the official record but to put alternative interpretations into the 
public domain, to enrich the historical record by incorporating individual voices, certain 
accounts that are omitted or underrepresented in official records (reclaiming history), hidden 
struggles, politics and popular movements, including those of former Bantustan rulers, their 
formative years and other influences which led them into those positions. Being in that 
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position was fortuitous for some leaders (Mabuza, Gqozo) but not for others. Whatever 
„good‟ intentions or deeds any former Bantustan leader may have had or done are generally 
over-shadowed by the negative legacy of the Bantustans. But is the general condemnation, 
stigma, hostility, alienation and resentment against all former Bantustan rulers deserved, fair 
or biased? If Bantustan leaders were puppets of the apartheid state, to be manipulated at will, 
how much culpability or liability should Bantustan leaders have taken for the things, 
including the administrative disasters and near-political implosions which happened in the 
Bantustans which were orchestrated from without? Can anyone ever respect what they did or 
risked and what role do forgiveness, compassion and the spirit of reconciliation have to play 
in mediating their „reintegration‟ into democratic society? These are some of the questions 
that the reader should bear in mind as they read through this thesis. 
Actions have consequences and former Bantustan leaders chose to wade in unchartered and 
murky waters where many feared to go. It can be argued that these individuals courted 
adversity and calamity with the hope of prosperity in unpopular positions which demanded 
some degree of courage. It was a path less travelled but for many of their critics, it was also a 
path of least resistance. Criticism is not agreeable but necessary up to a point. Bantustan 
leaders were used as decoys by the apartheid state and much violence and disruption resulted 
from the Bantustan system. There is no sun without shadow and many of these men were 
seeking to gratify their desires with the least exertion but they were not responsible for the 
system itself. Politicians or leaders have faults and inadequacies as do all people but it is hard 
to believe that all Bantustan leaders were of the same ilk. There were differences and 
similarities in the motives and objectives that were being pursued as well as the means that 
were used to achieve them, whether one regards them as self-serving aggressors, masochists 
or wayward sons in a tragicomedy. Some Bantustan leaders were definitely more vindictive 
or had a higher propensity for violence, some were more ostentatious, paranoid, power-
crazed and greedy megalomaniacs after the accumulation of personal riches and some were 
endowed with more intransigent attitudes than others. Interviews with individuals that had 
contact with leaders such as Mabuza (later in this thesis) and Gqozo (2008) suggest that they 
possessed more honesty, integrity, took more personal responsibility for their actions and felt 
it was an honour to serve their people with pride. Perhaps it is true that some like Mabuza, 
according to oral accounts, tried to take on a David and Goliath contest thinking that they 
could take on the apartheid state from within its own structures and initiate some kind of 
change. Perhaps it was a well-meaning but mistaken and naïve undertaking with serious 
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ramifications for their reputations and legacies. Some of the Bantustan leaders, as White 
(2008) argues, just did not have the necessary insight or foresight to recognise the 
implications, immediate or future, of their actions.  
Since the disbanding and reincorporation of the Bantustans into South Africa in 1994, and 
even before that, former Bantustan leaders have endured the humiliation, disrepute and 
stigma of their association with those apartheid creations. They have been caricatured as 
having been led by the nose and paraded around by the apartheid state as models of what it 
was to betray and oppress one‟s own people. Perhaps they did not see or refused to see the 
bigger picture, did not put the implications of the Bantustan system into proper perspective or 
assessed the risks superficially. Whatever the case might be, there is no denying the 
unpalatable truths about the Bantustan system and the individuals that ruled over them but 
hindsight is 20-20 and we can never achieve perfect understanding or appreciation of 
someone else‟s experience. We judge after the fact but things are not always as clear cut or 
predictable when they happen. It is thus the biographer‟s job to peel back the layers and 
reveal the hidden nature of the individual, their private desires, fears, longings, vulnerabilities 
successes and failures. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Conquests, colonisation and migration create dislocations or disengagement between culture 
and territory (Oommen cited in Ratcliffe, 1994:10) and many political regimes have 
successfully used strategies of cultural separation to consolidate power and control. In most 
instances, white/colonial conquest and subjugation fostered tribalism by manipulating the 
African population‟s different histories and cultures. However, such arbitrary distinctions do 
not mean that people can be separated into neat, mutually exclusive compartments 
(Kaarsholm, 1995:34; Van den Berghe, 1990:1-15; Van den Berghe, 1970:80; Sharp, 1988). 
In a world where race is a salient factor, there also exist “social credentials that constitute the 
real bases of political inclusion” (Mehta, 1990 cited in Jacobson, 2006:653). Other 
discriminatory markers for eligibility for political rights include gender, culture and 
psychological conditions which are interwoven as preconditions for inclusion and exclusion 
(De Vos and Romanucci-Ross, 1975:305, Said and Simmons, 1976:111, 127).  
In Africa, “tribal identity persists because colonial governments gave it an institutional and 
political support and because the tie to the tribal, communal, or lineage land, often phrased in 
the idiom of filial loyalty to ancestors, is still an important social and economic asset” 
(Uchendu, 1975:268-269). Uchendu (1975:269) notes that one can maintain expand or 
contract the social frame of reference which confers or imposes a certain social identity 
(choice between cultural alternatives). The frame of reference for identity can be continental, 
regional, national or ethnic, for example, Igbo, Zulu, Akan, Yoruba, Hausa, Kikuyu, Ganda 
or Lunda. The unequal nature of inter-group interactions gives rise to ethnocentrism or total 
avoidance of contact. Conflict and competition are endemic because people readily believe 
and magnify the perceived differences (distinctiveness and notions of superiority) between 
them as long as it benefits them in some way and competing groups try to impose their values 
on others. Unfortunately, increased inter-group contact and the attendant concomitants of 
economic growth and urbanisation exaggerate ethnic differences and competition for limited 
resources and opportunities (Said and Simmons, 1976:15, 20, 25; Wilson and Frederiksen, 
1995:2, 4; Van den Berghe, 1970:12, 14, 269; De Vos, 1975:6, 15; Ratcliffe, 1994).  
Bourdieu comments on the divisive aspects of culture and arbitrary distinctions as follows:  
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…the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) is also the culture 
which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which legitimates 
distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define 
themselves by their distance from the dominant culture (Bourdieu, 1992:167). 
Identity politics, according to Uchedu (1975:273), is often embarrassing and uncomfortable 
for political elites who find themselves in conflicting roles as national leaders and as cultural 
brokers or custodians for their own ethnic groups (a dilemma of how to “keep faith” with 
competing loyalties). Government patronage in many instances has led to the persistence of 
ethnic enclaves and heightened ethnic patriotism or allegiance and tensions in many plural 
societies (Fein, 1999:157-163). This was the case in the former Yugoslavia (Stavrou, 
1976:134-149), Rwanda and Burundi (Mamdani, 2001; Van den Berghe, 1970; Prunier, 
1995; Said and Simmons, 1976:28; Destexhe, 1995; Taylor, 1999), Armenia and Cambodia 
(Kiernan, 1999:165-178), Somalia (Adam, 2008; The Africa Watch Committee, 1990), 
Uganda (Mamdani, 1976) and even the United States (Jacobson, 2006:645-650). 
This chapter and the rest of the thesis are based on how Mahmood Mamdani historicises 
colonialism and the enduring socio-political problems that it created on the African continent. 
3.2 Colonial Divide and Rule Tactics 
Mahmood Mamdani‟s (1996) thesis in Citizen and Subjects focuses on the different modes of 
rule in rural and urban Africa. It is an example of new paradigms that seek to account for the 
modern dilemmas facing African societies in theoretical frameworks that allow the 
identification of major actors and institutional structures which aid and frustrate social 
change. Mamdani argues that rather than being citizens, rural populations are subjects of 
undemocratic authority which does not have systems of accountability to the people. Being a 
citizen (under common law) is framed as being good, ideal and desirable whilst being a 
subject (under customary law) is bad. The „rural‟ is characterised by colonially and post-
colonially re-invented „despotisms‟ while the „urban‟ is constituted by civil struggles. In 
terms of Mamdani‟s conceptualisation, rural citizens under traditional authorities and 
Bantustan governments in South Africa were not true citizens and this is at the heart of this 
enquiry because Mabuza‟s constituency and „power base‟ was rural, which has implications 
for the weight that one can assign to his political career and/or contribution. 
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Different groups tend to rely on or manipulate identity-based politics in struggles for access 
to the state and the resources that it controls or to protest against exclusion and oppression 
and demand basic rights and socio-economic provisioning. The problem with the native-
settler, subject-citizen or indigene-settler distinctions is that they are artificially created to 
further certain agendas. Ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental, but is the product of a 
conscious effort by social actors. Individuals or groups that are classified as aliens or 
foreigners have their nationality and rights of citizenship questioned (entitlements, rights and 
obligations). They are unequally treated or discriminated (exploited, dominated, excluded or 
ignored) as a minority or as refugees by state authorities, non-state and other regulatory 
agencies (Mamdani, 1996:22-24, 47, 67-69, 143, 191). 
Ethnicity is a matter of shared traits or cultural commonalities but it is also the result of the 
interplay between external categorisation and self-identification. Dormant ethnic identities 
are manipulated in pursuit of particular interests18, thereby politicising ethnicity and 
ethnicising the polity as was done by colonial authorities, Christian missionaries and 
emergent African nationalist elites. Colonial indirect rule categorised Africans by „tribe‟ and 
promoted separate settlements between rural natives and settlers of urban centres. Despite the 
historicity and fluidity of ethnic identities, the general exploitation of popular ethnic 
grievances and the role of political institutions and policies in the framing of ethnic relations, 
ethnicity is not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations but also in the contexts of 
cooperation. Ethnic groups are groups with ascribed membership usually, but not always, 
based on claims or myths of common history, ancestry, language, race, religion, culture and 
territory. Further, traditional leadership does not give everyone a chance to be elected, and it 
does not appear to have systems for recourse against the unfair exercise of power (Mamdani, 
1996:22-24, 47, 67-69, 143, 191). 
The tribe/tribalism was taken to be the building block of social life in Africa in particular and 
ethnicity, as a political identity, continues to be undergirded and reproduced by institutions of 
colonial vintage. Ethnicity/tribalism, taken as a primordial identity, was manipulated by 
different elite interest groups because such identities were regarded as more historically and 
institutionally durable as opposed to more fluid or transitory legally or institutionally 
                                                 
18 Employing or mobilising ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of socio-economic 
competition which can lead to regional inequalities, lack of development, lack of economic unity, rivalry in 
provision of amenities as well as conflict which manifests as ethnic polarisation, sectarianism, factional politics, 
intolerance and extremism. 
 
Page | 92 
 
inscribed political identities. Mamdani (2001) shows how particular political identities (racial 
and ethnic) are the result of complex state formation processes, both cultural and market-
based, in which registration papers translate into inclusion or exclusion from particular 
regimes of rights and entitlements as opposed to cultural or biological identities. The colonial 
state was the legal or institutional complex which set in motion specific political identities 
which in turn reflected how power was organised (officially enforced or insurgent). 
Each person carries multiple identities ranging from those defined by ethnic, racial, 
geographical, economic, religious, political, moral and even aesthetic factors. Mamdani‟s 
(2001) interpretation of the Rwandan genocide examines the social dynamics in historical, 
theoretical, political and regional perspective19. It illustrates how a failure to transcend certain 
identities can result in unimaginable acts of violence. The racialisation, ethnification, and 
later redefinition, of Hutu and Tutsi differences under colonialism in Belgian Rwanda created 
a set of circumstances which ignited genocide in the 1990s. Colonialism set into motion the 
world of the settler and the native and this confined or set apart Hutus as indigenous or native 
and the Tutsi minority as foreign, settler alien Hamites. The colonisers racialised, as opposed 
to ethnicised, the position of Tutsis and gave them a privileged position relative to the Hutu 
majority. This situation conditioned Hutu propaganda in the 1959 Hutu Revolution. Next, the 
Second Republic was ushered into power in 1973 with the Habyarimana coup and tried to 
redefine Tutsi from a racial category to an ethnic one (the opposite of what the Belgian 
administration had done). The acrimony between the two groups was again the fuel for Hutu 
Power propaganda after 1990 (Mamdani, 2001:14). 
British indirect rule was similar to French „association‟ as opposed to „assimilation‟. The 
relationship between Europeans and Africans was based on differentiation – exaggerating 
differences in order to reproduce specific power distributions. However, it was both a 
solution and a problem in the long term because of the inherent contradictions associated with 
the concept of ethnicity (Mamdani, 1996:8). Mamdani‟s theses (1996; 2001; 2010) dissect the 
dialectics of post-colonial citizenship and the analyses focus on distinctions between settler 
and native identities whilst linking history, geography and politics together in a bid to 
historicise political choices, the individuals that make them, their consequences as well as the 
legacies that remain. He illustrates how Europe ruled Africa by creating settler citizens and 
nativised subjects. Such identity construction was designed to justify political and economic 
                                                 
19 The Hutu and Tutsi displacements, diasporas and refugees over the years who have settled in Uganda, 
Congo/Zaire, Tanzania or Burundi. 
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domination and later intolerant, selective nationalist discourses. Direct and indirect colonial 
rule legally enforced race and ethnicity as salient political identities. Direct rule was more 
synonymous with race-based political identities and indirect rule was synonymous with 
multiple and separate ethnic consciousnesses. Indirect rule or to use Mamdani‟s term, 
“decentralised despotism”, involved the extensive use of ethnically defined Native 
Authorities to define and enforce custom and it was reinforced by the armed might of the 
central state as the means for controlling and exploiting the rural peasantry. Political and 
cultural identities cannot be differentiated all the time because of the complex web that 
entangles them. With regard to the chieftaincy and the application of customary law 
generally, the colonial state removed democratic accountability to those below and reinforced 
bureaucratic accountability to those above (Ntsebeza, 2002:1-2, 28, 34, 41-47, 52, 76, 88; 
Hendricks, 1990; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:99-119). 
Mamdani extends the subject-citizen thesis to the current situation in Dafur, Sudan. At the 
root of the decades-long conflict in Sudan is ethno-regional identity cleavage between the 
northern and southern regions. Mamdani argues that the Dafur conflict has a local, regional, 
international, historical and geopolitical context for the global war on terror despite the fact 
that it dates back to the colonial making of settlers and natives; races and tribes and the 
building of Nation and State in independent Sudan (Mamdani, 2010:85-130,175-246). 
Mamdani (2010) traces the history, politics, ethnic relations and government of Sudan‟s 
Darfur region since 2003 and reflects on questions of belonging, identity and the different 
histories and interpretations which are available. Mamdani takes issue with the responses or 
intervention of the international community (the United States‟ Homeland Security Act in the 
War on Terror, the African Union, the United Nations, the Save Darfur Coalition, the 
International Criminal Court at The Hague), humanitarian aid organisations and the media 
which he accuses of having a saviour or Messiah-complex to rescue the people of Darfur 
whilst fighting ideological proxy wars, including that on terror in Darfur by manipulating the 
misery of the local people. 
The on-going conflict in Darfur foregrounds ethnicity and race and their reconstitution over 
time from British colonial efforts to artificially tribalise Darfur and separate the population 
into natives and settler tribes. Under indirect rule, the power of native authorities was 
redefined and restricted to the judicial field and tax collection (Mamdani, 2010:175-200). In 
colonial Sudan, rights were defined by ethnicity, not citizenship and the national-ethnic 
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question of citizenship and rights in the context of cultural pluralism and militant nationalism 
has provided the fuel for conflict in the region. So-called native tribes were positioned above 
the settler tribes leading to marginalisation and struggles over land which were fuelled by 
drought and desertification. Civil war broke out between nomadic and peasant tribes over 
fertile land in the south between1987 and 1989 and the creation of tribal homelands (dars). 
Intervention by the Sudanese authorities in the 1990s gave rise to two rebel movements 
which became prominent from about 2003. Insurgency, counterinsurgency and repression has 
resulted and deteriorated20 into what has widely been described as „genocide‟ involving 
landed southern African victims (non-Arab/Black/African) and northern landless 
Arab/Muslim perpetrators; identities which are mediated by stereotypical religious extremism 
(Mamdani, 2010).  
Leaders and organisations reflect varying degrees of autonomy and cooptation. African 
politics today bears all the hallmarks of cooptation through the use of different pressures, 
coercion, inducements and clientelistic manipulations. Even in democratising and liberalising 
contexts, states seek to „engage‟ society by incorporating, co-opting, eliminating and 
harassing independent organisations. Clientelistic politics built along ethnic, religious, 
regional, clan and other such particularistic lines are evident in Uganda, Kenya, Darfur, South 
Africa and other places which privilege or have privileged particular social groups over 
others in the past in order to gain votes, funds or establish a popular support base. 
In the game of politics or power, indirect rule or rule by proxy has had wide application. 
Mamdani‟s thesis is relevant for this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, because indirect 
rule was used during colonial times and during apartheid to dominate rural populations in 
South Africa. Secondly, the Bantustans, which Mabuza participated in, were an extension of 
the „reserves‟ which manipulated ethnic identities and the positions of traditional authorities. 
As has already been mentioned, colonialism was attended by the notion of nativism, 
population relocations and the creation of subjects and citizens. This was accompanied by 
conflicting forces and interests and the use of various pillars of control through traditional 
structures and chieftaincies to bolster apartheid capital accumulation (Hendricks, 1990); a 
situation which greatly compromised the position of chiefs. As an institution of traditional 
authority, the South African chieftaincy has struggled for legitimacy, more-so with redefined 
roles under a democratic dispensation. Many scholars have written about this appropriation 
                                                 
20 Rape, torture, malnutrition. 
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and manipulation of identities and the manner in which traditional authorities were hijacked 
over the years but which still has implications for rural populations and traditional authorities 
today (Williams, 2009a:194-197; Williams, 2009b, Sithole and Mbele, 2008; Oomen, 2005; 
Cliffe, 2004:355-356; Mashele, 2004:349-354, Mamdani, 2001; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 
1999; Skweyiya, 1993; Holomisa, 1991; Posel, 1987; Mare, 1980; Legassick and Wolpe, 
1976; Wilson, 1962).  
The internecine violence of the 1990s in South Africa cautions us that we cannot 
underestimate the magnetism and staying power of ethnic identity which was one of the 
rationales given by the apartheid state for corralling people in the Bantustans. Ethnicity is 
multifaceted and has a certain fluidity, flexibility or fuzziness (situational and ambiguous) 
which allows it to be animated; politically activated and deactivated depending on the 
circumstances (Grundy, 1986). It is responsible, for example, for sectarianism and the 
politicisation of ethnicity and religion, which contributed to the problems Uganda faced 
under the Amin and Obote regimes in Uganda21. Similarly, nationalism, in its many 
manifestations and is an ideology subject to distortion from the point of view of popular 
interests.  
South Africa, like Kenya, Nigeria and many other countries is a multi-ethnic state with 
tensions that wax and wane over time. The coexistence of various official state laws in South 
Africa began as early as the 1830s when chiefs in the Cape Colony were granted authority to 
enforce indigenous law (subject to review by a colonial official). Where indirect rule was the 
norm, chiefs ceased to claim their position by virtue of right or inheritance because they 
became bureaucrats appointed to those positions by a superior. They ceased to be accountable 
to local communities as they assumed a more despotic character. However, although 
collaboration was a potentially profitable partnership22 with the colonisers, not all chiefs or 
customary leaders were simple cogs in the colonial or apartheid wheel. Social and spatial 
compartments in South Africa were typified by the different Native Reserves and later by 
ethnic-based Bantustans in which the functionaries were both instruments and beneficiaries 
of the system of fragmentation (Hendricks, 1990). 
                                                 
21
 Clientelistic networks based on clan, lineage, ethnicity, religion and region. 
 
22 To be simply identified with power whether it was real or not or to be regarded as part of power (no matter 
how low) or just being in proximity to power. 
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In South Africa, traditional authorities were sucked into a complex history of resistance and 
collusion with colonial and apartheid states and their relationship with the main liberation 
movements, the ANC and SACP, suffered. Today, they have a strained relation and peculiar 
role in a democratic South Africa. Their powers of land allocation and administration were 
confirmed through the Communal Land Rights Act, and their governance and judicial powers 
are established in terms of the Traditional Courts Bill (debated in 2008). However, the 
fundamental question of how to reconcile the role of traditional leaders and the democratic 
empowerment of ordinary people remains (Ntsebeza, 2002:1-2, 28, 34, 41-47, 52, 76, 88; 
Hendricks, 1990; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:99-119). 
Indigeneity in Uganda and the citizenship crisis in the Eastern Congo also followed a similar 
course under indirect rule colonisation and have been one of the root causes of post-colonial 
political violence in the African Great Lakes region. Parallels can also be drawn from the 
experience of Hindu-Muslim violence at the time of the partition of colonial India. In these 
instances, colonially generated political identities – religious, national, racial etcetera were 
reproduced and reinforced (Mamdani, 2001). Similar comparisons can be made with the 
South African experience although South Africa was a hybrid of the direct and indirect 
colonial administration approaches. Nevertheless, it experienced the same debilitating, 
disempowering and disenfranchising effects of racial segregation between the coloniser and 
the colonised.  
The focus on race and ethnicity created fractures within the social fabric of societies. South 
Africa has a culturally diverse population that is heavily laden with racial and ethnic 
stereotypes (not homogenised or assimilated) yet apartheid South Africa‟s doctrine of 
separateness divided the black population into distinct semi-autonomous sub-systems in the 
1960s. State orchestrated cultural revivalism and the establishment of traditional authority 
structures was a recipe for tribal power struggles and territoriality (Van den Berghe, 
1970:83,179 & 214). Race also coincided with ethnic identity when the colour bar was 
introduced (the Groups Areas, Reservation of Separate Amenities, Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages, Bantu Education Acts) (Kaarsholm, 1995:33-44). The colonised became subjects 
deprived of rights of citizenship and the South African „reserves‟, Bantu Authorities and 
Bantustans were an extension of this colonial enterprise.  
According to Magubane (2001:4), the term race and the ideology of racism should be 
understood as shorthand for inhuman social practices, exploitative and oppressive relations 
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that brutalise, degrade, and reduce people who are colonised and oppressed to less than 
human status. In the South African context, this is typified by the 1652 arrival of the Dutch 
under the leadership of Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch East India Company and their 
treatment of the San and Khoi as a captive labour force to reap high profits, on territory 
appropriated without regard to the rights of the indigenous owners. Such treatment led to 
gross injustice, plunder, conquest and genocide (hostile reprisals through commando raids to 
exterminate those they could not control). This situation did not change much with the arrival 
of the militarist 1820 British settlers who treated the Xhosa with disdain accompanied by 
ruthless scotched earth campaigns. The British perfected the art of double-speak with the 
passage of Ordinance 50 of 1828 which defined the „Liberal Spirit of the Cape‟ by English 
apologists of British imperialism who had illusions about the boundless benevolence and 
Christian philanthropy of British colonialists (Jaffe, 1994:59 cited in Magubane, 2001:11). 
Missionaries subverted African chiefdoms and kingdoms from within, while British imperial 
forces in the so-called Kaffir Wars subverted them from without (Magubane, 2001:15). Cape 
liberalism, according to Keegan (1996:94-106 cited in Magubane, 20001:16) turned out to be 
a “shallow, tawdry, and deceptive conscience salving exercise.” The English humanitarians, 
who criticised the excesses of Boer farmers‟ cruelty towards the San and the Khoi, did not do 
it in the name of anti-colonialism, but of furthering colonialism. They pursued it with 
renewed determination following the discovery of diamonds (1867) at Kimberly and gold 
(1884) on the Rand and they decided to make South Africa a permanent part of the British 
Empire. The only difference was that the focus changed from a concerted effort to 
exterminate Africans to keeping them as inferior cheap labour for new industries and the 
mines in order to preserve the illusion of white superiority by keeping whites out of menial 
jobs (Lewsen, 1969). 
3.3 Racial and Ethnic Tensions Intensified under Apartheid 
Apartheid‟s grand plan to exclude Africans from South African nationhood was embodied in 
the resettlement schemes of the 1960s and 1970s which led to the creation the Bantustans. 
According to Hendricks (1990:154), the façade of independence, a meaningless vote 
(political co-optation) for the Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and 
Ciskei in 1981 and the collaborative relationship between the South African state and its 
junior/unequal partners in the Bantustans was the best result towards the  realisation of  this 
plan.  
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When the Afrikaners became the hegemonic force in 1948, they inherited a state in which 
white supremacy was already a fait accompli (from the introduction of the 1913 Native Land 
Act and the 1923 Urban Areas Act); a mandate to protect white interests (English capital and 
Afrikaners‟ control of state institutions) which they maintained for over forty years through 
laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act; an Amendment to the Immorality Act 
(criminalised sex across the colour line); the Population Registration Act (defined „race‟ and 
provide the bedrock for the massive apartheid structure); the Suppression of Communism Act 
(1950); the South Africa Act Amendment Act (1956); the Group Areas Act (confined each of 
the urban racial groups which to its own residential and trading areas); the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act (segregated a variety of facilities ranging from public buildings and 
transport, parks, libraries and benches); the Bantu Authorities Act (paved the way for the 
„Bantustans‟ of the grand apartheid programme of social engineering); the Native Laws 
Amendment Act (influx control); the Abolition of Passes Act (a curiously named statute 
which introduced the reference book as the ultimate instrument of control), and the Bantu 
Education Act. 
These laws built on deeply rooted notions of white superiority from the glory days of 
European empires. Apartheid ensured that blacks occupied the lowest rungs of colonial 
capitalism - as the unskilled or semi-skilled, unemployed and landless masses (Magubane, 
2001). Indirect rule was extended with the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which paved 
the way or the creation of the Bantustans from the ashes of the old neglected reserves.  This 
happened at the same time as the introduction of influx control measures which locked 
millions of South African families into poverty and landlessness, thus creating new openings 
or possibilities for contestation. The Bantustans were administered by government-paid 
chiefs and Bantustan councillors and they were deliberately underdeveloped by the Pretoria 
government. Bantustans were intended to serve as rural reservoirs for cheap migratory labour 
to the cities and industry in white South Africa. People were forcibly moved to the 
Bantustans and their economic and social decisions were conditioned by their unequal and 
distorted access to markets, services and opportunities. The Bantustans also created a legacy 
of landlessness, severe land pressure and land-related conflicts which persist today 
(Hendricks, 1990). 
From the mid-1970s, the development of separate black national „Bantustan‟ identities and 
tribal orientations became a priority for the apartheid regime but it had little interest in 
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collecting statistics on the African population information and often suppressed data that 
depicted the poor conditions in the Bantustans. The regime excluded all South Africans living 
in the Bantustans from official records resulting in such statistics being significantly skewed 
and unreliable. Sixteen separate health departments were established in each of the ten 
Bantustans and six universities for African students were also located there but tightly 
controlled by the central government. The fragmented and weak systems of service delivery 
inherited from the former Bantustans and the legacy of apartheid in general is felt by many 
rural people. Before the Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana were given 
„independence‟, their direct health care funding consisted of expenditure on clinics, while all 
other health services in the Bantustans were funded and administered by the South African 
(formerly the Native and then Bantu) Development Trust, a central government body. Under 
apartheid, the main grant for child and family care was the state-maintenance grant (a 
combination of a parent allowance and a child allowance) which was awarded on a means-
tested basis to particular categories of women and children. This state-maintenance grant was 
awarded on a racially differentiated basis with whites receiving the highest amount followed 
by Indian and Coloured people at the same level, then African people at the lowest end. The 
grant was unevenly administered under the racial and Bantustan-segregated welfare delivery 
system because some administrations did not award the grant at all whilst others awarded the 
child allowance component, without the parental allowance. Although African families 
constituted the majority of poor households, most African families did not benefit from the 
grant. They were mainly excluded through administrative measures, for instance, the self-
governing Bantustans and the four „independent‟ states (Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana 
and Venda) did not administer the grant, thus leaving vast swathes of the African population 
without access to social welfare. 
The establishment of the Bantustans was also, officially, designed to lead to the 
decentralisation of industry.  The State‟s industrial decentralisation policy was introduced in 
1960, (the year of Sharpeville and Langa massacres), as an attempt to develop centres near 
the „reserves‟ and enforce racial separation on a regional basis. In 1970 the Prime Minister‟s 
economic adviser, Dr Piet Riekert, explained that the „ultimate target‟ of the decentralization 
programme was to stem the flow of Africans from the „homelands‟ to the cities; and 24% of 
industrial investment would have to be channelled to the border areas and 
„homelands‟(compared with 10% in 1968). In the early 1980s, the apartheid state offered 
absurdly generous incentives for labour-intensive industries to locate in industrial 
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decentralisation points in or adjacent to the former Bantustans. The incentives were easily 
abused and some of the decentralisation areas were patently incapable of surviving without 
subsidies. Consequently, wages were extremely low and Bantustan authorities frequently 
sought to ban union activity. However, the misadventures of the colonial and apartheid states 
which relied heavily on patronage proved to by dysfunctional and costly in the end. 
Apartheid social engineering was an example of the flagrant abuse of power by the state 
(Held, 1989:236). Collusion between the interests of capital and state policies legitimised 
racial segregation which denied blacks their basic civil liberties. The poverty created by 
minority rule in South Africa partly destroyed traditional African norms and values (through 
the migrant labour system, legal insecurity, and economic dependency) and naturally affected 
the country‟s social fabric (Adam, 1990:117). However, there is much that is political 
mythology in South Africa‟s history, for instance, the “Verwoerdian vision of discrete racial 
and cultural groups with separate destinies” (Sharp, 1988a:9). This vision led to the 
“disaggregation of the African population” which was “functionally necessary to the policy 
of apartheid because it provided a rationale for allocating people to their respective 
homelands” (Sharp, 1988a:8) through laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
(1949), the Population Registration Act (1950), the Group Areas Act (1950) and the 1955 
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas/Tomlinson 
Commission which defended apartheid segregation. The Bantustan system was designed to 
encourage ethnic or cultural revivalism and separatism by forcibly and rigidly categorising 
blacks according to ethnic identity to undermine the black population‟s resolve against 
apartheid injustice (containing widespread insurgency) (Kaarsholm, 1995:35; Ratcliffe, 
1994:13).  
The politics of exclusion and patronage was used by the white minority regime to indirectly 
control the numerically superior African population. The success of this co-optive tactic 
relied on the manipulation of ethnic identity (community/belonging, culture, language, and 
tradition/custom); which are real only in relation to particular world views. Bantustans were 
used to forcibly displace thousands of people and dump them in „Bantustans‟ which were 
modelled under a spurious notion of ethnic nation-states and their supposed desire for self-
determination, regardless of ideological attachments. African leaders (Tribal Authorities, 
Development Corporations and Bantustan leaders) were made to actively participate in their 
own domination with the effect that black anger, resentment, opposition and discontent 
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against the prevailing political conditions in South Africa, particularly during the mid-1980s, 
was deflected from the white minority government onto its black „clients‟ working in 
Bantustan political structures (Omer-Cooper 1987:213 cited in Phatlane, 2002:416; Adam, 
1990:116, 131, 135). The Bantustan system created a counterproductive „us and them‟ 
mentality which often made it imperative for people to demonstrate loyalty or patriotism to a 
given ethnic heritage. 
Divide and rule tactics were also employed to fragment the liberation movement into 
sectarian partisanship which was marked by numerous pitched battles between the 
UDF/ANC, Inkatha, AZAPO/Black Consciousness and the PAC (Adam, 1990:132-133). The 
state‟s manipulation of ethnic differentiation to diffuse political opposition led to heightened 
ethnic awareness, rivalries among, as well as internecine violence within different ethnic 
groups. South Africa‟s apartheid regime openly venerated and incorporated ethnicity into its 
power plays such that, for example, the Zulu Inkatha movement and Inkatha Freedom Party 
played right into its hands and was mobilised to generate nationalism and conservatism 
alongside the Conservative Party and other Afrikaner right wing elements in opposition to 
what was seen as the ANC‟s centralised, hegemonic and unifying nationalism. Inkatha 
worked to counteract support for the universalism of the ANC by urging people to organise 
along ethnic lines and was deliberately provoking confrontations between Zulus and Xhosas. 
Inkatha managed to divide the ethnically segregated hostels on the Rand and large parts of 
Natal with the backing of the South African Defence Force and the South African Police 
(Kaarsholm, 1995:36). The ANC and other liberation movements could not afford to ignore 
the ethnic challenge represented by organisations like Inkatha. According to Kaarsholm, 
Inkatha‟s “monopolisation of traditional and ethnic articulations and potentials” (1995:39) 
compelled the ANC to form tactical alliances with some Bantustan governments, including 
that of KaNgwane led by Enos Mabuza, to counter the hardening and ethnic chauvinism 
(Maré and Hamilton (1987). In the eyes of the South African government and Swaziland‟s 
King Sobhuza, the success of the Swazi land deal hinged on an appeal to the KaNgwane 
people‟s loyalty to families, lineages, tribal communities, chiefs  and the Swazi king. This 
appeal to their Swazi identity was regarded as fool-proof because individuals generally owe 
certain duties in return for security and a sense of belonging to a group; more so since the 
South African authorities had made it abundantly clear through the policy of apartheid that 
blacks did not belong and were not welcome in South Africa. 
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3.4 Persistent Divisions during the Negotiations and Transition 
The notion of political/ideological or institutional continuity and change is given a twist in 
Mamdani‟s (1996) thesis that colonial rule in Africa generated a distinctive form of 
„bifurcated‟ state.  Bifurcation follows the institutional contours of indirect rule, and 
reproduces and reinforces the division of town and countryside. This system also created the 
„native question‟ which refers to means of controlling subject populations. The town is the 
space of citizenship and civil society (racialised during colonialism and deracialised with 
independence), while the countryside is ruled through a „decentralized despotism‟ based in 
ethnicity. Rural people are thus constituted as subjects of customary or tribal law and 
authority, including „communal‟ land tenure. The latter, together with the labour and money 
tributes exacted by „traditional leaders‟, and/or their state cadre successors to local despotism, 
inhibits the deeper development of agrarian commodity production whilst simultaneously 
impeding the exercise of political rights (Mamdani, 1996). 
When the political negotiations began in earnest in 1990, de Klerk‟s strategy was to aim for a 
„power-sharing‟ arrangement in which his party and his race would keep the upper hand. He 
set about building an anti-ANC alliance from among the black groups and Bantustans, the 
most prominent of these being Buthelezi‟s Inkatha movement in Zulu-land. These 
manoeuvres are exemplified by the gate-crashing of the negotiating venue at the World Trade 
Centre in Johannesburg by a few thousand enraged Afrikaner right-wingers and the near-civil 
war which was provoked by Buthelezi and his Bantustan allies in Ciskei and Bophuthatswana 
with the aided of the Afrikaner die-hard fringe. Mabuza was not a conservative force like the 
other homeland leaders who tried hard to thwart hope for the achievement self-determination 
in South Africa and bolstered Zulu and other „Bantustan‟ sub-nationalisms. However, the 
pejorative labels are applied equally to all former Bantustan leaders. 
The formation of CONTRALESA was an attempt to reform the negative features of tribal 
authority which had been hijacked, used or abused in the past through the use of language 
and the force of custom and tradition whilst also exacerbating ethnic division. Native 
Authorities were responsible for managing local-state apparatus and were installed by the 
colonising power, sanctioned by it and presented as the traditional tribal authority. 
CONTRALESA was thus formed as an attempt to rehabilitate the chieftaincy as an institution 
but not to detribalise or create one uniform ethnicity. The ANC was unable to democratise 
Native Authorities as institutions of indirect rule and instead embraced the individuals in 
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those institutions who were willing to join the ANC in an electoral alliance. It was a 
compromise arrangement in which the ANC initiated intertribal alliance from above with the 
promise of a federated civic power. Unwittingly, however, this maintained unreformed 
customary power in the reserves and this became a new phase of qualified collaboration 
(some might say capitulation) to ameliorate the erstwhile system of representation without 
participation which had taken root in the reserves. The political choices appear contradictory 
and the alliances or compromises seemed like a big risk but the imperatives for participation, 
representation, autonomy and alliance carried a lot of sway (Mamdani, 1996:293, 194, Bank 
and Southall, 1996). However, the problems of trying to democratise customary rule in the 
reserves (rural) and hostels (urban) became quite apparent. The possibility for inter-tribal 
alliance or conflict is always there but the majority of chiefs in CONTRALESA stopped 
being hostile to the ANC even though the Zulus/the IFP remained aloof because they did not 
want their customary rule tainted by democracy. Rather, they wanted to retain and maintain 
their customary power and autonomy and to influence the political and other allegiances of 
Zulus in both the rural and urban (Mamdani, 1996:293). For these groups, straddling both 
spheres led to an almost inevitable inter-tribal collision and internecine violence of the early 
1990s as customary rule proved to be potentially toxic for democracy. 
When all the former administrations, including the apartheid Bantustans, were combined in 
1994, they brought together administrations with diverse culture, skills levels, work ethics, as 
well as rigid human resource policies and practices. The dismantling of the Bantustans in 
particular led to the collapse of the systems for the issuing and registration of permission to 
occupy (PTO) certificates and a vacuum in state-supported land rights administration which 
led to growing (rather than reduced) uncertainty and insecurity for holders of communal land 
and other resource rights. Consequently, land reform in these areas has become a priority for 
South Africa‟s democratic government. 
 
3.5 The Fate of Traditional Authorities in a Democratic South Africa 
The controversial role, authority, powers, legitimacy, privileges and clientalism that South 
African traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen) have been associated with from colonial 
times to apartheid as well as their relevance or implications under the democratic 
dispensation (local government and CONTRALESA) have been discussed widely (Ray, Van 
Rouveroy van Niewaal and Adriaan, 1996:25; Switzer, 1993:3; Spierenburg, 2002:2-4, 
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Holden and Mathabatha, 2007; Callinicos, 1992). The Interim Constitution (1993) and the 
Final Constitution (1996) both outline what these new roles and powers should be. The 
Council of Traditional Leaders Act No. 10 of 1997 was amended through the Council of 
Traditional Leaders Amendment Act No. 85 of 1998 and the National House off Traditional 
Leaders Amendment Act No. 20 of 2000 to show just how contested the status of traditional 
leaders was and continues to be in South Africa today because of the particular history of 
chieftaincy. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No.41 of 2003 
(TLGFA) contained transitional arrangements which deems existing tribal authorities 
(created by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951) to be traditional councils. 
It was argued, for example, that allowing traditional leaders to actively participate in politics 
would encourage political parties to fight over traditional leaders and create unnecessary 
confusion, sectarian consciousness, populism and factions along ethnic lines23. In the Eastern 
Cape, unresolved tensions between the ANC and traditional authorities led to the defection of 
several Transkei chiefs from the ANC. KwaZulu chiefs boycotted the CODESA negotiations 
of the early 1990s and Eastern Cape chiefs did not participate in the 1 November 1995 Local 
Government elections (Mashele, 2004:352-353; Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999:118-119; 
Skweyiya, 1993). Similar debates about the legacies of colonialism24 and the 
accommodations that have been made since regarding traditional authorities have part of the 
politics of countries like Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, Namibia, Ghana and Botswana which 
have what can be described as a mixed polity. 
South Africa‟s political map changed with the unbanning of political parties in February 1990 
and individuals and parties alike took positions to play the last part of the political chess 
game (Mamdani, 1996:255). The force of transition took on board every group and tendency; 
if only to take stock of it, testing claims and discarding those groups found wanting. This was 
still a context of racial, ethnic and class antagonism, replete with interest-bearing agents 
making rational choices that would benefit them or their constituencies the most.  
Mamdani‟s (1996) notion of bifurcated states along the rural-urban, traditional-modern axis is 
a reality that South Africans cannot escape as many in the poor rural areas can still be 
regarded as subjects and not citizens. In such a setting, chiefs still control access to resources 
in a patron-client relationship and also have moral authority (advisers) which is linked to 
                                                 
23 Holomisa, Buthelezi, Gwadiso and others took advantage of the on-going confusion to engage in political 
brinkmanship. 
24 Appropriated, subordinated, redefined or repackaged by colonial indirect rule. 
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people‟s sense of belonging and identity and this gives them the legitimacy to act as the 
crucial link between the people‟s day to day lives, needs and concerns and the state‟s goals 
regarding reconstruction, development and service delivery. During the political transition in 
the early 1990s, traditional leaders, as ex officio holders of their positions, had genuine fears 
of being side-lined or over-shadowed in all the changes that were taking place (Holomisa, 
1991:1-7).  
The roles, functions and powers of traditional leaders, and by extension, Bantustan authorities 
were/are questioned in terms of “authority”, “legitimacy” and “power” (Bellamy, 1995:477; 
Downie, 1995:69; Miliband; Weber, 1978:212). For authority to be effective, the person in 
authority has to be seen as legitimate and theories of legitimation establish why a given state 
or person deserves the allegiance of those that he exercises authority over. 
The South African Office of the Presidency commissioned a review of traditional leadership 
to assess if the institution has been successfully integrated and aligned into the democratic 
system of governance in compliance with the Constitution. Section 211 (1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) provides for the recognition of the status 
and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law and section 212 (2) outlines the 
role of traditional leaders as dealing with “matters relating to traditional leadership, the role 
of traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of 
communities observing a system of customary law”. The focus of no-going debate is the 
association of democracy with traditional leadership or the perceived incompatibility of the 
two systems which are forced to tolerate or accommodate each other in what has been 
referred to as „democratic pragmatism‟ (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:4-10; Oomen, 2005; 
Ntsebeza, 2006). Traditional leadership is generally regarded as being antithetical to an 
orientation of human rights. This argument is understood in terms of Mamdani‟s (1996) 
thesis that rural citizens are not true citizens under traditional authorities because they are 
subjects of paternalistic and undemocratic authority (inherited, not elected and the 
primogeniture, patriarchy and chauvinism practiced in succession) which does not have 
systems of accountability to the people and does not promote equality and gender parity 
(Sithole and Mbele, 2008:5-6, 22). 
Cousin (cited in Sithole and Mbele, 2008:27) suggests that history should inform our 
understanding of pre-colonial and colonial traditional leadership, its artificial legitimacy, 
hierarchies and roles and the current changes or attempts to transform its accountability. In 
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South Africa, this is also understood in terms of the historical reality that traditional 
leadership is closely associated with apartheid‟s manipulative and abusive measures which 
sought to legitimise separate development (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:5, 11). Holomisa 
(1991:1-7), on behalf of the ANC and as President of CONTRALESA, acknowledges the 
historical or traditional role and function of hereditary traditional leaders in African and 
South African societies, especially in the rural areas where they have the responsibility to 
adjudicate minor civil and criminal cases. He also notes how traditional leaders were stripped 
of their sovereignty by colonial and apartheid governments in South Africa and that 
traditional leadership, as an institution, has to be transformed in a democratic dispensation to 
diffuse tribal suspicion and arrogance. 
According to Sithole and Mbele, (2008:7) political trade-offs have been made between 
government and traditional leadership for purposes of national and local elections; thereby 
allowing traditional leaders the space to strategically influence policy and legislative 
processes for their benefit. The result is that several pieces of legislation25 specify the status, 
powers and responsibilities of traditional leaders (amakhosi) and appear to mark the 
resurgence of traditional authority (and customary law) or their reinsertion into political 
governance. Further, the government has established Houses of Traditional Leaders in all six 
provinces that have Traditional Authorities and the National Council of Traditional Leaders 
as part of the consolidation of the position of traditional authorities but a lot of ambiguity 
remains and not all stakeholders accept the government‟s accommodation of traditional 
leaders (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:7, 22). Consequently, the debate over the role and status of 
traditional leaders in the democratic dispensation continues to involve stakeholders including 
the South African government, policy-makers, academics and traditional leaders themselves 
(Sithole and Mbele, 2008; Oomen, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2006) and they remain divided on how to 
approach the thorny issue of integrating traditional leadership post 1994. 
The National House of Traditional Leaders was established in 1997 to perform an advisory 
role and shortly thereafter, six26 of the nine provinces established their own houses for 
                                                 
25 National House of Traditional Leaders Act No. 10 of 1997, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998, the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act No. 32 of 2000 which gives traditional leaders ex officio representation 
in local government, the Communal Land Rights Act of 2005, the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Amendment Act of 2003 and the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims 
(Nhlapho Commission) which was set up in terms of section 25 of the Traditional Leadership Framework Act to 
address the sensitive matter of possible past illegitimate appointments to traditional leadership and colonially 
engineered succession disputes. 
26 KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, North West Province, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Free State. 
Page | 107 
 
traditional leaders. The Preamble of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Amendment Act (2003 - TLGF) states that the institution of traditional leadership must be 
transformed to be in harmony with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The debates which 
eventually gave birth to the TLGF Act were intense and highlighted the contested nature of 
the apartheid past and historical accuracy. Contrary to claims that they were decentralised 
despots, traditional leaders argued that they were “liberators and protected rural populations 
from the National Party‟s most pernicious policies, rather than puppets of the apartheid 
system” (Williams, 2009a:195). Traditional leaders lobbied the government through 
CONTRALESA and the Coalition of Traditional Leaders (CTL) which was formed in 2000 
and includes the provincial and national houses of traditional leaders, the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa and the Royal Bafokeng nation. The Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 was designed to „transform‟ chieftaincy 
so that it became consistent with newly established democratic values and institutions.  
Approximately 2 400 traditional leaders claim to rule over 14 million South African citizens, 
mostly in the rural areas, including the former Bantustans. Traditional leaders are public 
office bearers under the current dispensation but they are forbidden from active participation 
in party politics. They have a role to play in issues of local governance, judicial 
responsibilities regarding customary law and dispute resolution, agriculture and land affairs 
or the administration of communal land, sustainable development, lobbying for and 
coordinating service delivery and social welfare interventions for communities where local 
government is overstretched, mobilizing intervention on HIV/AIDS, heritage, custodians of 
culture, tradition, ritual and custom which restores the moral fibre of their communities and 
maintains local identities in the rural areas. As much as one will find sympathisers and the 
sceptics of traditional leaders, traditional leaders‟ perspective, realistic or not, is that they 
have been sidelined or alienated because they have been assigned a token consultative or 
supporting role to municipalities and they only exist subordinated to national, provincial and 
local government administrations (at the bottom of the food chain) which would much rather 
have them erased completely. They maintain that existing legislation which affects them was 
not passed in good faith and has made them vulnerable (Sithole and Mbele, 2008:23, 31, 33). 
Such arguments regarding contrived reintegration or incorporation are reminiscent of the 
sentiments of secessionist former Bantustan leaders such as Mangope and Buthelezi in the 
early 1990s but South Africa is not unique in experiencing this dilemma of having to 
formalise the role, functions, legitimacy and powers of traditional leaders that where 
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undermined and manipulated by colonial administrations. Ethnically defined Native 
Authorities which constituted a critical part of imperial domination and hegemony in the rural 
areas through the system of unelected chieftainships was largely left intact in most countries 
such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Namibia and Uganda which have also had to 
rationalise the role of traditional leaders after liberation from colonialism. The TLGF Act is a 
direct attempt by the government to reconfigure political space and it was met with 
scepticism and hostility in some cases by traditional leaders such as the IFP‟s Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, IFP MP Hlengwa, Chief Mzimela and the ANC‟s own Chief Mwelo 
Nonkonyana (Williams, 2009a:192). 
3.6 Conclusion 
As a conceptual framework, this chapter demonstrates how the past weaves itself into the 
present and the future by showing how political arrangements (power, roles, and influence) 
are negotiated, reconfigured or redefined over time through manipulation, strategy, power 
and political trade-offs. It also shows how seemingly archaic institutions such as traditional 
leaders in South Africa got a new lease on life in the new democratic dispensation despite the 
unravelling of their relationship with their subjects and liberation movements. Although their 
role under colonial rule and apartheid left many embittered, they were able to reinvent or 
recast themselves in a new political game with new rules. Politicians, good or bad, are adept 
at grafting themselves onto whatever is de rigour at any given time and Enos Mabuza, the 
subject of this thesis, was no different. Despite being a former disdained Bantustan leader, he 
was able to craft his resurgence from Bantustan politics and reincarnate in the fields of 
business and conservation. He managed to insert himself of the business world because he 
did not conduct himself in a perfunctory manner. Rather, he demonstrated tenacity, 
commitment and conviction of purpose and was also able to enrich himself in the process. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework for Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a necessary interdependence between and among individuals in the matrix of social 
relations in which individual lives and identities are formed. Elias (1991:60) notes that 
identity is formed through “the specific activity of the individual in relation to his fellows, 
and for his capacity to be influenced and shaped by their activity.” This observation supports 
Hegel‟s (1979) view that „human subjectivities are interdependent and inter-subjective‟ and 
depend on each other for confirmation or recognition. The individual functions in a 
systematic way within the context of human behaviour (body-environment) and behaviour, 
therefore, cannot be explained by reference to isolated or atomised individuals (Crossley, 
2005; 2001; Eakin, 1999:43; Merleau-Ponty, 1965). Merleau-Ponty (1965) argues that there 
is purposiveness to human behaviour. We are reflective and behave strategically and 
innovatively, thus implying a degree of goal orientation in our actions. Although humans are 
not mere products of circumstance, they are rooted in society or social groups that constitute 
the context of their behaviour, for instance, agent A‟s actions are a response to agent B‟s 
actions and vice versa. Crossley (2005; 2001) and Merleau-Ponty (1965) also note that the 
interaction between individuals and the environment is mediated by meaning and that the 
same stimuli can elicit different responses (and meanings) in different contexts. Social agents 
have to learn the rules that govern „social games‟, which exist by virtue of the activities of 
those that play them (Crossley, 2005:21). 
Our identities are relational or interpersonal and develop in collaboration with others. Eakin 
(1999) maintains that we are social beings and our identity is experiential. He regards 
individuals as “situated selves and products of a particular place and time” (Eakin, 1999:85).  
For him, “the self is defined by, and lives in terms of its relations with others” (Eakin, 
1999:43). Bourdieu (1991) refers to „relationalism‟ as the analysis or study of social 
relationships because individuals are located within social spaces or fields and often find 
themselves at the intersection of several such fields. Consequently, there are many stories that 
can be told about individuals because they are “dynamic”, “changing” or “plural” (Eakin, 
1999:70), for example, a woman can be a mother, daughter, sister or wife (different roles 
with different responsibilities). 
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This study investigates how an individual is situated in a particular context and how that 
context moulds him or her. Latour (1999; 1987) and Benton (2005:206-226) object to the 
myth that people who become distinguished possess exceptional creativity or talent and 
suggest that we should analyse real people and real life experiences in a more holistic and 
encompassing way. This chapter discusses Bourdieu‟s habitus-field analysis (1992; 1998; 
Swartz, 2003: 791-823; Hage, 1994) together with Latour‟s (1999; 1987) actor-network 
analysis with emphasis on Bourdieu‟s conceptualisation. Bourdieu and Latour‟s analyses 
offer an alternative way of reading biographies and portraying their subjects as normal 
people. Such an analysis examines the role of individual choice in relation to others 
(circumscribed) and focuses on how one adapts to changing conditions. The two theories are 
used to critically analyse and explain the particular course that Enos Mabuza‟s career took at 
a time of rapid, profound and violent socio-political change (Gish, 2004).  
The realisation that conflict is inherent to social existence because of competing interests has 
given birth to numerous theories regarding how the state operates or ought to operate in 
relation to its subjects or citizens. One extreme is the Machiavellian argument that dominance 
is more important than the methods used to obtain power (Hoffman, 1995:46-51) and that 
morality, good faith, compromise, responsibility, obligation and accountability have very 
little import (Held, 1989:158-175). Similarly, Weberian state theory argues that the state can 
have the prerogative or autonomy to impose policy on any facet of human existence. In 
practice, Weber‟s elitist state can discriminate against the poor and other minorities; resulting 
in instability because the state is neither inclusive nor flexible and citizen participation and 
expression is not encouraged (Hoffman, 1995:46-51; Held, 1989:39-41). However, other 
theories recognise that political legitimation (concentration and organisation of power) is not 
absolute or immutable (Beetham, 1991:117-119). Hobbes‟ normative authority theory states 
that in order for subjects to submit to political authority, such political subjection and 
obligation is incurred by consent and must be fair. The state is given a mandate to act 
rationally in the public interest. State policies must be genuine and yield what is desirable, 
including law, order and prosperity (Held, 1991:32, 41). Rousseau‟s theory of a social 
contract posits that citizens obey the state if it represents their collective aspirations 
(Beetham, 1991:246; Held, 1989:29). It is assumed that the state responds to those aspirations 
and needs and does not act unilaterally. The state is an administrative body which performs 
the function of redistribution and regulation of collective social, economic and political life 
and to make provision for public goods or services. State policy should, therefore, be a united 
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projection of the general will of the people (Hoffman, 1995:105-108) and the electorate 
should be entitled to question the state or government‟s capacity to rule impartially and 
effectively. Given the various positions of authority held by Enos Mabuza at different stages 
in his life, analysis will necessarily include some discussion on theories of authority and 
legitimacy (Bellamy, 1995:477; Downie, 1995:69; Miliband, 1989; Weber; 1978:212) to 
explain why or how (mandate) he gained the trust and respect of those that he led.  
Various tenets and assumptions of the trust theory (Khodyakov, 2007; Solomon and Flores, 
2001; Good, 1988) and social contract theories put forward by Hobbes, Locke, Kant, 
Rousseau and Rawls (Skyrms, 1996; Binmore, 1994) are also discussed in so far as they help 
to explain how Enos Mabuza became a Bantustan leader; even though he was not eligible for 
the post according to the usual criteria. 
4.2 Pierre Bourdieu’s Habitus-Field Analysis  
Bourdieu‟s habitus-field analysis was adopted for this investigation based on his argument 
that to conceive of action as being determined by the conscious aims of actors is “a well-
founded illusion” that comes from the anticipated adjustment of their habitus to probabilities 
(prediction) within the field (cited in Hage, 1994:429). In this sense, behaviour may be 
understood as the pursuit of known goals or objectives. Bourdieu (1998:138) comments that 
people/researchers tend to simplify things by assuming that actors/agents always consciously 
plan the things that they eventually achieve and that the end point (result of their actions) can 
be projected backwards to explain the individual‟s life or career. Bourdieu (1998:138) 
suggests that, in reality, people adapt to the conditions around them (and distinguish 
themselves) without consciously setting that outcome or goal. In Bourdieu‟s own words 
(cited in Hage, 1994:436), “…we cannot capture the deepest logic of the social world unless 
we immerse ourselves in the particularity of a historically situated and dated empirical 
reality…” It is unlikely that people have clearly defined goals at the time when they make 
certain decisions which turn out to be significant (almost by accident) in their individual lives 
or to society in general. This realisation begs us to situate „great‟ personalities in context in 
order to explain their behaviour in relation to the social pressures that affected them, as well 
as the inter-dependences that existed with other social actors (Eakin, 1999; Bohler and 
Hildenbrand, 1995:331-340). 
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Bourdieu uses knowledge of social processes to theorise about „determinants of practices‟, 
that is, the social conditions which influence our functioning personas (cited in Hage, 
1994:429). His theory brings up questions about determinism and voluntarism and in that 
sense resembles structural functionalism (Parsons and others).  
Bourdieu‟s Habitus-field analysis conceptualises networks as a resource for the enterprising 
individual (to take advantage of). Networks are comprised of connections or privilege from 
Bourdieu‟s (1998; 1992) notion of „friends in high places‟ or „old boys‟ networks which 
people use in order to get ahead professionally. The theory suggests that sometimes it is not 
what you know that matters ultimately, but who you know (Bourdieu, 1998; 1992). The 
habitus-field analysis can help us to uncover reasons or explanations to account for people‟s 
choices, behaviours and decisions, thus deepening our understanding of them. The key 
concepts in this theory are habitus, field and capital, which are outlined below. Bourdieu‟s 
(1998; 1992) argument is that the aggregate of different combinations of these concepts 
conditions or influences human behaviour. 
Bourdieu states that agents do not merely bear with the social structures in which they are 
positioned but add their own imprint to them (cited in Hage, 1994:419-440). The habitus 
creates structure and meaning to our lives by devising appropriate strategies and practices 
based on internalised schemas (Bourdieu, 1990 cited in Humphrey, Miller and 
Zdravomyslova, 2003:5-9). According to Hage (1994:429), „calculative rationality‟ is the 
product of the way our disposition to act is activated in specific social conditions (Hage, 
1994:429). The theory presupposes that certain conditions should prevail in order for agents 
to engage in calculative rationality. Habitus is initially acquired through primary socialisation 
within the family and affiliation to other social groups that we are born into. A person‟s 
perception of the general social environment of their upbringing (race, ethnic group, class, 
gender) shapes their identity and determines how influential the habitus will be in 
determining their choices, practices, thinking or lifestyle. Habitus is a system of durable and 
transposable dispositions, orientations or behaviours that generate meaningful practices and 
meaning-giving perceptions, thus giving the individual a sense of their position relative to 
others. The unique dispositions of a social class or group (due to their common codes of 
conduct and similar upbringing) are known as social habitus (Bourdieu cited in Eakin, 
1999:65). According to Eakin (1999:65), the idea of the habitus is a “potentially deterministic 
vision of the individual‟s social construction.” Eakin (1999) criticises the notion of a social 
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habitus because it brings into question issues regarding individual power, agency and 
accountability. 
Although, habitus is generally resistant to change, it can be adapted or altered in harmful or 
helpful ways in changed circumstances, for example, when the individual‟s society undergoes 
sudden or radical transformation which affects most aspects of life (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Subsequent to initial socialisation, the habitus is modified by other skills that we acquire later 
in life. Habitus can also be described as a socially constituted system of cognitive and 
motivating structures that transmit a person‟s history (experiences) within several underlying 
structures (Bourdieu, 1998: 15 & 18). It is important to note, however, that the habitus is not 
uniform. Some people‟s habitus is more extensive and adaptable in different fields (contexts) 
than others because different conditions produce a distinct type of habitus. 
Bourdieu‟s fields in the habitus-field analysis are fluid and dynamic. A field is made up of 
relatively autonomous social worlds (disciplines and institutions) which include the family, 
church/religion, schools/education and the local community. According to Hage (1994:419-
440), these arenas or contexts are social spaces in which the field‟s effect is experienced and 
what happens to an object that traverses this space cannot be explained solely in terms of the 
object‟s attributes but also through its interaction with the field. The field structures or 
influences the habitus, which in turn also plays a role in constituting the field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992:127). The field and habitus determine which practices are appropriate and 
meaningful in given contexts. One can think of this in terms of acts and their consequences 
because the rules that apply in any particular field are constantly changing. In this way, the 
field and habitus also define the limits of our action in a similar way to Latour‟s (1999:182) 
argument below. The individual or actor requires tacit knowledge, as well as a good 
command of the unwritten rules that determine conduct and success in a particular field in 
order to participate in that field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:94-104).  
In the same way that Latour uses the actor-network analysis to make sense of what makes 
great scientists (discussed below), Bourdieu (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330) tries to 
demystify the world of art and artists when he writes about artists such as Mozart, Beethoven, 
Da Vinci, Picasso, Coleridge, Byron and Shakespeare as creative agents and also as products 
of certain contexts. Bourdieu‟s claim is that such individuals negotiate the spaces that they 
come to occupy by strategising to maximise economic, symbolic, professional or social gains 
in the form of power or other forms of capital. Bourdieu‟s analysis considers how notions of 
Page | 114 
 
habitus, capital and social class can help us to make sense of artistic practice – what defines 
an artist or art at different periods in history, why and how artists enter specific artistic fields 
or disciplines (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330). Bourdieu argues that the effects of 
social and political structures on aesthetic taste cannot be ignored, especially since artists 
depend on patronage (grants/funding), favourable reviews from recognised art critics and 
those that censor content intended for public consumption. Clear causal and relational links 
can be traced within different fields (institutions, discourses, traditions, values, practices) 
between artists and their audiences (who, what, when, where). Bourdieu maintains that 
creative production does not happen in a vacuum but that certain associations or conditions 
(contexts) help artists to sustain certain positions and possibilities in the fields in which they 
operate (1984:63-96, 101-113, 208-236, 319-330). In order for an individual to be regarded 
as being „gifted‟ or considered an „artistic genius‟, their talents have to be approved through 
various processes of legitimation. More often than not, the same talents that distinguish 
„gifted‟ individuals are open to interpretation and the individual can just as easily be labelled 
mad or eccentric. The individual‟s background (class origins, family background, and 
educational opportunities) plays a part in their acceptance, success or failure. This study is an 
analysis of how Enos Mabuza used different forms of capital and his habitus to move from 
one field to the next (politics, education, and conservation) as well as his contributions to 
each field. 
Different forms of capital (cultural, economic and political among others) are referred to in 
Bourdieu‟s analysis (1983: 241-258) but their value (direct or indirect) is not necessarily 
reducible to money. Individuals accumulate capital from different fields whilst forming their 
habitus. Capital is not randomly distributed within populations and different forms of capital 
afford individuals some advantages relative to other players in the same field/s. The different 
resources or forms of capital that are available to social agents act as a form of personal 
power (as a means to an end) in the pursuit of different objectives and are transformed 
through strategic investments and conversions that allow the individual to move from one 
field to another. 
Social capital is not just associated with progressive French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu but 
also with the work of James Coleman, Gary Becker and Robert Putnam. Social capital has a 
wide scope of application (as an analytical, empirical and policy panacea) in social exchange 
theory because it acts as a glue that holds society or people together in a reciprocal or 
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dependent way. Social capital refers to the resources that people get through their personal or 
exchange (inter-dependence) networks, for instance, access to valuable resources, social 
support or financial assistance (Cook, 2005:4-14; Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998:1–24; 
Coleman, 1988: S95–S120; Bourdieu, 1986:241–258). The meaning of social capital 
(customs, institutions, norms, rules, networks and associations) and how it relates to specific 
practices is socially constructed and thus differs from society to society and era to era. In this 
way, social networks (friendship, civic, family, work colleagues/associates) can be 
understood in a structural or functional sense (Crossley, 2005:32). Actors or social agents can 
be placed within a particular context according to how much capital they have, as well as its 
specific composition (status or value) relative to the different forms of capital that are 
available (Crossley, 2005:33). 
Cultural capital can overlap with the habitus described above. Cultural capital comes in an 
objectified form (books, art), in an embodied form (long lasting dispositions or culturally 
valued competences) or in an institutionalised (educational qualifications, merits and 
abilities). The latter gives individuals access to certain privileges such as good jobs, money 
and status in a similar way to Marx‟s use and exchange value (Crossley, 2005:28-29). 
Embodied competence and educational qualifications, generally, do not lose their value over 
time and are a good investment to equip oneself with for future endeavours.  
Economic capital or wealth is readily quantifiable in the form of property (land, real estate) or 
money and it is related to other forms of capital, for instance, symbolic capital, depending on 
the individual‟s ability to use its power to their advantage (Crossley, 2005). 
Symbolic capital refers to the status, prestige, respect or recognition that individuals get from 
their peers, or the general public in the case of celebrities (Hollywood). Symbolic capital 
gives individuals certain advantages, for example, access to exclusive clubs. This form of 
capital is sometimes localised within specific domains or areas of specialisation, for instance, 
neuro-surgeons (Crossley, 2005:31; Bourdieu, 1998). 
For Bourdieu, social conditions „activate‟ in agents certain acquired qualities and capacities 
of the body and mind. This way, agency is seen as a socially and historically constructed 
structure or mechanism (theoretical, real and causal) so that, when confronted with specific 
situations, it generates forms of practices that normally exist in it as tendencies or potential 
(cited in Hage, 1994:430). Also, according to Bourdieu (cited in Crossley, 2005:49), crises 
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occur when the expectations of individuals (embodied in their habitus) are mis-aligned with 
the objective realities of social fields (any structured area of social life). Solutions to these 
crises are possible because the same crises act as a stimulus for innovation and social learning 
(Habermas cited in Crossley, 2005:43). The intensification of structural difficulties 
(discrimination and violence, poverty) experienced by the majority of South Africans after 
the 1976 Soweto student uprisings is a significant period which made it difficult for most 
people to remain unaffected by the issues around them and compelled them to take action 
based on the resources (capital) that they had at their disposal. 
4.3 Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory  
Latour‟s actor-network theory is used to support Bourdieu‟s habitus-field theory outlined 
above. Latour (1999:182) defines action as “a property of associated entities” in which an 
agent is allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded such action by others. Sociologists try to 
understand the material or structural realities (institutions, relations of production, class 
relations, power relations, norms), mechanisms, processes and norms that operate in a 
particular context because they combine to shape the courses of individual lives by 
preventing or enabling certain actions (Bertaux, 2003:40 & 43). Latour‟s actor-network 
theory and his commentaries on the production of scientific knowledge can be seen as an 
illustration of this important point. According to Latour (2005; 1999; 1988; 1987), there are 
social aspects to scientific or technological discoveries. This observation is extended to an 
analysis of the scientists themselves, the products of their labour and how these are consumed 
(application or uses). Latour‟s (1999) main argument in this regard is that scientists that 
changed the way we understand our world, for example, Albert Einstein, Louis Pasteur, 
Marie Curie, Thomas Edison, Isaac Newton, Sigmund Freud and Charles Darwin did not 
necessarily possess special features that distinguished them or made them successful. Latour 
maintains that the secret to understanding these individuals‟ achievements lies in 
understanding the principles that determine intellectual networks (collaboration), or any other 
networks, and using them to offer causal explanations for how ideas come into being and how 
they evolve over time (Latour, 2005;1999;1988;1987).  
In Latour‟s analysis, a network is a mix of aligned (or potentially aligned) interests. Relations 
within a network can be between things or actants (non-human and human) and different 
actors/actants within a given network can have different interests. The actants actively try to 
convince other actors (bargain or negotiate) to align their interests with their own. As can be 
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expected, networks are not intrinsically coherent and are often conflictual (Latour, 2005; 
1999; 1987). The introduction of different actors or „trials of strength‟ (moments in which the 
individual is defined and transformed) into a particular context or arena can lead to a change 
in individual actors‟ positions within the network, for example, promotion or demotion 
(Latour, 1999:179). Position, in Latour‟s study of prominent scientists, comprises of three 
different aspects: academic rank, situation in the field and geographical location. The actor-
network theory systematically traces the influence or contribution of different actors that are 
involved in an individual‟s career development and emphasises collective action in the 
realisation of goals and the attainment of revered status, instead of individual merits. 
However, this seemingly harmonious and interdependent relationship is not immutable and 
can change through what Latour (2005; 1999; 1988; 1987) refers to as translation in the form 
of displacement, drift, invention, mediation or the creation of a new link or network. 
In this investigation, Latour‟s actor-network theory is used to determine and analyse the 
factors that influenced Enos Mabuza‟s career in a tense and turbulent socio-political context 
in which allegiances (socio-political networks) and key actors were constantly changing. 
Enos Mabuza‟s involvement in the despised Bantustan system naturally deflected attention 
from his contributions to the anti-apartheid struggle. His achievements earned him both the 
respect, and often the hatred, of those who knew him but he did not act alone or in a vacuum. 
It can be assumed that, to a considerable degree, he negotiated spaces or his mandate with his 
contemporaries on either side of the political divide and with his constituency (the 
KaNgwane people). Paris (2001) discusses issues regarding individual culpability or guilt, 
collective responsibility (associated guilt) and the complicity of a collective that passively 
stands by when something bad is being done and does nothing to prevent it. She argues 
(Paris, 2001:462-463) that witnesses or bystanders incur responsibilities and their position is, 
therefore, not a value-free (neutral) choice. The moral and political issues regarding Enos 
Mabuza‟s career are tangled and complex but he did not operate with impunity. Whilst Enos 
Mabuza is accountable for his actions, it would be a falsity to try and assign absolute 
responsibility on him alone because he was allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded such 
action by those around him. 
Social analysis cannot ignore an individual or society‟s desire for growth, self-determination, 
responsibility, choice and the quest for identity and autonomy, which brings us to the 
realisation that behind enquiries into human action, agency and social networks lies 
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traditional theories of human motivation. Such theories argue that as humans satisfy basic 
physiological or biological needs for safety, belonging and love; they seek to satisfy 
successively higher order needs such as self-esteem and self-actualisation because the 
fulfilment of these needs is a means to finding the purpose or meaning of life, which 
ultimately leads to personal growth, integration and fulfilment (Maslow, 1987; Frankl, 1946). 
In the same way that Latour studied the lives of distinguished scientists, Maslow used 
biographical analysis and his „hierarchy of needs‟ to explain the remarkable lives of Albert 
Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson and concluded that 
human motivation manifests itself in relation to a given situation or  in relation to other 
people (Maslow, 1987:10). Maslow (1987) and Frankl (1946) do not think that self-
actualisers were perfect because many of those that they studied were flawed or imperfect but 
transcended the dichotomies that others accept as being undeniable, for example, the 
differences between the spiritual and the physical or the selfish and the unselfish. They argue 
that self-actualisers are reality-oriented and treat life‟s challenges as problems that require 
solutions (agency) and that the means used to achieve those ends can be ends in themselves 
(the journey or process) in terms of their results or consequences. This alludes to the 
purposefulness or meaningfulness of events and as opposed to accidents or providence 
(Maslow, 1987). Consequently, motivation theories have been applied in social psychology, 
education, business/economics, industrial relations, advertising, law, politics, philosophy, 
theology and sociology in so far as they explore the limits and possibilities for human 
potential and its implications for interpersonal relations within social institutions and society 
generally (Cox, 1987). 
The African concept or ideology called Ubuntu compliments Latour‟s theory. The main 
virtue espoused by this ideology is that the needs of the collective generally come before 
those of the individual. Ubuntu is a humanist ideology which emphasises people‟s allegiances 
and relations with each other because we are social beings and no man can live in complete 
isolation. This mutual interdependence means that we are who we are because of our 
relations or interactions with other people and harmony and unity is maintained through 
sharing/generosity and selflessness. It is by recognising the humanity of others that we 
become dignified individuals that are worthy of respect (Forster, 2007: 245-289; Ramose, 
2003: 230-238). Traditionally, African leaders (kings, chiefs, headmen) owed their positions, 
status and power to the people that they presided over and were expected to consult 
extensively with them and not impose their own will on their subjects. Modern democratic 
Page | 119 
 
societies today also expect leaders to be open and available to their constituencies so that 
everyone prospers as a result of their guidance and leadership (Forster, 2007: 245-289; 
Ramose, 2003: 230-238). 
4.4 The Social Contract and Trust Theory as Extensions of Networks 
According to traditional social contract theories (Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau and Rawls), 
the legitimate power or authority of a „sovereign‟ (Hobbes, Locke), leader or government 
must derive from a consensus by the governed (some or most but not necessarily all) 
regarding the form and content of rules, values, norms and goals. A scarcity or other 
motivation drives people towards a social contract with the hope or belief that social 
interaction and cooperation will be beneficial to all. However, there must be no coercion or 
fraud in the making of the agreement (Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994).  
Bellamy (1995:477), Downie (1995:69), Miliband (1989) and Weber (1978:212) note that in 
order for authority to be effective, the person in authority has to be seen as being legitimate. 
Contractarianism can lead to the legitimation of totalitarianism because it is based on the 
assumption that people are motivated primarily by self or sectoral interests (Skyrms, 1996; 
Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994). However, there are elements that justify and explain why the 
social contract comes into being, for instance, Rousseau and Rawls‟s principles of justice. A 
rational assessment of the best strategy for realising those self-interests might be one that also 
maximises joint-interest with a collective (Skyrms, 1996; Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994). 
Contractarianism by mutual agreement, therefore, deals with political theories regarding the 
legitimacy of political authority derived from mutual respect and moral principles that can be 
justified to each person who is bound by the contract (Khodyakov, 2007; Skyrms, 1996; 
Misztal, 1995; Binmore, 1994).  
The link or intersection between the individual (Bourdieu‟s habitus) and the field (Bourdieu) 
or network (Latour) is trust, regardless of whether it is explicit or implicit. Dippenaar points 
out that trust is crucial to any relationship but individual, cultural and institutional trust takes 
a long time to build and cannot be bought, remains fragile and is easily destroyed (2004:159-
161). Honesty and sincerity builds trust, even when the truth is unpleasant to hear. He also 
points out that people can normally discern the intentions and degree of sincerity behind 
certain behaviour/actions and words. (Dippenaar, 2004:159-161). Trust is important to social 
organisation in the family between parents and children or between spouses; at work between 
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employers and employees and in a wider context between those that govern and their citizens. 
Gambetta (1988) and Kodyakov‟s (2007) definitions of trust have been used to explain this 
decision or outcome and the focus of the analysis is on the factors that influence the creation, 
development, and maintenance of trustworthy relationships (trust-building as a relational 
exchange). Gambetta defines trust as: 
A particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses 
that another agent or a group of agents will perform a particular action, both 
before he can monitor such action and in a context in which it affects his own 
action (1988: 217).  
Alternatively, Khodyakov (2007:126) offers this definition of trust: 
Trust is a process of constant imaginative anticipation of the reliability of the 
other party‟s actions based on (1) the reputation of the partner and the actor, 
(2) the evaluation of current circumstances of action, (3) assumptions about 
the partner‟s actions, and (4) the belief in the honesty and morality of the other 
side. 
In this way, trust is defined as a dynamic process which is underscored by the idea of 
temporality and the agency of individuals and institutions (Möllering, 2001:403–420; 
Nooteboom and Six, 2003; Misztal, 1995). It thus accounts for rational (Gambetta, 1988:213–
237; Nooteboom, 2000:44–68), as well as non-calculative or affective dimensions of human 
behaviour (Jones, 1996:4–25; Lewis and Weigert, 1985:967–985; McAllister, 1995:24–59). 
Trust is treated as a process (creation, development and maintenance) and not as a variable 
with different levels of strength, because its composition changes in different contexts 
(Khodyakov, 2007:214; Nooteboom and Six, 2003). This „temporal-relational context of 
action‟ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998:962–1023) develops under conditions of uncertainty or 
risk (Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 1999; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1988:94–107) and is, 
therefore, contingent. Trust depends on the reputation of the potential trustee or another 
intermediary, for example, a civic organisation or a guarantor, who might be responsible for 
the successful placement of a candidate or potential trustee (Khodyakov, 2007). 
Messick and Kramer (2001:89–119) and Yamagishi (2001:121–148) examine the 
characteristics of trustees as a criterion for building trust and conceptualise trust as a social 
practice and process because it involves the responsibility of both parties, commitment to the 
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relationship, and the possibility of change in whatever form. Jones (1996:4–25) notes that to 
trust is to anticipate that the other party will pledge some degree of moral competence in the 
form of loyalty, generosity, and honesty. Khodyakov (2007) argues that the type of social 
exchange involved in the case of interpersonal trust is „reciprocal and symmetrical.‟ It entails 
gaining people‟s confidence by being reliable, reasonable, fair, honest and having a good 
track record or reputation (Cook and Cooper, 2003:209–244; Gambetta, 1988:213–237). 
Zucker (1986:53–111) discusses „characteristic-based‟ trust which is similar to Uslaner‟s 
(2002) „particularised‟ trust. Both types of trust are linked to characteristics or similarities 
like gender or ethnicity which the parties in the relationship might have in common. Trust 
based on these similarities is believed to be less risky and tends to produce close-knit 
networks (Bourdieu‟s social capital) based on familiarity or a common experience, the 
dissemination of important and accurate information and mutual problem solving (Cook, 
2005:4-14; Putnam, 2000; Portes, 1998:1–24; Misztal, 1995; Coleman, 1988:S95–S120; 
Bourdieu, 1986:241–258).  
Uslaner‟s (2002) „generalised trust‟ refers to a less stable form of interpersonal trust based on 
collaboration or cooperation (Gambetta, 1988:213–237) towards the realisation of a common 
goal, although the intentions or motives of the different parties may not be entirely clear. 
Zucker‟s (1986:53–111) „process-based trust‟ is also characterised by higher levels of 
vulnerability or dependency on some else‟s actions or decisions compared to „characteristic-
based‟ or „particularised‟ trust. Despite this, however, one notes that this form of transitory 
trust is becoming second-nature in the global environment which is characterised by fast 
changes and concomitant risk and uncertainty (Misztal, 1995; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 
1988:94–107). 
The term „political trust‟ is used by political scientists to refer to people‟s trust in institutions 
like the state or government and its agencies (Uslaner, 2002). Sociologists, such as Giddens 
(1990), use the term „system trust‟ to refer to this abstract form of trust. According to 
Giddens (1990:83), trust in institutions is different from trust in individuals (and more 
problematic) because institutions do not necessarily know or deal with individuals or groups 
in an intimate way. Khodyakov (2007) shares the view that the impersonal nature of 
institutions makes the creation of institutional trust more difficult because people are asked to 
put their faith in „anonymous others.‟ Khodyakov (2007:123) further notes that trust in 
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institutions depends on their “perceived legitimacy, technical competence, and ability to 
perform assigned duties efficiently.” 
It is argued (Khodyakov, 2007; Möllering, 2001: 412; Ensminger, 2001:185–202; Misztal, 
1995; Coleman, 1990; Gambetta, 1988:213–237; Good, 1988) that the decision to trust 
depends significantly on the previous experiences and reputation of all parties in the 
relationship, thereby giving the relationship grounding in certain aspects of the past, the 
present and the future. Solomon and Flores (2001:15) put the point as follows: “Trust is 
historical, but it is not so much tied to the past as it is pregnant with the future.” Anticipating 
the formation of a trusting relationship is a reflexive process which entails a cost-benefit 
analysis or calculation of future possibilities, options and risks (Cook and Cooper, 2003:209–
244; Solomon and Flores, 2001; Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 1999; Gambetta, 1988:213–237; 
Luhmann, 1988:94–107) without absolute knowledge or information about what is, or will, 
motivate other stakeholders in the relationship. Multi-level games theory is used in politics to 
define power relations based on a consideration of the information and skills/competencies 
that groups or individuals have and how they can use them to the best advantage for 
themselves, or to further sectional (class, race, gender) interests. 
We can try and predict what will happen in the future but such predictions are limited by the 
information that we have in the present. Trust as a process of an „imaginative anticipation‟ 
goes beyond the rational choice perspective (the assumption that people are Driven by the 
desire to maximize their own profits) by implying that people cannot accurately predict the 
future (long-term), but can hypothesise about it, thus giving themselves (at least) a sense of 
readiness for action (Khodyakov, 2007:126-127). In reality, people are compelled to rely on 
the honesty and morality of others than on their ability to act rationally or make the best 
decisions in isolation (Messick and Kramer, 2001:89–119; Uslaner, 2002). 
Dant (2003:132) discusses the link between knowledge and action based on the recognition 
of mutual socio-political needs and collaboration with others to realise them. Dant (2003:149 
& 152) examines Gorz (1989) and Touraine‟s (1995) theories about how individuals can 
evaluate their situation and “act in strategic and collaborative ways to claim their freedom”, 
thereby giving their action a political effect or meaning. Touraine (1998) uses humanistic 
arguments (self-reflection and action mediated by social factors) to explain events in Eastern 
Europe and the relationship between actors/individuals and social action and movements in 
the 1990s. Touraine (1995:212) discusses how the individual or „subject‟ engages in struggle 
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against the established order or life determined by institutions (in this case an oppressive 
state). Touraine (1995:212) maintains that it is the character of individuals who are willing to 
“sacrifice their social success or intellectual prowess” for their own benefit and for others that 
Drives political action. However, Dant (2003:152) notes that such action can serve many 
(good and bad) purposes depending on the context and how they are interpreted, for instance, 
terrorism. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The above discussion does not mean however, that social contract, trust or networks theories 
are perfect. Beck (1992), for example argues that social contracts mean that decisions are 
made by a few elected representatives and that the rest of the citizens surrender their social, 
civil and constitutional rights and become invisible or silent subjects. This notwithstanding, 
Mabuza was born and raised in the Swazi community or constituency which made up the 
KaNgwane Bantustan and key elements of the trust theory are used to explain how and why 
he was nominated or elected to head the KaNgwane Bantustan (and accepted) even though he 
did not belong to a ruling house or chieftaincy. The context of events is important to 
sociological analysis because it enables us to understand and give meaning to such events by 
anchoring them in lived social-historical realities (Bertaux, 2003:39; Roos, 2003:32-33). 
Constraints (dynamics, power and conflicts) are not absolute even when they are generally 
perceived as such and human action is never fully predetermined (structure and agency). 
Certain outcomes can be anticipated or foreseen but they are never a foregone conclusion. 
Experiential (grounded) theory in the form of Bourdieu and Latour‟s theories above, focuses 
on contextual/situational analysis to understand what Enos Mabuza, what he did or did not 
do, the reasons which informed his actions, the role of individual choice and how people 
adapt to changing conditions and rules. 
Like other Bantustan leaders, Enos Mabuza‟s career leads to a lot of speculation regarding his 
motives. His actions, methods and decisions are questioned or criticised because of the 
precarious position that Bantustan leaders occupied. Mabuza was not a saviour but neither was 
he opposed to the struggle (Pityana, 2005; Makwetla, 2005; Phosa, 2005; van Wyk Smith, 
1993). His constituency had faith in him (as an individual) and in the Inyandza National 
Movement which he led with the expectation that his actions would be beneficial to them or 
at least not be detrimental to their interests or goals (a case of „better the devil you know‟ in 
the context of the apartheid state‟s well documented brutality). 
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In terms of the theories outlined above, legitimate power and authority is seen as a property 
of social relationships and Enos Mabuza‟s position as the elected, not imposed, leader of a 
Bantustan does not seem as arbitrary as that of most other Bantustan leaders. This thesis 
depicts his career in relation to his time or socio-political (historical) context. Analysis has 
been done according to categories or themes, for example, politics, education, conservation, 
and religion and the main focus is on the purposes, causality, constraints and choices (Latour, 
2005; 1999; Bourdieu, 1998; 1992; Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1992; Creswell, 
1998; Marcus, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994:131-132 & 141; Clifford, 1962: ix-xx) 
behind the montage that was Enos Mabuza‟s career. A certain amount of causality is involved 
in the sense that events and actions create the conditions or possibility for later actions and 
events, through the mediation of human action (Bertaux, 2003:47 & 50). Bertaux (2003:46) 
and Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova (2003:12) further note that when the structural 
parameters of normal everyday interaction at the personal, the family or group level change; 
strategic choice and conscious deliberation (cost-benefit analysis, rational or not) become 
important for adaptation and survival. As such, the study considers significant social changes 
or transitions that coincided with significant personal changes in attitudes or decisions that 
Enos Mabuza made (Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova, 2003:2; Roos, 2003:32), by 
examining the material or structural realities (institutions, class and power relations, norms) 
and processes that influenced Enos Mabuza‟s life and work. 
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Chapter 5: Mabuza’s Legacy in Education in the Former Eastern 
Transvaal 
5.1 Introduction 
The Human Capital Theory states that individuals and countries invest in quality education 
and training (qualifications) in order to enhance their productive potential and competencies 
with the hope of upward social mobility, which translates to better opportunities and rewards-
better jobs, income and status in the future (Barker, 1999: 9, 209-211). Education transmits 
knowledge and skills and assigns people to certain roles that have varying degrees of prestige 
and esteem (stratification based on a form of natural selection which is determined by 
aptitude). In this regard, John Dewey notes that education is a constructive agency by which 
society maintains itself and by which it can be improved (1966:79). In an ideal, equal world, 
the ultimate purpose of education is so that people are informed and equipped to participate at 
their preferred socio-economic level or standard but often times, education acts as a filter 
which prevents this.  
Dewy (1966) explored the academic-social divide in relation to social change. He argued that 
education is a re-organisation and reconstruction of experience through which we are able to 
see continuities and connections between thought, action and meaning. The educational 
experience stimulates and enriches the individual through interaction with others („flexible 
re-adjustment‟), thus creating a sense of responsibility and pseudo-social contract which 
prepares students for participation in democratic society (Dewy, 1966:6, 83-87, 99, 160-
163,120-21). Bourdieu‟s (1986:241–258; Crossley, 2005:28-29, 32-33) theories about how 
social and cultural capital and „determinants of practices‟ in different social networks 
influence human behaviour support Dewey‟s argument. 
This chapter begins by highlighting the socio-economic circumstances of Enos Mabuza‟s 
childhood as the pretext for his accomplishments in education. The second section provides 
an outline of the Bantu Education policy as a system of disempowerment which was 
deliberately designed to under-educate blacks by segregating the South Africa‟s education 
system. Instead of building and empowering, the education system and curriculum was used 
as a weapon to exploit and control generations of blacks with far-reaching social and 
economic consequences (Lawson and Peterson, 1972; Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 2002; Morrell 
and Moletsane, 2002; Unterhalter, 1990). Blacks were so disadvantaged that the effects of the 
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Bantu Education system are evident  in South Africa‟s deficit of skilled black workers 
(segmented labour market) and in schools that are still reserved  for blacks, whites or Indians 
(unofficially but out of habit and a chronic lack of resources) (Barker, 1999; Standing, Sender 
and Weeks, 1996). 
According to Frankl (1946) and Maslow (1987), psychological needs are enduring 
motivations or Drivers of human behaviour which become stronger as we make progress 
towards realising them (the continuous desire to fulfil our potential). The third section traces 
Enos Mabuza‟s achievements as a student from a disadvantaged background. He was part of 
the first generation of South Africans to experience Bantu Education but excelled 
academically in spite of it. The fourth section shows how the education that Enos Mabuza 
received enabled him to give back to his community and try to improve other people‟s quality 
of life. He understood how education can empower people and open new possibilities for 
them and it drove his passion to try and make others experience through his career as a 
teacher, headmaster and Inspector of Education. Mabuza and his wife raised their six children 
to value education because of the opportunities it provides. Mabuza imparted the same 
knowledge and wisdom to his children and his students so that they could make the most of 
their abilities and reach their potential in a socio-political and economic environment which 
was rigged to discriminate and disadvantage them. 
The intention with which a person acts is a principle element of action. According to 
Langford (1971:71-99), some intentions are consciously and explicitly formulated while 
others are ill-defined and the people who hold them are often unaware of them. However, the 
deliberate individual and collective motivation for goal-specific action which characterises 
Enos Mabuza‟s educational legacy shows that individuals can make a difference in their own 
lives and those of others around them. According to Bringheti (2007:337), the way we see or 
perceive things influences how we act or intervene upon reality (agency). The rest of the 
chapter explores how Enos Mabuza‟s used his political position to influence educational 
developments in the KaNgwane area. Mabuza realised that education moulds our identity and 
he used it to promote the Swazi people‟s pride in their history, culture and language. His 
efforts, together with others, eventually led to the recognition of siSwati as a separate and 
official language in South Africa. Mabuza contributed towards overcoming the divisions and 
inequalities in the schooling system by supporting People‟s Education and establishing, for 
example, the Elijah Mango College during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane.  
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Mabuza also shared the vision which led to the establishment of Penryn College in Nelspruit. 
Penryn College is an independent school which is inclusive of all races, cultures, genders and 
creeds and promotes respect and tolerance for different thoughts and ideas. It is linked to the 
Methodist Church and twinned with South Africa‟s largest independent school, St Stithians 
College in Randburg, Johannesburg. It also has the largest school-based outreach programme 
in Africa called Penreach (Snaddon, Interview May 2006; Wylde, Interview August 2007). In 
turn, Mabuza‟s children benefited (their schooling) from the generosity of friends and 
colleagues. 
5.2 Bantu Education and Systematic Disempowerment  
Schools or education systems form part of an individual‟s socialisation because through 
them, social, economic and other values are transmitted or reinforced. Some approaches 
regard education as having a transformative role because of the ideal of free critical thought 
and educational qualifications which add value to individuals through the capital they confer 
(money/employment, power, status). The disadvantaged can be empowered through the 
opportunities that should be open to them because of the education system‟s capacity to 
confer cultural and symbolic capital (markers of distinction and social privilege). However, 
the educational field is shaped by, and also shapes, other fields (social, political religious), 
thus facilitating the reproduction of social structures- inequalities and divisions, instead of 
being a vehicle for social change (Webb, Schirato and Danaher, 2002:105-126).  
Traditional Marxist and hegemonic views focus on how education systems discriminate and 
exclude certain groups of people from attaining certain types or levels of capital, thereby 
naturalising (pedagogy presents it as being legitimate and necessary) and reproducing social 
inequalities and divisions. Patriarchal and colonial assumptions and the unequal power 
relations they embody are partly attributable to, and are given expression in educational 
structures which perpetuate socio-economic inequality, stratification, dominance and racism 
(Apple, 1979), for instance, the stereotype that white and black are separate, hostile and 
unequal (Guarasci and Cornwell, 1997a:5). Bourdieu and Passeron (1977:54-67) refer to this 
arbitrariness as „symbolic violence.‟ 
Bourdieu‟s commentary on practices within France‟s intellectual field (secondary and higher 
education-university/college) centres around issues of distinction, symbolic value, exclusivity 
and prestige which are associated with institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
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Cambridge and Oxford. Universities and the academy are sites charged with the duty of 
knowledge production. They are associated with refinement and superiority and are held in 
high esteem (status). Academics and students aspire to be a part of the rich traditions of such 
institutions but as with secondary education or just education systems in general, the 
traditions and practices within the higher education system also maintain or reproduce the 
relative disadvantage of certain groups (Bourdieu, 1988:73-127; Webb, Schirato and 
Danaher, 2002:127-145). 
Bantu Education was a typical example of how an education system can be manipulated and 
used as a socio-economic filter. Bantu Education was a form of “indoctrination fit to subvert, 
pervert and destroy the foundations of democratic society” (Lawson and Peterson, 1972:7). 
The Bantu Education Act of 1953 put African education in the hands of central government 
which designed the curricula for black schools with the aim of systematically disempowering 
and disadvantaging them. The government‟s control of education in the townships was also 
characterised by fear and intimidation of both teachers and students (Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 
2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002). Instead of equipping blacks for participation in all 
spheres of life, Bantu Education was designed to groom them for positions of servitude and to 
contain counter-ideologies in a white-dominated society. The main objective of Bantu 
Education was to create passive and compliant blacks who accepted authority, were punctual, 
dependable and could follow routine (Lawson and Peterson, 1972). Consequently, blacks 
provided cheap, unskilled labour in the diamond and gold mines which made South Africa 
rich (Callinicos, 1985:23). 
The Bantu Education Act created two separate systems of education; a superior one for 
whites and an inferior one for blacks in the townships (and later in the Bantustans). Table 1 
below shows the disparities in Pupil-Teacher ratios in white and black institutions after Bantu 
Education was introduced. 
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 1986 1990 1993 
Whites 17.5 17.9 18.0 
Africans* 37.4 37.0 44.4 
Table 1: Pupil: Teacher Ratio 
*Data for Africans excludes the former self-governing and TBVC territories (Barker, 1999:242). 
 
Bantu Education disadvantaged blacks such that a black person and a white person with a 
Matric Certificate were note equally qualified and this tended to reinforce the stereotype that 
blacks are incompetent or lazy (Barker, 1999:241). Black education was severely and 
deliberately under-funded, for instance, the government‟s per capita education expenditure in 
1986 was R2 746 for white students and R610 for black students (Barker, 1999:241).  The 
tables below illustrate this point clearly when one considers South Africa‟s demographic 
profile (race ratios). 
Year African Coloured Indian White 
1953 16.0    
1955 15.8    
1960 19.5 24.3 7.9 79.0 
1965 24.9 30.9 14.3 252.3 
1970 66.3 45.0 19.8 366.0 
1975 160.2 104.9 43.8 738.7 
1980 553.0 247.1 122.7 1360.9 
1985 1816.0 724.1 324.0 2973.7 
1986 2453.4 868.3 367.1 3057.0 
1987 3400.3 1007.6 404.7 3321.0 
Table 2: Educational Spending (Million Rand): Primary, Secondary and Tertiary (Unterhalter, 
1990:41). 
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Year African Coloured Indian White 
1953 17.08 40.00 40.00 128.00 
1955 15.68 N/A N/A N/A 
1960 13.60 74.50 74.50 114.00 
1965 12.70 71.00 91.50 357.00 
1970 47.64 83.30 121.00 428.00 
1975 50.00 126.00 171.00 605.00 
1980 87.28 286.00 318.00 1021.00 
1985 293.86 891.62 1386.00 2746.00 
Table 3: Per Capita Spending (in Rand) on School Education 
NB: The per capita figure for Indians and Coloured were calculated together in 1953 and 1960. The 1964 
figures for white and Indian education are estimates (Unterhalter 1989 in Unterhalter, 1990:41). 
 
 1986 1990 1993 
Whites 2  746 4 087 4 372 
Africans* 610 1 194 1 659 
African Expenditure as a 
Percentage of White 
22% 29% 38% 
Table 4: Per Capita Educational Expenditure (Rand) 
*Data for Africans excludes the former self-governing and TBVC territories (Barker, 1999:241). 
 
According to Salmi‟s (1993:21) typology of violence, alienating violence (indirect) can 
assume the form of educational segregation whereby students are taught in an official 
language that is different from their mother tongue or they are taught a curriculum which is 
designed to systematically disadvantage them or which ignores their cultural background.  
Bantu Education in South Africa was designed specifically for this purpose and the Afrikaans 
language was imposed as the medium of instruction (Morrell and Moletsane, 2002) and the 
1976 Soweto Student Uprising and People‟s Education were protests against such alienation. 
Tertiary institutions were also reserved for different racial groups in order to realise the social 
dislocation that epitomised apartheid, for example, the University of Durban-Westville was 
reserved for Indians and the University of the Western Cape was for “Coloureds” and so on. 
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This separation determined the quality of education that the different racial groups received 
and the black majority received the most inferior education (Fleisch, 2002; Karlsson, 2002; 
Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996; Barker, 1999). 
5.3 Mabuza’s Experience and Distinction as a Student 
According to most accounts, Enos Mabuza was born on 6 June 1939 at Viviya (Sheba Gold 
Mine) close to Fair View Mine on the mountains close to Barberton in Mpumalanga. 
Barberton is one of the oldest gold-mining towns in South Africa and Enos‟ father worked at 
Sheba goldmine in the area. However, according to an undated interview transcript (Interview 
with Julie Fredrikse), Mabuza was born in June 1942 in Johannesburg‟s vibrant Sophiatown. 
This creates a two year discrepancy and introduces a new place of birth. According to this 
account, Mabuza‟s father stopped working in the mines in Barberton and moved the family to 
Johannesburg in the early 1950s. He worked on and off, preferring to be self-employed most 
of the time because of the oppressive employer-employee relationships which characterised 
most work situations.  
Mabuza‟s mother was a housewife and raised the children with the assistance of their paternal 
grandmother (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). As the family matriarch and 
disciplinarian, Enos‟ grandmother had a profound effect on him as a young man. Enos was 
the eldest of four children - siblings Margaret, Agripa/Boy and Norman Mhlupeki. His family 
led a rural, impoverished and humble pastoral life. According to his sister Margaret, he was 
very close to his mother partly because his father worked away from home. The distance 
between them increased when his father took a second wife and divided his time between the 
two families (Pillay, 2007:94-95). Enos‟ sister Margaret recalls that he was a quiet young 
man who enjoyed his own company and would often disappear and play his flute in the 
mountains. As the eldest child, he preferred to herd the family‟s livestock, mainly sheep, 
alone (Margaret Mabuza, Interview). Enos struggled to get an education because his family 
was poor. Mining did not pay well and his father had to stretch already limited resources in 
order to support another family. Consequently, Enos‟ grandmother and aunt assumed the 
responsibility for his early education by selling some of their cattle and sheep to raise money 
for his school fees.  
Elias Ginindza first met Mabuza in Barberton when Mabuza was in Standard 6 at Ngwane 
Primary School. Elias Ginindza was in Form 1 at Emjindini Secondary School, also in 
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Barberton. Mabuza had transferred from Sheba Mine Primary School (Barberton) where he 
had done his initial primary education (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). According to 
Ginindza, Mabuza distinguished himself as a very good pupil and excelled in the quarterly 
tests and examinations. He was the top student at his school (not just his class). According to 
Mr Ginindza (Interview, June 2007), it was quite an achievement to be one of the top ten 
performers in the quarterly test in your class or school but Mabuza was modest about his 
achievements. Standard 6 was an important milestone in the olden days because the results 
determined which vocations people pursued, for example, teacher training. Mabuza passed 
Standard 6 with a First Class pass. He was one of the top students in the area and he 
progressed to Emjindini Secondary School, where Elias Ginindza was in Form 3 (Mr 
Ginindza, Interview June 2007). According to Ginidza, Mabuza was allowed to do Form 1 
and 2 simultaneously because his grades were impressive yet he managed to remain the top 
student. The following year (Form 3), Mabuza was the only student chosen by the principle 
and staff to do what was known to as English A. Only a few exceptionally bright students 
were allowed to do English A and it was, therefore, a great honour for the school if its 
students performed well. Again Mabuza excelled and passed English A with distinction (Mr 
Ginindza, Interview June 2007).  
Elias Ginindza completed his Junior Certificate (Standard 8) and left Emjindini Secondary 
School in search of employment because he did not have the financial resources to continue 
studying. Mabuza also studied up to Standard 8/Junior Certificate and went to pursue teacher-
training at Vryheid in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands (Ndaleni Training College on the 
outskirts of Richmond) and Lovedale Teachers‟ College where he received his Primary 
Teaching Certificate in 1959. Mabuza distinguished himself as a student and obtained a two-
year Primary Teacher‟s Certificate by the time he was twenty-one years old. He was 
requested to stay and lecture (music) at the college and he agreed and so began his career as 
an educator. However, competent teachers were in short supply in the Transvaal Lowveld 
where Mabuza grew up so he left Ndaleni Training College after two years and returned to 
the lowveld to use his passion for education to uplift his own community (Sandile Mabuza, 
Interview June 2007; Ms Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview 
June 2007). 
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5.4 Mabuza’s Career as an Educator 
According to his family, Mabuza was passionate about education and considered himself a 
teacher first and foremost. He had a career in the education which lasted sixteen years and he 
believed that the plight of black people could only be improved if they were educated or 
skilled (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, June 2007). 
Mabuza returned to the Transvaal lowveld and started teaching in White River (the old 
Mbombela location in Kabokweni) at Mkwenyane Primary School (Elias Ginindza, Interview 
June 2007) and by then Elias Ginindza was also teaching in Nelspruit (10 miles away). 
According to Elias Ginindza, it was an honour for young teachers to be chosen by their 
Principles to teach Standard 6 and Mabuza and himself were chosen to teach these top classes 
(Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). As old friends and colleagues, Mabuza and Elias 
Ginindza met regularly to discuss how their students were performing and the problems they 
faced as teachers. They exchanged teaching notes and shared ideas to improve their students‟ 
learning experience as well as to enrich their own teaching experience (Elias Ginindza, 
Interview June 2007). 
According to Elias Ginindza (Interview, June 2007), teaching was not just a job for Mabuza, 
it was a “great passion and commitment.” Mabuza believed that education should be an 
enriching experience, inside and outside the classroom and he encouraged his pupils to 
explore their interests in their respective subjects. The pass rate at Mkwenyane Primary 
School had been very poor but it improved significantly when Mabuza started teaching there 
(Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). Mabuza is described as a dedicated, patient and 
nurturing teacher who devoted time (often after hours and on weekends) to the pupils who 
had learning difficulties. The majority of his pupils passed, including many that other 
teachers had given up on. Some of Mabuza‟s students obtained First Class passes and the 
community (Barberton Area) was abuzz with news about the new teacher whose students 
were performing so well when no-one had believed that such a turn-around was possible. The 
community was proud because a young, relatively inexperienced, teacher was able to produce 
such results and bring honour to the school (Mr Ginindza, Interview June 2007). This was a 
cause for celebration and schools in the area held functions to celebrate the successes of their 
teachers and students. The celebrations encouraged others to follow Mabuza‟s example (Elias 
Ginindza, Interview June 2007). 
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Whilst teaching at Mkwenyane Primary school, Mabuza studied part-time and obtained his 
Matric Certificate by correspondence. He was then invited to teach secondary level at 
Emjindini Secondary School where he had done his secondary education. He accepted and 
during this time, he enrolled for a part-time Bachelor of Arts degree with the University of 
South Africa (UNISA). It was an honour for him to be recognised in this way and after a 
short while (still without his university degree) he was promoted to the position of Vice 
Principal at Emjindini Secondary School. His academic performance afforded him 
opportunities that would otherwise have been lost to him if he had not persevered. He was 
always looking to learn new things and improve himself. Mabuza obtained his degree (with 
distinction) in the minimum time expected for full-time students (three years), even though he 
did his degree by correspondence (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, 
Interview June 2007).  
Mabuza returned to White River at Edwaleni Secondary School where he was a teaching 
Principal. This was a promotion because it was a level higher than the position he had at 
Emjindini Secondary School in Barberton (Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007). As a 
leader (principal), Mabuza treated his subordinates (teachers) and students with respect and 
created a supportive, productive and creative learning environment. 
Based on his success as a teacher, Khumbula Secondary School in Ntsikazi/KaBokweni 
invited Mabuza to become a teaching Principle. Khumbula Secondary School was bigger 
than Emjindini Secondary School but it was a rural, impoverished school with poor, needy 
students and the disadvantages associated with a lack of resources. Many of the students at 
the school were mature (with families) and they were often difficult to discipline. The 
apartheid government had been threatening to close down the school because it had a high 
failure rate but Mabuza motivated the students and turned the situation around in 
approximately 2-3 years. As headmaster, Enos Mabuza established a library at the school and 
motivated his teaching staff. Khumbula Secondary School‟s fortunes changed and it started 
producing some of the best high school results in the KaNgwane area (Elias Ginindza, 
Interview June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Esther Mabuza Interview June 
2007). 
Enos Mabuza‟s performance at Khumbula Secondary School set him apart from other 
teachers. He was promoted to become the first black teaching Inspector of Education in the 
then Eastern Transvaal when the KaNgwane Bantustan was established. An Inspector of 
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Education was the equivalent of a Circuit Inspector, which was one of the top positions in the 
Education Department. However, in terms of apartheid policies, a black person could not 
become a Circuit Inspector so Mabuza‟s career had peaked. As Education Inspector, Mabuza 
was dedicated and sourced textbooks and other learning materials to improve the standards of 
black schools which were under his supervision (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; 
Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007).  
Mabuza studied for a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree with UNISA and again he passed with 
distinction in 1974. Between 1989 and 1993 he added an MBA and an LLD (Honoris Causa) 
to his of qualifications. 
5.5 Promoting Swazi Culture and Language  
According to Fitz, Davies and Evans (2006) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), education 
moulds and sustains cultures, traditions and bridges the gap between the individual and 
society through the promotion of common rules of conduct and values (social reproduction). 
Zulu and siSwati are similar and are generally “mutually intelligible in spoken form”, 
although often different when written (Woodson, 1991:381). Macmillan (1989:302) notes 
that there was limited literature on Swazi history and language until the 1970s. Notable 
contributions were by D. Ziervogel in his book A Grammar of Swazi which was first 
published in 1952. Other books were by historian J.S.M. Matsebula who was Swaziland‟s 
King Sobhuza II‟s chief counsellor and private secretary. Matsebula is credited with the 
creation of siSwati orthography in the late 1960s. He published Izakhiwe ka Ngwane (in 
Zulu) in 1952 and wrote several primary school texts which were published in the early 
1970s, including A History of Swaziland in 1972 (Macmillan, 1989:302). Before that, 
although siSwati was spoken universally within Swaziland and in parts of bordering 
Transvaal (KaNgwane and other areas) and Natal, Zulu was used as the written language.  
Mabuza followed in Matsebula‟s footsteps and promoted siSwati as a written language. He 
co-authored several siSwati literature and grammar books including a revised version of D. 
Ziervogel‟s A Grammar of the Swati Language in 1967 when he was an Inspector of 
Education in the Eastern Transvaal (Macmillan, 1989:302). Mabuza went a step further by 
establishing a siSwati Language Committee in 1974 with the aim of getting official 
recognition for siSwati as a separate language. Mr Ginindza (Interview June 2007) notes that 
for a long time, siSwati was treated as a dialect of the Zulu language and Swazi scholars 
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maintained that siSwati was a separate language and needed to be treated as such. Mabuza 
served as the siSwati Language Committee‟s first Chairperson and representatives from 
Swaziland sat on the committee as advisors (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; 
Macmillan, 1989:310). The scholars involved with the committee collected existing materials 
and also wrote new ones. Mabuza co-authored Sifundza siSwati: Libanga 1 with S. S. 
Mahlasela and E. Posselt and helped to translate the English Bible into siSwati with Mr Elias 
N. Ginindza and others (Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Mr Ginindza, Interview June 
2007).  
The Swazi Territorial Authority was created in 1976 with Chief Mkolishi Dlamini elected as 
Chairman of the Executive Committee. Mabuza was elected Councillor for Education and 
Culture on this committee and supervised the introduction of siSwati into KaNgwane‟s 
schools in 1978 (Macmillan, 1989:303). Elias Ginindza was involved in this process and 
succeeded Mabuza as the Chairperson of the siSwati Language Board when Mabuza became 
Chief Councillor of KaNgwane. Contrary to Bantu Education‟s imposition of Afrikaans as 
the medium of instruction and the sustained attempt to stifle other cultures, as Swazis, 
Mabuza and others who worked on this project preserved and advanced Swazi culture and 
identity (its history, customs and practices) through the medium of language (Ossewaarde, 
2007:378) and today siSwati is recognised as one of South Africa‟s nine official languages. 
5.6 Pearls of Wisdom for the Next Mabuza Generation 
Enos Mabuza met his wife Esther at Mkwenyane Primary School where they both taught 
(Margaret Mabuza, Interview June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007) and like Enos 
Esther Mabuza holds a Bachelor of Arts degree (1992) from the University of South Africa 
and was the headmistress of a lower primary school for fifteen years (Mabuza, 1992:4). 
Mabuza‟s children (daughters Busisiwe, Nekeziwe/Grace and Nompumelelo and sons 
Vusumuzi, Sizo and Sandile/Christopher) had strong role models in both their parents who 
appreciated the value of formal education. The Mabuza family has done well in terms of 
developing its human, social and cultural capital. Mabuza‟s eldest child, Busisiwe, works in 
South Africa‟s highly competitive and male dominated private equity industry as a venture 
capitalist. She is a partner in Ethos Private Equity which is one of the major players in the 
industry. Busisiwe Mabuza holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics from the City University 
of New York (Hunter College), a Computer Science degree from Spelman College in Atlanta 
(USA) and an MBA from the Stern School of Business (New York University) (Bouwer and 
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Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Nekeziwe is an attorney and Nompumelelo is a researcher. Vusumuzi 
is an attorney in Nelspruit and Sizo is working in publishing (Juta Publishing), although he 
trained as teacher. The youngest child, Sandile, has a degree in Sociology and Law from the 
University of the Witwatersrand and is working in the horticultural sector in Nelspruit 
(Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007). 
Mabuza‟s children were not coddled or allowed to sit on their laurels. Pressure was put on 
them to perform to the best of their abilities and to take advantage of the educational 
opportunities which were available to them. A series of letters between Enos Mabuza and his 
son Sandile (between 15 January 1987 when Sandile was in Standard 8 at St Stithians 
College in Johannesburg and 23 November 1990 when he was returning from the United 
Kingdom after completing high school) shows how the value of education was transmitted in 
the Mabuza household. Enos and Esther Mabuza were actively involved in the education of 
their children and encouraged them to always do their best. As parents, they communicated 
with their children‟s teachers and headmasters (Mr Wylde at St Stithians and Mr Roberts and 
Dr Stephen at Perse Boys High School) in order to keep track of their children‟s progress 
(Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 May 1987:2; Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 10 September 1990).  
Mabuza always asked if his son had settled down for a new term or year (Mabuza, Letter to 
Sandile 27 July 1987) and Sandile‟s test and examination grades were the main topic of 
conversation in their correspondence during this period. Mabuza would advise his son to 
improve his grades by concentrating and working hard, being thorough in his homework, 
assignments and tests and participating in class discussions and other activities (Mabuza, 
Letter to Sandile 15 January 1987:1). He also regularly advised his son to be disciplined in 
his studies and  to “aim at no less than 56% in all subjects…You must start now striving to be 
amongst the best candidates for your Matric year” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 31 January 
1987:2). Enos Mabuza urged Sandile to ensure that his marks would be “the same or better 
than the class average” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 May 1987:2) by working “hard and 
systematically” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 27 July 1987) or “systematically and steadily” 
(Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 28 0ctober 1987:1). 
The tone of Enos Mabuza‟s letters to his son does not change much. In early 1988 he 
encouraged Sandile to read more for subjects that he did not do well in the previous year and 
encouraged him to ask for help from his teachers in order to “have an above average or good 
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pass”  (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 14 March 1988:1). Mabuza commended the effort that 
Sandile put into his studies and advised that; 
  
“…at no stage should you be complacent…plan your studies and apply 
yourself. Use your time wisely… plan your revision well and be systematic in 
your studies…Aim at scoring high marks in your favourite subjects and at 
least  above average marks in the other subjects” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 
30 October 1988:1).  
Enos Mabuza did not just want his children to be focused and do well in school. He also 
wanted them to enjoy their experiences in school (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 12 October 
1990:1). When Sandile was in his final year of high school, his father gently reminded him 
that being at Perse Boys High School was “a golden lifetime opportunity” and that he should 
make the best of it (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 October 1990:3). Enos and his wife 
emphasised the importance of working hard (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 14 March 1988:1) 
because they wanted their children to set high standards for themselves. Towards the end of 
Sandile‟s last term of Form 6 at Perse Boys High School, Enos Mabuza commented that; “I 
would not be surprised if you have been inspired to study at Cambridge or Oxford…Life is 
not an easy or free ride. You have to work hard. You have to survive through your own 
sweat” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990:2). 
Enos Mabuza‟s passion for education and his competence in the field did not go unnoticed by 
others in the field and this enabled him to build a network of friends and colleagues who 
assisted in the education of some of the Mabuza children, for example, when Sandile was at 
St Stithians College in Randburg (Johannesburg), Enos Mabuza often reminded him to write 
letters to or call Mrs Mary Rose and Mrs Hodgson because “you are where you are because 
of her” (Mrs Rose) (Mabuza, Letter-15 January 1987:1). Sandile also studied at Perse Boys 
High School in Cambridge, England through the efforts of Dr Schulter. The Schulters and Mr 
Zimmerman were family friends and would often meet Sandile at the airport when he 
returned from holidays back home in South Africa (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 10 September 
1990). When Enos Mabuza travelled to London at the end of December 1990, he took 
presents for the Schulters to show his gratitude for their assumed role as Sandile‟s adopted 
family in the United Kingdom (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990).  
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Sandile also used to spend holidays with the Parks family in London. Enos Mabuza described 
the Parks as being “kind and generous” (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 25 May 1990). Mrs Dielle 
Fleischmann was another family friend in the United States and she used to enquire about 
Sandile‟s plans regarding university choices. She wanted to discuss how his studies could be 
sponsored as well as discuss career options for him in the USA (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 
October 1990:3). The Mabuzas are grateful for friends who opened their hearts and homes 
and offered to help as this section shows. It was not just Sandile who benefited from his 
father‟s connections. Busisiwe studied at Spelman College in America with the help of family 
friends after she was expelled from the University of the North for political reasons (Sandile 
Mabuza, Interview June 2007). 
Enos Mabuza was not just respected and valued as an experienced educator in the Eastern 
Transvaal. Perse Boys High School headmaster (Mr Roberts) invited him to address staff and 
students (Sandile‟s Form 6 class) on 14 November 1990 (Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 30 
October 1990:3; Mabuza, Letter to Sandile 23 November 1990:1). He was also called upon to 
share his insights with students and teachers by delivering the keynote address at the official 
opening of Penryn College at its premises in Nelspruit on 26 June 1993. 
5.7 Mabuza, People’s Education and the Struggle for a Decent Education  
Education is one of several mediums for secondary socialisation which maintains social 
solidarity outside the family. Schools serve as rich repositories of social rituals which prepare 
us for events and transactions within broader institutional contexts, for example, politics 
(McLaren, 1993). Education has played an important role with regards to political awareness 
and the rise of nationalism in countries that were colonised, for instance, Ghana and South 
Africa where many of those that joined the armed struggle in exile began their militancy as 
students (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51; Apple, 1985). According to Giddens (1991; 1990), 
identity is modified by the way in which we adapt or adjust to new or available information 
and possibilities. Consequently, actions and reactions do not have to be determined by the 
disadvantage of inherited circumstances. Human agency means that individuals reflect on 
past actions, present opportunities and future potential and plan their life trajectories 
accordingly (to be in charge of their own destinies) and during apartheid, many black South 
African students were involved in politics. When Mabuza became Chief Minister of 
KaNgwane, he still kept his attention on educational issues and his government quietly 
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supported the political role of student organisations in KaNgwane (Elias Ginindza, Interview 
June 2007). 
At the height of apartheid oppression (the states of emergencies of the 1980s) black people‟s 
educational demands were linked to political and economic ones which formed the backbone 
of the struggle for national liberation. According to Adam (1990:127), People‟s Education 
was geared towards transforming the Bantu Education system (ill-trained teachers, an inferior 
curriculum, under-funded schools, intimidation). The focus of People‟s Education was on 
political relevance. Students demanded an integrated education system under a single 
ministry as well as equal expenditure and rights for all citizens. 
Identity (being black), combined with poor education condemned blacks to a life of servitude 
and the Declaration on People‟s Education by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee in 
December 1985 was informed by the realisation that only a decent education would prepare 
blacks for participation in a democratic South Africa. Enos Mabuza‟s government in the 
KaNgwane believed that a sound educational foundation was an imperative for the 
empowerment and economic emancipation of the majority of South Africans who were 
marginalised by the apartheid state and to this end; KaNgwane embraced People‟s Education 
(Unterhalter, 1990:34). 
People‟s Education provided an alternative or parallel curriculum which was aimed at 
counteracting the mis-education of the apartheid system by mobilising students and making 
communities understand the evils of apartheid; to stimulate critical thought and analysis, 
thereby empowering them to take charge of their own destinies (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51). 
However, laws such as the Education Affairs Act of 1985 and the Education and Training Act 
were used to outlaw People‟s Education (in its original form) and some Bantustan 
governments also outlawed it, even though the Bantustans were not covered by the Education 
and Training Act. These laws prevented the circulation of books, pamphlets, badges, banners, 
flags and t-shirts which were associated with People‟s Education in South Africa‟s townships 
(Unterhalter, 1990:29-51).  
The ANC and other political organisations had been banned in the 1960s and the national 
struggle was being undermined by the rise of numerous organisations with competing 
interests and agendas which were fragmenting efforts for national liberation. In its 
„programme of action‟, the Harare Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity Ad-hoc 
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Committee on Southern Africa (21 August 1989) also embraced the basis and ideals of 
People‟s Education and students vowed to make South Africa‟s townships ungovernable. 
They engaged in widespread school boycotts and sit-ins, marches and other gatherings which 
the police and other state agents interrupted and dispersed using assault rifles, tear-gas, dogs, 
baton sticks and sjamboks (horsewhips). Many students were killed, others were arrested and 
faced up to two years in prison, some were detained and released after paying heavy fines and 
others were abducted and never found (Unterhalter, 1990:29-51).  
Mabuza used his position as Chief Minister to ensure, among other things, that educational 
provision was a priority. The small size of the KaNgwane Bantustan translated to a limited 
amount of resources but despite these limitations, its education system was fairly decent 
compared to other Bantustans which had more resources. In line with the black demand for 
better education and facilities Elijah Mango College of Education in KaBokweni, for 
example, was established during Enos Mabuza‟s tenure as Chief Minister. Mabuza sent a 
delegation led by his Education Minister to Israel to find an architectural design that would 
set the college as a flagship educational institution in KaNgwane. Years later, the Department 
of Health and Social Services proposed to take advantage of the infrastructure offered by 
Elijah Mango College and convert it into a Health Sciences Training College. Elijah Mango 
College is serves as an examinations centre for UNISA (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 
2007). 
5.8 Mabuza’s Role in the Founding of Penryn College 
Mabuza witnessed first-hand the effects of Bantu Education (as a student, teacher, school 
principal and education inspector in the Eastern Transvaal). As an Inspector of Education, he 
did not just see disadvantage in one school. He saw the poor plight of all black schools in the 
region and the shortcomings of the education system. Most of the schools did not have 
adequate infrastructure and learning materials. School management, educator capacities and 
motivation as well as learner attitudes were in disarray (www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm; 
www.penryn.co.za/history.htm). Elias Ginindza (Interview June 2007) maintains that all good 
leaders abhorred Bantu Education because of its disempowerment agenda and Mabuza sought 
an educational alternative which would teach independent thought from what Bantu 
Education offered blacks in South Africa. Mabuza first explored this possibility by 
appointing people to research how they could enrich the lives of the disadvantaged black 
majority, not just individuals or particular schools but entire communities. He consulted with 
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people like Dr Hudson, as well as top administrators in the Methodist Church (of which he 
was a member). The idea gathered momentum when Mabuza‟s son (Sandile) was a student at 
St Stithians in Johannesburg. Against the background of simmering revolution in the late 
1980‟s, David Wylde and others at St Stithians College had a similar vision to Mabuza‟s and 
they came together to this vision a reality (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). 
Guarasci and Cornwell (1997a:1-16; 1997b:159-170) maintain that schools/education can 
provide a platform for linking student academic development with citizenship education by 
allowing them to engage difference in daily inter-group relations (how to become better 
citizens). Penryn College‟s founding vision was to establish a school that would provide a 
liberal education based on inter-group dialogue; with the aim of de-stereotyping students‟ 
conceptions of one another (to exorcise the ghost of apartheid Bantu Education). The 
individuals who established Penryn College wanted to make their own contribution to the 
dismantling of apartheid by using their professional expertise (education) to bridge the gaps 
that apartheid had created. Apartheid education policies translated into inequality in the 
labour market and other spheres (Karlsson, 2002; Morrell and Moletsane, 2002; Fleisch, 
2002; www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm) and these individuals 
wanted to intervene by bringing together learners from different backgrounds and offering 
them an equal and enriching educational experience. The attempt to reform the education 
system (granted on a small scale) was one step towards addressing the racial discrepancies 
that existed and to provide a synergy between the advantaged and disadvantaged, between the 
wealthy and the poor, black and white (David Wylde, Interview: 2 August 2007; Snaddon, 
Interview: 4 May 2006). 
David Wylde was the headmaster of St Andrews College in Grahamstown (2003-2008) and 
he is one of the founders and trustees of Penryn College. As young men, Peter Anderson and 
David Wylde were students at St Andrews College in Grahamstown. Later, Peter Anderson 
became the headmaster of St Matthews Private Secondary School in Kliptown, which was 
part of the Lebowa Bantustan. David Wylde worked at Pretoria Boys High School, which 
was exclusively white. The two of them saw the racial disparities in the education system and 
discussed ways in which they could engage their communities to improve the situation and 
the idea of a school outreach project was hatched. Peter Anderson believed that the most 
beneficial form of community engagement was one that would involve the disadvantaged 
rural areas by connecting rural black students with urban white boys at St Stithians College 
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(Wylde, interview: 2 August 2007). The model would be based on an affluent school building 
or assisting a disadvantaged school to achieve high academic standards. In turn, this 
partnership or surrogacy would increase previously disadvantaged groups‟ access to a decent 
standard of education and encourage racial integration or cooperation. 
David Wylde became the headmaster of St Stithians College (in affluent Randburg) in 
January 1989 but his dream of founding a school in a rural area stayed alive. Although Enos 
Mabuza had his own ideas for a similar project, he was not part of the original group that 
came up with the outreach concept and he did not attend the first meeting in which the idea 
was formerly raised at St Stithians. However, Mabuza‟s support for Wylde‟s idea was 
solicited at a later date. Bill Carter facilitated early discussions between Wylde (St Stithians) 
and Enos Mabuza regarding Wylde‟s vision of establishing an outreach school to bridge the 
gap between black and white; rural and urban. Wylde‟s vision was that at least 5 000 pupils 
could have a better future if the outreach project could positively impact 100 educators in 10 
schools in the chosen rural community (Wylde, Interview: 2 August 2007; 
www.penryn.co.za/visi on.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm). 
Bill Carter was Vice-Chairman of the St Stithians Council and he knew Enos Mabuza in a 
professional capacity because they had met several times to discuss business in the Transvaal 
lowveld (KaNgwane). Although Mabuza was in politics at this stage, his reputation as a 
competent educator was well known. Further, although legal segregation was still in force, 
Enos Mabuza‟s son, Sandile, was in his Matric year at St Stithians College and Mabuza was a 
member of the St Stithians Council which meant that he had a good idea how the school was 
run and how it made a difference in the quality of education that his son received (Wylde, 
Interview: 2 August 2007; www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm;  www.penryn.co.za/history.htm). 
According to Wylde, when he broached the idea of an outreach project with the St Stithians 
Council, their initial response was stunned silence before they warmed up to it. However, the 
council suggested that instead of engaging with a rural school or community, it would be 
simpler to initiate a similar project with a school in Soweto or any other black disadvantaged 
school in the urban areas. As it turned out, similar initiatives were already underway with 
black schools in Soweto and Wylde decided to follow Peter Anderson‟s advice that 
“whatever you do, do it in the rural areas” because they had the greatest need for such a 
project. The plight of rural schools was demonstrated by the fact that at that time, the per 
capita expenditure on an urban white child and an urban black child was significantly 
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different in favour of the white child; and the amount spent on a rural black child compared 
to an urban black child was significantly less (Unterhalter, 1990:41; Barker, 1999:241; 
Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007). At the heart of this project was the need to reduce these 
disparities. The vision was for St Stithians College, which was situated in affluent white 
South Africa, to act as “a beacon or a magnet school” or “lighthouse”; a centre of excellence 
from which an educational outreach programme would be developed into the disadvantaged 
school system in deprived rural black South Africa (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007; 
www.penryn.co.za/vision.htm). 
Roger Cameron succeeded Wylde as headmaster of St Stithians in December 1990. Cameron 
had been heading a government school in Port Elizabeth and was aware of the inequalities 
that existed in the education system. Cameron shared Wylde, Carter and Mabuza‟s vision and 
carried on from where Wylde and others had left off. The project was launched informally 
towards the end of 1990 and first formal classes for the „reaching-out‟ project began modestly 
in an Anglican Church hall (Plaston) in 1991.The class was comprised of 25 black students.  
The project‟s viability was reviewed after a year by interviewing people at St Stithians 
College. Wylde, Simeon Ripinga and others were unhappy with its size and scope. Wylde 
notes that Ripinga was “categorical” about this and they discussed their concerns with 
Cameron. They wanted the outreach project to be situated in a rural setting so that it could set 
an example for others and they felt that the project (as it was then) was compromising this 
vision (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007).  
It was decided in 1992 that St Stithians‟ beacon school should be in the KaNgwane 
Bantustan. A high school was initially proposed but it was eventually decided that a private 
school in the region would be the best way to realise this vision. Carter suggested that instead 
of establishing the school in a black area or township, it had to be in a white area in 
anticipation of the repeal of the Group Areas Act and other discriminatory legislation. 
Ripinga and others supported this idea because it meant that the school would not be in a 
remote area and more schools and learners could have access to it. The massive socio-
economic disparities between white and black South Africa in and around the former 
Gazankulu and KaNgwane Bantustans (Nkomazi, Malelane, Barberton, Ermelo, White River 
and Enhlanzeni) quite apparent in the educational infrastructure. Today, Penryn College is 
one of the few originally black schools that have become multi-racial as opposed to the trend 
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where previously white schools have become multi-racial. It is in this sense that the 
establishment of Penryn was a fairly radical political act (Wylde, Interview 2 August 2007). 
Penreach is the biggest project of its kind in South Africa with more than 750 organised 
Penreach skills development events each year. Penreach services are essentially free but 
visiting educators pay a small fee per day, plus their transport costs. Penreach‟s annual 
expenditure is approximately R3 million and most of the funding comes from partners or 
sponsors such as the ABSA Foundation, Standard Bank, BarlowWorld Trust, Nedbank 
Foundation, Jet Stores, First Rand Limited, Sappi Papers, Pick „n‟ Pay and the Sugar Industry 
Trust Fund. Part of the funding is used to source books for school libraries with the help of 
Rotary Clubs. The Penreach project has led to improvements in educator confidence and 
school productivity and thousands of school children who would not have had access to 
certain knowledge, expertise and resources are benefiting from Penreach‟s success (Wylde, 
Interview August 2007; Dr Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006; 
www.penreach.org.za/facts.htm). Robbie Williams was the first chairperson of the Penryn 
Trust. Rob Snaddon and Paul Harris have served as chairpersons of the Penryn College 
Council. Prominent business people and educators are trustees of the Penryn Trust and they 
include singer and businesswoman Yvonne Chaka Chaka, co-founder David Wylde and Dr 
Rob Snaddon of H. L. Hall and Sons Ltd27. 
The Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College is named after him in recognition of his 
contribution to education in the area dating back to his years as a teacher, headmaster and 
Education Inspector. A collection of his personal papers are kept at the centre. In his address 
at the official opening of Penryn College at its new premises on 26 June 1993, Enos Mabuza 
reiterated that the vision for Penryn College was to produce high quality, effective learners 
who are dynamic and innovative, in spite of the challenges inherited from apartheid. Penryn 
College has lived up to this expectation by maintaining a very high pass rate since its first 
Matric group in 1998  (David Wylde, Interview August 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview June 
2007; Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006; www.penreach.org.za/facts.htm). In recognition of 
Penryn College‟s performance, the school has been awarded the Mpumalanga Premier‟s 
award for outstanding service to education (www.penryn.co.za/index.htm). Penryn College 
was envisioned as more than a just a school and this sets it apart from other schools in the 
country. At the sixth annual National Teaching Awards dinner held in Pretoria on 20 October 
                                                 
27 For more information on Penryn and how it is run, how it raises funds and how it benefits other schools and 
educators, see (www.penryn.co.za/fees.htm; www.penryn.co.za/history.htm). 
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2005, the Minister of Education, Mrs Naledi Pandor, acknowledged the value of in-service 
and further training and the important role that continuous professional education plays in 
improving the educational experience for both learners and teachers (Ministry of Education, 
2005). 
Bantu Education made teachers believe that they could not make a difference (Ministry of 
Education, 2005). School administrators were frustrated and pupils believed they were 
destined to fail but Mabuza‟s career in education demonstrated that passion and dedication 
makes a difference (Dr Rob Snaddon, Interview May 2006). Mabuza was not a token black 
person brought in to endorse the project. He had demonstrated his passion for teaching over 
many years and actively participated in the founding of the school. He was a competent 
educator who understood the deficiencies in the education system, even though the majority 
of the partners had an affluent white background. The transformation agenda was at the heart 
of the project and it lives on today with the support of other like-minded people. However, 
some of the positive changes made by the school are slowly being undone. Instead of more 
disadvantaged children benefiting from the school and its community activities, Penryn is 
mostly seen as an elite institution for the well-heeled. Penryn College is an independent 
(private) school and its fees are competitive to the point where they are prohibitive to poor or 
ordinary people who are also entitled to a decent education (Mrs Esther Mabuza, Interview 
June 2007; www.penryn.co.za/fees.htm). Apart from the Penreach project, its core business is 
no longer to cater for the poor. 
Despite the changes over the years, Penreach remains a shining example of schools engaging 
with communities to uplift as many people as possible. Similar projects include Rhodes 
University‟s Molteno Project which was founded in 1974 (named after the Molteno Brothers‟ 
Trust which contributed to the project, together with other funders). The project was 
originally a brainchild of Rhodes University but it is now an autonomous body with its head 
office in Braamfontein (Johannesburg) and other offices in Grahamstown (Gold Fields Centre 
for English), Pietermaritzburg, Nelspruit and Mmabatho.  The project focuses on of language 
learning in disadvantaged black primary schools (http://www.ru.ac.za/affiliates/molteno/).  
5.9 Conclusion 
Mabuza believed that everyone could overcome adversity if they were given a little help and 
hope. The main driving force behind his career in education was to see more black people 
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overcome the depressing cycle of despair which was fostered under apartheid. Mabuza‟s own 
life demonstrates that breaking the cycle of poverty and disempowerment was possible even 
under apartheid. He came from an impoverished background, struggled to get an education 
and gradually rose to become distinguished among his peers. In recognition of Mabuza‟s 
contribution to education, he was elected to serve on several educational boards such as the 
University of the Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians College Council and Promat Colleges. 
In the end Mabuza was able to achieve what many would have deemed impossible for a black 
man at the time. He lived comfortably and his children received an adequate education. He 
was determined to succeed and to see others succeed (Elias Ginindza, Interview June 2007). 
The vision which motivated Mabuza‟s endeavours in education was the need to restore 
human dignity and self-respect to marginalised black communities. He believed that 
educational empowerment offered hope and a sense of confidence, competence, achievement, 
independence and freedom. 
The African concept of Ubuntu (Zulu: umuntu u ngu muntu nga banye bantu) means that a 
person is a person because of, or in relation to others (Forster, 2007; Ramose, 2003) and it 
complements Bourdieu‟s habitus-field and Latour‟s actor-network analyses. Together, these 
concepts highlight the fact that identity, status and other attributes that we possess are defined 
through our inter-connection with other people. Had Mabuza‟s grandmother and aunt not 
intervened by making sacrifices that afforded him the opportunity to go to school, he might 
have remained a poor, broken rural boy. Latour‟s (1999:182) argument that action is “a 
property of associated entities” in which an agent is allowed, authorised, enabled or afforded 
such action by others, even in the face of adversity. Mabuza‟s own diligence (agency) as a 
student led to professional competence, social mobility and personal growth (the 
development of his social and economic capital) which put him in a position to help the 
disadvantaged. Mabuza worked with different stakeholders in making his small contribution 
to education and it is more than others were willing to do. 
Mabuza did not act alone or in a vacuum. The collaboration of different individuals on 
various educational projects illustrates Latour‟s argument in Actor-network theory that 
different actors (and networks) can align their interests in social interaction (1999; 1987) and 
that leaders do not necessarily possess special features that distinguish them or make them 
successful but that the secret to their success lies in the nature of their social networks which 
are used for mutual benefit. In the case of Penryn College, the need to realise a common goal 
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across racial and class/economic lines to redress imbalances in South Africa‟s education 
system was a convergence of such interests. The project drew individuals such as David 
Wylde, Bill Carter, Professor Selby Ripinga (who was KaNgwane‟s Minister of Education), 
Dr Lynn Hurry, Peter Laburn and others who had very different backgrounds but a common 
passion for education (Wylde, Interview August 2007). This also supports Bourdieu‟s 
(1986:241–258; Crossley, 2005:28-29, 32-33) fields and the interplay or collaborative efforts 
between people (agents), social structures (external factors or fields) and the different forms 
of capital they possess and/or contribute. 
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Chapter 6: Mabuza’s Contribution to Nature Conservation 
6.1 Introduction 
Climate change and global warming are arguably the most crucial issues or environmental 
challenge of our time and many people agree that something must be done to help reverse the 
severe environmental degradation caused by development across the globe (Battel-Mink and 
Kastenholz, 2005:1-12; Brechin, 2008:467-474; Sekhar, 2003; Beck, 1995). The Green 
Movements of the 1960s and 1970s led to the founding of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
in 1961 (of which Mabuza was a member) and Greenpeace in 1971. The Brundtland 
Commission of 1983 (World Commission on Environment and Development) was tasked to 
examine the world‟s environmental problems and propose means to address them by devising 
strategies or mechanisms to ensure that the planet‟s resources can cope with and meet the 
needs of present generations without compromising those of future generations. A report 
entitled Our Common Future was published by the commission and it advocated sustainable 
development as a way to reduce the effects of human activities on the environment for future 
generations through conservation or the preservation of renewable and non-renewable 
resources. Such measures were designed to reduce unnecessary pressure on these resources as 
well as reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to minimise the 
effects of global warming and climate change. Another important issue on the agenda were 
efforts to reduce the loss of plant and animal species (Brundtland Commission, 1987:8; Beck, 
1995a).  
The research carried out by the Brundtland Commission led to the first Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, followed by the 1997 United Nations Framework for Climate 
Change in Kyoto, Japan which culminated in the 2001 Kyoto Protocol on climate change 
aimed at preventing or effectively managing natural disasters. The third Earth Summit/World 
Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002 (26 
August-4 September) and one of its aims was to create an awareness of environmental issues 
at grassroots levels. However the main problem that communities have/had with conservation 
efforts is that their long and short term goals do not seem to correspond with those of local 
communities in terms of survival and subsistence despite the imperative to protect natural 
resources for future generations. This antagonism has often led to half-hearted conservation 
efforts. Brechin sums up this attitude or ambivalence as follows: “Environmental concerns 
have become and continue to be seen as background noise, like distant thunder on an 
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otherwise sunny day, so why pack up the picnic?” (Brechin, 2008:472) but we cannot afford 
to bury our heads in the sand either. Ecological politics (Beck, 1995b) or what Giddens 
(1994a:15) terms life politics refers to a “politics of lifestyle which concerns how, both as 
individuals and collectively, we should live in a world where what used to be fixed either by 
nature or tradition is now subject to human decision” or the dark, destructive side of 
technology (the consequences of modernity). 
This chapter examines Mabuza‟s contribution to the field of conservation and the networks 
(social and professional) that he was able to build with it. It begins with an overview of the 
key debates in the area followed by a historical perspective of South Africa‟s conservation 
projects from the colonial era up until the early 1994 when a new democratic political 
dispensation was introduced. This section covers forced removals of Africans from their 
ancestral lands to make way for game parks as well as their exclusion from visiting or 
decision making processes even though they lived on the boundaries of these parks. The next 
section is an overview of some of the conservation stakeholders (individuals and lobby 
groups) that Mabuza had on-going connections with. This network includes, among others, 
the National Parks Board and the organisation Food and Trees for Africa. Mabuza‟s interest 
in conservation issues publicly began in the late 1970s, around the same time that he joined 
Bantustan politics but his observable commitment to conservation came in the mid 1980s 
when he was instrumental in establishing three game reserves - Mahushe Shongwe, 
Songimvelo and Mthethomusha in the former KaNgwane Bantustan where he was born. The 
general character of these parks is outlined and the chapter concludes with a consideration of 
the utility or purpose (means-ends) of the linkages between the various stakeholders 
identified in the chapter and the attendant power dynamics in determining who does/did what, 
when and why. 
6.2.1 SA Conservation in Historical Perspective (Colonial Period - 1994) 
The Western or colonial conservation emphasis used to be biased in favour of scientific 
wildlife environmental management, research and monitoring (including publications) and to 
a lesser extent, tourism. This utilitarian outlook informed early conservation interventions in 
the Mpumalanga area where wildlife was targeted for commercial hunting. There were ready 
markets for large quantities of animal hides and ivory locally and abroad. Wildlife provided 
meat (fresh and Dried/biltong). Africans, on the other hand, valued certain wild animal 
species as sacred totem animals but hunted mainly for subsistence and not trade. The overall 
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result was excessive hunting and severe depletion of wild animals in the area (Carruthers, 
2007a:152; Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:6-7). The different values, approaches and 
priorities regarding wildlife from this stage laid the foundation for the conflict and injustice 
which was to poison African and settler relations over conservation matters. For one thing, 
nature enthusiasts in the region in the late nineteenth century were not bound to the country 
and their main objective was selfish, transient entertainment and the rush of the buffalo, 
giraffe, water-buck and elephant trophy hunt especially between the Crocodile and Komati 
rivers (Carruthers, 2007a:151). It was not a survival question for them but it most definitely 
was for the local inhabitants who needed to safeguard the natural resources which they 
depended on for a living. 
A series of Location Acts passed in 1869, 1876, and 1884 and the 1913 Land Act outlawed 
rent-paying and share-cropping farming by blacks. Blacks lost rights to private property and 
free trade many years before the National Party and official apartheid was instituted. The 
division of South Africa into white and black areas had been virtually finalised by the Land 
Act of 1936 which outlawed black purchase of white land and the Group Areas Act of 1950 
prevent the development of a system of private property for blacks. Further, during the 1960s, 
blacks who still owned land in white areas were forced to move. Until 1994, blacks could not 
own land in over 85% of greater South Africa and the result was overwhelming human 
suffering, widespread famine poverty and malnutrition (Keenan, 1987:120; Keenan and 
Sarakinsky, 1987:581-599; Unterhalter, 1987). In the barren reserves or Bantustans, the 
marginalised populations were involved in cattle herding and shepherding, tilling, ploughing 
and reaped barely enough to survive from small plots of land.  They lacked basic economic 
and political rights (civil liberties) and chiefs and headmen tended to allocate land for 
political, not economic purposes since they derived their power and privilege from the right 
to allocate land.  
The agricultural and industrial reforms of the 1980s left Bantustan populations with even less 
land for subsistence, let alone for productive, commercial black farming. This ensured that 
blacks remained dependent on (white) capitalists for their livelihood. Increased black spot 
removals and forced resettlement into the Bantustans and the redefinition of Bantustan 
borders to include many of the relocation or dumping grounds (consolidation of the 
Bantustans) which had originally been left on the South African side of the borders (Keenan, 
1987:120; Keenan and Sarakinsky, 1987:581-599; Unterhalter, 1987). There was also 
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intensified squatting and slum clearance even though, as part of the reforms, influx control 
had been abolished and restoration of citizenship legislation had been passed in the form of 
the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984. Residents of the six self-
governing territories, and not the four independent ones, could enter South Africa for 
employment without having to contend with elaborate immigration (Home Affairs) 
procedures but it was small comfort for everything else they had lost over the years. 
The Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) published many materials regarding rural 
land struggles, forced removals, land claims, disputes and restitution in the early 1990s. The 
Association made a critical observation that conservation agendas had a bad image in local 
communities. Local communities were hostile to conservation efforts because they were often 
reminiscent of colonial times as well as black spot and other forced removals to make way for 
game parks from which they were excluded and for the consolidation of the Bantustans. Title 
deeds and property rights were disregarded and land was effectively stolen from them. This 
victimisation incensed local communities so that instead of embracing conservation as a way 
of life – taking responsibility for the conservation of soil, botanical and animal resources, 
land use, they were shunned and illegal hunting or poaching was rampant because of a 
general lack of consultation with them as stakeholders. With respect to the creation of game 
parks, communities were often displaced and relocated elsewhere to make way and the 
disruption led to a loss of traditional livelihoods (fish, animals, wild fruits, thatching grass, 
firewood, weaving grass and medicinal plants). The communities did not realise any 
benefit/revenue or benefit from the nature reserves which were imposed on them and they 
often were denied access as well as employment. Conservationists prioritised plants and 
animals over people and a balance or compromise was needed. Examples of this wanton 
disregard for local communities can be cited from Bantustan experiences. The establishment 
of the Thembe Elephant Park along the Mozambican border (in Ingwavuma District) by the 
KwaZulu government in 1983 and the Kosi Bay Nature Reserve and Thukela Biosphere 
Reserve in 1988 caused many problems and a similar thing happened in Bophuthatswana 
when Lucas Mangope‟s government commissioned a 7500ha game park in the Madikwe area 
without consulting locals, including the chiefs (Association for Rural Advancement - Karis 
Gerhart Collection).  
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6.2.2 Forced Removals and the Deliberate Exclusion of Blacks from National Parks 
The Kruger National Park was created through forced removals of livestock, people and 
evidence of human habitation and production. The existence of the Gazankulu, KaNgwane, 
KwaNdebele and Lebowa Bantustans along the parks western border is testimony of these 
displacements (Jensen, 2007:196-197). With specific reference to KaNgwane, many of the 
families in its Nkomazi area were evicted from the Kruger National Park into the poorest part 
of KaNgwane on the border with Mozambique with Swaziland to the south and Kruger to the 
north. Life for these families was particularly difficult because Nkomazi is isolated from the 
industrial, mining and commercial farming centres and unemployment was high. The area is 
home to Shangaans, Swazis and Mozambican refugees that settled there during that country‟s 
civil war (Kloppers, 2005). Mozambican refugees ended up in camps on the rural areas of far 
flung places like in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi Zimbabwe, Swaziland and South Africa, with 
those countries closest to Mozambique carrying the heavier burden. In South Africa, most of 
the refugees were concentrated along the north-eastern border, which was adjacent to the 
KaNgwane homeland. Mabuza‟s decision to house the refugees and assist them can be seen 
as being in defiance of the wishes of the South African government, given the ambiguous 
relationship that existed between Mozambique and South African despite the existence of the 
Nkomati Accord as well as the open aggression of the South African security forces in 
actively destabilising Mozambique (Grundy 1986:71-87; Dominy, 1986:71- 92; Kloppers, 
2005). The socio-economic circumstances in this region and the population‟s composition 
make it ripe for tensions and open conflict even today (Jensen, 2007:196-197; Kloppers, 
2005).  
There is general consensus that the sustainable use of wildlife resources, pastures for 
livestock and land for cultivation should be a priority but conserving biodiversity is also 
important. Determining the relative weight of these is, however, a contested thing depending 
on who is advocating what, when and where. Historically, the first conservationists in South 
Africa (initially in the Kruger National Park) adopted a traditional, centralised, hierarchical or 
top-down approach. Forced removals of Africans from the Kruger Park and adjacent areas 
caused animosity between the park‟s management and local rural communities (Mabunda, 
Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:9). The exclusion of Africans atomised and destabilised 
communities and many traditions were lost in the process as African indigenous knowledge 
about the land and its plants and animals was rejected in favour of Western science. The main 
focus for botanical and zoological experts was on cataloguing (naming and counting) the 
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different fish, reptile, mammal, amphibian, insect and bird diversity and, where possible, 
increasing the numbers of desirable species under controlled conditions (predator or vermin 
eradication- cheetah, wild dog, crocodile and leopard). Emphasis was also put on measure to 
deter poaching by local s around the park (Carruthers, 2007a:162). Other aspects of landscape 
heritage such as its geology, archaeology and history were neglected (Carruthers, 2007a:164). 
Further, the National Party came to power in 1948 and introduced apartheid and as a 
parastatal, the National Parks Board received and implemented apartheid policies or 
directives without question. The few blacks who worked in the park were low paid labourers 
and were not promoted to higher positions (Carruthers, 2007a:169; Mabunda, Pienaar and 
Verhoef, 2003:13).  
In championing environmental issues, Mabuza was not oblivious to the fact that his people 
had been removed from the best-known national park (Kruger) in the country (the oldest in 
Southern Africa) in the early 1900s in order to make way for wildlife. He also witnessed the 
Kruger National Park become the economic powerhouse of the Mpumalanga lowveld and 
deny blacks admission but he did not become bitter. Instead, it strengthened his resolve to 
find a way in which the park could be used to benefit local communities (Player, 2003). The 
most publicised land claim against SANParks has been that of the Makuleke community in 
the northern part of the Kruger National Park which applied for restitution in 1995. This 
community had lived in this area for roughly 200 years and was forcibly removed from 23 
700 ha of land between the Levhuvhu and Limpopo Rivers by the Transvaal authorities in 
1969 in order to expand the Kruger National Park to the north. The community was provided 
with alternative land to resettle on outside the park but wanted to return to its ancestral land 
in the park. The claim was resolved in 1998 with the land rights of the Makuleke being 
restored. However, the people would not re-inhabit the area but would manage it jointly as a 
protected area with SANParks. In this way, the community derives an income from the 
wildlife and tourist facilities in the area and has formed a partnership with Wilderness Safaris 
to run a tourist lodge (Carruthers, 2007:300-301; Fraser, 2007:299-311). Other notable claims 
against SANParks have been in the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park and the Pilanesberg 
National Park (instigated by Chief Pilane of the Bakgatla). 
Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef (2003:13-14) note that the physical and psychological 
separation of blacks from the national parks meant that most blacks did not have a sense of 
ownership for them in the early 1990s. In the Mpumalanga area noted for its parks, for 
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example, blacks had very limited access to the major national parks and were encouraged 
instead to visit Manyeleti Game Reserve which was situated in the Gazankulu Bantustan and 
was far inferior compared to the Kruger National Park. 
6.3 Key Debates in Conservation Circles in Mabuza’s Time 
Scientists and policy makers insist that the world has entered an environmental crisis and this 
has contributed to an almost fanatical need to protect natural areas from certain types of 
human use. The different groups involved do not agree on the extent of this crisis (if it 
already exists) or its imminence. The situation, however, cannot be dismissed simply as the 
imaginings of  alarmists but there is no consensus regarding how it should be responded to in 
order to protect threatened flora and fauna species whilst guaranteeing socio-economic 
development and poverty eradication (Carruthers, 2007a; Battel-Mink and Kastenholz, 
2005:1-12; Brechin, 2008:467-474; Sekhar, 2003; Beck, 1995a; Beck, 1995b; Giddens, 
1994a:). Sustainable development as the guiding discourse for current environment and 
development planning which tries to overcome the shortcomings of traditional approaches by 
merging conservation and development goals. However, what constitutes sustainable 
development is ambiguous and, at best, depends on the social and power dynamics of specific 
locales or contexts (socio-economic, political and environmental) and the people‟s 
receptiveness to the interventions which are implemented (Carruthers, 2007a: 147-174; 
Carruthers, 2007b:293-297; Carruthers, 1995). Community conservation is designed to 
ensure that the benefits of infrastructure, revenue and capacity-building opportunities offered 
by national parks are widely shared through arrangements in which local residents benefit 
materially and/or gain in terms of education and training. Land restitution claims, in South 
Africa for instance, are enabling previously marginalised communities to reclaim heritage 
values or a sense of place and belonging re-connecting them to their ancestral lands 
(Carruthers, 2007a:170). 
McNeely (1993) discusses instances of innovative uses of economic incentives to promote 
conservation or entice locals into supporting it in various conservation projects around the 
world. Different types of agreements include profit-sharing, resource utilisation, the 
preservation of traditional ceremonies and the creation of local employment have been 
reached between conservationists and the people surrounding protected areas and whether 
this is tantamount to bribery or not is one of the on-going debates (McNeely, 1993:146-147). 
However, difficulties have been encountered relating to unrealistic expectations of income 
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from tourism, lack of capacity as well as intra-community divisions which are compounded 
by inappropriate interfaces between management structures and incoherence in the 
articulation of community needs and those prioritising protected areas. Are these so-called 
new conservation interventions merely elaborate and perverted schemes to seduce people into 
forfeiting what was rightfully theirs? Are local communities deliberately misinformed about 
the benefits that will accrue to them and their distribution in a bid by conservationists to give 
legitimacy to their actions? Where does one draw the line and does the new emphasis on 
community involvement make today‟s conservation projects fundamentally different from the 
traditional utilitarian and business-like conservation approaches? In KaNgwane, for example, 
the site of the tourist lodge in the Mthethomusha Game Reserve was leased to the private 
sector with the lease being paid into a trust fund to be used for community projects elected by 
the tribal authority (McNeely, 1993:146-147). 
Brian King has conducted research evaluating the impacts of conservation and development 
projects in Southern Africa (mainly South Africa and the Mpumalanga/KaNgwane area) 
using quantitative and qualitative data. KaNgwane‟s livelihood patterns ranged from 
subsistence-based agriculture and environmental resource dependency to full-time 
employment in a variety of sectors. And the focus of King‟s work has been on the 
intersection or debates between securing livelihoods for the poor and imperatives to save the 
environment - social versus environmental justice (livelihoods versus biodiversity and 
ecosystems) and the implications for human populations dependent on various resources for 
survival. The situation creates obvious political, socio-economic and ethical dilemmas but 
how do we balance these competing goals when conservation has long been commercialised 
and grown accustomed to demanding that sacrifices be made; usually by those in positions 
where they cannot afford such sacrifices. However, there are always new opportunities and 
avenues for development agencies to pursue their particular goals. King‟s research shows that 
there is measurable community variation in the perceptions and benefits arising from 
community conservation initiatives (King, 2007a:207–219; King 2007b:13-25; King, 
2006:79-96, King, 2005). In the South African context, any conservation project has to take 
into consideration the history of racial exclusion and forced removals and current attempts at 
land reform (restitution) and what is meant by adequate compensation. Local conditions such 
as land use patterns (crop farming, pastoralism), land tenure systems, leadership struggles and 
contests between a modern youthful politicised element and the more traditional leadership 
structures. Although the vigorous promotion of national and international conservation 
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agendas have generated interest in community conservation projects that attempt to include 
local participation and their knowledge in natural resource management, King (2007a) points 
out that the initial excitement associated with community conservation has waned in light of 
recent assessments which have concluded that it has been unsuccessful in meeting its 
ecological and social goals. The elderly, destitute, widows, orphans, unmarried teen mothers -  
those on the fringes or neglected because of circumstances forced to exploit natural resources 
for survival .They are the most disadvantaged in these debates because they usually operate 
outside the economic mainstream and are unlikely to gainfully employed because of their 
levels of education and/or lack of formal skills. 
6.4 Conservation Stakeholders Linked to Enos Mabuza 
Ian Player is the brother of world renowned Grand Slam professional golfer Gary Player -a 
prominent member of the “white golfing establishment” according to Bell (2004:26). Bell 
quotes Gary Player in his 1966 book, Grand Slam Golf in which he declares: “I must say 
now, and clearly, that I am a South African of Verwoerd and apartheid” (Bell, 2004:26). She 
uses this statement to show that although Gary Player is celebrated as a progressive white 
person, he was in fact an opportunist who changed his tune to fit in after having spent most of 
his time as an avid supporter and promoter of apartheid governments and their policies. Bell 
also notes that B J Vorster was Gary Player‟s friend and sometime golf partner, an 
observation which she believes justifies her labelling him an opportunist when apartheid 
eventually met its demise. However his brother Ian is known for different reasons. Ian Player 
insisted that matters of beauty and spirit were as important to conservation as science, and 
that people and cultures are an important part of the environmental equation. 
Walters‟ (2003) 3-page citation of outstanding and celebrated South African conservationist 
and environmentalist Ian Player‟s achievements notes that began his distinguished career 
(spans over 50 years) in conservation in 1952 before it became fashionable. He started out as 
a game ranger with the Natal Parks Board where he stayed for 22 years and retired as Chief 
Conservator in 1974 when he established The WILD Foundation.  He was also the warden of 
the Umfolozi Game Reserve and sought the support of black leaders in order to get 
community buy-in for various conservation initiatives. He promoted conservation initiatives 
and raised funds for environmental projects to popularise the concept of conservation and to 
bring its urgency and importance to the widest possible audience. In doing so, he founded 
among others, the Wilderness Leadership School, the first organization in Africa dedicated to 
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providing a pure wilderness experience to people of all backgrounds, races and nationalities 
even during the dark apartheid days. The Wilderness Leadership School is a conservation 
education and experiential programme aimed at developing leaders and preserving the 
wilderness. Consequently, it spawned a global network of conservationists from all sectors of 
life committed to saving the wilderness and wildlife.  He also started the Wilderness 
Foundation SA and co-founded the Wilderness Foundation (UK) (now the Wilderness Trust) 
in collaboration with Sir Laurens van der Post, Edmund de Rothschild and the Duke of 
Wellington.  In his book The Dark Eye in Africa (1955), Laurens van der Post demanded 
battle against racism in Africa. Player established and convened the first World Wilderness 
Congress which first convened in Johannesburg in 1977.  More that 2000 of the world‟s 
leading scientists, politicians, financial leaders, poets and artists, including Enos Mabuza, 
shared that platform to focus attention on the need for conservation and the protection of 
wilderness areas as well as promoting the practical means of accomplishing such goals28. Ian 
Player has received several honours for his work including the Knight of the Order of the 
Golden Ark from the WWF, Decoration for Meritorious Service (SA) (the highest Republic 
of South African civilian award), Conservation Statesman Award (SA), Gold Medal for 
Conservation (USA) and Conservationist of the Year (twice: USA). Player was a close friend 
of Mabuza‟s and greatly influenced his involvement in conservation. Mabuza tried to emulate 
Player on a smaller scale by contributing to conservation matters in his own community and 
helping to raise funds for various other conservation projects.  
Enos Mabuza‟s passion and commitment to conservation issues developed early in his life as 
a young boy who loved the outdoors and grew up surrounded by the natural splendour of the 
Barberton area. He was invited by Ian Player to address the World Wilderness Congress in 
Johannesburg in 1977. He also attended the second World Wilderness Congress in 
Queensland Australia in 1980 with his wife attended and again addressed an audience of 
distinguished people such as Dr. Ian Player and Sir Laurens van der Post (Martin, 1997:48).  
The next year (1981) Mabuza addressed the Eighth International Game Conservation 
Conference in the United States of America and in 1986 he attended the Conference of the 
World Wildlife Fund in Italy. He became actively involved in various conservation 
organisations around the same time that he became involved in Bantustan politics and 
beyond. Compared to his politics and participation in business, conservation issues were a 
                                                 
28 See http://www.wild.org/main/about/wilderness-network/ and http://www.wildernessfoundation.co.za for 
additional references. 
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scandal-free crusade for him. His entrance onto the conservation scene might have been a 
deliberate effort on his part to change tempo, slow things down and deflect attention from his 
politics. Compared to the politics and business phases of his career, conservation was 
probably less emotionally taxing and more satisfying even though it might have been just as 
time consuming as the others. Conservation presented a safer, perhaps neutral option for his 
advocacy because the chances of generating controversy, being judged and criticised were 
significantly less. It was a diversion or distraction in which he did not have to take sides 
necessarily or bear all the responsibility. His participation in conservation circles, however, 
allowed him to create new social and professional networks and standing as this chapter 
highlights. Dr. Frank Raimondo and Dr. Jeremy Anderson are among those that Mabuza 
worked with in conservation on the through Ian Player‟s initiatives. Dr. Jeremy Anderson is a 
respected environmentalist in Africa and he ran the KaNgwane Parks Board and worked 
closely with Mabuza (Ms Rosemary Smuts29, email communication March 2009). 
Mabuza was concerned about and encouraged the efforts of ordinary people in investing in or 
managing the environment/resources. He later came to serve on several environmental and 
community trusts, including the National Parks Board, Food & Trees for Africa, the 
Independent Development Trust and the 1820 Foundation. He was also a member of the 
Board of Trustees of the Wilderness Leadership School. Mabuza was instrumental in 
promoting responsible use of renewable and non-renewable resources, empowering 
the disadvantaged so that they can become self-reliant and helping to establish two nature 
reserves (Songimvelo and Mthethomusha in areas that made up the former KaNgwane 
Bantustan) in the Mpumalanga lowveld where he came from. Mabuza was committed to 
driving environmental conservation initiatives and prioritise ecological balance in order to 
counteract aggressive or careless developmental agendas. However, conservation was a white 
male dominated (like most other fields at the time) and a specialised arena30.   
Ian Player, a prominent conservationist first met Enos Mabuza in 1976 at a function in White 
River, Mpumalanga when Player was organising the first World Wilderness Congress which 
was scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in October 1977. Player (2003:170) recalls that 
he took to Mabuza when he joked about the name White River and asked “When do we get a 
                                                 
29 She used to work with Enos Mabuza in the KaNgwane government and was later the Social Secretary to the 
British High Commissioner. She is co-founder, director and fundraiser for the Caring Network South Africa 
which operates in greater Cape Town since 2001. 
30Wildlife ecology, park/biodiversity management, botanical research, wildlife management and community 
development based on needs assessments, research and lobbying policy. 
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Black River?” They became close friends after that and Player invited Mabuza to be a 
keynote speaker at the October 1977 World Wilderness Congress. Player comments that Enos 
Mabuza served as Chairman of the National Parks Board (now SANParks) “at a decisive time 
in the country‟s conservation history.”  He adds further that “It was my privilege and joy to 
serve under him until his untimely death and to witness his gentlemanly approach, 
incisiveness and humility during the crucial transformation period through which the 
National Parks had to pass” (Player, 2003:170). Mabuza lived his whole life on the edge of 
the Kruger National Park and “had a deep love for the landscape and the great variety of life 
within the Park.” 
Paul De Bruyn is another example of individuals that were in Mabuza‟s conservation circles. 
De Bruyn is Co-Founder and CEO of Ukwakhisana, an initiative focused on the socio-
economic development of communities near the Kruger National Park. In 1988, De Bruyn 
raised R98 million on behalf of Enos Mabuza for low cost housing in KaNgwane. He was 
also responsible for private sector funding and the management of the establishment of the 
Maputaland Coastal Forest Reserve (1991-1998). In 1992/3 he successfully mediated a 
dispute between five communities and neighbouring farmers in KZN Midlands. Between 
1996 and 1999 he raised approximately R500 000 for disadvantaged children‟s programmes - 
CHOC, Johannesburg Children‟s Home & Autism SA. At the third National Conservancy 
Conference held 30 April-1 May 2005 and entitled “The Power of Conservancies” De 
Bruyn‟s presentation was entitled “Local Communities: The Vital Denominator.”  The 
conference was hosted by the Mpumalanga Conservancy Association which was founded in 
February 2004 and whose members participate in shared tourism and conservation projects 
that involve local people. The Mpumalanga Conservancy Association is a member of the 
non-profit National Association of Conservancies/Stewardship South Africa (NACSA or 
NACSSA) which was established in August 2003 to promote community-driven conservation 
(stewardship of natural resources) and to network with local and international bodies with 
similar aims (http://www.nacsa.co.za/). NACSA defines conservancies (community-based 
conservation) as voluntary association between land users/owners who cooperatively wish to 
manage their natural resources in an environmentally sustainable manner 
(http://www.nacsa.co.za/).  
James Stevenson-Hamilton and Sue Hart is a renowned Mpumalanga conservationist 
veterinarian that Mabuza worked closely with. She established the non-governmental 
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educational organisation Ecolink to nurture the connection between people and nature 
through enrichment programmes, including Environmental Youth Clubs, Environmental 
Education, Youth Outreach, Water Management, Skills Training and Small Scale Farming. 
There is also the Ecolink EarthCare programme which was established in 1986 and focuses 
on appropriate organic farming and small scale agriculture, including aspects of suitable 
seeds and crop varieties, marketing and sales, recycling, health and nutrition. 
The National Parks Board/SANParks 
The National Parks Board was/is the highest decision-making and most important body for 
wildlife and conservation in South Africa.  It was essentially a government department and 
consisted of members appointed by the government. The early 1990s were a time of great 
change in South Africa – political, economic and social restructuring because of the 
negotiations which were underway.  Changes were also introduced in the management, 
decision-making and research philosophies of National Parks Board to reflect these national 
changes and to align management systems with the democratic governance principles which 
were to be ushered in. Internally, the restructuring exercise was regarded as an imperative to 
make the organisation more representative of South Africa‟s demographic composition - a 
visible way of projecting „transformation‟ and the compromises of negotiated political 
transition. The opportunities created by the political transformation led to blacks being 
promoted into the ranks of the previously all white National Parks Board of Curators. The 
main challenge was to make the National Parks relevant to the daily lives of all South 
Africans (Maguranyanga, 2009:80).  
Affirmative action policies were introduced in the restructuring of the board and directorate 
(Pollard, Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:438-439). Enos Mabuza became the first black 
board member of the National Parks Board in 1991 when the end was imminent for the 
apartheid regime but it still meant that he was appointed by it.  After the watershed 1994 
elections, the cabinet portfolio of Environmental Affairs and Tourism was assigned to the 
Nationalist Party because it was not considered a powerful or threatening portfolio.  The 
„sunset clauses‟ which came out of the negotiated political settlement ensured that public 
sector agencies and government departments were not radically overhauled. This enabled 
both the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and the national park 
agency to continue to be staffed by bureaucrats from the old regime thus ensuring continuity 
in many of the organisation‟s practices. However, Maguranyanga (2009:80) notes that the 
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new Board had some socially progressive whites, including environmental sociologists 
(activist scholars) such as Dr. David Fig and Professor Jacklyn Cock. Mabunda, Pienaar and 
Verhoef (2003:14) note that the ANC government did not take a clear stand on the role of 
national parks from 1994 until the 1998 Kruger Centenary Celebration when Nelson Mandela 
articulated the future relationship between national parks and the government. According to 
Mandela, South Africa had entered a new era in which national parks were to be regarded as 
important national assets and the “conservation responsibility rested with new leaders in 
partnership with neighbouring communities (cited in Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 
2003:14). There were no blacks or women in Kruger National Park management positions 
until 1998 when David Mabunda was appointed the first black director (park warden). By 
2002, there were 36 white men, 20 black men, 11 black women and 4 white women in 
management positions at the park (Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:14 & 17). 
Political imperatives prescribed managed, gradual or incremental change within the structures 
and culture of the National Parks Board after 1994. A Transformation Task Group was 
appointed for the National Parks Board in January 1995 to develop a shared vision and goals 
of what needed to be transformed within the organisation and to identify key stakeholders to 
ensure their full participation in the process. Management objectives and targets became 
focused on gender equality, affirmative action and equal opportunities.  Appendix 2 shows 
the National Parks Board‟s racial composition or profile for the period March 1995- March 
1997 including affirmative action placements in targeted occupational categories.31 The 
organisation‟s affirmative action policies focused on occupational categories that had been 
historically reserved for whites, although whites were not forced out of their jobs to make 
way for black placements (National Parks Board, 1996/97:90-91). The thrust of the 
organisation‟s transformation agenda was put on training and development, basic conditions, 
remuneration affirmative action, equal opportunities, career development, occupational health 
and retirement/pension benefits. Training was mainly focused on visitor service/hospitality 
and customer care, individual training for empowerment, supervisory/management 
development and nature conservation (National Parks Board Annual Report 1994/95: 45). 
The National Parks Board increased its contribution to the Pension Provident Fund from 10 to 
12% in January 1995. A participative management philosophy was introduced to improve 
communication and effectiveness in the organisation and salary scales were revised to make 
                                                 
31 Skilled and supervisory staff, middle and senior management and executive personnel. 
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them market competitive. Affirmative action was actively pursued especially for positions 
that blacks had been traditionally excluded such as front desk reservations, secretaries, 
training and human resources managers and social ecology managers. Long service was 
recognised with 725 employees being given awards. Despite these changes, however, 
increasing union activity led to work stoppage in October 1994 and a labour dispute over 
salary demands and basic conditions was declared in March 1995 leading to negotiations (27-
29 March 1995) which stalled in early April 1995. A mediation process was initiated but 
failed and the union went on a legal strike for ten days. One of the union demands was for the 
National Parks Board Provident Fund to be converted into a union-managed fund. There was 
also a change in the union representation of workers of the Parks Board from Municipal 
Workers Union to SATAWWU (National Parks Board, 1994/5:42-45; National Parks Board, 
1995/6:55-61). 
The restructuring of National Parks Board in 1994 was accompanied by a commitment to 
engage poor rural communities adjacent to national parks. The Social Ecology Department 
was introduced in August 1994 with the support of several international agencies to devise 
ways of enabling all stakeholders to derive optimum, tangible and equitable benefits from 
opportunities created through the national parks system. In what can best be described as a 
carrot and stick approach, much talk about public benefit/use and economic empowerment 
through the maintenance of bio-diversity was used to get the cooperation, and in some cases, 
the enthusiasm, of local communities for conservation initiatives or interventions (Pollard, 
Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:438-439). This marked a shift in the National Parks 
Board‟s thinking and revision of its corporate identity to focus more on the developmental, 
financial and social aspects of conservation initiatives on surrounding communities. National 
parks used to be rightly perceived as being racially exclusive because surrounding black 
communities did not have access to them or derive direct benefits from them and are 
excluded from the decision-making processes. The National Parks Boards new vision 
required a coordinated marketing and advertising campaign to rid it of its previous elitist 
image. A Director of Marketing and Communication was first appointed for this task in 
August 1994 (National Parks Board, 1994/5:33).  The Social Ecology Department worked 
through environmental education drives facilitated by local community and park forums to 
devise action plans for community development. Shareholding targets were set for the 
previously disadvantaged to heal the divide  and give communities real equity in the form of 
community-owned and managed camping sites, cultural villages and craft centres and 
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community lodges (National Parks Board, 1994/5:31). A Social Ecology Section was 
established at the Kruger National Park (the flagship of the National Parks Board) in 1995 
and it sought to involve neighbouring communities foster a sense of pride and ownership 
among the park‟s neighbours by establishing open communication channels, curio shops and 
restaurants (Mabunda, Pienaar and Verhoef, 2003:14 & 17). 
The restructuring of National Parks Board was accompanied by plans to expand existing 
national parks by acquiring land adjacent to them and trans-locating animals from crowded 
parks to stock others as well as the creation of trans-frontier parks (National Parks Board, 
1994/5:20). However, such expansion also heralded the further intrusion of national parks 
onto community land which was used for other things and was reminiscent of the old ways in 
which conservationists bulldozed their way around the countryside and took what they 
wanted with little regard for the needs of local communities. 
In 1995, new non-white board members with expertise and experience in conservation, 
human rights, business and social issues were appointed to the Board. The new members 
included Ms F Khan, Mr V Khanyile, Mr R Maruma, Ms P R H Modise and Ms M 
Mbengashe, thus transforming the racial profile of the board and its policies and culture to 
some degree. 1995 was the first time that women served on the National Parks Board and 
more confidence (positive response) was shown in the board.  Enos Mabuza remained an 
ordinary board member until October 1995 (when the ANC was now in power) when he 
succeeded Mr T I Steenkamp as Chairperson of the 18-member board. Mabuza served in this 
capacity until his death in December 1997 when he was succeeded by Mr V. Khanyile as 
Acting Chairman (National Parks Board Report, 1996/97:102).  
Mr Mavuso Msimang previously of the South African Tourism Board - Satour) was 
appointed as the National Parks Board‟s Chief Executive Officer in July 1997 (succeeding 
Dr. Robbie Robinson who had been the National Parks Board‟s Chief Executive). Professor 
Amareswa Galla was appointed by the board to facilitate the organisation‟s realignment 
process. As the board‟s Chairman, Enos Mabuza noted that Msimang‟s appointment “brings 
to the post extensive national and international management experience.” The organisation‟s 
priorities were to make it financially viable, transform its composition and strategies and to 
position it as a truly post-1994 organisation whilst retaining its standing as one of the leading 
conservation agencies in the world. In terms of its community engagement, the National 
Parks Board‟s Social Ecology department was involved in various programmes with 
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communities adjacent to all national parks under its management to ensure their economic 
growth and welfare (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/072435397.htm). The name of 
the organisation changed from the National Parks Board to the South African National Parks 
(SANParks) in December 1997 and its logo would change the following year (National Parks 
Board, 1996/97:104). 
Food and Trees for Africa (FTFA) 
Food and Trees for Africa (FTFA) was founded in 1990 as Trees for Africa – a non-profit, 
environmental and education organization. Helen Suzman was a founding patron of the 
multiple award-winning FTFA which is the sub-Saharan partner of Global ReLeaf. It works 
in partnership with government, the private and public sectors, local authorities and civil 
society to improve the quality of life and environments for all communities in South Africa.  
Its sponsors and partners include Audi South Africa, ABSA, Woolworths Trust, South 
African Breweries, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Department of 
Agriculture, Eskom, USAID, the Danish Cooperation for Environmental Development 
(DANCED), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Green Trust, 
Barloworld, Deutsche Bank, the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the Urban Greening Fund, 
with Mabuza having served as a board member South African Breweries. Ms Jeunesse Park 
is the organisation‟s founder and Chief Executive Officer and she is also the founder of the 
Carbon Standard & Global Carbon Exchange which is primarily concerned with to offsetting 
carbon dioxide emissions. The organisation‟s focus was initially on the protection and 
management of the environment by developing, promoting and facilitating national greening 
programmes32 in degraded environments, offsetting carbon emissions to manage climate 
change, food security and sustainable natural resource use and management. Individuals, 
schools, churches and other community centres big and small donate trees for the 
organisation‟s greening projects and vegetable seeds and seedlings for home food 
gardens/food security (http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html). 
FTFA‟s founders wanted to contribute to a healthy and sustainable quality of life for all 
through environmental awareness, addressing the pressing issue of global warming. 
However, the organisation‟s name was changed in 2000 to reflect its increasing focus on food 
security through perma-culture food gardening activities designed to help alleviate poverty in 
                                                 
32 Environmental stewardship programmes such as Trees for Homes, EduPlant and the Urban Greening Forum 
which have environmental/aesthetic, social and economic benefits such as trees for homes/timber/construction 
and capacity building  and skills development with a consultative community-based approach to ensure 
sustainability. 
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low income households by contributing towards food security. FTFA has raised its corporate 
identity in the area of community environmental upliftment particularly in the townships and 
villages where it promotes self-reliance. In 1997, Kader Asmal was the Minister of Water 
Affairs & Forestry and he praised FTFA praised as “a dynamic, progressive and accountable 
NGO” (http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html). 
Ms Park describes Mabuza as a wonderful and highly respected friend and Chairman of 
FTFA from 1993 until his death in 1997. She remembers him as an active and effective 
Chairman who contributed to conceptualising viable community programmes, connecting the 
organisation with high profile people and used his existing networks and high profile 
business connections to raise funds for the organisation. The FTFA started the Enos Mabuza 
Horticultural Bursary Fund after he passed away and it has been used to pay for a number of 
students to study horticulture since then (Jeunesse Park, email communication March 2009). 
In the FTFA 1994 Review, Enos Mabuza (then Chairman), noted that FTFA‟s urban renewal 
programme had planted over 62 000 trees that year. He acknowledged that the symbolic 
value of the exercise far outweighed the immediate environmental impact but the 
organisation‟s emphasis was the importance of environmental upliftment as a critical factor in 
urban renewal. Mabuza and others in the FTFA positioned the organisation to participate in 
the development of long-term environmental education programmes, particularly since its 
work was/is endorsed by the Departments of the Environment and Education 
(http://www.trees.co.za/home/aboutus/history.html). In 1998, Windsor Shuenyane replaced 
Mabuza as Chairman of Trees for Africa. He had been closely associated with the 
organisation since its inception nine years before. Shuenyane was succeeded as Chairman by 
Prof Mohale Mahanyele. Kumi Naidoo and Dali Tambo have served on the FTFA‟s Board of 
Directors. 
Team Africa, Open Africa and Afrikatourism 
Mabuza was also a member of Team Africa which is comprised of corporations, 
professionals and individuals including Dr. G A „Robbie‟ Robinson; Dr. Ian Player; Prof W 
Roy Siegfried; Mr Errol Martin; Prof Ernie Heath; Dr. George R Hughes and Mr TI 
Steenkamp who formed a strategic alliance of those who share the non-governmental 
organisation Open Africa‟s vision in the Afrikatourism Project. Open Africa was founded by 
Noel de Villiers in 1995 with representatives from Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Zambia and Swaziland. Afrikatourism is based on sustainability and community 
Page | 167 
 
participation to optimise and balance the synergies between tourism, job creation and the 
conservation of natural and cultural resources, the continent‟s heritage. Nelson Mandela is a 
patron of Afrikatourism and some of its sponsors include the Anglo American Corporation, 
De Beers, FirstRand, Sanlam Investment Management, the European Union, Transnet 
Foundation, the Business Trust, Wilderness Foundation South Africa and the World Bank 
(http://www.africandream.org/navtop/aboutus). 
The Wilderness Conservancy 
Enos Mabuza served as a member of the Wilderness Conservancy advisory team with Nick 
Steele (Director of KwaZulu Department of Nature Conservation), Vance Martin (President 
of The WILD Foundation and The International Wilderness Leadership Foundation), Walter 
C. Quinn (President of The ZOO), Dr. George Hughes (Acting Chief Executive of KwaZulu-
Natal Nature Conservation Service who has also served as Chief Executive of the Natal Parks 
Board) and Ian Player (whose credentials have already been mentioned above) 
(http://www.wildernessconservancy.org/about/advisors.html).  
Splendidly Alive People within Limited Environmental Resources (SAPLER) 
The Splendidly Alive People within Limited Environmental Resources (SAPLER Population 
Trust) is a non-governmental organisation and as its name suggests, it is mainly focused on 
population issues such as birth and death rates, birth control, the AIDS pandemic, poverty 
and livelihoods - socio-economic, moral or political issues which depend on access to health 
care and health information and have implications for resource use in the long term. The 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, for example, has taken over significant portions of health budgets and 
services and less attention is being given to family planning issues as a result. Further, 
SAPLER has expressed concern over the tendency to want to replace AIDS deaths with new 
children, thus maintaining the population as it was, or increasing it. One of SAPLER‟s goals 
is to control population growth by reducing teenage pregnancies in order to contain human 
demands on natural and other resources/the environment. The organisation is also concerned 
about the general attitudes (resistance) of some religious groups, Catholics in particular, to 
discussing the issue of early marriages and child bearing, the legalising of abortion and oral 
contraceptives in as far as they impact birth control/family planning and population growth. 
SAPLER‟s trustees support abortion on request – if and when a woman makes the choice to 
have one.  In the mid 1990s, one of the interventions or projects that SAPLER, in conjunction 
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with other organisations33, undertook in a bid to address the population and AIDS problems 
was to try and motivate behaviour change in South Africa on a large scale through the 
provision of relevant information which would enable them to make informed or correct 
decisions regarding their reproductive health. It promoted correct and consistent condom use 
and at the same time aimed at reducing the stigma associated with AIDS and condoms 
especially among the most vulnerable population groups such as adolescents, migrant 
workers and commercial sex workers. According to the organisation‟s website, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu supports its efforts (SAPLER National Survey online). 
SAPLER acknowledged Mabuza‟s work as an “ardent environmentalist” but criticised the 
fact that he wrote the introduction to The Green Pages (1991/92) but failed to highlight or 
mention population or family planning. SAPLER does mention, however, that they visited the 
former KaNgwane and Lebowa Bantustans in the early 1990s and noted that the people of 
KaNgwane were wary of family planning programmes. When asked why this was so, they 
were either told, “This is a very Catholic area,” or “This is a very tribal area where the 
women are afraid of the chiefs” (SAPLER National Survey online).  From these responses, it 
is obvious that tradition or culture had direct implications for population control and, by 
extension, resource use or overuse – barriers that Mabuza and other environmentally 
conscious people had to contend with. Kaufman‟s research into the use of modern 
contraceptive use by black women, with a focus on the Bantustans, shows that South African 
geopolitics and the context of family planning (individual and community influences, 
including traditions and education levels) play a role. She found that KaNgwane had low 
levels of contraceptive use compared to the other Bantustans but notes that women who lived 
in KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, and the Ciskei were not significantly different from 
black women in Natal (the reference category) in their propensity to use modern 
contraceptives (Kaufman, 1998:429). KaNgwane and KwaNdebele had reasonable 
infrastructure and access to white South Africa, unlike Gazankulu, for example, but Kaufman 
comments that the governments of these three Bantustans were not particularly supportive of 
family planning (Kaufman, 1998:424). 
                                                 
33 The United States based Population Services International and the South African non-governmental 
organisation “The Society for Family Health” (SFH). 
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6.5 Mabuza’s Conservation Initiatives in KaNgwane 
 
Figure 2: Greater Kruger National Park area showing Nelspruit, Barberton and the 
Mozambican and Swaziland borders with South Africa. 
Carruthers (2007a:149) notes that our identities and sense of „belonging‟ is shaped by the 
places we grow up in or move to and vice versa. She acknowledges that certain landscapes 
are not just aesthetically pleasing but also have a powerful cultural component which is 
evidenced by numerous San rock art sites, for example. The natural beauty of the Barberton 
and its Bulembu Mountain Pass where Enos Mabuza was born, and what is now Mpumalanga 
province, held particular significance throughout his life. Mpumalanga is known for its 
impressive plant and animal diversity, many private game reserves and protected areas such 
as botanical and zoological gardens which offer a variety of activities such as walking and 
horse riding trails, bird watching, fly fishing, photographic safaris and trophy hunting 
expeditions. The Kruger National Park is the main attraction but it is not the only one. There 
are others such as the Nelspruit Nature Reserve, the Blyderivierspoort Nature Reserve, the 
Gustav Klingbiel Reserve and the 2500 ha Barberton Game Reserve (Carruthers, 2007:149).  
Mabuza‟s birth place, Barberton, features many reminders of the early gold rush in the form 
of museums such as the Cultural Historical Forestry Museum which showcases aspects of 
South Africa‟s forestry industry. It also has the Mount Sheba Nature Reserve south of 
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Pilgrim‟s Rest, which is a living museum of the early gold mining town. Mount Sheba Nature 
Reserve is best known for its indigenous forests and the Lowveld National Botanical Gardens 
has rare lowveld species including indigenous ferns, trees and cycads. The Barberton area 
also has verdite deposits which are used by sangomas to promote fertility. Another attraction 
in the Barberton area is God‟s Window which provides a magnificent view of miles of 
thickly forested mountains and rich plant diversity. The Crocodile River cascades 12 metres 
into a series of rock pools to form the Montrose Falls in Schoemanskloof. Other spectacular 
falls include the Bridal Veil, Horseshoe and Lone Creek Falls. Other striking rock formations 
include the Sudwala Caves, Bourkes‟s Luck Potholes and the Blyde River Canyon which is a 
26 kilometre gorge carved out of the face of the escarpment. The Blyde River Canyon is the 
third largest gorge in the world after the Grand Canyon in the United States and the Fish 
River Canyon in Namibia. Mpumalanga is also rich in coal reserves (Witbank, Secunda) and 
power stations which, unfortunately, cause high levels of air pollution. Forestry (timber 
plantation of pine, gum and Australian wattles) and paper mills are also part of the 
Mpumalanga landscape particularly in the Sabie and other areas. However, this naturally rich 
area, like many others, faces challenges to its preservation and leaders like Mabuza tried to 
do their part to preserve it.  
Mabuza addressed guests at the 1990 Audi Environmental Awards with a speech entitled 
“The Stewardship of Creation” and quoted Robert Ardrey (1977) when he said “…A 
philosophy of enmity with nature and an urge to reduce the wilderness to extinction, is a 
philosophy of human extinction” (Mabuza 1990: pages un-numbered). He realised that the 
earth is non-renewable and that ordinary people needed a different attitude of different 
appreciation of this reality because our planet and everything in it, the things we take for 
granted and assume will always be there might not always be there. However, in doing so, he 
also noted that people will not see the need or urgency for conservation in the face of these 
more immediate socio-economic problems and deficiencies such as widespread poverty. It 
was, therefore, imperative for leaders to attend to matters of social justice (the distribution of 
resources) before people at the grassroots could buy into conservation ideals (Mabuza, 1990: 
un-numbered pages).  
For Mabuza, conservation was about prioritising ecological balance instead of the aggressive 
developmental agendas and careless natural resource use. He acknowledged the pressures 
posed by rapid population growth and the attendant ills such as over-stocking, over-grazing 
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and others which lead to or exacerbate processes of land degradation and desertification 
(Mabuza, 1990: un-numbered pages). His address made a call for environmental legislation to 
define the parameters for technological development so that we can preserve vegetation, 
catchment areas, wildlife and the ozone/atmosphere (Mabuza, 1990: unnumbered pages). He 
advocated for holistic and integrated approaches to conservation by academics, big business, 
politicians and professional conservationists as well as local communities – similar to the 
bottom-up, consultative approach which was adopted when the Mthethomusha Game Reserve 
was established in KaNgwane in the mid 1980s (discussed below). 
In his tribute to Mabuza, Player (2003) recalls, that at the congress, Mabuza delivered his 
address in slow, poetic, measured tones. He described the Swazi Bantustan of KaNgwane and 
the traditional Swazi way of life, including its respect for animals, birds and the land. He 
spoke about KaNgwane‟s need for wilderness conservation and explained the difficulties of 
setting aside land for conservation and balancing this need with that for land for settlement 
and cattle. According to Player (2003:170), the audience was impressed by Mabuza‟s grasp 
of the subject and during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza fulfilled 
his promise or desire to set aside land for a game reserves in the area, perhaps as small 
comfort for blacks having been excluded from conservation projects for so long in the 
country‟s history. The paragraphs below describe the type of natural heritage that Enos 
Mabuza sought to preserve for future generations.  
According to the Association for Rural Advancement (Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-Gerhart 
Microfilm Collection), soil conservation measures included the planting of grass strips and 
the construction of 42km of diversion banks. However, less than 1% of the Bantustan‟s land 
area was used for afforestation. The three nature reserves that he had a hand in creating are 
his conservation legacy in the former KaNgwane Bantustan and Mpumalanga as a whole. 
Mabuza‟s conservation initiatives seemed to embrace the need for decentralised conservation 
in which local input and participation was actively sought. In some respects, this was a 
different and comparatively more popular approach to natural resource management. 
Nadine Gordimer paid tribute to Enos Mabuza on 4 August 2001 Gordimer on the Occasion 
of the Opening of the Enos Mabuza Centre at Penryn College in Nelspruit. She recalled her 
friendship with him and their shared passion for literature, the politics of the day and 
conservation (Gordimer, 2001).What force was behind Mabuza‟s dedication to conservation 
issues when the Bantustans were already arid and unproductive? The creation of three 
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relatively nature reserves naturally deprived local communities of already limited means of 
livelihood. Given the history of long standing mistrust and misgivings about conservation 
initiatives; how was he able to convince local communities that the reserves were necessary? 
In the Bantustans in particular, conservation efforts seemed incompatible with developmental 
(meeting the needs of the poor) but eco-tourism was one way of providing employment 
opportunities even though they are never enough to satisfy demand in poor communities. 
Overcrowding, overstocking and droughts worsened the plight of marginalised Bantustan or 
rural populations but so too did unmitigated environmental degradation - erosion and 
desertification. Neither Mabuza nor the communities had control over the problem of over-
crowding but they (Mpakeni community with respect to Mthethomusha) dedicated 
themselves to a cause on which the future of the human race and the planet itself depends. 
Mabuza‟s strategy was to engage the respective communities and giving them a sense of 
ownership in the projects (participation and empowerment); and approach which is being 
used by the South African Ministry of Tourism and others (Van Schalkwyk, 2004:325-327; 
Visser, 2004). 
Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve  
Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve was the first eco-tourist community conservation project 
to be initiated in the former KaNgwane Bantustan in 1986. The Matsamo Tribal Authority 
(covering the Mzinti community) has its main office in Schoemansdal. It agreed to the 
change in land tenure and use for the area covering the game reserve and in return 
participates in managing it. The reserve is owned by the surrounding the Matsamo 
community (Matsamo Tourism Association) and lies on the Kruger National Park‟s southern 
boundary along the Crocodile River, south of Malelane and less than two hours drive 
(145km) from Nelspruit. Mahushe Shongwe is close to Mzinti village and the Mzinti River 
(on the Lebombo flats, 30km from Malelane) flows through the reserve. Parts of the Malelane 
land system are made up of metamorphic greenstone rocks such as amphibolite and schist 
with dolerite dikes which are similar in composition to basalt and they weather into clayey-
structured fertile soils which support moderately dense riverine bushveld and mopani as well 
as acacia woodland, Jackalberry, Tree Fuschia, Sycamore Fig and Potatobush in riverine 
thickets during dry season (Venter, Scholes and Eckhardt, 2003:98-105). The topography at 
Mahushe Shongwe is gently undulating with granitic rock outcrops just a stone throw away 
from the Swaziland border with the Mawewe Shongwe Reserve (Mawewe Cattle-Game 
project which is a 9000 ha integrated wildlife and livestock area created in 1994) to its south. 
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Mahushe Shongwe is a small game reserve covering an area of 1 200 hectares on communal 
lands (King, 2007a:210).  The game reserve has approximately 150 bird species and is 
popular with birdwatchers. Several species of large herbivores have been reintroduced to the 
reserve. Visitors can go on day or night game drives in open 4x4 vehicles or on guided bush 
walks (http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/mahushe.asp).  
 
King (2007a; King, 2005), however, notes that conservation in this particular area has various 
impacts and meanings which remain tied to the livelihood and governance systems. A small 
number of part-time and full-time jobs are generated by the game reserve on a seasonal basis 
and revenue generated from hunting and game meat sales is shared between the Mpumalanga 
Parks Board (MPB) and the Mzinti community. The Matsamo Tribal Authority currently 
administers or controls access to a diverse range of resources in and around the game reserve 
and the majority of the 35 plots demarcated for the Mzinti community belong to households 
within the older section of the community which have stronger ties to the Matsamo Tribal 
Authority. King reports that the induna (local chief or headman) and members of his family, 
for instance, have been allocated small-scale sugar cane plots. It is also reported that the 
households that have been allocated plots are male-headed and that political elites have also 
benefited from the distribution of plots; suggesting that the tribal authorities continue to use 
development projects to control resources and reward allies within the region. The induna and 
local chief also grant permits for wood collection because communal land belongs to the 
tribal authority. However, rather than strictly viewing Mahushe Shongwe as a constraint to 
environmental resource access or site for limited employment, community members identify 
a number of benefits from its existence including education and development opportunities 
(King, 2007a). The apparent lack of transparency concerning land allocation reaffirms the 
sense of mistrust of the tribal Authority (King, 2007a:210; King, 2005:69) but new 
environmental legislation and agencies are now challenging the legitimacy of the tribal 
authority in managing certain resources to which it has historical claim (King, 2005:68). 
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Figure 3: Location of Mahushe Shongwe Game Reserve (King, 2007a:210). 
 
Songimvelo Game Reserve  
The eNcakeni area (known today as Songimvelo) was settled by the bakaNgwane (people of 
Swaziland) under the eMjindini Authority during the reign of King Mswati II (1840-1868). 
Since about 1882, mining and deforestation of wooded hillsides contributed to environmental 
degradation of the area, especially during the gold-boom of the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
Songimvelo Game Reserve in eastern Mpumalanga was established in 1984 in the former 
KaNgwane Bantustan in an area with the highest known plant and animal diversity including 
insects and over 300 bird species in Mpumalanga Province. It is the largest reserve operated 
by the Mpumalanga Parks Board and extends over 500 square kilometres or approximately 
49 000 hectares of pristine bushveld, middle-veld and grassland which forms part of the 
eastern Drakensberg escarpment in the Komati valley (Carruthers, 2007a:166-167). It is 
adjacent to Swaziland‟s Malolotja Nature Reserve (on the border), south-west of the 
Barberton Mountain slopes which have greenstone rocks with 3 600 million year-old fossil 
evidence of primitive life forms. There are also archaeological sites dating back to 400 BC. 
The area is bisected by the Lomati and Komati rivers which have carved numerous sheer 
cliffs, deep gorges (the Msauli, Malolotja and Mlumati) and hidden valleys forming a ragged 
landscape of rocky outcrops, rolling hillsides, forest ravines, open plains and mountain 
streams. In addition to these focal points, there are many species of animals, including 
threatened species in the game reserve. More than 1400 known species of birds also live in 
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the reserve. One of the unique features about Songimvelo is that it was one of the first 
reserves to directly include local communities in natural resource management decisions 
(Carruthers, 2007a:166). It was handed over to the Mpumalanga Parks Board in 1994 by the 
KaNgwane authorities and has since been incorporated into the Lubombo Trans-Frontier 
Conservation Area (TFCA) which consists of five mini TFCAs based on an agreement 
between the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland which was signed on 
22 June 2000. The mini TFCA which includes Songimvelo is called the Songimvelo-
Malolotja TFCA between South Africa (Barberton area where Mabuza grew up) and 
Swaziland (Pigg‟s Peak) (http://www.mpumalanga.com/parks/songimvelo.asp). 
Mthethomusha Game Reserve 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, new and different visions for conservation were being 
promoted by individuals and organisations and the creation of Mthethomusha Game Reserve 
was a prime example of these pioneering approaches which deliberately sought close 
community involvement in conservation. Mthethomusha Game Reserve extends over an area 
of 8 000 hectares (19 800-acre) of mountainous country situated on the south western border 
of the world-famous Kruger National Park in the south eastern part of Mpumalanga province 
with a view of the Lebombo and Malelane Mountain ranges. This region shares borders with 
Mozambique and Swaziland and straddles the Nsikazi Highland north of the Crocodile River 
Gorge. Mthethomusha has three distinct woodland vegetation types or ecosystems occurring 
among its jumbled granite boulders and craggy peaks. Mthethomusha Game Reserve was one 
of the very first game reserves to be built on what has now become the contemporary 
approach to community and conservation involvement and partnerships. Through an 
innovative initiative by the local Tribal Authority of the Mphakeni tribe under the leadership 
of the late Chief Charles Nkosi, low potential agricultural land was given over (sanctioned 
the establishment of the reserve) to the management of the KaNgwane Parks Corporation for 
optimal and sustainable development in 1986. The land is owned by the Mpakeni community 
and Mthethomusha Game Reserve and its privately operated Bongani Lodge is one of the 
premier tourist destinations in Mpumalanga today. The „Big Five‟ and other animals as well 
as a rich abundance of bird species are found in this game reserve. The African elephant, lion, 
buffalo and white rhino have been part of successful reintroduction programmes in the 
reserve. Remains of iron-age settlements are to be found in the hills and there are more than 
250 well-preserved San (Bushmen) rock art paintings in its caves and overhangs which make 
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guided nature walks a truly memorable experience. The rock paintings are estimated to be 1 
500 years old and provide the greatest concentration of rock art per square metre on earth. 
The Mpakeni community shares in the proceeds from tourism and continues to harvest other 
resources – wood for fuel and grass for thatch, medicinal plants. This wild frontier is also 
made up of the historic towns of Barberton, Komatipoort, Kaapmuiden and Badplaas 
(http://www.sa-venues.com/game-reserves/mpl_mthethomusha.htm). It is significant that 
Mthethomusha Game Reserve in KaNgwane was one of the first places that Nelson Mandela 
visited on his release from prison in 1990 (Player, 2003:170). The map below shows the 
location of Mthetomusha and Songimvelo Game Reserves which were part of the KaNgwane 
Bantustan and which Enos Mabuza was instrumental in establishing. 
 
Figure 4: KaNgwane Conservation 
(http://www.savenues.com/accommodation/mpl_game_lodges.htm) 
 
Although Mabuza does not have a nature reserve named after him, KwaNdebele‟s leader S. 
S. Skosana has the approximately 1800 hectares S. S. Skhosana Nature Reserve in 
Mpumalanga (north of Bronkhorstspruit in the former KwaNdebele Bantustan) named after 
him.  
In recent years, cultural villages have also become striking features in or around the game 
reserves as extensions of the ecotourism vision. These include the four-star graded (Tourism 
Grading Council of South Africa) Matsamo Cultural Village (Emvelo) at Jeppes Reef border 
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post along South Africa‟s border with Swaziland. The village opened in 2001 and it is a 
showcase of Swazi culture by a rural community of the Shongwe clan. Traditional songs and 
dances, curios/crafts, al fresco restaurants which offer Swazi cuisine and traditional healers 
and herb gardens are showcased at Emkhayeni. Guest accommodation is in 14 traditional 
Swazi „beehive‟ huts equipped with modern amenities. The village employs close to 100 
people (75% of them women) who have shares in the venture. There is another Swazi 
Cultural Village at Matsulu off the N4 east of Nelspruit, approximately 50km south of the 
Malelane Gate of the Kruger National Park on the R570. The village offers conference 
facilities with swimming pool, horse riding, hiking trails and mountain biking. Ebutsini 
Cultural village is adjacent to Songimvelo Game Reserve and close to the Oshoek Border 
post to Swaziland. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Mabuza may have had a disproportionate focus on conservation issues at a time when people 
in the Bantustans were poor and faced with many hardships such as unemployment, 
inadequate service delivery and no rights. Perhaps at the time, his projects with the game 
reserves had little value or meaning to people leading miserable and uncertain lives, battling 
to survive on a daily basis but in one respect, the game parks that he helped establish were a 
symbolic reclamation of what these communities had lost when they were forcibly removed 
and excluded from benefiting from national parks which were reserved for whites. Would it 
have been more preferable for Mabuza not to have done anything at all on a national or local 
scale with regard to conservation given the extensively documented alienation of 
communities around the Kruger National Park and the locals‟ resentment towards it and the 
hegemony, dispossession and disempowerment that it represented? Agency or action is 
always directed towards something (goal-oriented) and is inseparable from the dynamics 
and/or problematic features of those situations. Compelled or voluntary action reproduces or 
transforms situations with positive or negative results. How then does one interpret Enos 
Mabuza‟s contribution to conservation? If Mabuza was exploited in a historically exclusive 
white field to peddle the conservation gospel; he also used them to further his own ends and 
ambitions. However, there was some degree of respect and recognition of the 
knowledge/expertise or value that each stakeholder brought to their interactions. Mabuza‟s 
entrance into the white dominated world of conservation and the timing of his chairmanship 
of the National Parks Board opened up the field to more blacks, and women as the transition 
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too root. His involvement in conservation showed that one did not need to have an affluent 
social background to care about the environment.  
Was Mabuza the best black candidate to champion conservation issues? Perhaps not but he 
was at the right place at the right time and had a keen interest for conservation, which may or 
may not have been a prerequisite, but nonetheless allowed him to make the best of the 
situation for mutual benefit. This can easily be labelled cronyism but affirmative action, 
which was seem as being necessary, also played a significant role. By its very nature, the 
policy is expedient even though it is usually flawed in its implementation in different 
contexts. As this chapter shows, Mabuza shared similar values and had close contact and 
rapport with a good number of prominent conservationists dating back from the mid 1970s. 
Like his politics and relations with certain Swazi chiefs that he acted as proxy for in the 
Bantustan structures, Mabuza‟s conservationist persona seems to have been consolidated with 
the help of patronage links into what was exclusively a white upper class domain. His family 
has asserted that his commitment to conservation issues started in his childhood so there was 
a definite personal and genuine dimension to it even though, in some respects, he acted on 
behalf of or in concert with a powerful white business and professional environmental 
interests. Does this then mean that his contribution to this field was irrelevant or that the 
results of his actions where only one-sided? Not at all. Apart from the personal satisfaction he 
derived from it and the professional and personal contacts that he made, other people that he 
did not know on a personal level also benefited from his knowledge and the environmental 
projects that he was able to initiate with others, ostensibly on the behalf of various 
communities/stakeholders, and their long-term effects or implications. As noted above, the 
Matsamo Tribal Authority, for instance, worked with Mabuza‟s KaNgwane government in 
shaping household patterns of access to a variety of resources that resulted in locally 
understood rules. Today, although the Matsamo Tribal Authority has diminished in power 
since 1994, it has become a barrier to accessing environmental resources within, and around, 
the Mahushe Shongwe game reserve (King, 2007a:214). The Mpumalanga Nature 
Conservation Act of 1998 expanded the regulatory authority of governmental agencies and 
the Wildlife Protection Service (WPS) of the Mpumalanga Parks Board has been empowered 
to enforce new restrictions on the collection of wood and medicinal plants as well as fishing 
(King, 2005:70). Although King is sceptical about benefits that accrue to local communities, 
apart from corrupt traditional authorities with power to allocate resources, he is more upbeat 
about the role of the Ehlanzeni District Municipality which has been generating economic 
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and political opportunities for individuals to access previously unavailable resources (King, 
2005:68). 
Mabuza did not re-invent the wheel in the field of conservation but he did not just have a 
fleeting fascination with it. It was a sustained passion which presented him with an 
opportunity to preserve the natural heritage and splendour of the place of his birth and in 
doing so he joined existing and new stakeholders including scientific experts, advisors, 
consultants and non-governmental organisations to preach the themes mentioned in the 
introduction above. For better or worse, Enos Mabuza tried to raise conservation awareness 
and motivate people to support conservation efforts (advocating responsible land and other 
resource use to ensure the sustainability of ecological/environmental, socio-cultural and 
economic systems not just in KaNgwane. The direct economic and social impacts of 
community conservation have been questioned because while some benefits accrue to local 
communities, such efforts do yield some benefits, they do not necessarily or significantly 
reduce poverty as claimed by their proponents, especially when compared to the revenue 
generated by national parks and tourism to other stakeholders including politicians, policy 
makers, consultants, businesses in the tourism industry and professional conservationists and 
the organisations they patronise (Pollard, Shackleton, and Carruthers, 2003:440; King, 
2007a:207–219; King 2007b:13-25; King, 2006:79-96). Mabuza‟s hand in establishing the 
game reserves in KaNgwane in the 1980s might have been an elaborate public relations 
exercise; a way of distracting the locals with promises of benefits. It could also have been a 
way to show up the other Bantustans and their casinos or one way through which he 
manoeuvred and positioned himself for the National Parks position in the early 1990s. 
Politics (power blocks and interests) is an integral part when it is decided who gets what, 
when and how (Lasswell, 1936; Fischer, 1988:127-132; Davenport, 1987:391-394) and the 
transformation of South Africa‟s conservation arena was no different. 
Bantustan authorities were controversial figures from the outset and they were not respected 
by the people because they were drawn into the administrative system of the apartheid state 
as its proxy in the rural areas. They were even more unpopular because they were generally 
responsible for implementing policies such as forced removals, policing pass or influx 
controls and imposing a variety of taxes on an already impoverished and overcrowded rural 
population. Further, they implemented some version of conservation in the form of livestock 
limitation or culling, land re-division into grazing, cultivation and residential areas 
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(Betterment Schemes) which limited their access to already inadequate resources and 
marginal infrastructure development. These issues put traditional authorities and Bantustan 
elites in conflict with rural communities (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; Ribot, 2001:74; Ray and 
van Rouveroy van Niewaal, 1996:25; Fischer, 1988:127-132; Davenport, 1987:391-394) and 
this makes the case for Mabuza‟s three game reserves (one in each of the three main land 
masses which made up KaNgwane) in a small Bantustan like KaNgwane a curious one. 
Mabuza was not authoritarian per se because in all his dealing, he consulted the local chiefs 
who, it seems, looked to him for answers to issues that were typically outside their usual 
areas of expertise. They went along with whatever Mabuza deemed to be necessary, 
responsible or beneficial action.  
One of the main reasons that Mabuza became a Bantustan leader was that the chiefs were 
illiterate and needed an educated person to „show them the way.‟ As such, the local chiefs 
were receptive of most ideas or suggestions that Mabuza made. Consulting the chiefs was 
more of a formality which placated the chiefs or reassured them that they were really the ones 
in charge, thus giving his actions legitimacy or the appearance of it. With the cooperation 
and/or support of the chiefs, the people at the grassroots felt no real need to question his 
motives in a public sense. The only time that there was notable discord and contestation was 
when Mabuza and some of the chiefs and their supporters disagreed over proposed 
incorporation into Swaziland in 1982. Overall, Mabuza avoided conflict, scandal and bad 
publicity by consulting or involving the major power brokers, no matter who they were, in 
partnerships such that his actions were sanctioned in one way or another and were thus 
acceptable in principle. 
To conclude, conservation is traditionally conservative so whose interests are served at the 
end of the day, in spite of protestations that its long-term goals are meant to benefit 
everyone? Who has the power and who initiates what? Community or individual views of 
conservation projects have not been significantly affected by an idealised appreciation for 
natural landscapes or the popularity of sustainable development in the past decade or so. For 
many, conservation projects are not always a good thing for those affected in one way or 
another. Incorporating issues that matter to them the most (immediate or short-term goals) 
such as redress for land dispossession based on racial considerations, ensuring food security, 
adopting appropriate land use patterns to minimise land degradation and being able to make 
independent choices from given alternatives without having inducements or incentives thrust 
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upon them in return for supporting external and/or joint conservation interventions into 
conservation programmes. These challenges will remain for years to come and have to be 
negotiated in other ways; especially in the developing world where rural households need to 
particular ways of accessing environmental and economic resources to produce livelihoods - 
wood for cooking and heating as well as for construction; land for farming and grazing of 
livestock (cattle, goats, sheep), thatch grass for construction (roofing), medicinal plants to 
cure common ailments and wild animals to supplement protein in local diets. In the final 
analysis, it might be that the old conservation issues and power dynamics have simply been 
given a facelift (the chameleon effect) much like Mabuza‟s many incarnations in other 
spheres. Maintaining legitimacy and relevance means that organisations and individual have 
to regularly reposition or adapting to their changing environments. 
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Chapter 7: Challenges and Opportunities in Politics 
7.1 Introduction 
The political arena is often described as a spider‟s web of deceit, loose cannons, red herrings 
and dark horses. It entails a good measure of idealism or cynicism, second-guessing, 
mistakes, blunders and appeasements Personal desires make strange bed-fellows with 
individuals‟ sense of duty or patriotism and in the end everything has a price. It is also 
described as a contact sport like gladiators doing battle as in the Roman Coliseums of old. A 
politician or leader needs to be intelligent enough to understand the game because ultimately 
winning is all that matters (Grothe, 2008:254-273; Wilkinson, 2002). Bourdieu‟s social 
analysis and theory of practice (1977; 1998a; 1990) borrows from classical theorists such as 
Marx, Weber and Durkheim in trying to explain social hierarchies, divisions or 
differentiation. Bourdieu‟s theory states that individuals are positioned in social space or 
fields according to the forms of capital they possess. Clusters form around distributions of 
these forms of capital and a class or group habitus (mentality) is formed within the clusters in 
the process. In turn, their decisions or actions are informed by an individualistic framework 
or rationality (maximum utility) in pursuit of different goals (1977; 1998a; 1990). Power 
corrupts‟ because of the effort it requires to acquire and retain it (ambition often breeds 
tyranny) amidst other power-seeking rivals but there are exceptions to the rule. 
The general persona of a leader is accepted as one that requires character, courage, integrity - 
not expediency, accommodation and short-range opportunism. However, a career in politics 
is rarely a charmed experience because politics is a game of survival in which contenders are 
faced with different challenges and make decisions to address them as they see fit, which, 
unfortunately is often misguided. A career in politics requires some degree of cunning in 
order to stay in a game which can be described as a rat-race or a game of musical chairs. It is 
often marked by inconsistencies and quid pro quo arrangements (marriages of 
convenience/alliances) of all types and typically has an indeterminateness (shades of gray) 
which does not make saints of the majority of those involved in it. Winston Churchill once 
commented on the questions of conscience, integrity, character, honour, sincerity, truth, 
actions, failure, mistakes and defeat in politics (life generally) as follows: 
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The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the 
rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life 
without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our 
hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the 
fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour – Winston Churchill. 
The disdain towards blacks who worked within apartheid structures was once summed up by 
Mosiuoa Lekota‟s dismissal of them as “fools, crooks and eunuchs” – apartheid‟s foot 
soldiers (Mufson, 1990:286). However, the ANC‟s allies over the years included whites (the 
Congress of Democrats) from as early as the 1950s (Callinicos, 2006:3) and to some degree, 
traditional authorities became important to the ANC and the SACP, particularly in the rural 
areas, when they were banned in 1960. Mufson (1990:190) describes the alliances which 
made up the Mass Democratic Movement and the ANC‟s central position within it as a 
“broad church of resistance with room in its pews for capitalists and communists, white and 
black, young and old.” 
This chapter partly compares the similarities and differences between Bantustan leaders 
(Mabuza‟s cohorts or contemporaries in the late 1970s and 1980s) who both claimed to be 
supporting the black man‟s cause despite working in apartheid-created structures. It considers 
how they got to those positions, how they managed to stay there (what they did) and who 
they cooperated or formed alliances with - the networks to which they belonged (Mills, 
1956). 
7.2 Perceptions and Truths about Bantustan Leaders and/or Traditional Authorities  
Bantustans seemed to Promote ethnic nationalism (Mayer, 1972: 8-9,11) and various 
inducements such as economic resources, prestige and politico-legal means of power were 
used to entice and lure ambitious leaders into Bantustan politics and traditional authorities 
that refused to collaborate or failed in their functions were deposed in favour of more 
cooperative ones (Ntsebeza, 2002:25 & 33; Ribot, 2001:74; Ray and van Rouveroy van 
Niewaal, 1996:25, Hendricks, 1992:58-82; Rogers, 1980; Frederikse, 1990:179; Mayer, 
1972:6, 9, 15-18, 20). The strife and violence which was synonymous with most Bantustans 
was internally and externally induced by systems of patronage and repression (between chiefs 
and other politicians and the apartheid state) which were the foundation of the Bantustan 
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system (Bank, 1994:87-90). The backgrounds of Enos Mabuza‟s contemporaries in the 
Bantustan system in 1976 were as follows: 
Name Bantustan Credentials/Qualifications 
Cedric Namedi Phatudi Lebowa Royalty + Educator + 
Intellectual + Inspector of 
Schools 
Gatsha Mangosothu 
Buthelezi 
KwaZulu Royalty 
Hudson William Edison 
Ntsanwisi 
Gazankulu Intellectual + Educator 
Kaizer Daliwonga 
Matanzima 
Transkei Royalty + Lawyer 
Lennox Leslie Wangoma   Ciskei Royalty + Educator 
Lucas Manyane Mangope Bophuthatswana Royalty + Educator 
Naganani Enos John Mabuza KaNgwane Teacher, headmaster, school 
principal, Inspector of 
Schools 
Patrick Ramaano Mphephu Venda Royalty 
Simon Skosana KwaNdebele  
Tsiame Kenneth Mopeli QwaQwa Royalty + Teacher, Principal 
and Inspector of Schools 
Table 5: Bantustan Personalities 
 
A significant number of Bantustan leaders in the mid-late 1970s were of royal blood 
(Paramount Chiefs and other chiefs) because of the way the South African government used 
the conservative political system of traditional institutions or leaders (already in 
existence/authority and commanding a fair amount of respect or deference from the people) 
to deal with the „native problem‟ whilst also giving legitimacy to the Bantustan policy. In 
accordance with this, the constitutions of some Bantustans (KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and 
Venda) specified the composition of their respective Legislative Assemblies. In most cases, a 
certain number of Cabinet Ministers had to be chiefs, representatives of Paramount Chiefs or 
headmen in order to be eligible. However, this was not strictly so in Gazankulu, Lebowa and 
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KaNgwane.  Some Bantustan leaders who were of royal descent also had careers as educators 
(teachers, headmasters, school principals, Education Inspectors) like Enos Mabuza. General 
Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa is of royal descend and a military man.  Mabuza was not 
the only commoner to rise to be the leader of a Bantustan. Professor Ntsanwisi was the son of 
a migrant labourer, Joshua Oupa Gqozo was the son of labourer and religious minister and 
Lennox Sebe was born a commoner but was elected as a representative of the Ama Ntinde 
Tribe in the then Ciskeian Territorial Authority in 1968 and became Chief Minister in 1973 
(Malan and Hattingh, 1976:241-245). 
 
 
Figure 5: Bantustan Personalities from left to right: Chief Buthelezi, Chief Pathudi, Chief 
Mangope, Chief Matanzima, H. W. E. Ntsanwisi, Chief Mphephu and Chief Sebe (Malan and 
Hattingh, 1976:245). 
The contribution of Bantustan leaders like KaNgwane‟s Enos Mabuza who claimed to 
support the struggle was, if genuine, tenuous compared to that of other organisations, not 
least because of their dependence on unpopular and unstable power bases and general 
perceptions about them being part of the apartheid regime‟s collaborative network. For many 
people, it was “difficult to discern where the power of apartheid‟s black faces began and 
ended” (Mufson, 1990:287). The pictures below illustrate this and the general brutality of 
Bantustan police forces did not do much to dispel these perceptions. 
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Figure 6: Bantustan Protest (Mayibuye Vol. 3 No. 9, 1992:12) Bantustan Protest (Mayibuye 
Vol. 3 No. 9, 1992:17). 
On top of their precarious position in relation to the state, Bantustan leaders were also 
vulnerable to rivals from other political parties in the Bantustans. Some Bantustans were 
more volatile than others because of this internal strife and frantic jockeying for position and 
power. These power struggles manifested, for instance, in several coup d‟etats that were 
staged in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, KwaNdebele, Transkei and Venda in the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s (Bank, 1994:75-98) in which the biggest casualties were usually ordinary people, 
especially when the different factions called upon the security police and other government 
operatives to „manage‟ (contain or suppress) the sporadic revolts and hostile take-overs. In 
the 1990s, the independent Bantustans were the most problematic because they did not really 
consider it worth their while to resubmit to a higher power in the form of a unified state when 
apartheid finally ended. The leaders had become drunk with power and were accused of 
corruption and many other atrocities against their people but they did not resign and disband 
their political parties voluntarily like Enos Mabuza in KaNgwane. Instead, they were hell-
bent on making the transition/negotiations (CODESA, the National Peace Accord etc) as 
difficult as possible for all concerned (obstructionist or belligerent). They were selfish and 
not really interested in doing what was best for everyone (being constructive – promoting 
peace, reconciliation, goodwill) and some like KwaNdebele‟s Skosana in the mid 1980s 
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demanded independence for their Bantustans - a sign that they fully were co-opted into the 
apartheid state‟s divide and rule strategy. 
Disaffected elements in the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, led by Rocky Malebane-Metsing 
(leader of the Bantustan‟s opposition Progressive People‟s Party) and Warrant Officer 
Mothuloe Timmy Phiri of the Bophuthatswana National Guard Unit, unsuccessfully 
attempted a coup in Bophuthatswana on February 1988. Their grievances against Lucas 
Mangope‟s government included allegations of corruption, misappropriation of government 
funds and nepotism to stifle political opposition and manipulation of the October 1987 
elections in Bophuthatswana. There was also dissatisfaction with low salaries in the civil 
service and Defence Ministry and the dominance of whites in the ruling BDF party. The coup 
was crushed by the SADF, undermining the Bantustan‟s claim to independence A period of 
severe repression followed the failed coup attempt, for example, the Transvaal Rural Action 
Committee (TRAC), the Bafokeng Women‟s Club and the Black Sash were banned in the 
wake of the 1988 coup (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:641). On 11 March 1994, the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) staged an invasion of Bophuthatswana (the capital Mmabatho) 
claiming that they had been invited to defend the Bantustan, except they were met with fierce 
resistance from the Bophuthatswana Defense Force (Goodman, 1999:297). 
In the Ciskei, Charles Sebe was jailed in 1984 for plotting a coup against his brother, Chief 
Lennox Sebe. Charles Sebe was broken out of jail in 1986 with the assistance of South 
African security forces during Operation Katzen. On 4 March 1990, Brigadier Gqozo seized 
control of Ciskei in a bloodless coup, finally deposing Lennox Sebe. This is followed by a 
brief period of liberalisation or calm in that Bantustan. Again in 1991, Ciskei rebels, Colonel 
Onward Mangwane Guzana and former General Charles Sebe were shot dead at a roadblock 
on 27 January, following an apparent ambush on their coup plot/attempt against Brigadier 
Oupa Gqozo‟s government (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731). 
KwaNdebele was one of the last Bantustans to be created by the South African government in 
the mid-1970s. It was reportedly run by a coalition of businessman-thugs (including local taxi 
drivers) trying to extract as much money as possible from trading licences and the limited 
budgets and other „aid‟ afforded to Bantustan leaders. The two dominant figures in this 
coalition were Chief Minister S. S. Skosana and Piet Ntuli of the Mbokodo  Party (meaning 
„grinding stone‟), a thinly veiled vigilante group which used violence, torture and 
intimidation to maintain its position of power. They mobilised their supporters and armed 
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them to squash resistance. This heavy-handedness led to the car bomb assassination of Piet 
Ntuli in July 1986 which an ANC spokesman claimed the ANC was responsible for. Violence 
in KwaNdebele escalated over the proposed incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele (late 
1985) to consolidate it in preparation for independence, which Skosana and Ntuli wanted. 
Anti-independence protests ensued leading to a mini-war led by Prince James Mahlangu and 
King David Mabua Mapoch Mahlangu of the KwaNdebele royal family. Prince James 
Mahlangu was elected as KwaNdebele‟s Chief Minister IN March 1990 and he and decided, 
with the support of the Legislative Assembly, to support national negotiations and to move to 
dissolve the Bantustan as a whole (Holden and Mathabatha (2007:255-258). 
September 1987 witnessed a coup by the Transkei Defence Force in which Prime Minister 
George Matanzima was deposed and replaced by the short-lived civilian government of Stella 
Sigcau. On 30 December 1987, Major General Bantu Holomisa led a military coup which 
deposed Stella Sigcau. Holomisa installed himself as Transkei's military and government 
chief on 6 January 1988. On 22 November 1990, a former Transkei Defence Force MI chief, 
Lieutenant Colonel Craig Duli (who was supported by the South African security forces), 
died while attempting to overthrow the military government of Major General Bantu 
Holomisa (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731). 
In Venda, the government of President Frank Ravele was overthrown by Colonel Gabriel 
Ramushwana in a military coup (bloodless) but on 5 April 1990. Coup leader Colonel 
Ramushwana announced that he would manage the Venda's affairs until it was re-
incorporated into South Africa (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998: 731). 
The majority of Bantustan elites got carried away with the illusions of power given by the 
system as the conclusions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have put on record. 
The Bantustans, particularly those that had achieved „independent‟ status, had security 
powers that sometimes exceeded those of the South African state itself. A discernible 
difference in the nature of violations emerged in this period between the self-governing 
Bantustans which did not have their own police forces and army and the independent 
Bantustans, which had their own security apparatus complete with SADF personnel or SADF 
ex-members on secondment who occupied high level positions in the forces (TRC Report 
Vol. 3, 1998: 635; Grundy, 1986:75, 78). 
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In comparison, Enos Mabuza had a fairly smooth ride in KaNgwane where no attempts were 
made to remove him from office (by coup or other means). The only period of uncertainty in 
that Bantustan was when the apartheid regime suspended KaNgwane‟s nominal self-rule 
status for six months (June to December 1982, after which they were re-instated) following 
the dissolution of its Legislative Assembly over the Swazi land deal.  Enos Mabuza resigned 
from Bantustan politics of his own accord. According to his wife/widow, it had been a 
difficult and uncomfortable job, one that he would not have chosen on his own had he not 
been duty bound. Nevertheless, Mrs Mabuza maintains that her husband did not have regrets 
about his life or career (his decisions) because “he believed that he served his people to the 
best of his abilities” (Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007). He did not believe that 
political office or power should be the monopoly of one person or a select few and was 
anxious about overstaying his welcome as leader. He believed that there were many capable 
leaders and was happy to let someone else carry on from where he left off and he fully 
supported Mr. Zitha who succeeded him (Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007). However, 
Holden and Mathabatha (2007:260) point out that at the time of Mabuza‟s resignation from 
his position as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister, the UDF (Albertina Sisulu) suggested that 
Inyandza should remain in existence with Mabuza as its leader so that it could guard what 
had been achieved and not leave a back door open for others with unscrupulous motives. 
They felt that his resignation was at an inopportune moment because the ANC had not taken 
over officially and the fragile CODESA negotiations which had just begun were marred by 
ultimatums, stalemates and violence. They feared that the South African government would 
install someone to lead KaNgwane and undo everything that Mabuza had done to keep it in 
step with other anti-apartheid organisations. The UDF/ANC wanted Mabuza to be the one to 
guide the will of KaNgwane residents during the negotiations (transition period 1990-1994). 
Mabuza considered these arguments but declined to stay on because he believed that a new 
democratic era was inevitable and nothing that the Pretoria government did could change the 
course of events because political organisations had been unbanned, political prisoners had 
been freed and the exiles were returning. According to him, Inyandza had been formed as a 
temporary measure and had lived its course and had to be dissolved. To Elias Ginindza, this 
decision was also meant to signify to Pretoria that it was time to dismantle the Bantustan 
system (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). 
Enos Mabuza advised or suggested that Inyandza members were free to join the ANC during 
the negotiations process and make their contribution under its banner. In April 1990, he 
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called for the dissolution of KaNgwane (enacted soon after) and the Inyandza National 
Movement in preparation for reintegration into South Africa (27 April 1994). This gesture 
was true to his word that he/Inyandza were merely holding the place of the banned ANC in 
KaNgwane (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260). 
7.3 Mabuza’s Entrance into Bantustan Politics 
The birth of the KaNgwane Bantustan was not without difficulty until the attainment of „self 
governing‟ status in August 1984. Mabuza describes KaNgwane‟s constitutional development 
between 1978 and 1982 as “turbulent” even though, according to him, “KaNgwane is a stable 
progressive region” run by “dedicated leaders” (Mabuza, 1983:10). Enos Mabuza‟s family 
only has fond memories of him and others who knew him or worked with him describe him 
as being „gentle‟ and „dignified‟ (Wylde; M. S. Gininda; Elias Ginindza – interviews June 
2007). They insist that Mabuza was unassuming because he was not in politics for instant 
gratification or an easy ride to fame or fortune. Mabuza‟s family notes that he reluctantly 
accepted the position out of duty (the ties that bind - obligation, service) and that he 
appreciated the challenges involved. He did not think he was in that position by right 
(entitlement, which was the general attitude of many Bantustan leaders of chiefly decent).  
Compared to the other Bantustans, KaNgwane was created almost as an after-thought 
because, for instance, it was simply known as Swazi until 1978 and it was the last of the 
Bantustans to have a Territorial Authority established (1976). KaNgwane was the smallest 
Bantustans in terms of the land area under its jurisdiction. It was initially one block of land 
comprised of 20 Tribal Authorities, 4 Regional Authorities (Nsikazi, Nkomazi, Mlondozi and 
Mwsati) and one Territorial Authority - The Swazi Territorial Authority which officially 
opened in April 1976. The Nsikazi Regional Authority was supposed to disappear after 
consolidation and the establishment of a new authority in 1975 when compensatory land was 
granted to the Bantustan. This did not happen in the end and KaNgwane ended up as three 
distinct land masses after consolidation (Malan and Hattingh, 1976: 206 & 216). As part of 
the arrangement which led to KaNgwane being given self-governing status, the apartheid 
regime bought out some white farmers (land) in the remote, peri-urban but fairly affluent 
KaNyamazane/Louisville and KaBokweni areas where the majority of black people led a 
pastoral life. The KaNgwane government headquarters was in Louisville/KaNyamazane 
where Mrs Mabuza still lives (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). Mpumalanga‟s 
Ehlanzeni District Municipality and under it, the Umjindi, Mbombela and Nkomazi Local 
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Municipalities constituted the KaNgwane homeland which was basically 3 separate land 
pieces interspaced by white farmland. 
South African Swazis in the Transvaal included clans under Mhola Dlamini, Dantyi Nkosi 
and others, the Shongwe and Khumalo clans (from the Barberton and Nelspruit  areas), the 
Hlwatwayo  of Mhlaba and several smaller tribes (Dlamini, Magagula, Sukazi, Shongwe etc) 
around Piet Retief and a few in the Paulpietersburg District. There were also smaller groups, 
mostly under independent chiefs, who inhabited Sekhukhuneland, Nelspruit and Pilgrim‟s 
Rest (descended from small groups which survived by agreeing to be subjects of Swaziland‟s 
Mswazi (1840-1875), who was a descendent of Sobhuza I. The remainder were people left in 
the wake of Mswazi‟s raiders (Macmillan, 1989:289; Malan and Hattingh, 1976: 206). In 
1970, the Swazi areas which eventually made up KaNgwane at the end of the decade 
consisted of 14 tribal authorities – the Nkomazi Regional Authority was established in 1959 
and the Nsikazi-Legogote Regional Authority was established in 1962. Eight chiefs were 
resettled within the Bantustan with their subjects in 1974 and 1975 and this paved the way for 
the establishment of the Mlondozi and Mswati Regional Authorities in 1975.  
From the recollections of Enos Mabuza‟s immediate family, he was not very politically 
inclined as a young man in high school and he had no aspirations of becoming a political 
figure, let alone a controversial one. Enos Mabuza‟s son Sandile has had personal 
communication with some of the surviving Swazi chiefs who were responsible for his 
entrance into Bantustan politics. These include Chief Tikhontele Dlamini (who later worked 
closely with Enos Mabuza as Chief Minister) and Chief Ngomane who were part of the 
Swazi Tribal Council. Mabuza was approached by members of the Hhoyi Tribal Authority 
(one of the 20 tribal authorities in the KaNgwane area) - led by Chief Tikhontele Dlamini to 
lead the newly created KaNgwane Bantustan. Most people in the area, including the chiefs, 
were rural-based, poor, uneducated or illiterate. The chiefs felt vulnerable or exposed to the 
under-handed tactics of the apartheid government and feared that it would take their land and 
manipulate them. They needed someone who had formal education at a higher level to help 
them lead the people. Enos Mabuza was fortunate enough to have been educated and spoke 
fluently in siSwati, English and Afrikaans Mabuza obtained a Primary Teaching Certificate in 
1959; Matriculation Certificate in 1964, Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of South 
Africa in 1969, a Bachelor of Arts Honours degree also from the University of South Africa 
in 1973 and completed the Executive Development Programme at the University of the 
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Witwatersrand‟s Graduate School of Business in 1989. Enos Mabuza was considered as a 
suitable candidate because he was seen as being neutral, educated and understood the white 
man‟s language (English and Afrikaans). The chiefs had confidence (faith, trust) that he had 
the necessary credentials and personality - he was respectful of culture and tradition, humble, 
intelligent, giving and he could lead - „wise‟ and calm enough to guide them (Bourdieu‟s 
forms of capital). According to those that knew him, Enos Mabuza was passionate and 
dedicated about his work and as a teacher, headmaster and education inspector, he made 
efforts to source as materials (textbooks  etc) for the schools as he could in order to  improve 
the standards of black schools in the KaNgwane area. His performance at Khumbula High 
School set him apart and showed his leadership abilities such that he was offered a post as an 
education inspector in the region and again he distinguished himself in that position. Mabuza 
agreed to help the Hhoyi traditional leaders in an advisory capacity for a few months until 
they decided what direction they were going to take in the political environment of the time. 
He was made a member of the Hhoyi Tribal Authority in Nkomazi on the border with 
Swaziland. According to his son Sandile (Interview 5 June 2007), the chiefs referred to Enos 
Mabuza as “umfana wemakosi” (son of the chiefs/kings) because he was loyal and obedient. 
He was from the Barberton area and had never lived in Nkomazi so he did not have any real 
connections with people there. The Swazi chiefs thought this was the best way to protect their 
interests and once Enos Mabuza agreed to join the Hhoyi Tribal Authority, they were in a 
position to nominate him (a commoner) to the position of Chief Executive Councillor of the 
Swazi Bantustan. Mabuza maintained good relations with the Swazi chiefs until his death in 
1997, long after he resigned from Bantustan politics (Margaret Mabuza, Interview 6 June 
2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). 
Other people from the other Regional Authorities saw/heard about Enos Mabuza‟s work with 
the Hhoyi Tribal Authority thought that they could all benefit from his input and competence 
and a joint meeting of all the tribal authorities requested him to join them in politics on a full 
time basis (give up his career as a teacher) since they had become quite dependant on him 
(assistance in handling the daily administrative the affairs of the area in relation to the South 
African government).  According to the Mabuzas (his wife, sister, son – interviews, June 
2007), these invitations were extended by the hereditary chiefs based on merit and 
competence. They recognised that, although was a commoner, leadership does not have to be 
restricted to the traditional or individuals of royal extraction, especially if it is potentially 
detrimental in the long term. Asked if the chiefs‟ decision to approach Mabuza with this 
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request was unanimous, Mr. M. S. Ginindza (Interview – 7 June 2007), is slightly hesitant 
(which suggests that there were some dissenting voices) but says yes, the majority of the 
leaders agreed that this was the right strategy to better serve their people. Mabuza‟s election 
or co-optation into politics by the hereditary chiefs was not how Bantustan leaders were 
chosen different from what was the norm at the time (the chiefs jealously guarded and 
competed for such positions amongst themselves – see section on perceptions about 
Bantustan leaders). Most Bantustan leaders were chosen from among the senior chiefs within 
a given Territorial Authority or hand-picked (and replaced with more malleable candidates if 
they became obstacles to the apartheid government‟s vision) (Margaret Mabuza- 6 June 2007, 
Esther Mabuza - 6 June 2007, Sandile Mabuza – 5 June 2007, David Wylde – 2 August 
2007). 
Both Enos Mabuza‟s parents were still alive when the chiefs made their offer and Enos 
discussed it with his family and they in turn advised caution. Everyone involved agreed that it 
was dangerous to take up such a position in terms of possible confrontations with the South 
African government or other chiefs who would feel robbed of their „rightful‟ positions of 
authority since he was, strictly speaking, not eligible for the position because he was a 
commoner. There was a fear too that ordinary people would not accept him in that position. 
Mabuza accepted the family‟s input and concerns but decided to take the offer because his 
elders had made a sincere request and he felt he had a duty to perform. The family (parents, 
siblings and wife) supported his decision but it made all of them very nervous. Margaret 
Mabuza (his sister) notes that it was a difficult and sad decision for him to make because he 
loved teaching so much but he was also an obedient person and liked to help where he could. 
It was not part of his nature to be indifferent or cavalier and he saw and experienced how the 
apartheid government treated the black people. He was concerned about the leaders being 
used by the government to oppress their own people because they did not understand what 
they were asked to do in order to avoid a repeat of Ndebele King Lobengula‟s signing away 
of his people‟s land (Rudd Concession) out of ignorance  (Maylam, 2005:115-116).  
Mabuza‟s consultations with his family and a close friend (Dr Nyathi – Mabuza‟s colleague 
in the teaching profession) means that he did not make the decision lightly or unilaterally. His 
family members note, however, that Enos Mabuza never really considered himself a 
politician even though he spent over a decade in politics. According to his family, Enos 
Mabuza‟s first and real passion was always education and he regarded himself not as a 
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politician/Chief Minister or businessman but as a teacher first and foremost (Sandile Mabuza; 
Margaret Mabuza; Esther Mabuza). 
Enos Mabuza was appointed a member of the Nkomazi Regional Authority by the Hhoyi 
Tribal Authority in 1975. Shortly thereafter, representatives from the South African 
government (Bantu Administration and Development) met with all the local chiefs to discuss 
the formation of the Swazi Territorial Authority. The government did not impose a particular 
candidate to lead the new body but gave the chiefs the option to nominate or elect the person 
who they wanted as a leader (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007.  The Swazi Territorial 
Authority was established in April 1976 and consisted of 28 elected members, including Enos 
Mabuza. Chief Johannes Mkolishi Dhlamini was considered the most senior Swazi Chief in 
South Africa by the South African government (the officials of the then Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development) and was appointed as Chief Executive Officer of the Swazi 
territories. Three Executive Officers, Enos Mabuza among them, were elected to work 
closely with Chief Johannes Dhlamini (Mabuza, 1983:5). 
The Swazi territory was supposed to be granted Legislative Assembly status in April 1977 
but a dispute over Trust Farms (white farmer which were bought out by the South African 
government to consolidate the Swazi Bantustan) arose between the Executive Committee and 
the Swazi Territorial Authority on one hand, and the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development on the other. The Commissioner General, Professor E. F. Potgieter, and senior 
officials from the Department of Bantu Administration and Administration had not 
anticipated the resistance of the people whom “they had been made to believe were soft, 
pliant and condescending” (Mabuza, 1983:5).The Territorial Authority resolved that if it had 
to negotiate the question of Trust Farms from a position of strength because it wanted to 
expedite the granting of legislative assembly status and transfer responsibility for the Swazi 
territory to the new body. As Chief Executive Officer, Chief J. M. Dhlamini refused to accept 
this resolution of the Territorial Authority and was removed from office by a motion of no 
confidence on 23 June 1977. As one of the three existing Executive Officers, Enos Mabuza 
was elected to succeed Chief Dlamini as Chief Executive Councillor34. 
                                                 
34 See also Macmillan (1989) regarding Mabuza‟s entrance into politics and the divisions in that KaNgwane 
polity 
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7.4 The Mandate of KaNgwane’s Legislative Assembly 
The KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was established with effect from 1 October 1977 by 
the KaNgwane Constitution Proclamation R214 of 1977 in respect of the area defined in 
Schedule 1 of the Proclamation. Proclamation R214 of 1977 was gazetted simultaneously 
with a host of other supplementary (to specify the Bantustan authorities‟ rights, powers, 
authorities, duties, obligations and functions) ones as follows: 
R215 - Established departments for the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly 
R216 - Salaries and allowances of members of KaNgwane‟s Legislative Assembly 
R217 - Specified the financial regulations for KaNgwane 
R218 - Specified requirements for the withdrawal of moneys from the Revenue Fund 
R219 - Rules of procedure for KaNgwane‟s Legislative Assembly 
 
The National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971 empowered the KaNgwane Legislative 
Assembly to make laws for the areas under its jurisdiction. However, the tough stand taken 
by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and Chief Dlamini‟s handling of 
the impasse created tensions which Mabuza partly blamed on the “political ineptitude of the 
Chief Executive Officer”, Chief J. M. Dhlamini (Mabuza, 1983:5). Chief J. M Dhlamini was 
not satisfied with the way he had been removed from office and challenged the dismissal in 
the Transvaal Supreme Court. In a judgment delivered on 10 November 1977, Justice Van 
der Walt found that the procedure provided for in the Swazi Territorial Authority 
Constitution had not been followed in summoning the meeting at which Chief Dhlamini had 
been voted out of office. The resolution of the Swazi Territorial Authority was consequently 
declared invalid and Chief Dhlamini was reinstated as Chief Executive Councillor. According 
to Mabuza, it was clear, however, that a political leader who was not popular (had no 
support) with the people or the Legislative Assembly could not continue to lead by virtue of a 
court order (Mabuza, 1983:6). On 14 December 1977, Chief Dhlamini‟s Executive Council 
resolved to request the State President to dissolve the first KaNgwane Legislative Assembly 
and constitute a new one which would elect a new Chief Executive Councillor. This was 
granted and the second KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was convened on 23 March 1978. 
Chief Dhlamini and Enos Mabuza stood for election to the position of Chief Executive 
Councillor. Enos Mabuza won or was re-elected unanimously (Mabuza, 1983:6) and served 
in this capacity through three successive Legislative Assemblies (proof of his popularity) and 
his title changed to Chief Minister in 1984. According to Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 
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2007), Enos Mabuza was a very methodical, orderly person and he overhauled the structure 
of the then Swazi Territorial Authority so that revenue could be collected and tribal issues 
could be dealt with in a systematic manner (efficiently) and resources and decisions could be 
accounted for and each chief was allocated a staff compliment to assist in the execution of 
their administrative duties. Below is a summary of KaNgwane‟s leaders and their period of 
tenure: 
Chief Councillors  
Johannes Mkolishi Dlamini April 1976 – 1977 
Enos John Mabuza 8 October 1977 - April 1981  
Chief Executive Councillor  
Enos John Mabuza April 1981- 18 June 1982 
Administrator  
N.J. Badenhorst 18 June 1982 - 9 December 1982 (during the controversy of the Swazi land 
deal) 
Chief Ministers  
Enos John Mabuza 9 December 1982 - 1 April 1991  
Mangisi Cephas Zitha 15 April 1991 - 26 April 1994  
Social capital is highly embedded in class structure; which is why “old boys networks” from 
elite schools and universities offer individuals access to different resources (capital) which 
give them an advantage when climbing the social ladder (who and not what you know or 
friends in high places who are usually met in high places or en route to high places). Being 
born in a „high place‟ considerably increases one‟s chances of having influential friends in 
high places too. Buthelezi was born into royalty or a chieftaincy line and became chief but 
Mabuza was a commoner brought in by some chief to replace another chief, which possibly 
put him in the middle of an on-going power struggle in which he was used as a proxy. In 
evaluating KaNgwane relative to the other Bantustans, it is important to point out that the 
Transkei was the first Bantustan to have a Territorial Authority established in 1956, roughly 
twenty years before one was established in KaNgwane. Transkei attained partial self-
governing status in December 1963 and became independent in 1976 – almost two years 
before the KaNgwane Bantustan was constituted. KaNgwane was granted nominal self-rule 
status on 1 April 1981 and it was the last of the Bantustans to be granted self-governing status 
on 31 August 1984. KaNgwane lagged behind all the other Bantustans in terms of political 
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and socio-economic development. KaNgwane was the smallest Bantustan population 
estimated at 597 783 in 1992 and a GDP of approximately R151 620 000 in 1986. However, 
experiencing the growing pains much later than the other Bantustans might have been an 
advantage in that KaNgwane‟s leaders could learn from the experiences of others and 
possibly avoid some of the pitfalls which they fell victim to.  
7.5 Mabuza’s ‘Open-Minded’ or ‘Progressive’ Approach 
Enos Mabuza‟s father stopped working in the mines in Barberton and moved the family to 
Johannesburg where he occasionally worked as a general labourer. However, being employed 
by someone else did not appeal to him or satisfy him for long periods because he did not like 
the oppression and exploitation which characterised most employer-employee relationships at 
the time and he would ask to have his work pass cancelled in anger. After that, he would 
either look for another job or do odd jobs for himself selling pots, sharpened axes, knives, 
scissors and other goods from house to house. Enos Mabuza‟s father had only passed 
Standard Four but was very politically aware and chose the insecurity of self-employment 
over working for abusive white bosses. When asked if his father belonged to any political 
party or group, Mabuza‟s response is that his father was once a paid-up member of the ANC 
but the membership probably lapsed (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). 
Mabuza notes that his mother was a strong woman who brought up the children in between 
doing odd house-keeping jobs for English-speaking whites in the suburbs. According to 
Mabuza, black women „preferred‟ to work for English-speakers because although they were 
condescending, they were not as bad as their Afrikaner counterparts. However, this 
distinction between Afrikaners and the English was blurred when more blacks started seeing 
“…a general white greed, so to speak…”, even though there were some white individuals 
who were civil. It is clear from this comment that from this early age, Enos Mabuza wanted 
to steer away from the stereotype that all whites are bad (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, 
undated). 
Enos Mabuza was aware of the ANC as a child in Sophiatown because of the songs that 
people used to sing on the roads – songs about suffering, oppression and freedom and he also 
got to know the names of ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter 
Sisulu (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). Asked if he had negative feelings 
towards whites, coloured or Asians when he was growing up in Sophiatown, Mabuza 
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comments that he did not, although he had limited contact with them. He remembers having 
negative feelings towards the police, particularly white policemen, because they were the 
ones the township people had the most contact with or experience of, most of it negative. He 
comments that occasionally there were fights between black and Afrikaans kids when they 
did have contact at a shopping complex or other such places but Mabuza is reluctant to say 
that such clashes were consciously political or malicious in nature (no real bitterness or 
resentment). His feeling is that, as children, they were aware that there were differences 
between blacks and whites or Indians and Asians (appearance, class/possessions) because 
blacks always bought from the other groups and not the other way round. As children, the 
only confrontations he experienced with children from other racial groups were mere 
playground rivalries or hostilities and the only „weapons‟ that either group had where slings.  
He remembers this because one of his younger brothers was once injured by a sling but at this 
stage, all the children did was wonder why they were different and why they did not have the 
same material things that the Indian or Asian children had at school. Mabuza struggled to 
understand why he had to do odd jobs during the school holidays (selling peaches, oranges 
and chicken entrails) to buy school books and contribute to the family‟s well-being when the 
other children did not. Mabuza‟s realisation that the economic system was fundamentally 
skewed came much later when he was doing his Junior Certificate and white brutality was 
getting worse (more arrests for pass offences etc). It became clear to him why his father had 
been adamant to work for himself and why so many people despised the “Boers” (the brutal 
police and the “Baas” or employers). Around this time, Mabuza says he started to make links 
between the circumstances he found himself and other black people in and what he was 
learning in school (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). 
Enos Mabuza‟s family was forcibly moved from racially mixed Sophiatown and relocated to 
Meadowlands, Soweto (on the West Rand) following the passing of the 1950 Group Areas 
Act. His political awakening took root in 1954-1955, around the same time that Bantu 
Education (1953) was introduced. Education and schools in general were being separated 
from the churches too and this was a problem for Mabuza who made the realisation that 
blacks were being governed against their will (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, undated). 
The Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960 happened when Mabuza was in high school as a 
boarder at St Joseph‟s in the Natal midlands (Pietermaritzburg). He recalls that he came into 
contact with boys who were involved with the PAC when he was doing Matric and they 
discussed politics and change with those that he befriended. They resolved to make a 
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contribution to improve the black man‟s lot in life. However, Mabuza‟s account stresses that 
violence was never discussed and they kept their ideas and plans away from their families. 
Asked if he thought the PAC and ANC were the same, different or opposed to each other (as 
in being more anti-white or more Africanist), Mabuza comments that he regarded the PAC as 
a party with a “different thrust” from that of the ANC but not necessarily opposed. In his own 
words, Mabuza adopted a “live and let live attitude” to most things and people throughout his 
life. He tried to be tolerant and to keep an open mind – not criticising, judging, condemning 
or controlling others unnecessarily. He says that at the time, he was not preoccupied with the 
details about whom or what would bring about black people‟s liberation but that liberation 
was needed and would come (Frederikse, interview with Mabuza, undated). 
The contradictions which seemed to plague Mabuza‟s career were already evident when he 
took a part time job as a clerk at the newly created Resettlement Board offices in 
Meadowlands for two years after he finished high. He had decided that he would be a 
religious minister and help save the world that way but he needed preaching lessons and this 
job was a way for him to pay for them. He admits that this was an odd thing to do because the 
township folk hated the Resettlement Boards but he says he did it anyway because, apart 
from the money, he wanted to get closer to the Afrikaners in order to get to know and 
understand who they were as a people, particularly since they controlled everything. Working 
there meant that he could experience both worlds because it also exposed him to the people‟s 
suffering when they came to the offices after their houses had been bull-dozed or widows 
were evicted and so forth. This was Mabuza‟s first real encounter with the intricate workings 
of the system and racism. Not surprisingly, however, the job at the Resettlement Board 
offices did not win him many fans among the black folk who saw him there at a time when 
anti-white, especially anti-Afrikaner sentiment was growing in the townships. Mabuza 
commented that he was surprised that his superintendant, an Englishman called Bernard or 
Bennett, treated him badly quite contrary to the general view that some blacks had that the 
English were a lesser evil (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). 
7.5.1 The South African Black Alliance 
The South African Black Alliance (SABA) was formed on 11 January 1978 or in March of 
the same year (discrepancies in the accounts) by the KwaZulu Bantustan‟s Chief Buthelezi in 
Ulundi in order to mobilise anti-independence Bantustan leaders. The Alliance‟s main 
objective was to convene a National Convention of representatives of all population groups to 
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seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the country‟s problems. The Dikwankwetla Party from 
the QwaQwa Bantustan was set to join the alliance but the organisations represented would 
not merge into one solid block because doing so would contravene the Political and 
Interference Act of 1968 which banned inter-racial mixing in political parties. 
SABA succeeded the abortive Black Unity Front (BUF) which was also a Buthelezi initiative 
to „unify black resistance‟, in solidarity with the leaders of Gazankulu (Ntsanwisi) and 
Lebowa (Chief Cedric Phatudi) who shared Buthelezi‟s opposition to sanctions/dis-
investment. SABA‟s stated aims were to help bring about an open, democratic South African 
in which the principle of one man, one vote applied and there was equality before the law and 
equality of opportunity. These were common concerns - the reasons or aims of the struggle 
and they were shared by most other groups within the struggle. Buthelezi‟s grand plan 
envisaged SABA operating along the same lines as the Congress Alliance in the 1950s (the 
ANC, Congress of Democrats, Coloured People‟s Congress, South African Indian Congress 
and the South African Congress of Trade Unions). However, one glaring difference between 
the Congress Alliance and SABA was the latter‟s link to state-created structures (Bantustans 
and councils) which meant that its „resistance‟ or antagonistic stance towards apartheid was 
informed by sectarian considerations mixed with some communalism, but remaining loyal to 
their own interests and those of the apartheid state.  
SABA and its predecessor (the BUF) have been described as pragmatic but with a populist, 
some would say vague and opportunistic agenda designed to serve specific class interests 
(petty bourgeoisie functionaries in the Bantustan and other apartheid structures) (Maré and 
Hamilton, 1987: 135-179). Critics, including Rev. Allan Boesak, argue that SABA 
(Bantustan political parties such as KwaZulu‟s Inkatha and KaNgwane‟s Inyandza National 
Movement) was merely a means to an end (getting onto and/or staying on the political gravy 
train), especially for Buthelezi who initiated, led and dominated it (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 
157-163). 
Chief Buthelezi led (was Chairman) SABA and he presented it as being concerned with 
social, political and economic reforms in South Africa and planning the type of future that 
South Africa would have after apartheid (industrial relations between workers/unions and 
employers, businesses and consumers, among business people themselves and politicians). 
The sanctions debate was at the centre of SABA‟s discussions on these issues, especially in 
the mid 1980s. Buthelezi‟s stance regarding sanctions was ostensibly because of their 
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potential effects on the poor/ordinary people who, in his view, would be hardest hit. He also 
opposed sanctions because he believed that they would cripple the country‟s economy long 
after apartheid ended (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163).  
There was nothing objectionable about SABA in principle or on paper, save for its 
composition and their „ulterior motives‟, especially Buthelezi who had open and on-going 
courtship or „guarded cooperation‟ with state agencies (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 
1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:157-163). Consequently, SABA had mixed 
successes and failures because it was originally meant to provide a broader platform for black 
politicians who wanted to widen their political bases, make a contribution to the struggle, or 
perhaps simply wanted to assuage their consciences. SABA failed to attract an urban base 
(political and community organisations) even though it participated in the boycotts of white 
bread (after price increases) and a boycott of Fatti‟s and Moni‟s following a strike at the 
company (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-
163).  
Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu) and Phatudi (Lebowa) from the defunct Black Unity Front did not 
join SABA. Mabuza/Inyandza National Movement/KaNgwane joined in mid 1978 and 
Mopeli‟s (QwaQwa) Dikwankwetla Party which joined SABA in 1979 disaffiliated in 
1981.Other SABA members, apart from Buthelezi‟s Inkatha and Mabuza‟s Inyandza national 
Movement (Bantustan parties), were Allan Hendrickse‟s Labour Party and the Reform Party 
(based respectively on the Coloured and Indian Councils imposed by the apartheid regime). 
Through SABA, Mabuza came in contact with the controversial Indian leader Amichand 
Rajbansi of the Reform Party, South African Indian Council and the National People‟s Party 
(Bank, 1994:86; Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 157-163). 
Maré and Hamilton‟s (1987:157-163) evaluation of SABA‟s overall contribution to the 
struggle is negative because, according to them, the organisation or alliance was ultimately 
divisive. They cite Buthelezi‟s activities (by extension SABA‟s) in explaining this 
opportunism and divisiveness - Buthelezi‟s relations with the white political establishment 
and businesses in South African, his forays abroad, his strained relationships with the ANC, 
Black Consciousness (the Black People‟s Convention (BPC) and the South African Students 
Organisation (SASO)), the PAC, the Committee of Ten  and others. SABA (its members) 
were born out of the tribal and ethnic institutions of the apartheid state – the Bantustans, 
many of which were notorious for their volatility - ambition and repression (propensity for 
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violence), as well as feuds in the ruling families/tribal politics. Despite the lack of enthusiasm 
for SABA, the organisation held meetings and organised under its banner for over 5 years, for 
instance, to protest the KaNgwane and Ingwavuma land transfer to Swaziland in 1982 which 
meant territorial and political separation from South Africa for the affected territories. 
Buthelezi drafted background papers, a memorandum to all South African political groups 
(June 1982), briefings and addressed the people of Chief Nyawo, Mathenjwa and 
Mngomezulu (28 May 1982), the Tembe Tribe (24 June 1982), a prayer meeting of the South 
African Black Alliance at KaNyamazane Stadium in KaNgwane (25 July 1982) and 
University of Pretoria students (4 August 1982). Inkatha and the Progressive Federal Party 
(not a SABA member) held a joint protest meeting on 12 and 13 July (Durban City Hall) 
1982 on the same issue of the South African government‟s decision to excise these territories 
without consulting the people (the dilemma of „black voicelessness‟) (Davies, O‟Meara and 
Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:32,163; Buthelezi Karis-Gerhart 
Collection). 
SABA was short-lived and collapsed in 1983 soon after it condemned (and expelled in early 
1983) the Labour Party‟s decision to enter the new/proposed constitutional arrangements of 
the apartheid regime (the tri-cameral parliament in the early 1980s). The Labour Party‟s 
decision was in contrast to the Reform Party‟s withdrawal from the 1981 Indian Council 
elections because of the unfairness of the proposed arrangements to blacks/Africans. SABA 
also criticised the President‟s Council which was supposed to refine Prime Minister Vorster‟s 
constitutional proposals. Apart from opposing the proposals, SABA attacked the President‟s 
Council for its exclusion of Africans/Blacks and this led to the Labour and Reform parties 
refusing to accept nominations to the council. However, one of the contradictions or 
ambiguities regarding Enos Mabuza political career is that he did serve as an advisor on the 
President‟s Council for about 5 years in the early 1980s (period soon after the KaNgwane 
Bantustan was created and Mabuza Inyandza joined SABA - overlaps). SABA also put 
forward ideas for consociational democracy along the same lines as that recommended by the 
Buthelezi Commission (Davies, O‟Meara and Dlamini, 1998:404-405; Maré and Hamilton, 
1987: 157-169). Despite Mabuza‟s many forays into unknown and contradictory situations, 
he managed to earn the respect and ear of senior members in the South African government, 
the ANC/UDF‟s leadership and other organisations, regardless of their political affiliations.  
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7.6 Mabuza’s Inyandza National Movement 1978-1990: Friend or Foe? 
One can regard the formation of Inyandza as a populist endeavour or a template for ethnic 
chauvinism given populism‟s associated appeal to both the political left and right. However, 
for Laclau (2005:3-20, 99, 138, 157-172, 221-222), populism is the embodiment of a set of 
demands; a political alternative with a social logic and Inyandza fits this unassuming 
definition like any other party or organisation. It was created to address certain questions 
related to representation and popular participation. For Laclau (2005:155), there is “no 
political intervention which is not populistic to some extent” in its constitution. He argues 
that populism is not evil and that it is the very nature of the political even though in its 
excesses it has the potential to become the very things that it initially sets out to change. 
Mayer (1972:20) concurs and points out that “political identification requires trust – the 
feeling that the state to which one gives one‟s loyalty protects one and takes care of one‟s 
vital interests.” Taking the foregoing discussion of the South African situation, Mabuza and 
Inyandza were not the real enemy. 
The tri-cameral parliament was supposed to establish a National Council to negotiate with 
leaders within government created structures (councillors in black urban areas, Bantustan 
leaders and other black leaders. Mabuza opposed the setting up of and participation in such a 
forum because it would not represent the aspirations of blacks. According to Mabuza, the 
National Council was an unacceptable arrangement to the majority of black people. Mabuza 
(cited in the Financial Mail, 1989:54; Mabuza, 1989b:4) stated that he would only participate 
in the National Council if the following conditions were met: 
 the unconditional release of political prisoners,  
 the unbanning and lifting of all restrictions on proscribed and restricted organisations 
and persons/ leaders of extra-parliamentary  organisations  
 the removal of troops from the townships 
 the repeal of discriminatory and repressive legislation such as the Internal Security 
Act 
 an end to all political trials and executions and the lifting of the State of Emergency 
 a commitment towards a meaningful negotiation process to resolve the political crisis 
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Mabuza (cited in the Financial Mail, 1989:54) added that “I do not see myself as being 
representative enough of the people to be there (together with other Chief Ministers), to 
negotiate even if these conditions were met” to create the right climate “….for it would be 
meaningless to release Nelson Mandela into a vacuum; he must be released into a political 
constituency and he must be invited to participate or to make proposals on the process of 
negotiation.” It was not just the ANC that Mabuza wanted to see at the negotiating table but 
also the PAC, UDF, AZAPO and other organisations that had legitimate or recognised 
constituencies. Mabuza‟s insistence on these things was echoed in the unifying perspective 
for the November 1989 Conference for a Democratic Future (Frederikse, 1990:240). From his 
speeches and interviews, it appears35 that Mabuza was well aware of the fact that the 
Bantustan system was imposed on the people but could not just be wished away. Something 
drastic had to happen to bring lasting change. The truth or morality of what he did remains a 
point of conjecture. He was not infallible and anyone is free to pass judgement about it but 
the fact remains that Mabuza refused to be quietly obliging, inoffensive or docile. He had his 
reasons for participating in Bantustan politics and perhaps his „progressive‟ actions in the 
latter part of his tenure as Chief Minister were tantamount to political grandstanding but the 
truth is that he was one of very few leaders in his position to challenge the state and 
essentially bite the hand that fed him. It might not have changed general attitudes towards 
him but he tried to do something different; and edit his personal story in the history books. 
It is difficult to separate some of what Enos Mabuza did and that which was done by the 
Inyandza National Movement as an organisation because Mabuza was one of its co-founders 
and President for most of its existence. Enos Mabuza has been labelled a populist because he 
mobilised support for his vision by co-founding and leading the Inyandza National 
Movement. Mabuza was not oblivious to the opportunistic tendencies of many individuals in 
the Bantustan system. He commented that “one of the most irksome flaws of the „Bantustan‟ 
policy is that it invites unemployable wolves who see it as an opportunity to jockey for 
positions of power and money” (Mabuza, 1983:7). His family maintain that he was not in 
politics for the prestige, power or wealth but to serve his people. Was this deceptive? 
Possibly. Was he beyond reproach? His (and others like him) position of „power‟ naturally 
attracted envy, suspicion and resentment from rivals and mere observers alike. There was no 
easy solution to South Africa‟s problems and the transition to a democratic state had to be 
                                                 
35 What he verbalised could have just masked the real reasons for his certain actions. 
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managed carefully. The argument of people like Mabuza and others who found themselves 
working within government created structures was that they were in it to give expression to 
their opposition to apartheid. Many wrote them off politically as traitors or at best, misguided 
people who were committing political suicide. However, Nelson Mandela wrote an article 
entitled “Our Struggle Needs Many Tactics” which appeared in the journal Liberation in 
February 1958. The article focuses on the issue of boycotts as a weapon to be used in the 
struggle but part of it addresses the issue of participation and non-participation in government 
created bodies. The following extract sheds light on Mandela‟s pragmatic approach, which is 
also how politicians generally respond to different circumstances and opportunities as they 
present themselves. Although Mandela‟s piece deals with boycotts as a tactic, the article can 
also be read to include the formation of partnerships or allegiances with different groups 
because; as the saying goes, there are many ways to skin a cat:  
In some cases it might be correct to boycott, and in others it might be unwise 
and dangerous. In still other cases, another weapon of political struggle might 
be preferred. A demonstration, a protest march, a strike or civil disobedience 
might be resorted to, all depending on the actual conditions at the given time. 
In the opinion of some people, participation in the system of separate racial 
representation in any shape of form, and irrespective of any reasons advanced 
for doing so, is impermissible on principle and harmful in practice. According 
to them, such participation can only serve to confuse the people and to foster 
the illusion that they can win their demands through a parliamentary form of 
struggle…” (Mandela, 1958:15). 
All the Bantustans had party-political organisation not long after a Legislative Assembly was 
established or the Bantustan became a self-governing territory and such organisations 
regularly competed in elections, often against official opposition parties. The Inyandza 
National Movement was founded in 1978 as a political vanguard of the KaNgwane 
Legislative Assembly and was disbanded voluntarily by its founders/leaders when the 
CODESA negotiations were concluded. Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259) estimate the 
Inyandza National Movement‟s members to have been approximately 100 000 in 1982 when 
the controversy of the Swazi land deal took centre stage. According to an interview with Mr 
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M. S. Ginindza36, the Inyandza National Movement‟s membership was form all over South 
Africa and the organisation had representatives in Pretoria and Johannesburg to mobilise 
support. Inyandza was visible and active not just in KaNgwane despite its size compared to 
other organisations, financial limitations and security concerns. People could join the INM 
voluntarily and all that was required was that members be interested in its policies, principles 
and programmes which were “directed by Enos Mabuza‟s wisdom and vision” to highlight 
flaws in the apartheid system as well as to mobilise support for the improvement of living 
conditions in the KaNgwane area. Inyandza/Mabuza‟s speeches as President of Inyandza and 
Chief Minister of KaNgwane often denounced the apartheid regime at its rallies (at Inyandza 
congresses and through various publications). Mabuza called for the release of political 
prisoners and the return of those in exile (“Viva ANC! Viva Nelson Mandela, release Nelson 
Mandela!”) like other anti-apartheid organisations and this greatly upset the apartheid regime 
(Elias Ginindza37, Interview 8 June 2007). 
In terms of class composition, the Inyandza National Movement‟s rank and file members 
were mostly from the working class but its leadership had a distinct class bias in that most of 
the leaders were from the black educated class (teachers, clerics, small businessmen- „middle 
class‟). The same individuals also formed the majority in the KaNgwane Legislative 
Assembly, which can be read as nepotism or cronyism. However, Sandile Mabuza (Interview 
5 June 2007) claims that the KaNgwane cabinet was quite efficient because there was little or 
no tokenism, even though some of the semi-literate hereditary chiefs were Cabinet Ministers 
holding relevant or appropriate portfolios such as the Ministry of Arts and Culture (later 
renamed the Ministry of Education and Culture) and thus acted symbolically as the custodian 
of Swazi culture. Ministers in the KaNgwane government following a cabinet reshuffle which 
was reported by the Lowveld Bureau in The Star on 5 November 1986 were as follows: 
Mr. E. Mabuza - Chief Minister 
Chief T. S. Dhlamini - Minister of Finance 
Mr. T. M. Nkozi - Minister of Justice and Police 
Mr. P. I. Masilela - Minister of the Interior 
Mr. M. C. Zitha - Minister of Health and Welfare 
                                                 
36 He was friends with Enos Mabuza and also a colleague (teaching and politics). M. S. Ginindza was an office 
bearer in the INM as well as an executive member of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. At the time of the 
interview, Mr Ginindza was a member of the Mpumalanga Provincial Legislature. 
37 Mr Elias Ginindza was Enos Mabuza‟s colleague from the teaching years. He regarded Mabuza as a brother 
and friend and affectionately refers to him as E.J. 
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Mr. D. S. Mkhwanazi - Minister of Public Works 
Mr. E. C. Mango - Minister of Education and Culture 
Chief E. N. Ngomane - Minister of Agriculture and Forestry 
 
 
Figure 7: KaNgwane‟s Coat of Arms 
 
Government Notice No. 2213 published in the South African Government Gazette (Number 
7400 of 10 November 1978) announced the coat of arms registered for the KaNgwane 
Legislative Assembly (Certificate of Registration No. 995 issued on 6 April 1979). The coat 
of arms has the motto: SIYINYANDZA (“We are a bundle of wood tied together” - 
symbolising unity, solidarity or bringing together). Other Bantustans designed their own flags 
and had their own anthems but KaNgwane did not do so. Instead, it used the South African 
flag (old below) and the generic "Nkosi sikelel'i Afrika"(God, Bless Africa) as its anthem to 
demonstrate that it (the leaders and the people of KaNgwane) were part of South Africa and 
would remain so. 
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Figure 8: Old South African Flag 
 
A number of questions spring to mind regarding the motives and directives of a political and 
cultural formation such as the INM: 
 Who did the INM represent? 
 What were the INM‟s ideals or objectives?  
 What organisations, if any, was it affiliated with?  
 Was there convergence between the INM‟s objectives and those of the main liberation 
formations such as the ANC or UDF? 
According to Mr M. S. Ginindza, Enos Mabuza was so politically inclined that he decided 
that the INM should affiliate with the ANC in exile although this was kept out of the public 
sphere because the ANC was banned and by law one could not be a part of it. However, 
underground structures were being formed - networks and alliances were being nurtured and 
Mabuza and the INM‟s leadership decided to align their organisation with the ANC in exile. 
They believed that the INM would serve the struggle better if its objectives were in sync with 
those of the ANC (to form a partnership in which the INM would act as a rearguard for the 
ANC along with other formations like the UDF).  The movement‟s constitution declared, like 
the current South African Constitution of 1996, that South Africa should belong to all who 
live in it and that it should be non-racial and non-sexist. The following excerpts from the 
preamble of the Inyandza National Movement‟s Constitution (adopted at its first national 
congress in November 1978) summarise KaNgwane leadership‟s political aspirations or 
Inyandza‟s declaration of intent. 
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“Whereas KaNgwane is a „self-governing territory‟ which now and forever 
shall remain part of the Republic of South Africa, and believing that our 
national unity, peace and progress are the cornerstones of national 
development; 
Desiring to abolish all forms of discrimination and racism based on tribe, clan, 
sex, colour or creed, and striving to promote the principles of equal 
opportunity, justice, liberty,…peace and economic, social and political 
progress…, 
We accordingly declare ourselves a peaceful movement…” 
Mabuza‟s criticism of the divisiveness of the Bantustan system whilst simultaneously 
defending his involvement in it represents a double-bind but he summarises his position as 
follows: 
“Although I do not agree with the RSA government‟s „Bantustan‟ or „separate 
development‟ policy, I have found myself bound to be involved in my present 
leadership role in spite of the fact that my people had neither a say in the 
formulation of the policy nor a choice in its implementation” (Mabuza, 
1983:6). 
Regarding the Swazi land deal of 1982, Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement 
regarded KaNgwane as part of South Africa and “not as an independent political entity or a 
vassal state to be a constituent part of Swaziland” (Mabuza, 1983:9). They were committed to 
peaceful negotiation with the South African government to bring about peaceful change so 
that Africans could have a say in the decision-making processes which affected their lives 
and their future. The preamble to the INM‟s constitution cited above was also used to oppose 
the proposed Swazi land deal of 1982, a decision which the ANC approved. However, the 
South African government did not see things the same way and retaliated by shutting down 
the KaNgwane government offices in Louisville. The vehicles that were used by the 
officers/ministers were taken away and a white administrator was brought in from Pretoria. 
The KaNgwane government/Mabuza effectively became a “prodigal son” because it went 
against the South African government‟s wishes („the parent‟s expectations‟). Mabuza proved 
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that he was not the government‟s stooge, or at least not to the same level as other Bantustan 
leaders who did its every bidding (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). 
The cooperation or understanding between the ANC and Mabuza/Inyandza was deliberately 
concealed or not known by ordinary people for security reasons. Aliases were often used in 
correspondence between Mabuza and the ANC to disguise his identity, for instance Mabuza 
is referred to as “Comrade Jonathan” and KaNgwane as “The Sparrow” in the ANC‟s 
minutes of a meeting them on 19 April 1986 and 21 September 1986 (ANC. 1986a; 1986b). 
Elias Ginindza (Interviews 8 June 2007) also claims that Enos Mabuza went by the name 
Reagan to keep his identity hidden from security agents who might have wanted to harm him. 
Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement reached out to the ANC and UDF and leaders such 
as Mosioua „Terror‟ Lekota often addressed crowds at Inyandza‟s rallies in places like 
Nkomazi and Nelspruit. An example of the cooperation or rapport between the ANC/UDF 
and Inyandza/Mabuza was Mabuza‟s involvement, small though it might be, in the Delmas 
Treason Trial (1985-1988). The trial turned out to be one of the longest political trials in 
South Africa history. The apartheid government sought to expose (and make example 
of/warn others) the activities of trade unions such as the South African Allied Workers 
Union, students and residents organisations affiliated to the UDF as part of a revolutionary 
conspiracy. Twenty-two Transvaal UDF leaders including Mosioua Lekota (UDF Publicity 
Secretary), Popo Molefe (UDF General Secretary), Moses Chikane (secretary of the UDF in 
the Transvaal), Rev. Tom Manthatha (South African Council of Churches) were indicted for 
treason under security laws in June 1985. Crimes such as terrorism and treason both carried a 
maximum penalty of death by hanging. In December 1988, Justice Kees van Dijkhorst of the 
Pretoria Supreme Court convicted eleven of the twenty-two accused and eight were acquitted. 
The Judge handed down sentences ranging from 5-12 years imprisonment but six of the 
eleven convicted were given suspended sentences for terrorism. However, on 15 December 
1989, the Appellate Division overturned the convictions (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:598). 
The ANC requested Mabuza, Nadine Gordimer (award-winning literary witness to South 
Africa‟s tragedies, political activist and apartheid critic, UNDP Goodwill Ambassador) and 
others to testify in their defence (give evidence-in-mitigation) in the Pretoria Supreme Court. 
These individuals were called to testify publicly on behalf of the UDF (the ANC‟s internal 
surrogate) despite the dangers that would arise from the association. Mr M. S. Ginindza 
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accompanied Enos Mabuza on this mission to speak the truth to the South African authorities 
with the hope that justice would prevail (M. S. Ginindza, interview 7 June 2007). 
The Delmas Trial was the setting for Gordimer and Mabuza‟s first meeting and they became 
friends after that. In 2001, Gordimer recalled her friendship with Mabuza. She said they 
shared passion for literature, the issues of the day and conservation. She described Mabuza as 
having two deep strengths - his political convictions in the inevitability of freedom from 
apartheid and his Mabuza‟s religious faith which moulded his personality and beliefs in the 
power of good triumphing over evil and his truth to it in word and deed Gordimer said people 
listened to Mabuza and valued his input on an array of issues because of his “searching 
intellect and integrity” (Gordimer, 2001:1). 
Mabuza acted against the expectations of the South African government by travelling to 
Maputo and Lusaka where ANC exiles could be found and posed the biggest „security‟ threat 
to the establishment. He helped several people, including Jacob Zuma (ANC) and Matthews 
Phosa (AZAPO, later ANC), to go into exile. He also sent parcels with basic supplies and 
information that was requested from time to time. According to Esther Mabuza, the apartheid 
government suspected that something fishy was going on in KaNgwane but they never had 
concrete proof. One of the few times that tensions  got to a head was when the security police 
descended on a school which was accommodating ANC operatives and burnt down sections 
of the school  (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 
2007). Also in contravention of the expectations of the South African government, Mabuza 
housed nearly 50 000 refugees and soldiers (mostly attached to Frelimo) that were fleeing the 
conflict in Mozambique (provided refuge to those in need). This gesture was well 
appreciated. A representative of the Mozambican refugees addressed an event attended by the 
British Ambassador in 1988 and commented on Enos Mabuza‟s inclusiveness:  
The troubles in Mozambique made our world so unhappy we had to run away 
from our land. Here we found the police going from door to door looking for 
us. But Mabuza gave us a home, and we thank him for being so brave. He says 
we are all Africans (in Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260).  
In 1986, approximately 4 000 KaNgwane students protested against Bantu Education. The 
South African police opened fire and one student was killed.  Twenty-six students were 
arrested for public. The South African police tried to block the funeral of the slain student 
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(political gathering) by surrounding the township in which the protest had occurred and 
intimidating mourners. Mabuza was requested to intervene by demanding that the South 
African police remove themselves from the township and allow the funeral to take place. In 
negotiating with the police, Mabuza explained that freedom of speech was the „inviolate‟ 
right of every citizen. He managed to convince them to allow the funeral which was attended 
by 15 000 people and addressed by members of the UDF (Holden and Mathabatha, 
2007:260). 
George Bizos also worked with Enos Mabuza on some matters pertaining to the ANC and the 
UDF. Mabuza also had contact with leaders of the white opposition such as Dr. Frederick van 
Zyl Slabbert. He also became close to Graca Marcel when her husband, Mozambican 
President Samora Marcel, died in a plane crashed in Mbuzini, close to the Swaziland border. 
Graca Marcel attended Enos Mabuza‟s funeral in 1997 (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 
2007). 
On 28 February 1986, Enos Mabuza led a 20-member Inyandza National Movement 
delegation to meet with a 21-member ANC delegation (led by Oliver Tambo) in Lusaka. This 
meeting between Mabuza/INM and the ANC in Lusaka was at the invitation of the ANC and 
it dealt with „the way forward‟; how to get the ANC and other organisations unbanned before 
meaningful negotiations with the South African government could begin. Inyandza 
understood the realities of the political situation in South Africa (that it was ruled by a 
minority government but that the rightful leaders of the people were in exile and would 
return). Inyandza‟s objectives were to find a common ground with the ANC in order to 
consolidate the latter‟s position “as the government in waiting” (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 
June 2007). The meeting was successful and the result was a communiqué that affirmed that 
the ANC and Inyandza shared the same values and goals (hence the apparent alliance 
between them). The ANC accepted (trusted) Mabuza‟s reasons for operating within apartheid 
structures and he in turn accepted the necessity for armed struggle. The ANC accepted that 
the INM had to operate within apartheid structures but appreciated the KaNgwane 
government‟s continued assistance to liberation fighters („guerrillas‟) who were taking up 
arms and regularly in transit in and out of South Africa through KaNgwane territory (its 
location presented an easy opportunity) to Mozambique and Swaziland (M.S. Ginindza – 
interview, June 2007; Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). The communiqué titled 
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„Mobilise All Forces for Freedom: Joint Communiqué between the ANC and the Inyandza 
National Movement Held in Lusaka‟ was published in Mayibuye Vol. 3, 1986.  
They agreed that the solution to the problems facing our country lies in the institution of a 
system of majority rule in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. Accordingly, 
they were united in their opposition to the entire system of „separate development‟ as 
represented by such institutions as the tri-cameral parliament, the Bantustans, community 
councils, the Regional Services Councils, the proposed National Statutory Council and so on. 
The two delegations also agreed that the obstacle to a negotiated resolution of the South 
African problem is the Botha regime. They concluded that no negotiations are possible while 
the leaders of the people are in prison and while the Pretoria regime refused to accept that our 
country should be governed by all its people, both black and white, as equals, brothers and 
sisters (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:260). 
Holden and Mathabatha (2007:260) describe this as “remarkable moment, especially in view 
of the ANC‟s hard line and polemic-filled approached to Bantustan leaders” (2007:260). This 
meeting with the ANC in Zambia was reported in the news across the country and it gave 
Enos Mabuza and the Inyandza National Movement national coverage in terms of their 
allegiance with the ANC and contribution to the struggle (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 
2007). According to the media reports, Mabuza had proved that he had a different political 
agenda from that of other Bantustan leaders by denouncing both apartheid and the Bantustan 
system on numerous occasions. In 1984, for example, he condemned the idea of a tri-cameral 
parliament which he described as „monstrous.‟ He also promised the people of KaNgwane 
that his government would actively “seek to promote non-racialism, equality and democracy 
in KaNgwane, just as we hope in the future to participate in the development and promotion 
of non-racial democracy in South Africa as a whole” (Mabuza cited in Holden and 
Mathabatha, 2007:260.) 
However, Mr M. S. Ginindza (2007) notes that despite the successful meeting and 
communiqué (agreement) between the ANC and INM, the more militant quarters of the 
liberation movement inside the country – UDF, SAYCO and COSATU did not understand or 
necessarily tolerate why INM operated the way it did (fighting apartheid from within). The 
suspicion (and need to prove themselves) was particularly true of the INM‟s relations with 
rank and file members of the main liberation and civic groups (grassroots- opposed to sell-
outs, traitors and those deemed compromised and, therefore, risky as alliance partners) who 
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were not always privy to what their leadership discussed or agreed to with other groups in 
terms of alliances and strategies. Inyandza had to rely on the ANC‟s leadership to explain the 
link between the organisations; why Inyandza was relevant to this marriage of convenience. 
KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi considered Mabuza a confidante (SABA link, working in the 
Bantustan system etc) to the extent that Inyandza regularly sent representatives to Inkatha 
meetings to share ideas since none posed a threat to the other. However, Mabuza‟s 
cooperation with the ANC caused Chief Buthelezi great annoyance, especially after Inyandza 
met with the ANC in Lusaka. Buthelezi felt betrayed by Mabuza‟s open association with the 
ANC which Buthelezi refers to as “the forces of darkness.” Buthelezi regarded Mabuza‟s 
actions as defection or breaking rank and he said some very unflattering things about Enos 
Mabuza (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). Buthelezi and the ANC‟s once mutually 
beneficial association had gone sour and so did his relationship with Mabuza and it was 
during this time that Buthelezi‟s Inkatha began fuelling internecine violence in Natal. In an 
address to an Inkatha annual general meeting on 5 July 1986, Buthelezi accused Mabuza of 
misconceiving the aims of Inkatha and criticised Mabuza/Inyandza‟s meeting with the ANC 
in Lusaka as a form of “seeking political succulence” (Buthelezi, 1986b:27). Buthelezi 
describes Mabuza as a man who “used to be under my armpit and now look where he stands” 
(Buthelezi, 1986b:27). Buthelezi attributed this alleged betrayal by Mabuza on the 
divisiveness of the ANC which, in his view, was hell-bent on stripping him of allies 
(destroying him and Inkatha) such as Mabuza and others who fell by the way-side. Buthelezi 
continues his attack on Mabuza as follows:  
Those who are thus so easily stripped, would in any case have proven to be no 
allies at all when the going got tough. We are well rid of such flimsy allies in 
the great struggle which lies ahead. I am simply mentioning Mr. Mabuza in 
passing because I know that this conference will lament and mourn yet another 
victim who is consumed by the fires of black dissent” (Buthelezi, 1986b:27). 
Buthelezi variously labels Mabuza and others like him “lily-livered”, “faint-hearted”, 
“politically rotten” and “disloyal” – fallen victim to human foibles such as cowardice, lack of 
conviction and greed (1986b:27; Maré and Hamilton, 1987:163).  
Recollections by former INM members paint Inyandza as having been an integral part of 
South Africa‟s mass democratic movement. They like to think of the organisation as having 
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been an umbrella body (loosely along the lines of the UDF – an amalgamation of different 
groups with similar interests) to circumvent legal restrictions whilst filling the political 
vacuum created by the banning of most political organisations (ANC, PAC, BC and others). 
The INM worked with the UDF and its affiliates including the South African Youth Congress 
(SAYCO), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as well as progressive 
churches under the banner of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). Minutes of 
underground meetings between the INM/KaNgwane‟s leaders and the exiled ANC 
(meetings/briefings referred to in ANC/O. R. Tambo papers held by the University of Fort 
Hare) provide evidence of the latter encouraging or suggesting that the INM should work 
with all progressive forces within South Africa. The UDF was an obvious choice as a partner 
because it was unquantifiable (ubiquitous) in many respects and had access to different 
constituencies which made it difficult for the apartheid regime to clamp down on its activities 
(ANC. 1986a; 1986b). 
As part of the INM‟s former leadership, Mr M. S. Ginindza insists that their organisation‟s 
aims and objectives corresponded with those of the ANC in almost all respects. They note 
that the only difference was the name of the organisation for the reasons outlined above but 
one might wonder whether this convergence was by design or coincidence. However, Enos 
Mabuza showed his deference to the ANC by stating repeatedly that he would hand over or 
submit to the ANC once it was unbanned (the real leaders returned to South Africa) and it did 
indeed happen that way. Enos Mabuza, Elias Ginindza and M. S. Gininda were founding 
members and leaders of the organisation and structured it in such a way that it had or 
represented more or less the same aims and objectives as the ANC. According to the people 
interviewed, Inyandza‟s connection with the ANC was deliberate, not coincidental. Several 
newspaper articles including the one by Stevens (1986:33) and others which appeared in 
BONA magazine and several (July/August and December issues) of the ANC‟s 1990 
Mayibuye publications variously commented on this and other issues labelling Enos Mabuza 
the ANC in disguise because of the similarities in their objectives and approaches. Inyandza‟s 
leader, Enos Mabuza, came to be seen as a „comrade within the system‟ by the ANC‟s 
leadership because, for instance, he/Inyandza National Movement succeeded in uniting the 
people of KaNgwane to seek common citizenship in South Africa (the Swazi land deal) by 
refusing to be handed over to independent Swaziland. The Inyandza National Movement was 
a Swazi cultural organisation but its leaders were the most vocal against the Swazi land deal 
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in 1982 instead of showing deference to all things Swazi since the deal was presented as the 
right of the Swazi king. Inyandza also refused to opt for „independence‟ for KaNgwane.  
The Inyandza National Movement (INM) convincingly won in KaNgwane‟s first general 
elections in 1988 in which the average voting percentage was 39.7%. According to a 
statement issued at the time, this is regarded as good for a first general election. The 1988 
election was the first time that women voted in KaNgwane. The INM won 10 of the 14 
contested seats, which shows to its popularity, at least in KaNgwane. Following this election, 
the INM held 52 seats in the legislative council. Candidates of the INM, among them Enos 
Mabuza himself, took 42 undisputed seats when nominations closed on 22 August 1988. Just 
one of the contested seats was won by an independent candidate. Five of the fourteen 
candidates fielded by David Lukhele‟s break-away Insika National Party forfeited their 
deposits. The INM took the result as a clear confirmation of Enos Mabuza‟s policy to use 
self-government to promote the social and economic development of the people of 
KaNgwane and to oppose South Africa‟s racial policy and the notion of Bantustans as 
„independent states‟ (SAPA, 1998:10). 
The Inyandza National Movement held its 12th Annual Congress on Sunday 30 September 
1990 at the Lowveld Showgrounds. The Congress was themed “The Realities and the Role of 
Democracy in a New South Africa.” Some of the discussions held at the Congress centred on 
the future of the Inyandza National Movement, organisational structures, alliances, the future 
of the KaNgwane government, the Negotiation Forum and the constitutional basis of the role 
of democracy in a new South Africa. Mr John Stuart Kane-Berman was a guest speaker at 
this Congress. He is former Vice-President and current Chief Executive of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) which has a proud history of involvement in the fight 
against apartheid. He also served as a board member of the Ithuba Trust and New Era Trust 
and is the author of several books on South African political experience.  
On Thursday 10 February 1994, at a Special Session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly 
in Matsula, KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister Mr. M. C. Zitha (Mabuza‟s successor as Chief 
Minister of KaNgwane and President of Inyandza who had been part of the Inyandza 
National Movement from its inception) continued with the work and vision of set by Enos 
Mabuza by reiterating the message that reconciliation as the only way to resolve the problems 
that were besetting the transition to democracy (Elias Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). Zitha 
was commenting on white right-wing violence which threatened to derail the negotiation 
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process from 1990 (threats of war, senseless destruction and intimidation such as the 
bombings in the western Transvaal and the Free State). Further, most Inyandza members 
joined the ANC when Inyandza disbanded and the ANC was unbanned. Mr. Elias Ginindza is 
one such individual and he is a member of the Mpumalanga Legislature (as ANC). The ANC 
did not object to this „conversion‟ because the Inyandza had played a supporting role for the 
ANC. However, it has been noted that there were some individuals within Inyandza who 
wanted the organisation to be an autonomous entity – separate from the ANC or any other 
organisation. Inyandza‟s office bearers (National Executive Committee) in 1990 were as 
follows: 
President: Mr. Enos J. Mabuza 
Deputy President: Mr. M. C. Zitha  
National Chairman: Mr. E .N .Ginindza (Mpumalanga Provincial Executive Council) 
Deputy National Chairman: Mr. E. C. Mango 
National Organiser: Mr. J. M. Matsana 
National Treasurer: D. S Mkwanazi (Chairperson of Committees, the Mpumalanga Provincial 
Legislature) 
Secretary General: Prof S. S. Ripinga (now with the ANC and served as South African High 
Commissioner to Cameroon) 
Deputy Secretary General: Mr. N. S. Ngozo 
Administrative Secretary: Mr. M. S. Gininda 
Assistant Administration Secretary-Records: Dr. P. M. H. Maduna (ANC and has served as 
an ANC member of parliament, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of State for 
Minerals and Energy Affairs and Minister of State Justice and Constitutional Development) 
Publicity and Information Officer: Mr. D. Z. Makhubela (now with the Mpumalanga 
Department of Education). 
Mabuza, Inyandza and the Spectre of Populist/Sectarian Ethnic Politics 
Bank criticises the Bantustan system, Bantustan-based political organisations and the South 
African Black Alliance (SABA) which was comprised various bodies led by co-opted elites. 
Some of the other Bantustan leaders were distrustful of Buthelezi‟s personal ambitions in 
creating and heading SABA, especially his claims that his Inkatha party was a national 
liberation movement which represented all blacks in South Africa (Zulu imperialism) but 
Mabuza of KaNgwane and Mopeli of QwaQwa joined him together with the leaders of the 
Page | 218 
 
Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party (Rogers, 1980:91). Because of Enos 
Mabuza/the Inyandza National Movement‟s involvement in or association with such 
organisations, Bank labels them as populist (1994:86-87, 94) without differentiating them 
from Buthelezi and Inkatha, Allan Hendrikse and the Labour Party or QwaQwa‟s Mopeli and 
his Dikwankwentla Party. The label is convenient and warranted in some respects but in 
reality, there were similarities as well as differences (nuances) in the way these organisations 
operated - what and how they tried to achieve. Despite blanket criticism and labels such as 
those offered by Banks, Mabuza‟s administration earned respect, if not support (benefit of the 
doubt), for the relative peace and stability which prevailed in KaNgwane.  
Mabuza did not regard Inyandza as owing its existence to the KaNgwane Bantustan but as 
existing in spite of it. Inyandza did not cater to just the interests of Swazis although it was 
unavoidable that the majority of its members would be united by Swazi identity since it was 
an organisation in a predominantly Swazi area.  It was open to everyone (working class, petty 
bourgeois, peasants and others) in South Africa that shared its vision for a united and 
democratic South Africa and wanted to join because of a shared experience of apartheid 
injustice. George Hutchinson was one of Inyandza‟s founding members and he was 
considered a comrade by the ANC leadership (Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). Other 
respected leaders, for example, Penuell Maduna believed in Inyandza and put their weight 
behind it in spite of its Bantustan connection. Maduna was an Inyandza office bearer in 1990 
and was later chairman of the working group which was responsible for redrafting proposals 
on transitional executive structures (phase one of an interim government). Does their 
participation in or endorsement of a so-called populist organisation make them populist too? 
Other notable people who associated with Mabuza in different capacities included the former 
deputy president of the PAC, Dikgang Moseneneke, Rev. Stanley Makgoba also of the PAC, 
Barney Pityana who was a close friend of Steve Biko and an adherent of Black 
Consciousness as well as a member of SASO and Rev. Simon D. Sibanyoni of Kabokweni in 
KaNgwane. 
The ANC, PAC, SACP and other organisations were banned or restricted but apart from the 
banning of organisations, individual activists, certain books/literature and music was also 
banned in South Africa. In 1978 alone, 1 096 publications and 300 films were banned or 
subjected to age restrictions and excision. However, a Bantustan formation, Inyandza was not 
restricted in the same way and could thus fill in the political vacuum that existed (Mabuza, 
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1989a; 1989b; 1989c). It was perhaps unusual for Inyandza to actively seek or forge alliances 
more bona fide organisations in the struggle because Bantustan elites/politicians were 
considered its natural enemies but there were many dynamics at play and the conditions or 
realities on the ground were always changing. An alliance with Mabuza and Inyandza was 
deemed necessary and constructive for the struggle to be effective as part of a strategy for the 
widest possible base from which to bring down the apartheid state (Frederikse, 1990:206).  
Debates around the possibility and/or form of inter-racial cooperation (alliances or 
collaborations between black, white, Indian and Coloured South African against a „common‟ 
enemy in the struggle) raged on throughout the struggle, especially during the racially 
polarised mood of the 1970s. There were tensions and suspicions over what role (substance) 
whites would play if they were allowed into black organisations. Some Africans wanted a 
clear designation of who would lead the struggle and who would follow or play a supportive 
role. Naturally, there were concerns over what was entailed by the liberal white conscience in 
practice given the juxtaposition of poverty and privilege, power and wealth along racial lines.  
There was the distinct possibility that a good number of whites who would express interest in 
or support the liberation efforts would do so to infiltrate the movements as spies for the 
government in order to cause discord and derail the struggle. Consequently, the more inward 
looking groups that subscribed to hardline BC and Africanist ideologies strongly held that 
Africans should be the vanguard of the national struggle because of their experience of 
oppression and their numerical superiority over other groups. They did not want whites to 
formulate policies and programmes or decide on the methods of struggle because Africans 
suffered more than any other group under apartheid. The formation of the PAC as a split from 
the ANC was over this and other disagreements because the Africanists were not convinced 
about how genuine white allies could be or their ability to change their long-standing 
attitudes and prejudices towards other races. The formation of the South African Students 
organisation (SASO) as a splinter group from the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS) was also evidence of the different ideologies born from different experiences of 
injustice between blacks and whites (Frederikse, 1990).  
Blacks bore the brunt and indignity of race-specific oppression such as the pass laws, forced 
removals, the Group Areas Act, Bantu Education and job reservation, all of which inevitably 
shaped negative attitudes towards other racial groups. Coloureds, Africans and Indians 
experienced varying degrees of discrimination and oppression under apartheid. At some point 
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Coloureds, for example, had a qualified franchise, could own property, become petty 
bourgeois to some degree and benefited from preferential employment policies such as the 
1955 Coloured Labour Preference Policy, all of which were aimed at undermining Coloured-
African relations and incorporating Coloured moderates into the middle level of the apartheid 
hierarchy. The stratification that was created through such measures and privileged status, 
however illusory, alienated Coloureds from the mainstream African-dominated resistance 
because it created a reluctance to take on the system (Frederikse, 1990:39,184). This was a 
similar predicament to that of the Bantustan elites who were lulled into a false sense of 
security and grew accustomed to artificial power and the trappings which it provided. 
However, while the ideologies and arguments of Africanists and Black Consciousness 
adherents (the PAC, AZAPO and Black Consciousness organisations), particularly the more 
militant youths, were consciously anti-white or had strong racial overtones, a backlash, 
against white involvement or the nature of white involvement in mass-based organisations, 
the leadership of the ANC, UDF and Mass Democratic Movement was more open to the 
idea38 and welcomed anyone who purported to be part of the mass movement and was willing 
to work with them towards their goals (Frederikse, 1990:202). The ANC and the rest of the 
organisations which were driving the struggle (UDF, MDM) did not want to alienate potential 
allies, for example, the Congress Alliance was comprised of racially or nationally specific 
organisations which were linked through joint campaigns.  
The PAC, AZAPO and BC organisations raised legitimate concerns over the nature of white 
participation in the struggle and this led to an ANC consultative conference in Morogoro, 
Tanzania in April 1969 to try and chart a way forward (Frederikse, 1990:99).  It was argued 
that workers, academics and youths from the other racial groups who were opposed to 
apartheid could act as reinforcements or take a supportive, logistical, consultative or advisory 
role. People were wary of them, particularly whites, hijacking the struggle out of guilt or the 
arrogant need to further patronise and dominate because of the skills or resources which they 
brought to the table. Frederikse (1990:99 & 214) notes that one pressing issue for whites was 
compulsory conscription into the South African Defence Force and they wanted a way to 
campaign against it or an outlet for their anxieties and frustrations over the South African 
situation generally. Further, progressive whites often had an unstable base from which to 
organise because other whites who might have shared their sentiments were afraid of the 
                                                 
38 However, the ANC‟s leadership had to sell idea of co-operating with whites to the rank and file members in 
small doses as the political terrain changed from the mid 1970s onwards. 
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consequences of sticking their necks out in support of a popular black struggle. In these 
debates, Frederikse (1990:169-171) notes that as far as the government was concerned, the 
more radical, seemingly racist or separatist organisations such as the PAC, AZAPO and 
Black Consciousness affiliates were a safer, less threatening or more predictable enemy. 
Their rigid non-collaborationist stance inadvertently advocated separatism which worked in 
the state‟s favour whereas the ANC‟s non-racialism threatened to create a force which the 
state would not have been able to resist. As a result, Frederikse notes the limited or delayed 
state interference in the activities of the non-collaborationist organisations. 
The Black Consciousness Movement, for example, was critical of the ANC‟s caution and 
pragmatism which it argued was sterile and ineffective. At the Morogoro conference, the 
ANC adopted the „Strategies and Tactics of the ANC‟ programme which addressed these 
issues and included the ANC‟s new approach to the armed struggle and political mobilisation 
which gathered momentum following the 1976 Soweto Student Uprising. However, the 
dilemma or question of alliances/partnerships and principles remained high on the agenda of 
liberation movements through to the negotiated transition39 because of the variety of class 
forces and sectarian interests represented which needed balancing, including the question of 
the Bantustans (Egero,1991:41-42). It was also compounded by concerns over the palpable 
reality of ethnic identification which justified arguments in favour of constituency-based 
politics. Fears that ethnic and other interests would take precedence over the broader struggle 
were evident in AZAPO‟s attacks on the Transvaal Indian Congress and opposition to the 
1981 elections for the government-controlled South African Indian Council (SAIC) which 
was in a sense an „ethnic body.‟ Some of the strongest criticism of mobilisation along ethnic 
lines for non-racial ends came from the National Forum Committee which rejected 
unprincipled alliances that had the potential to dilute the revolutionary content of the struggle. 
In a speech entitled “Nation and Ethnicity in South Africa” which he delivered at the launch 
of National Forum Committee, Neville Alexander commented on the matter as follows: 
The fact remains that ethnic or national group approaches are the thin end of 
the wedge for separatist movements and civil wars fanned by great-power 
interests and suppliers of arms to opportunist ethnic leaders. Does not Inkatha 
                                                 
39 The first known meeting between President PW Botha and Nelson Mandela took place in July 1989 followed 
by the 2-4 May 1990 Groote Schuur and 6-7 August 1990 Pretoria minutes, CODESA I and II and signing of 
the Record of Understanding in September 1992 but several „secret‟ meetings preceded all this. 
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in some ways represent a warning to all of us? Who decides what are the 
positive features of a national group?...Class, colour and nation converge in 
the national liberation movement. Cultural organisations that are not locally or 
geographically limited for valid community reasons should be open to all 
oppressed and exploited people…In this way we shall eliminate divisive 
ethnic consciousness and separatist lines of division without eliminating our 
cultural achievements and cultural variety (cited in Frederikse, 1990:206-207). 
 
In reality, however, ethnic-based organisations were not confined to Bantustan politics. 
Coloured and Indian political formations, for example, worked in their own group areas or 
communities and catered for the distinct character of those communities because of the 
effects of Group Areas and other Acts which enforced geographical separation. 
Consequently, judgment of the Indian Congresses, the Natal Indian Congress for instance, 
was ultimately based on what they achieved rather than their composition (Frederikse, 
1990:196, 201 & 204) because they worked in solidarity with Africans (Frederikse, 1990:29-
35). Mabuza and Inyandza can be analysed in a similar light within the context of the 
Bantustans system in which they operated. Although in many respects Inyandza enjoyed a 
monopoly in KaNgwane politics generally and in the legislative assembly, it was as 
transparent as it could be about its leadership and practices in its internal structures (regular 
elections). A „genuine‟ attempt to establish the primacy of working class or other popular 
interests on its own is unlikely to merit an ethnic tag. The Congress Alliance was a 
compromise for practical purposes and included the ANC, the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions (SACTU), The South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured 
People‟s Organisation (later renamed the Coloured People‟s Congress) and the South African 
Congress of Democrats (Frederikse, 1990:59).  Alliances with white liberal organisations 
were often a short-lived improvisation because of cyclic nature of clashes over agendas and 
definitions of the role they could play long term. However, collaborations with white liberal 
groups such as IDASA and the Five Freedoms Forum were more sustained in response to 
black the community‟s request for liberal whites to take a stand against the states of 
emergencies from 1986. 
One of the people interviewed for this paper is Jabulani Michael Mndawe and he worked in 
the KaNgwane administration in the late 1980s with Simeon Gininda and others even though 
he was a member of the UDF, not Inyandza. Mndawe was in charge of KaNgwane‟s 
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townships, including inspecting the accounting records of the eight municipalities which fell 
in the Bantustan‟s jurisdiction (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government 
Offices, 7 June 2007). Mndawe is from Lydenburg in the Mpumalanga lowveld and was 
chairperson of the UDF affiliated South Africa Civic Association branch in KaNgwane and 
led its resistance efforts against the regime as a community structure. Resistance leaders in 
the lowveld including Michael Mndawe (UDF), John Baloyi (South Africa Council of 
Churches) and Sipho Sukati were taken into custody when the state of emergency was 
declared in 1986. According to Mndawe, the intension of the apartheid authorities was to 
have a Nelspruit treason trial similar to the Delmas treason trial. According to Mndawe, the 
Minister of Police at the time, Adriaan Vlok, was personally monitoring the movements of 
people who were believed to be causing destabilisation in the country. Efforts were made to 
make the detainees believe that they were being held on the insistence of the KaNgwane 
administration (Mabuza himself) but they did not fall for it. Mabuza risked everything by 
visiting them during their detention.  Mndawe reports that Mabuza was very supportive and 
used his own resources to see to the welfare of the families of activists who were detained for 
longer than two years at a time. Mndawe was eventually released with the help of Steven 
Ngwenya and Phineas Mojapelo who were attorneys that represented ANC and UDF activists 
who fell foul of the apartheid authorities (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga 
Government Offices, 7 June 2007). 
Mabuza established relations with some UDF officials and organisers including Mosiuoa 
Lekota and Popo Molefe who used to visit KaNgwane. In terms of contact with the ANC, 
Mabuza had a working relationship with Jacob Zuma, a former ANC youth League member 
who spent 1963-1973 in prison on Robben Island for Umkhonto we Sizwe and SACTU 
activities and left for Swaziland in 1976. Zuma was elected onto the ANC‟s National 
Executive Committee (NEC) and moved to Mozambique as the ANC‟s chief representative 
until 1987. In 1990, he was the first member of the ANC NEC to return to South Africa to 
prepare for talks with the government. Mabuza also had on-going contact with Matthews 
Phosa who is a celebrated businessman, the ANC‟s current Treasurer-General and former 
Premier of Mpumalanga40. According to Mndawe, Mabuza also had contact with Cyril 
Ramaphosa from the trade union side of the resistance movement (Michael Mndawe, 
interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007). Mndawe believes that his being 
                                                 
40 Phosa went into exile in 1985 and underwent political & military training. He became Umkonto we Sizwe‟s 
Regional Commander in Mozambique in 1986 and returned to South Africa in 1990. He participated in 
CODESA 1& 2 and was also a Commissioner on the Truth & Reconciliation Commission in 1995. 
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able to work in KaNgwane‟s administration whilst being an active member of the UDF, and 
through it, associating with the ANC is proof that there were no contradictions in terms of 
their aims. The common denominator with Inyandza, as with all the other organisations in the 
broad alliance, was that it made positive and consistent statements about a future South 
Africa in which racism would be eradicated (Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga 
Government Offices, 7 June 2007). 
One of the documented cases of police brutality and death in detention in the Eastern 
Transvaal is that of Michael Mndawe‟s younger brother Thembuyise Simon Mndawe who 
lived in KaNyamazane Township outside Nelspruit.  According to his brother, Simon was 
active in the Student Christian Movement and the banned ANC and from about 1979 he 
operated from Swaziland recruiting men for military training and distributing ANC 
propaganda in the country (pamphlets, slogans and other means) to conscientise, mobilise, 
inspire and counter the apartheid state‟s propaganda and misrepresentations. According to his 
brother, Simon Mndawe had regular contact with Mabuza from outside with information 
about ANC activities or plans in the lowveld. He had managed to evade capture several times 
and had been questioned by police about six months before his death. Mndawe was finally 
arrested at midnight on 22 February 1983 in terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act 
of 1982. The section allowed for detention without trial for lengthy periods and detainees 
were often kept in solitary confinement, denied access to lawyers and visits from family 
members (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:538). Many fatalities and torture victims or detainees 
during the1980s were male youths between the ages of thirteen and twenty-four. Many of 
them were activists and held local leadership positions. They were targeted (seen as terrorists 
and subversives) because the government hoped that their detention would significantly 
weaken organised opposition and thus contain the wave of mass protest that was sweeping 
the country (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:615).  
The proximity of Mozambique and Swaziland meant that the greater Nelspruit area was often 
used by guerrillas to enter the country covertly and Mndawe was suspected of being one of 
these guerrillas or terrorists. When Simon was arrested and charged, his family approached 
the Nelspruit law firm of Phosa, Mojapelo and Makgoba for assistance. Whilst in custody, 
Simon Mndawe was repeatedly assaulted (choked, punched and kicked) and sustained facial 
bruises and a fractured right cheekbone. He was also tortured (suffocated and electrocuted) 
but his complaints were ignored and medical treatment was withheld. The security police 
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forced a confession out of him a day after he was detained (on 23 February 1983). It is 
reported that he was taken to the security police for more questioning on 7 March 1983. 
Simon Mndawe died at Nelspruit police station on 8 March 1983 as a result of the injuries he 
sustained in prison but his death was officially recorded as „suicide by hanging‟. According 
to Michael Mndawe, although Simon Mndawe was an ANC cadre, his funeral was organised 
by Enos Mabuza. Representatives of the British anti-apartheid movement tried to attend 
Simon‟s funeral and make a documentary about the torture that was rife in the prisons but 
they were arrested as part of the cover-up. A commission of inquiry into malpractices in 
South African prisons was also ordered by the Minister of Justice on 29 September 1983 
following this and other deaths in detention, including those at the Barberton Prison Farm in 
the Eastern Transvaal on 29 December 1982 (African National Congress, 1984:28-29). 
Subsequently, an investigation into Mndawe‟s death was conducted in February 1984 
(Michael Mndawe, interview, Mpumalanga Government Offices, 7 June 2007; African 
National Congress, 1984:23; Bizos, 1998:133-151). 
Unlike other Bantustans, KaNgwane was small and did not have a university where the youth 
could mobilise as radically as they did at the University of Fort Hare or the Turfloop campus 
of the University of the North where the Black Consciousness aligned AZASO and other 
student formations were active. The Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) was active in 
whites-only universities and blacks-only universities (in the Bantustans as well as Coloured 
and Indian campuses) whilst student organisations such as the South African Youth Congress 
(SAYCO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) focused on mobilising 
mostly urban high school students from 1978 onwards (Frederikse, 1990:171 & 182). 
Without such a nucleus, the students in KaNgwane relied on information about boycotts and 
protests that were happening elsewhere in the country and only then could they support such 
protests (solidarity). An example of such boycotts and protests is that of high school and 
universities in April 1980 which originated in the Western Cape and spread nationally. The 
boycotts were over the standard and quality of education and quickly spread to include 
primary schools as well. This protest gradually spread to schools countrywide and grew into a 
general political protest which turned violent in response to police retaliation. Sporadic 
schools and university boycotts continued in 1982 and in 1983 similar demonstrations at 
schools affected 10 000 pupils countrywide and at least 22 meetings were banned. 
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In the Transvaal, the 1980s were marked by the violent and sustained enforcement of the 
UDF‟s programmes such as consumer boycotts and mass stay-aways from work and school. 
Communities were urged to boycott local businesses, particularly those owned by black 
councillors, policemen or whites.  The UDF and its affiliates demanded the withdrawal of the 
SADF from the townships, the release of political prisoners, improved housing and 
electricity, lowering of rentals and the resignation of councillors and these activities led to the 
emergence of „street committees‟, „People‟s Courts‟ and declarations of „People‟s Power‟, for 
example, in Alexandra in the wake of the 1986 Six Day War (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:600). 
The year 1984 was characterised by widespread rent and schools boycotts and demonstrations 
and in August demonstrations affected 800 000 school children. The Vaal Triangle rent 
boycotts spread and by June 1985 tension around rent and school boycotts peaked in the 
townships surrounding Barberton (KaNgwane) in the eastern Transvaal but many of those 
injured in the ensuing skirmishes were not directly participating in the boycotts (TRC Report 
Vol. 3, 1998:607). The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was banned in August 
1985 for leading or masterminding the wave of boycotts. Soweto pupils returned to school in 
January 1986 in response to a call from the Soweto Parents‟ Crisis Committee and in March a 
meeting of the National Education Crisis Committee resolved to end the schools boycott. In 
April 1986 black workers in White River north of Nelspruit and in Nelspruit itself take part in 
a crippling stay-away. 
A nascent political formation like Inyandza which supported or was sympathetic to the 
struggle had a purpose because it could conscientise the ordinary people who had no other 
immediate alternatives in the Bantustan. Inyandza had greater freedom to operate politically 
but people were not badgered to join Inyandza. Mabuza did not exaggerate his own 
importance in the broader context of the national struggle. He was aware that extra-
parliamentary organisations were highly critical of Bantustan-based political organisations as 
rent-seeking collaborationist formations in their character and operation but he was relieved 
that most organisations involved in the struggle accepted and even respected Inyandza‟s 
political stand and role in the struggle. Inyandza was not rejected because its aims did not 
contradict or threaten those of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Mabuza maintained 
that Inyandza existed only as a caretaker body holding fort in KaNgwane until the ANC and 
other political organisations were unbanned and the true leaders of the people, all the 
oppressed African people, the ANC, returned from exile and were released from prison and 
could lead again (Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c). Inyandza voluntarily disbanded in 1990 in 
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response to the unbanning of political organisations and encouraged its members to join the 
ANC. 
The proposed Swazi land deal of 1982 (discussed in detail below) was not only about 
returning South African Swazis to their motherland even though Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza 
and Pretoria presented it as such. The Bantustan‟s territory had been claimed by King 
Sobhuza of Swaziland as part of the Swazi monarchs‟ traditional realm, and the South 
African government hoped to use the Bantustan as a buffer zone against guerrilla infiltration 
from Mozambique. While it is possible that Mabuza opposed the deal because it would mean 
the loss of his position and whatever power he wielded as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, his 
official objection and challenge to the state through the courts was based on the argument that 
the move would deny all the residents of KaNgwane their citizenship as South Africans first 
and foremost. The struggle which was being waged in the country was about South African 
citizenship, equal rights and dignity and agreeing to cede the territory to Swaziland would 
negate that. The land deal did not go according to Pretoria‟s plans because of Mabuza‟s 
intervention and this led to the punitive dissolution of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly. 
Mabuza/Inyandza rallied national and international support from legal experts such as local 
International Law expert Professor John Dugard, the American Lawyers for Civil Rights 
Committee which was based in Washington DC and the International Commission of Jurists 
based in Geneva Switzerland in order to keep KaNgwane as part of South Africa. The success 
of this campaign eventually led to the reinstatement of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly 
and the retention of the Bantustan and its people (Mabuza, 1989c:5). Had the deal been 
successful, it was not only Swazis that would have been affected because there were also 
Shangaans, Zulus, Sothos and Mozambican refugees living in KaNgwane and not all of them 
had direct ties with Swaziland or King Sobhuza‟s claims on which the land deal was 
premised (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:51-64; Macmillan, 1989:289-316; McGregor, 
1994:545-567). The connectedness of constituency which was served by Inyandza was only 
ever really undermined by the development of internal factions over the question of the 
proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland. Disagreements or conflict between the 
chiefs and the nostalgic elderly who expressed the desire to become part of Swaziland again 
and those that did not created rifts within Inyandza which led to the formation of an 
opposition or rival faction, Inyatsi which was led by David Lukhele who had known 
connections to Pretoria and chiefs who supported the incorporation idea. However, Inyandza 
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as an organisation did not come under direct threat and managed to maintain credibility and 
some degree of legitimacy in spite of the acrimony and confusion which was created by this. 
Inyandza was envisaged as a temporary intervention and it was able to establish a working 
relationship with the ANC and UDF which it mimicked in terms of its ideological template. 
Mabuza explained that the “two-fold objective of Inyandza was and still is the socio-
economic development of our people at regional level, and the promotion of the national 
struggle by peaceful means for the liberation of the black people of this country. From its 
inception, Inyandza has been a non-ethnic and non-racial political movement...” (Mabuza, 
1989c:5). The Inyandza logo consisted of an undivided map of South Africa on which a 
bundle of firewood (Inyandza in siSwati) was superimposed. Firewood is commonly 
collected by women in the veld for fuel to keep home fires burning and its adoption as 
Inyandza‟s logo was meant to symbolise the people unified in their struggle for a just, united 
and democratic South Africa. Inyandza acknowledged that while South African was 
comprised of many cultural and racial groups with varied backgrounds, they shared one 
motherland in their opinions and visions. The colours of the Inyandza logo were the same as 
those of the ANC - black for the people, green for the land and gold for the country‟s wealth 
(Mabuza, 1989a; 1989b; 1989c).  
Inyandza chose to align itself with organisations in the Mass Democratic Movement in an 
attempt to break out of the ethnic straight jacket of government-created structures (Mabuza, 
1989c:4-6). The MDM was representative of the feelings and aspirations of the oppressed 
people and Mabuza/Inyandza was committed to reaching out to organisations such as the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA) and 
the Urban Councils‟ Association of South Africa (UCSA). Inyandza subscribed to the same 
principles, values and beliefs as the organisations in the MDM – the call for a united, 
democratic and non-racial state with full and equal citizenship and equality for all before the 
law irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed (Mabuza, 1989b:2). The apartheid regime used 
the Bantustans as dumping grounds for blacks that it did not want in the urban areas and 
public resentment led some of the Bantustans to become battle grounds in the 1980s (Egero, 
1991). Once the political transition was well and truly underway in the early 1990s, some 
Bantustan elites tried to resist their reincorporation into a united, non-racial South Africa. In 
Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, for example, the ruling cliques stood to lose lucrative 
sources of income from gambling resorts such as Sun City. However, a rejection of ethnic 
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separation, rising rural resistance and demands for the reintegration of the Bantustans led to 
coups in Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei and a crippling general strike in Gazankulu  in early 
1990 (Frederikse, 1990:264). 
Inyandza was committed to non-violent change and supported sanctions against the apartheid 
state. It also supported the 21 August 1989 Organisation of African Unity Ad Hoc Committee 
on Southern Africa‟s Harare Declaration which approved the ANC‟s position for negotiating 
with the South African government urged to remove, not amend or reform apartheid, the 
establishment of a multi-party state and an independent, non-racial judiciary. These principles 
were embodied in the ANC‟s Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa which 
where tabled on 8 August 1988 in Lusaka, Zambia. The same principles also formed the basis 
for the formation of the Democratic Party which was co-led by Wynand Malan; an invited 
guest at Inyandza‟s eleventh annual congress (Mabuza, 1989b:2). Mabuza‟s presidential 
address at Inyandza‟s eleventh annual congress came three days after the induction of F.W. 
De Klerk as South Africa‟s State President. De Klerk‟s tone was conciliatory, emphasising 
the need to create conditions conducive for negotiations to accommodate black political 
aspirations and as a gesture of goodwill, he had allowed peaceful anti-apartheid 
demonstrations in Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth on 15 September 
1989 (Mabuza, 1989b:1).This was a widely taken as a positive development and Mabuza, like 
other leaders in the Mass Democratic Movement, was optimist about South Africa‟s future 
prospects. 
Ethnic organisations mobilise on the basis of a set of perceived ethnic interests and symbols 
and this was the basis of KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha and Zulu nationalism which 
increasingly relied on the manipulation of ethnic symbols in their activities or the interests 
which they represented. It was also the basis of Inyandza‟s formation to some degree but 
unlike Buthelezi and Inkatha, it appears like Inyandza was able to maintain consistency in its 
stated priorities and emphases as contained in Enos Mabuza‟s speeches or the KaNgwane 
government‟s official documents. Buthelezi was a member of the ANC‟s Youth League and 
his entry into KwaZulu politics was supported or encouraged by the ANC in the 1970s to 
thwart apartheid from within. His Inkatha (Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe) was a national 
cultural liberation movement founded in 1975 also with the ANC‟s „approval‟ but serious 
rifts between Buthelezi and the ANC in the late 1970s led to the rapid deterioration of the 
rapport which they had had in the initial stages. He initially won popular support for refusing 
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to accept independence for the KwaZulu Bantustan which was the most populous of the 
Bantustans. It later became apparent that this refusal was linked to Buthelezi‟s ambitions for 
national leadership (Frederikse, 1990:211; Egero, 1991:30-31; Mare and Hamilton, 1987:46). 
Apart from Buthelezi‟s ambitions and increasingly erratic behaviour, after 1980 non-
participation in state-created structures became a holy principle and made pariahs of 
individuals who found themselves in those positions. Buthelezi felt isolated and became 
resentful to the point of joining ranks with Pretoria in curtailing the efforts of the liberation 
movements. Through such actions, he drew the line in the sand and has been widely criticised 
for building a personal and regional power base rooted in Zulu chauvinism, often in violent 
opposition to mass-based movements such as the ANC, UDF and COSATU. Inkatha the 
national movement transformed into the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which was officially 
launched as a political party in July 1990 and vigorously pursued a separatist agenda for the 
Zulu nation (Mzala, 1988; Mare and Hamilton, 1987). Buthelezi and Inkatha antagonised the 
liberation movements from mid 1987 until after the landmark 1994 elections. The „Reef 
Township War‟ in August 1990 was the result of the escalation of violence in the Transvaal 
and the Natal Midlands. The „Battle of the Forest‟ in June 1991 left twenty-three people dead 
in fighting between IFP and ANC supporters in the Richmond townships of Ndaleni and 
Magoda, Natal. In July 1991, the „Inkathagate‟ scandal exposed government funding of 
Inkatha anti-ANC activities. In 1992 the KwaZulu legislative assembly adopted a constitution 
for a future state of KwaZulu-Natal as an autonomous state within a federation and the next 
year, the IFP and KwaZulu Legislative Assembly embarked on a Self-Protection Unit (SPU) 
training project. Training of SPUs begins at Mlaba Camp in September with the assistance of 
Vlakplaas commander Eugene De Kock with weapons delivered by IFP member Philip 
Powell and by April 1994, an estimated 5 000 Inkatha supporters had received training as part 
of this secessionist plan in KwaZulu. In March 1994, the Goldstone Commission concluded 
that there was prima facie evidence of a hit squad in the KwaZulu Police. It was only with 
less than a week to the historic national April 1994 elections that Buthelezi and Inkatha 
finally gave up their separatist agenda (boycotting the election) and encouraged its supporters 
to vote (Frederikse, 1990:211; Egero, 1991:30-31). 
Cultural symbols reinforce identity and KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi contributed significantly 
to the “politicisation of culture” and identity politics (divisive) by wearing Zulu traditional 
dress at every opportunity (see pictures below) he could (Wilson and Frederiksen, 1995:4). 
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General Holomisa and Brigadier Gqozo were both military men and they were either pictured 
in military uniform (themselves a symbol of oppression or force) or in normal suits instead of 
cultural dress, this despite belonging to specific ethnic groups or tribes. Enos Mabuza was 
never pictured in traditional Swazi attire but in blazers and formal suits, as was the majority 
of the other Bantustan leaders. Perhaps this betrayed their bourgeoisie aspirations but it did 
not mean that they denounced their cultural heritages. Mabuza, for example, celebrated his 
Swazi identity by taking part in Swazi festivals (first fruits/harvest etc) and making regular 
visits to Swaziland (Sandile Mabuza, Esther Mabuza – interviews, June 2007). According to 
Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007), Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II and Enos Mabuza were 
fairly close and Mabuza used to attend annual Swazi cultural events and ceremonies at the 
king‟s court in full traditional Swazi clothing. Mabuza was a member of one of the king‟s 
regiments, respected tradition and the position of Swazi chiefs. This, Ginindza (2007) argues, 
led King Sobhuza to mistake Mabuza‟s celebration of Swazi identity or “bukhosi” („kinship‟) 
for unquestioning loyalty when the issue of the Swazi land deal came up in 1982. King 
Sobhuza tried to influence Mabuza into accepting the land deal by appealing to tradition (the 
Tibiyo structure, the Tinkundla councils) and national images to reinforce traditional 
hierarchies and respect for the king, the tribute system and other obligations but he failed to 
convince Mabuza that the land deal was in the best interests of the people of KaNgwane. 
In terms of KaNgwane‟s leadership, the „success‟ of the ruling Inyandza National Movement 
was partly because of its cultural appeal since the Bantustan system was loosely ethnic-based. 
The Inyandza National Movement was influenced by the Swazi culture‟s strong traditional 
element. Its formation was similar to that of Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha in KwaZulu-Natal and 
both formations behaved more like political parties than cultural organisations (Elias 
Ginindza, Interview 8 June 2007). Macmillan (1989) notes that there were Swazi artefacts on 
display at the KaNgwane government offices in the capital Nyamazane (Louieville) but 
despite this, Inyandza‟s leaders were unequivocal about wanting to be South African citizens 
and ultimately chose or prioritised their South African identity over the Swazi one. Was the 
KaNgwane government/Inyandza leadership deliberately circulating or exhibiting these 
Swazi cultural symbols to encourage partisan behaviour and attitudes? The answer to that 
question is unclear because Bantustan leaders generally denied forming political parties 
(disguised as cultural parties) to cement regional identities in line with apartheid‟s divide and 
rule tactics with the Bantustan system. However, the pictures below capture the type of tribal 
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or ethnic excesses (frequent reference to tribal/ethnic elements/symbols) that most people 
knew and some only suspected as far as traditional and Bantustan leaders were concerned. 
7.7 Mabuza and the Abortive Swazi Land Deal: A Test of Allegiance 
Ingwavuma is in the Umkhanyakude District Municipality of KwaZulu-Natal Province and 
falls within the Mngomezulu Tribal Authority. It is over 700 metres above sea level in the 
Lebombo Mountains and is just three kilometres from the border with Swaziland, 
overlooking the plains of Maputaland to the East. South African authorities, through the 
Department of Cooperation and Development led by P. G. J. Koornhof who was in charge of 
homeland affairs, wanted to divest themselves of the population of KaNgwane and 
Ingwavuma and it is alleged that members of the SADF intimidated people in Ingwavuma to 
encourage acceptance of the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland (Grundy, 1986:66; 
Dominy, 1986:71-92). 
According to Enos Mabuza, the KaNgwane-Ingwavuma land deal called into question the 
honesty of all concerned, especially honesty towards those who would be directly affected if 
the deal was pushed through. It was argued that the South African government‟s decision was 
inspired by its policy [Bantustans] of bringing together those who belong together. 
KaNgwane‟s leadership disagreed with this argument based on the logic and principle which 
had been used when independence was granted to the Ciskei “cheek over jowl with the 
Transkei and amidst the vocal protestations of President Matanzima” (Mabuza, 1983:8). The 
KaNgwane leadership questioned whether South African Swazis were the only national 
group which overlapped into an adjacent independent state outside South Africa since the 
Xhosas, Southern Sothos, Tswana and Shangaan-Tsongas were in the same predicament and 
yet nothing was being done to them. These apparent inconsistencies alluded to the under-
handed, dishonest reasons or motives that were behind the land deal. Mabuza wanted people, 
including the South African government, to understand and appreciate where KaNgwane‟s 
leadership‟s frustration and bitterness stemmed from (Mabuza, 1983:8). Mabuza reminded 
his audience of Afrikaner history and aspirations – the causes of the Anglo-Boer war; mainly 
that the Boers did not want to be treated as foreigners or second-class citizens in the land of 
their birth. He cited the same reasons to explain why his government and the Inyandza 
National Movement fought (in the courts) for their place in South Africa so that they would 
not “become pariahs in a foreign state” (Swaziland) (Mabuza, 1983:9).  
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One can be argue that Mabuza resisted the temptation to fall into the ethnic/tribal politics 
fanned by the controversial land deal of 1982 but still others can argue the opposite; that there 
were more selfish reasons why he opposed the deal. It is somewhat ironic that Mabuza 
appeals for self-determination for the people of KaNgwane by comparing their position with 
that of Afrikaners under English rule because this in fact contributed to the policy of 
apartheid. However, there are obvious similarities in the circumstances around the two 
events. Acrimony between the two Boer Republics and two British colonies continued until 
unification in 1910. British political dominance and the indignity it subjected the Boers to led 
to extreme and concerted efforts (reactionary in a sense) by white Afrikaans speakers to 
create and assert their own identity through Afrikaner nationalism (history about the 
Afrikaner Volk, their political destiny, political will and common culture – values, symbols 
and aspirations, plus attendant ideologies regarding racial and cultural exclusivism). The 
ideal of an Afrikaner Volk was given substance through a national consciousness which was 
built on an unapologetic, uncompromising desire for unity, autonomy and self-determination. 
Afrikaner identity and loyalty were promoted through trade unions, the economic movement 
(Reddingsdaadband, the Ekonomiese Volkskongies and the Genootskap van Regte 
Afrikaners), schools, churches, the family and political party/organisation such as the 
Broederbond. Religious dogma was manipulated to give credence to this vision and this 
desire or need was eventually used to legitimise a more sinister vision (apartheid) over the 
years (Sharp, 1988b:82-89). 
Did this comparison or argument deliberately and skilfully conceal a calculating 
pretentiousness designed to consolidate his position and self-importance? Was Mabuza‟s 
assiduous campaign against the land deal an end in itself or was it a means to an end? Perhaps 
it was a manifestation of his ego and growing narcissism because of the power that he 
thought he had as a Bantustan leader, regardless of the respect that he supposedly had for 
King Sobhuza and traditional political hierarchy (conservative monarchy) in general. 
Historical facts supported the King‟s claim; which is why Mabuza‟s opposition to the deal 
was incomprehensible to the Swazi intelligentsia (some chiefs and other observers who 
supported the land deal and regarded Mabuza as flirting with disaster by standing in the way). 
They were convinced that Mabuza was over-stepping the authority of the Swazi King and 
that this was a gamble or risk which Mabuza could not possibly win despite the fact that the 
timing of the deal and the South African government‟s enthusiasm for it were highly suspect. 
There is no concrete evidence to suggest that Mabuza opposed the deal for personal reason 
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(selfish reasons) and his motive will probably always be questioned. However, Mabuza‟s 
actions did not contradict his pronouncements on the issue and the only adverse effect which 
is directly attributable to his actions was that the few dissenters who wanted to become part 
of Swaziland did not get to do so, at least not in the way envisaged by the South African 
government and Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II (see section on the Swazi Land Deal). Mabuza 
responded to criticism levelled against him and his government by some Swazis and Swazi 
chiefs (acrimony) in the aftermath of the abortive Swazi land deal as follows: 
While it is said that politics is a dirty game, I feel qualified to claim that 
„Bantustan‟ politics is the dirtiest game of all games. I have, in five years time, 
gone through the mill of such politics and I have borne the curse and the 
scourge of Mickey Mouse politicians who believe that they can lead the 
people in KaNgwane while living in Disneyland. My government and I have 
often been accused by these political imps of trying to wrest political power 
from traditional chiefs and of not promoting the purity and sanctity of the 
Swazis (Mabuza, 1983:7). 
Further, he criticised what he termed “adventurous” white seconded officials in the 
KaNgwane government joined ranks with his Swazi detractors when they realised that 
Mabuza was not following the designs, desires and course dictated by Pretoria. However, 
despite these attempts to vilify and discredit him, the KaNgwane people whom Mabuza 
ranked “amongst the most highly politicised Africans in this country” came out in support of 
the KaNgwane government‟s decision to oppose the land deal and the Ministry of 
Cooperation and Development eventually withdrew the white officials who were interfering 
in KaNgwane‟s political affairs (Mabuza, 1983:7). 
Mabuza appealed to his audience that the people of KaNgwane should not be denied the 
opportunity to choose, map out and prepare their own road into the future in accordance with 
the principle of self-determination. Between 18 June and 25 November 1982, the South 
African government forcibly tried to determine that road or destination for the people of 
KaNgwane. In stating his opposition (and subsequent handling of) to the proposed land deal, 
Mabuza also took the opportunity to criticise other Bantustan leaders‟ propensity for 
violence: 
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As far as the proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland is 
concerned, we are of the conviction that the matter will, sooner or later, be 
resolved amicably and with dignity on the basis of the will and the wishes of 
my people and in compliance with the principle of their right to self-
determination. My people and I also cherish the hope that the RSA 
Government will be receptive to the voices of reason, moderation and reality 
as expressed by those Black leaders who believe in a South Africa that has 
room for all its peoples. I cannot, except with trepidation, contemplate the day 
when Chief the Honourable M. G. Buthelezi, Dr. the Honourable C. N. 
Phatudi and other African leaders like them, will turn back to our people and 
tell them that moderation has failed and the people should decide what should 
be done. I sincerely pray that that day will never dawn (Mabuza, 1983:10). 
Enos Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement was a cultural-political organisation, which 
suggests that he played into the hands of the South African government and, by extension, 
supported the Bantustan system which separated the black population along ethnic lines. 
Mabuza‟s opposition to the land deal has been interpreted by some to mean that he had 
become consumed by power and ambition that he could no longer submit to the authority of 
the Swazi King - become a god unto himself and that resisting the land deal was a way to 
safeguard his position of power as Bantustan leader. The reality of the situation, however, is 
that the South African authorities could have deposed him and replaced him with a more 
pliable candidate that was willing to follow orders, no be a hindrance to their plans. He could 
have lost his „power‟ either way, but he did not. 
7.7.1 Swaziland’s Claim to ‘South African’ Land 
Swaziland‟s part in the proposed land deal was based on an emotional appeal to irredentism. 
Swazi authorities alleged that Swaziland‟s borders with Ingwavuma District north of present 
day KwaZulu-Natal and KaNgwane had been at the centre of border disputes with South 
Africa since the colonial era and further back. The Transvaal (under Presidents Pretorius and 
Kruger) entered into land deals with Swaziland in July1846, 1855 and others throughout the 
1800s which, for example, gave to the inhabitants of Lydenburg District (Transvaal) or its 
government lands officially belonging to the Swazis in exchange for 70 head of cattle even 
though the king was not authorized to cede land without the approval of the nation. The 
present boundaries of Swaziland were first roughly demarcated in 1866, and were further 
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redefined by the British during their occupation of the Transvaal in 1880. The Swazi accepted 
the southern (and much of the western) boundary line but objected to the line in the north and 
north-west which cut off from Swaziland three important royal villages: Mbhuleni (in the 
Carolina district); Mjindini (near Barberton where Mabuza was born) and Mekemeke (north-
east of Barberton). A deal between Britain and the Transvaal in 1895 made Swaziland a 
protectorate of the Transvaal and the convention of 1894 protected the rights of the Swazi 
king over his subjects (Macmillan, 1989:292). Later, however, Swaziland‟s King 
(Mbandzeni) disputed the border in this area until 1889, during which time Swazi definition 
of „Swaziland‟ extended beyond Barberton to the Crocodile River in the north and along the 
upper reaches of the Komati River in the west (Macmillan, 1989:291). Following the 1899-
1902 Anglo-Boer War, Swaziland was administered as a part of the Transvaal from 1902 to 
1906. Several disputes ensued involving Swazis, Zulus and the authorities (Government of 
Natal-British) and the Boer South African Republic (Transvaal) over these land allocations. 
Theophilus Shepstone who was the Secretary for Native Affairs and Sir Garnet Wolseley 
(Governor of Natal) were involved in discussions regarding the establishment of boundaries 
between Swaziland and the Transvaal (Woodson, 1991:385-386). The redrawing of political 
boundaries which cut across the Swazi nation and put many people who traditionally owed 
allegiance to the Swazi king physically outside his kingdom planted the seeds for  
Swaziland‟s irredentist Dream which was revived rather vigorously in the 1980s (Griffiths 
and Funnell, 1991:51). 
Successive Swazi rulers (King Sobhuza I and Queen Regent Labotsibeni and council, with 
the help of J.L. Dube, Pixley Seme and Sol Plaatjie‟s South African Natives‟ National 
Congress and its publication Abantu-Batho) made concessions with the British and other 
settlers at different times in order to get back some of their land and to consolidate their 
authority which was fragmented by the land partitions (Natives Land Act of 1913, The Native 
Administration Act of 1927). Swazi authorities were desperate to counteract the subsequent 
dispersal of Swazis into the Transvaal and the Witwatersrand as “detribalised” mining and 
agricultural labour as well as what they regarded as social disintegration caused by education, 
urbanization and proletarianisation (Macmillan, 1989:299). 
In 1936, Pixley ka Seme (President of the African National Congress) wrote a letter to P. G. 
W. Grobler (Minister of Native Affairs) which was entitled “Petition of the Swazi Chiefs and 
Swazi Tribes of the Eastern Transvaal.” The letter addressed the issue of Swazi sacred lands 
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and requested the establishment of a native council for Swazis in the Transvaal (Woodson, 
1991:389).  Swaziland‟ s King Sobhuza II began voicing claims to Swazi territory in the 
Eastern Transvaal more loudly when colonial rule ended in Swaziland in 1968 and his 
argument was that he wanted re-unite the Swazis on either side of the border before he died 
(MacMillan, 1989:290). Woodson (1991:382), for example, notes the existence of a letter by 
Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II to the Native Commissioner (T. Ramsay) in Barberton (South 
Africa) in the Matsebula Collection at the University of Swaziland. The letter is dated 6 May 
1936 and in it, the king explains the traditional allegiance to him of the many ethnic Swazis 
living in bordering areas of South Africa. There is also a letter dated 28 August 1956 letter by 
King Sobhuza II to the British High Commissioner on the reversionary rights of concessions 
granted by his grandfather Mbadzeni.  
The earliest record of correspondence regarding the consolidation of the Swazi Bantustan 
(KaNgwane) is dated December 1976 in the form of a memorandum from Chief Johannes 
Mkolishi Dlamini to the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
(M. C. Botha). KaNgwane was created on 8 October 1977 and was known as AmaSwazi; a 
Bantustan for Swazis that were not incorporated into Swaziland along the border with South 
Africa. Enos Mabuza was its leader as Chief Councillor but this was not the end of 
Swaziland‟s claim. A report by David Lukhele and M. M. Nxumalo on the same KaNgwane 
issue was made in October 1977 (Woodson, 1991:390). These letters or reports were 
followed by talks between the South African government and authorities in Swaziland over 
the land deal and possible border adjustments in 1978, 1980 and several in 1982 (March, 
May, June, July, August, November and December) as well as some in 1983. There was more 
correspondence between the South African Prime Minister, the Rumpff Commission and 
Swaziland authorities (Prime Minister Bhekimpi, A. Magangeni Dlamini). On 30 August 
1983, for example, the Swazi Council of Chiefs in South Africa wrote a memo to Justice 
Rumpff regarding the “opinions of South African Swazis and their supposed desire to be 
incorporated into Swaziland.  G. I. A. Draper of the High Commission in London wrote a 
letter to Swaziland‟s Minister of Foreign Affairs (R. V. Dlamini) on 26 September 1983 
entitled “Why Ingwavuma is part of Swaziland” as part of the justification for the land deal 
(Woodson, 1991:392). Most of the correspondence emphasise the importance of a sea port to 
Ingwavuma. However, the fact remains that these talks and correspondence happened 
between a select few individuals.  
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A newspaper article by Schalk van Schalwyk in the Lowvelder (23 March 1982) tried to 
implicate Enos Mabuza in the deal by alleging that he knew about it (complicity in its design) 
as early as March 1982; instead of June 1982 when it became public knowledge following a 
Presidential Proclamation R109 (Woodson, 1991:391-392). This though has very little 
bearing on the matter because it does not prove that he was part of the discussions since the 
record shows that the claim and correspondence to that effect had been on-going since the 
mid-nineteenth century. If the allegation was true, why then would he have been so vocal in 
opposing it? It is not inconceivable that as the leader of KaNgwane, Enos Mabuza would 
have eventually heard about the deal, regardless of whether he was consulted about it or not, 
which he was not because the deal was partly designed to ambush and undermine his 
authority as KaNgwane‟s leader.  
The land deal was characterised by secrecy and its blatantly undemocratic nature (non-
consultative). For South Africa, the deal was meant to ensure Swaziland‟s acquiescence to a 
mutual non-aggression pact which was secretly signed in February 1982. Important 
pronouncements about it were made belatedly (deliberately after the fact) to prevent 
contestation by affected parties. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in Ulundi was notified 
about Proclamation R109 on 14 June 1982 (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259) and South 
Africa‟s intention of transferring KaNgwane and Ingwavuma district to Swaziland became 
public knowledge on June 18 1982 when the South African president, through the minister 
responsible for Bantustan development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, issued Proclamation R109 in the 
South African Government Gazette to announce the sudden abolition of KaNgwane‟s forty-
two member Legislative Assembly and the excision of Ingwavuma from the KwaZulu 
Bantustan. KaNgwane and Ingwavuma were placed under the direct control of the 
Department of Cooperation and Development with the intention of incorporating them into 
Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). KaNgwane‟s nominal self-rule status 
and Enos Mabuza‟s position as Executive Counsellor were suspended for a period of six 
months between 18 June and 9 December 1982 during which time an administrator (N.J. 
Badenhorst) was appointed to run its affairs.  KaNgwane‟s government offices in Louieville 
were locked and Mabuza‟s government was barred from getting on the premises and the 
Bantustan‟s budget for various projects was drastically reduced in a bid to force its 
submission. Based on these arrangements, Swaziland would accept South African citizens as 
its own. On 20 June1982, the Swaziland government welcomed South Africa‟s offer and 
agreed to receive the new citizens (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:51 & 61). However, it was the 
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traditional and authoritarian rulers in Swaziland that dealt alone with South Africa‟s white 
minority regime to decide the fate of the affected lands and their people. 
The Swazi people of KaNgwane are subjects of the King of Swaziland, whilst also citizens of 
South Africa. The seeming contradiction or overlap of jurisdiction led Swaziland‟s King 
Sobhuza II to actively promote the deal by using tradition and history to persuade ordinary 
Swazis to support Swaziland‟s claim. Swazis on the South African side of the Swazi border 
in the districts of Barberton, Carolina, Ermelo, Piet Retief, and Wakkerstroom maintained 
close contact with the royal house in Swaziland and regarded themselves as loyal subjects of 
the Swazi king, even though excessive land partition and high taxation was the reason why 
many Swazis (from Swaziland) had been forced into migrant labour on the Witwatersrand 
(Macmillan, 1989:294). Despite this, however, the alienation of South African Swazis under 
apartheid strengthened their allegiance to the Swazi king. King Sobhuza had a particularly 
powerful influence on the Swazis who lived in the Barberton sector (Nkomazi) of KaNgwane 
such that chiefs and other leaders in these areas reportedly sent delegations to Swaziland in 
1980 and 1981 to enlist King Sobhuza‟s help in forestalling future talks about KaNgwane 
becoming independent (based on the consolidation proposals of 1975). According to Griffiths 
and Funnell (1991:57), these leaders were unsettled by the creation of the KaNgwane 
Bantustan as a psuedo-state with its own political institutions, which in their view threatened 
their traditional allegiances with the Swazi king. These deputations to Sobhuza helped to 
fortify his resolve in pursuing the land deal but it is uncertain what popular opinion (ordinary 
people‟s views) was since the delegations were not comprised of elected representatives but 
traditional leaders. Enough pressure was put on the people such that many Swazis in 
Swaziland and KaNgwane ended up supporting the deal and its justification and aligning 
themselves with the king on the matter. It is important to note, however, that Swaziland‟s 
claim to the territories was only officially made public in Swaziland in August 1982; several 
months after the South African authorities had issued the June Proclamation R109 which 
ceded KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52 & 56).  
The Territories to be Transferred 
KaNgwane had an initial population of 125 000 but, according to Holden and Mathabatha 
(2007:259), from its inception, the South African government was unconcerned about the 
welfare of KaNgwane‟s population and was also wary of the political position of Enos 
Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement. Three separate parcels of land were to be 
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transferred to Swaziland in the proposed Swazi land deal; Ingwavuma district in KwaZulu 
and Nsikazi and Nkomazi in KaNgwane. The deal would have given King Sobhuza not just 
the Swazi citizens of South Africa but also KaNgwane‟s land and other resources which 
would have relieved some pressure off Swaziland‟s own (Ginindza, Interview, June 2007). At 
the time of the 1975 Bantustans consolidation proposals, KaNgwane consisted of two tracts 
of land in the eastern Transvaal. One was contiguous with Swaziland (Nkomazi) and one 
(Nsikazi) was separate from it to the north of the Delagoa Bay railway. The two KaNgwane 
areas had a combined surface area of about 1000 square miles. The 1975 consolidation 
proposals intended that KaNgwane would become one land mass by enlarging Nkomazi 
through the addition to it of Mswati and the removal to that area of people living in detached 
Nsikazi. KaNgwane was enlarged in 1976 by extending the land contiguous with and 
immediately north of Swaziland to include the barren highveld area of Mswati but Nsikazi 
remained part of KaNgwane such that the total land allocated to KaNgwane increased to 385 
000 hectares from the 208 735 hectares that it was in 1973 (the difference is presumably the 
area of Mswati). The de facto population of KaNgwane increased from about 100 000 in 
1970 to about 300 000 in 1982 because of the South African government‟s policy of forced 
relocation of black people from nominally „white‟ areas (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52; 
Macmillan, 1989:289).  
Ingwavuma District lies north of present day KwaZulu-Natal and east of southern Swaziland 
between the Lebombo Mountains and the sea. Ingwavuma is approximately 413 200 hectares 
and its Indian Ocean coastline includes the potential port of Kosi Bay. The Swazi authorities 
argued that they had never agreed to the various conventions which established borders 
between Swaziland and South Africa and that these boundaries had been unilaterally imposed 
on them by the South African government. They noted that the incorporation of Ingwavuma 
into KwaZulu in 1976 was based on the Tomlinson Commission Report regarding the 
“possible consolidation of Bantu Areas based on ethnic grouping” (Griffiths and Funnell, 
1991:57). Further, people living in Ingwavuma traditionally owed allegiance to the Swazi 
king, for instance, chiefs in the western part of Ingwavuma pay allegiance to the Swazi king. 
The map below indicates the three separate land masses which comprised KaNgwane and 
Ingwavuma which were at the centre of the controversial Swazi land deal. 
Page | 241 
 
What South African and Swazi Authorities Stood to Gain from the Land Deal 
The examples of ethnicity being used to oppress other groups cited above have a theoretical 
bearing on the Swazi land deal because they constitute instances where the particular 
societies had to rethink or analyse the meaning and value of citizenship. In the KaNgwane 
case, South African Swazis had inter-married with other groups over the years since the 
disputed boundaries which were the pretext of the deal were set and such people, for instance, 
had a right to stay in South Africa with their families instead of being parcelled off to 
Swaziland based on a deal that the two countries‟ authorities made in a clandestinely. 
One of the many tricks of the apartheid government was to try and make deals and pacts with 
different groups to weaken their resolve. Its divisive aggression was not confined to South 
Africa alone but was also targeted at the Frontline States – Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. Prime Minister Botha was trying to cajole 
these states into signing non-aggression pacts to have the ANC and other liberation 
organisations such as SWAPO of Namibia uprooted and expelled from their territories or face 
the wrath of Pretoria in the form of political and military destabilisation as well as economic 
sabotage. All this was happening in spite of the fact that African nationalism has a myriad of 
historic, cultural and structural bonds. An example of this is the fact that Samora Machel and 
FRELIMO of Mozambique were the ANC‟s Marxist-Leninist ally until the signing of the 
1984 Nkomati Accord. The ANC and Swazi elites (and even workers) also had a close link. 
According to Limb (1992), the Swazi monarchy took part in the founding of the ANC in 
1912 and Swaziland‟s Queen Regent Labotsibeni provided the capital for the launching of the 
Congress' newspaper, Abantu-Batho. The position of Swaziland (surrounded by South 
Africa) offered strategic entry points for ANC operatives because it was within good striking 
distance of South Africa‟s military-industrial-complex which was concentrated around 
Johannesburg. Many ANC aligned South Africans were in exile in Swaziland; studying or 
working there in the mid 1970s and King Sobhuza II had promised the ANC‟s Oliver Tambo 
that he would shield the ANC from South African security forces. Swaziland was also in 
good proximity to Natal and the Transvaal where the ANC was re-establishing underground 
networks in the 1970s (Gevisser, 2007:341-353). Natal, for example, was a major centre for 
anti-apartheid resistance inside South Africa. It was the home of Black Consciousness and the 
radical labour movement, as well as the KwaZulu leader (Chief Buthelezi) with whom the 
ANC had a tumultuous relationship but enjoyed a détente-type truce at the time (Gevisser, 
2007:316). 
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Callinicos (2004:517) notes that Swaziland‟s King Sobhuza II considered himself a member 
of the ANC because the Queen Regent Labotsubeni had inducted him into the party or 
movement when he assumed the throne yet Swaziland was the first country to enter an 
agreement with the South African government to thwart the efforts of the ANC. King 
Sobhuza was conflicted in his arrangements with the ANC and the South African government 
because he was indebted to South African authorities because Swaziland‟s economy was 
inextricably linked to South Africa‟s and Pretoria had carte blanche in many Swazi affairs, 
including control of the Swazi police (Gevisser, 2007:341-353). The South African 
government adopted a carrots and sticks approach to dealing with Swazi authorities and 
alternated between threatening and seducing them and for this reason; the ANC did not put 
all its trust in King Sobhuza (Gevisser, 2007:342-343). ANC operatives in Swaziland 
included Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, Joseph Mdluli, Cleopas Ndlovu and Albert Dhlomo 
who were arrested in Swaziland in 1976. From then on, relations between Swaziland and the 
ANC became increasingly hostile, repressive and often violent in the1980s (Mzizi, 2005; 
Limb, 1992). On 17 December 1982, up to 100 ANC members were detained in Swaziland 
when a large cache of arms was „found‟ in the north of the country and the arrests were 
confirmed by the Swaziland Police Commissioner. Again on 2 January 1983 several ANC 
members were detained in Swaziland. Another group of about seventeen ANC members left 
Mawelawela refugee camp near Mbabane fearing a South African attack. Gevisser notes that 
incidents like these led ANC/MK leaders like Moses Mabhida and Thomas Nkobi to describe 
the Swazi king as highly “capricious” (Gevisser, 2007:341-353) and eventually, the ANC left 
Swaziland for Mozambique.  
The ANC needed alternative strategies to counteract the one outlined above and Enos 
Mabuza became a valuable ally. Holden and Mathabatha (2007: 259) note that as Chief 
Minister of KaNgwane, “Enos Mabuza saw his role as using the Bantustan structures to 
protect those under his control while simultaneously agitating for broader democratic rights 
and the destruction of the homeland system.”  His government assisted the ANC‟s 
underground MK operations by providing safe shelter and intelligence/information when they 
came to or left South Africa from bases in Swaziland and Mozambique (a transit area for 
political activists). Mabuza‟s important contribution in this regard was to give cover to the 
ANC so that it could come and go undetected by South African security forces. However, the 
security forces eventually caught wind of these goings-ons and wanted to put an end to them. 
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Although it was never publicly admitted, the land deal was widely believed to have been used 
as bait by the South African authorities to woe Swaziland to a security deal in which it would 
assist the SADF to establish bases in Swaziland and to do counter-intelligence work 
(surveillance with the aim of neutralising ANC operatives) in Swaziland to track down ANC 
operatives working in Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). Ginindza (2007) 
agrees that the land deal and the expulsion of the KaNgwane Bantustan from South Africa 
was devised as part of a military strategy to block ANC activities; a fool-proof way of taking 
care of several problems with one stroke of a pen, including ensuring that Mabuza would no 
longer be a thorn in Pretoria‟s side. The land deal was, by and large, designed for mutual 
gain, although not necessarily equally. It was a secret quid pro quo arrangement between 
Swaziland and South Africa, although for the most part, it was initiated and manipulated by 
South African authorities to their own ends when it seemed opportune to do so. The land deal 
was merely a means to an end (the carrot or inducement) for the South African government. 
Swazi and South African authorities (Foreign Minister Roelof „Pik‟ Botha) secretly signed a 
non-aggression or security pact on 17 February 1982. The ANC had been operating from 
Swaziland and Mozambique and part of the deal was that Swaziland would expel the ANC in 
accordance with cooperative plans to prevent terrorist incursions into South Africa. The 
subversion of KaNgwane‟s leadership (Mabuza and his cabinet in allowing ANC activities in 
their area of jurisdiction) would have been neutralised permanently, by elimination or 
dissolution of the KaNgwane Bantustan. Ingwavuma was included in the arrangement in 
order to create a buffer between South Africa and Mozambique which had given the ANC an 
operational base (military strategy to neutralise the security threat). The proposed land deal 
was a form of compensation, sign of goodwill or simply payment for Swaziland‟s geniality.  
The arrangement was initiated by South Africa and this established it as the steering force 
behind the deal, which was partly a reflection of Swaziland‟s dependence on the South 
African economy (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:56; Macmillan, 1989:290). 
The Swazi ethnic group has Nguni, Sotho and Tsonga elements and KaNgwane was not 
homogenous but comprised of Swazi, Shangaan-Tsonga, Zulu and Northern Sotho ethnic 
groups. The South African government tried to manipulate ethnic identity in order to force 
KaNgwane out of South Africa and into Swaziland in terms of Swaziland‟s historical claim to 
South African land. It Officials from Pretoria (the Minister of Cooperation and Development, 
Dr Koornhof, and others) travelled to KaNgwane a few times to address the leaders and 
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convince them that they should accept the land deal. Memorandums were also sent which 
stated that King Sobhuza was anxious that the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland 
take happen as soon as possible because he was already very old and frail and wanted to see it 
done in his lifetime (Ginindza, 2007). According to census figures, there were 786,835 
people described as „Swazi‟ in South Africa in 1980 and about one third of them lived in 
KaNgwane. About eighty percent of KaNgwane‟s population was described as „Swazi‟ and 
the remainder as „Shangaan‟ (Tsonga), Zulu or Sotho. Some Swazi also lived under their own 
chiefs in the Lebowa Bantustan but the majority of those outside KaNgwane remained settled 
in the towns, on farms, and in so-called „black spots‟ within „white‟ South Africa. Many lived 
on the Witwatersrand, quite far removed from the influence of Swazi language and culture 
(Macmillan, 1989:289).  
The South African government presented the land deal as a way for South Africa to make 
amends for past injustices. Dr. Koornbof defended the proposed border adjustment as a step 
towards the fulfilment of a long-cherished Dream of the Swazi people to be united under one 
king in one country. However, it later became clear that the South African authorities did not 
support the claim for historical reasons but for something more sinister. It was a deliberate 
public relations exercise for the South African Authorities who wanted to win the hearts and 
minds of as many people as possible in order to undermine the struggle (destabilise the 
region). Swaziland had a population of about 650 000 and would have absorbed about one 
million people (854 000 people from KaNgwane‟s de facto and de jure Swazi population as 
well as its non-Swazi component) and 96 000 more from KwaZulu‟s sparsely populated 
Ingwavuma region. The handing-over of South African citizens to Swaziland would have 
almost trebled Swaziland‟s population (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:52 & 54). The land deal 
would have allowed South African authorities to dispose of one Bantustan, thus simplifying 
the design of grand apartheid because there would have been less people to deal with or 
contain inside South Africa as the struggle gained momentum in the 1980s. 
Swazi crackdown on ANC activities in Swaziland began in 1982 with the effect of crippling 
ANC activities in that country (Grundy, 1986:82). Bilateral non-aggression pacts between SA 
and the four independent Bantustans as well as with neighbouring countries like Swaziland 
and Mozambique were designed to create a strategic constellation of buffer states (Dominy, 
1986:71- 92; Kloppers, 2005). The Venda and Gazankulu Bantustans, for example, provided 
a line of defence from insurgence, terrorism, subversion and hostile actions from ANC bases 
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in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and South African authorities removed people there to create 
a strip of South African land which it could directly control and thus secure the borders 
(Grundy, 1986:78). Parts of KaNgwane were adjacent to the Mozambique and Swaziland 
borders. Swaziland was a pawn in a bigger game and this is evidenced by the fact that the 
Swazi land deal was shelved or abandoned indefinitely once South Africa and Mozambique 
signed an alternative security pact in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord, like the agreement 
with Swaziland before it, also stipulated the expulsion of the ANC/MK members, including 
Joe Slovo (head of Special Operations), from Mozambique (Callinicos, 2004:517). There was 
considerably less fuss (media, judicial and political contention) around the Nkomati Accord 
and it rendered the Swazi land deal irrelevant (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55; Grundy 
1986:71-87). 
The land deal was acceptable to Swazi authorities for three main reasons. Firstly, it served to 
crystallise Swazi irredentist claims which are outlined below. It would also have given 
landlocked Swaziland a seaboard in the process. Secondly, the proposal satisfied economic 
interests closely associated with the power base of the traditional rulers (the 
monarchy/royalty and senior chiefs) in their bid to consolidate their power since 
independence. Swaziland‟s economy is predominantly agrarian such that although some of its 
citizens have wage employment, they also retain usufruct rights over land because the 
number of jobs created by the economy is significantly less than the number of people 
entering the job market. Demand for land was compounded by the fact that there was no new 
land to absorb young families such that natural population growth was putting more pressure 
on available land and resources (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55). Further, whites in 
Swaziland were a wealthy middle class of landowners and entrepreneurs who dominated the 
economy (Kuper, 1973:362) and King Sobhuza had grown to understand the value of 
political stability, patronage and the removal of unpleasant restrictions in order to attract 
investment (Kuper, 1973:364). For this reason, according to Woodson (1991: 396) King 
Sobhuza II did not support sanctions against South Africa and even wrote letters to the 
United Nations imploring them not to impose sanctions on his ally, South Africa. King 
Sobhuza II ruled through a palace clique for the benefit of South African investors who were 
involved in Swaziland‟s mining sector. Wealth was created for foreign investors and a small 
local elite but the wealth thus generated had little impact on the lives of ordinary Swazis even 
though Swaziland had become an established tourist paradise for wealthy South African 
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whites by the early 1970s (Martin, 1975:66). This situation was beginning to create fractures 
and dividing public opinion, thus threatening aristocratic rule and political stability.  
Thirdly, politics in Swaziland can be described as cultural nationalism because the small 
kingdom has one numerically and politically dominant group (Swazis) such that the 
traditional leaders (the king and chiefs) use cultural identity as a symbol of national unity 
(Kuper, 1973:358). Consequently, cultural nationalism was an obvious avenue for the 
expression of political nationalism. The land deal corresponded with the political interests of 
the ruling monarchy in that it provided an opportunity for the Swazi government to “rid itself 
of undesirable elements” which were part of the struggle for change in South Africa. 
Swaziland is a non-party state such that political groupings including the Ngwane National 
Liberatory Congress (NNLC) and the People‟s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) 
operate illegally (underground). The NNLC was founded on 12 April, 1963 as a pan-
Africanist party whose objective was to liberate Swazis from colonial oppression until 
Swaziland was granted independence by Britain in 1968. Today, the organisation fights 
against Swaziland‟s monarchist regime which refuses to consider multi-party democratic 
politics in Swaziland. The NNLC played a prominent role in large-scale strikes by sugar, 
wood, asbestos and other workers in response to rising unemployment and the freezing of 
wages (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). It draws support from Swaziland‟s peasants, youth, 
intelligentsia and other disadvantaged groups and strives for equity whilst promoting the 
participation of the youth in party affairs (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). The advocacy of such 
organisations for radical change in Swaziland‟s political and economic structures was 
threatening the Monarchy‟s legitimacy. The land deal and the concomitant changes in 
Swaziland‟s socio-political landscape were one way to derail this agitation of ordinary 
Swazis into questioning the monarchy‟s prerogative to rule. The monarchy needed to divert 
the people‟s attention away from radical thinking by emphasising culture and heritage as the 
central issue behind the land deal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:56). 
7.7.2 Mabuza Defies Swaziland and South African Authorities 
This section considers whether Enos Mabuza wantonly antagonised King Sobhuza II or if 
there was a real case to be made on behalf of those that were powerless to act against the 
heavy-handedness of Swazi and South African authorities in this deal which was a 
euphemism or pretext for a more sinister goal; the deportation of KaNgwane‟s South African 
Swazi population (treated as aliens) to fragment the struggle by appealing to ethnic identity 
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instead of a common South African identity or citizenship. Enos Mabuza was not ambivalent 
about his Swazi heritage. According to his family (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007; 
Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007) and friends, he did not try to disguise his Swazi-ness 
to make it convenient or easier for him to be a South African. He was proud of his identity, 
embraced and celebrated it. KaNgwane‟s ruling Inyandza National Movement which Mabuza 
led was formed in 1978 and had a strong Swazi cultural or traditional element similar to that 
of Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha Cultural Movement in KwaZulu (Macmillan, 1989; Elias 
Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007).  The majority of Inyandza‟s members, including Elias 
Ginindza, were also proudly Swazi but opposed the incorporation on principle because of the 
manner in which the South African government tried to force the issue without consulting the 
people that would be directly and negatively affected by it (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 
2007). The fact that KaNgwane‟s ruling party capitalised on cultural appeal was partly the 
result of the ethnic based Bantustan system but the leaders were unequivocal about wanting 
to be South African citizens with full rights, even though they had family in Swaziland and 
visited them often. According to Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007), Swaziland‟s King 
Sobhuza and Enos Mabuza were fairly close and Mabuza used to attend annual Swazi 
cultural events and ceremonies at the king‟s court in full traditional Swazi clothing. Mabuza 
was a member of one of the king‟s regiments, respected tradition and the Swazi chiefs despite 
being educated. However, Ginindza (2007) argues that King Sobhuza mistook this 
celebration of Swazi identity or “bukhosi” („kinship‟) for unquestioning loyalty on Mabuza‟s 
part. King Sobhuza tried to influence Mabuza into accepting or supporting the land deal by 
appealing to tradition (the Tibiyo structure, the Tinkundla councils) and national images to 
reinforce traditional hierarchies and respect for the king, the tribute system and other 
obligations. The king reminded Mabuza that he was a Swazi and was expected, therefore, to 
support any proposal which would unite all Swazis under one king. 
Swaziland is based on the model of a tributary state under royal Dlamini leadership and 
national rituals such as the ncwala (a first fruits ceremony) are observed annually. The land 
deal was conveniently presented as a question of nationhood and ethnicity which was based 
on a known and legitimate historical claim by Swaziland, although it was not necessarily 
accepted by South Africa. The perception or feeling created around the land deal was that its 
success would affirm the KaNgwane people‟s Swazi roots, birthright and ultimately defend 
their cultural integrity, regardless of whether or not they had a say in the matter (Esther 
Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007). Bourdieu comments that: 
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Culture is a stake, which, like all social stakes, simultaneously presupposes 
and demands that one take part in the game and be taken in by it, and interest 
in culture, without which there is no race, no competition, is produced by the 
very race and competition which it produces. The value of culture, the 
supreme fetish, is generated in the initial investment implied by the mere fact 
of entering the game (Bourdieu, 1984: 250). 
This assessment of social interaction suggests that Enos Mabuza‟s position regarding the land 
deal was not entirely selfless but partly driven by a need to protect his position and privilege 
but the significance of his actions should not be disregarded out of hand even though the 
whole truth might never be known. 
American debates over immigration and citizenship mentioned above are relevant to the 
Swazi land deal because the meaning or significance of human existence is comprised of 
many things. Individuals are not only defined by their ethnicity (which is a form of group 
identity) because an individual‟s past and present experiences are an important part of who 
they are, for example, professional, occupational or class loyalties. Furthermore, commitment 
to a state and its laws (citizenship) transcends ethnicity and often has nothing to do with 
birthright but circumstance (refugees, exiles) or choice (immigration). However, according to 
De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1975:376), ethnicity retains certain instrumental and 
expressive uses which the individual manipulates on both a psychological and social level. 
Several power bases were entwined in the Swazi land deal and each had its own self-
authorising justifications for what was unfolding.  
Rational choice theory is normative insofar as it helps individuals to decide what they ought 
to do (bargain, cooperate, collaborate or compromise with different stakeholders) to achieve 
their aims.  In order for action to be considered rational, there has to exist a desire for 
something else (cost/benefit/utility) and this precipitates the notion of strategy and 
competition in the pursuit of identified goals (Hoffman, 1995:105-8). Apartheid policies were 
decidedly under-handed and unjust and the Swazi land deal was no different. In terms of the 
failed Swazi land deal or incorporation debacle, being Swazi was not the consideration or 
essence of their being although most people in KaNgwane shared the same beliefs, values 
and social practices. KaNgwane was comprised of mostly Swazis but the notion of a Swazi 
identity gives a false sense of homogeneity; yet when reduced, the group is still comprised of 
individuals who did not have the same goals or visions for the future.  
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As a Bantustan leader, Enos Mabuza might have played into the ethnic identity trap to some 
degree since most organisations and leaders did so at some point because the scene had 
already been set through apartheid intervention and manipulation. His handling of the land 
deal, however, is quite contrary to this view of him and his intentions in joining Bantustan 
politics. Most Bantustan leaders argued that they were not sell-outs but that they were using 
the space granted to them by the system to protect their people but their actions proved the 
opposite in many instances. The Swazi land deal presented an opportunity for Mabuza to 
prove himself as far as this argument was concerned and his response to it won the respect of 
many people. Mabuza was not the only one to benefit from the failure of the land deal 
because the civil or class action case which he brought against the South African government 
eventually benefited all the Swazis of the former KaNgwane Bantustan who are now South 
African citizens, with the option to renounce it at their discretion if they so choose. 
Mabuza and his party‟s position (Inyandza National Movement) was that the apartheid 
government could not make a decision like the land deal unilaterally on behalf of the Swazis 
in South Africa/KaNgwane without consulting them. The deal amounted to forced 
displacement, on the heels of the forced removals that characterised the way in which the 
African population was herded into the Bantustans in the first instance.  Mabuza‟s opposition 
to the deal was on several fronts and his handling of the situation demonstrated his ability and 
strength as a leader. It was no secret that King Sobhuza was old and frail and a power 
struggle (jockeying for position) was brewing in anticipation of a possible power vacuum 
after his death and this made Mabuza‟s response to the land deal all the more shrewd and 
courageous. The fear of punitive action was a very real issue for potential dissenters during 
Botha‟s reign of terror and sceptics may very well have been considered Mabuza‟s challenge 
to the land deal delusional wishful thinking against determined, powerful and hostile forces. 
However, Mabuza was within his rights to oppose the land deal as an individual although it 
raises the question of whether or not he imposed his (supported by some) preference on the 
rest of the KaNgwane people in much the same way that King Sobhuza and the South African 
authorities were imposing the land deal on them.  
Disagreements and divisions over the Swazi land deal proved that neither skin colour nor 
common oppression alone provides sufficient bond for group solidarity. The result was a rift 
between intellectual reasoning by the educated, including Mabuza, who opposed the deal and 
the emotional response and reality of people at the grassroots who did not believe that there 
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was anything to be gained from defending their South African citizenship when their status 
(with such citizenship) meant that they were discriminated and denied rights and subjected to 
violence on a regular basis. However, Swaziland is ruled by a monarchy which is not best 
known for upholding democratic values. Instead, it has a tendency to conflate political issues 
with Swazi culture and considers strikes and trade unionism to be un-Swazi (Mzizi, 2005; 
Limb, 1992). Many Swazis were illiterate and the education system was heavily censored to 
control political education and other topics that might turn people against the monarchy or 
„the Swazi way of life‟ (Mzizi, 2005; Limb, 1992). KaNgwane‟s Swazi population stood a 
better chance of accessing land and finding jobs within South Africa‟s own restricted political 
and social milieu given the population and employment problems that existed (still exist) in 
Swaziland. 
Mabuza‟s response to the heavy-handedness of the apartheid state was to use the legal 
resources of KaNgwane (his government) and the Inyandza National Movement which he led 
to contest the land deal (Proclamation R109 which ceded KaNgwane to Swaziland) in the 
Supreme Court, in particular Proclamation R109 which ceded KaNgwane to Swaziland 
(Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). Mabuza and Inyandza‟s resolve was strengthened when 
the state tried to shut them down by dissolving the cabinet. Mabuza and others held meetings 
to mobilise people to resist the incorporation and enlisted the services of individuals such as 
Professor John Dugard who specialises in International Law and is an Honorary Professorial 
Research Fellow at the University of the Witwatersrand Centre for Applied Legal Studies and 
founding editor of the South African Journal of Human Rights (SAJHR). 
De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1975:385) note that maintaining one‟s individual identity 
within one‟s own social (class, ethnic etc) group may be a disadvantage to the individual 
when they pursue certain goals although the opposite is also true that group support can be 
beneficial in the cooperative or competitive realisation of goals. Either way, compromise is 
involved in which part of the individual identity is sacrificed. The perception or feeling 
created around the land deal was that its success would affirm the KaNgwane people‟s Swazi 
roots, birthright and ultimately defend their cultural integrity, regardless of whether or not 
they had a say in the matter. 
Mabuza objected to the abolition of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and demanded a 
referendum of the people of KaNgwane to give them an opportunity to weigh their options 
and choose their own fate but the South African government repeatedly turned down the 
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request for a referendum and ignored Mabuza‟s objections to the abolition of the KaNgwane 
Legislative Assembly. Griffiths and Funnell (1991:62) believe that, as chief Minister, 
Mabuza had an obvious axe to grind in opposing the deal because it threatened his own 
power and position, whilst offering important and lucrative gains (leadership positions) for 
the ambitious in the administration of these territories once the hand-over was finalised.  
Fractures began to show in the Inyandza National Movement as debate and differences in 
opinion over the land deal took centre stage (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007) and in 
desperation, Mabuza applied to the Pretoria Supreme Court for return of the administration of 
KaNgwane to the tribal authorities, in essence offering to forfeit his own position as leader of 
the KaNgwane administration, in the hope that if Swazi traditional authorities were pacified, 
they might abandon the idea of „re-unification‟ with Swaziland and thus keep KaNgwane 
within South Africa‟s borders. 
David Lukhele was one person who was won over by the arguments of the South African 
authorities and he was very angry when Mabuza rejected the land deal. Lukhele argued that 
the incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland was the right thing to do if King Sobhuza 
wanted it because there was only one Swazi king. Lukhele managed to win over several 
Swazi chiefs on based on an appeal to ethnic identity. He accused Mabuza of deliberately 
wanting to usurp or replace the Swazi king and dividing the people‟s loyalties (Ginindza, 
Interview, June 2007). Lukhele was a former KaNgwane cabinet minister and member of 
KaNgwane‟s ruling Inyandza National Movement that turned out to be the most outspoken 
supporter of the deal in KaNgwane. Lukhele had been removed from KaNgwane‟s cabinet 
and quit Mabuza‟s Inyandza Movement in protest to form his own movement called Inyantsi, 
whose sole purpose was to antagonise Mabuza‟s government. The South African government 
allegedly send Lukhele on several missions to Swaziland to iron out the details of the land 
deal and he was later assassinated by the ANC (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007; 
Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007; Ginindza, Interview, 2007). The impasse around the 
land deal created serious tensions in KaNgwane but Mabuza advised against violence and 
retaliation. His conviction that the land deal was unfair and unjust, along with the support 
granted him by the 100 000 strong Inyandza National Movement which he led, “ensured that 
KaNgwane avoided much of the violence that was endemic to most homelands” (Holden and 
Mathabatha, 2007:259). 
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Mabuza wrote several letters to the British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher who took up the 
issue with Prime Minister P. W. Botha (Claassens, 1991). The Prime Minister (Pieter Willem 
(Pik) Botha) temporarily relented and denied that he was going to reconvene parliament to 
deal with this crisis. However, he did not rule out the possibility that this option would be 
explored at a later date. Mabuza travelled overseas to countries such as Canada and Germany 
to lobby support within influential international networks to prevent the incorporation of 
KaNgwane into Swaziland and this caused an international outcry which ultimately 
embarrassed the South African government into conceding defeat, thereby preventing the 
incorporation of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma into Swaziland. The case was taken to 
international courts since South Africa was a signatory to several binding treaties and accords 
which this decision or act violated (Sandile Mabuza, Interview, 5 June 2007).  
Towards the end of the year (25 November 1982), KaNgwane‟s leaders scored their first 
victory. After papers were presented to the Supreme Court against the South African 
government‟s attempts to transfer KaNgwane to Swaziland, the South African government 
approached KaNgwane‟ leaders and reached an out-of-court settlement in which Piet 
Koornhof announced that the June 1982 Proclamation R109 which had dissolved the 
Legislative Assembly of KaNgwane was rescinded and the legal costs incurred by KaNgwane 
were borne by the South African government. As a result of the settlement, Mabuza withdrew 
his application to the Pretoria Supreme Court for return of the administration of KaNgwane to 
the tribal authorities. Mabuza was reinstated as Chief Executive Councillor of KaNgwane and 
this putt to rest the South African government‟s seemingly ingenious plan (Holden and 
Mathabatha, 2007:259).  
The African National Congress‟ president O.R. Tambo gave a speech on 8 January 1983 on 
behalf of the organisation‟s National Executive Committee to mark the 71st anniversary of the 
African National Congress. The injustice of the Swazi land deal (the ceding of Ingwavuma 
and KaNgwane to Swaziland) was mentioned in this speech and the ANC president urged all 
the people to oppose attempts by the apartheid regime to deprive them of their South African 
citizenship. Tambo acknowledged Mabuza‟s help to the ANC which was operating under 
difficult conditions of illegality and police surveillance. Mabuza risked arrest and persecution 
by the security forces and this speech was encouragement for him to „keep fighting the good 
fight‟ in a sense (Tambo, 1983). 
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In January 1983 KaNgwane‟s leaders celebrated this victory with more than 5 000 residents 
who flocked to a stadium in Nelspruit for feasting and dancing. Mabuza addressed the crowd 
praising the efforts of local and international resistance parties and vowed to maintain 
KaNgwane‟s borders. The evidence acquired during the Rumpff Commission cemented the 
victory in the Supreme Court. Although the Commission was later dissolved, the evidence 
collected from various sources (including Punt Janson, the former commissioner-general of 
KaNgwane) sent the clear message to Pretoria that KaNgwane residents were opposed to 
their forcible incorporation into Swaziland (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259-260). 
Surprisingly though, Pretoria seemed to heed the message and the legal implications of the 
deal and in damage limitation mode, agreed to establish an Commission of Inquiry which 
would be chaired by Chief Justice Rumpff (the Rumpff Commission). The Commission was 
to investigate and report on the full circumstances surrounding the Swazi land deal and the 
conflicting claims between KaNgwane, KwaZulu (Ingwavuma) and Swaziland. It was 
expected to explain the inclusion of non-Swazi Ingwavuma in the deal as well as to assess the 
possibility of future land transfers (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). According to 
Woodson (1991:392), KaNgwane‟s Executive Council sent a confidential report to the Van 
der Walt Commission regarding the settlement of South African Swazis (defending or 
explaining how KaNgwane came into existence) on 20 November 1983 just to cement the 
conclusions of the Rumpff Commission. 
Ginindza (2007) acknowledges that there were definitely Swazis in KaNgwane who 
supported the land deal because of the historical link to Swaziland. These were mainly the 
elderly and other traditionalists and conservative royalists who were close to the monarchy 
and were convinced that the land deal was a good idea. However, KaNgwane‟s Bantustan 
authorities, together with a significant number of Swazis in KaNgwane who were concerned 
about losing their rights as South African citizens, especially the right to work in South 
Africa, opposed the deal despite this (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:61). Ginindza and Mabuza 
were among those who wanted to protect their South African citizenship and their families 
both still live in KaNyamazane/Louisville in the former KaNgwane Bantustan. King Sobhuza 
II died at age 83 at the height of the land deal fiasco and many Swazis from KaNgwane 
attended his funeral in Swaziland. However, loyalty to the king was not enough to make them 
want to renounce their South African citizenship even though KaNgwane was one of the 
poorest of South Africa‟s ten Bantustans.  
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Part of Mabuza‟s strategy in opposing the Swazi land deal was to consciously engage in 
media politics in order to communicate to a global audience what was happening to 
KaNgwane. According to Thorn, (2007:896-918), this strategy of lobbying world leaders and 
representatives of various global civil society groups across national borders was one of the 
pillars of the anti-apartheid struggle. The travels of ANC leaders abroad was an important 
conduit for information and a way of influencing views and global opinion by utilising or 
creating alternative and independent platforms whilst also circumventing banning orders and 
censorship laws in South Africa. Mabuza articulated his grievances about the Swazi land 
deal, mobilised public opinion overseas in countries like Germany, Canada and the United 
States which he visited to solicit support for his opposition to the deal. Giving the crisis a 
global dimension exposed the machinations of the apartheid state - emphasising the plight 
and injustice that would be suffered by the people of KaNgwane if the deal was successful. 
His visibility in the international public sphere during this crisis not only helped in its 
resolution but also earned him empathetic ears, admirers and valuable contacts in his bid to 
distinguish himself from other Bantustan leaders and putting himself on the political map (so 
to speak) in a more favourable light by championing the rights of the oppressed. 
The deal would have involved significant boundary changes since large tracts of South 
African territory would have been transferred to Swaziland and the courts ultimately declared 
that the land deal was illegal despite the documented Swazi historical claim to South African 
land adjacent to the Swaziland border. At first glance, the deal seemed justified reason 
(albeit, only part of it) but the courts could not ignore public international law with regards to 
the acquisition of territory and redrawing of borders or the wanton re-assignment of 
citizenship in the modern age. Mabuza could easily have accepted the land deal as an order 
from above (the logic that Buthelezi used to wash his hands of the proposed Driefontein and 
KwaNgema removals) but he did not, which brought him in confrontation with Pretoria and 
ultimately lost him favour. Instituting civil claims for damages is a challenge to the existing 
balance of power and making the case public gave Mabuza some power or advantage, yet he 
did not try to bargain to get something to benefit only himself out of the proposed Swazi land 
deal. Instead, he sought the support of the legal fraternity in a defensive action to prevent 
further dispossession by the state through the incorporation of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma 
into Swaziland. He made contacts with influential people and conducted community meetings 
to discuss the case. The case and subsequent publicised protest became high profile and cost 
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the government financially and in terms of its image, particularly the Department of Foreign 
Affairs dearly. 
7.7.3 Opposition to the Swazi Land Deal from Other Quarters 
Proclamation R109 was strongly opposed by the governments of KwaZulu, KaNgwane and 
all four opposition parties in South Africa‟s cabinet. Some other Bantustan leaders expressed 
their concern over the move in more muted tones. Save for a few chiefs and other loyalists, 
the people of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma did not want to be incorporated into Swaziland 
because they feared that they would lose their South African citizenship and the limited 
freedoms they had (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:259). It was clear that the rights of many 
people were being subordinated to other considerations because the trade-off was worthwhile 
for the two main instigators- the governments of South Africa and Swaziland. Having 
established what was on offer to for the key players in the deal, this section considers the 
reactions to it and why it ultimately failed. Many people were outraged by the proposed deal 
and opposition to it came from a number of different sources, including the Natal Provincial 
Administration, KwaZulu authorities and the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly through the 
Chief Executive, Enos Mabuza. General opposition also came from quarters opposed to 
apartheid, especially since the South Africa government was going to deprive almost a 
million blacks of their rights as South African citizens by giving them away to another 
country without their permission (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:54). 
Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259-260) report that Headmen in Ingwavuma objected to the 
land deal thereby forcing KwaZulu‟s Chief Minister, Gatsha Buthelezi to respond. Buthelezi 
had and Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini objected to the deal (on behalf of Ingwavuma) which 
had been confirmed as part of KwaZulu in 1976. However, according to Griffiths and Funnell 
(1991:62-63), the Zulus had limited historical claim to the Ingwavuma territory; save for the 
fact that Zulu King Dingane was killed and buried there. The majority of people in 
Ingwavuma were neither Swazi nor Zulu but Tsonga although Ingwavuma was considered 
part of the Swazi sphere of influence rather than the Zulu (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-63). 
Zululand was annexed by the British in May 1887 but Ingwavuma was not included. On 23 
April 1895, Britain annexed the western strip of Ingwavuma into Zululand in order to cut off 
the Transvaal (Boer Republic) from the sea. This was an expression of British policy against 
the Boers; not recognition of Zulu historical claim to it such that the largest part of the 
territory was treated separately. Tongaland, the larger part of Ingwavuma, was separately 
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annexed by Britain on 30 May 1895. In 1897, Zululand and Tongaland were incorporated 
into the crown colony of Natal and were not under Zulu control until the 1975 Bantustan 
consolidation proposals were implemented in 1976 (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-63). 
Given this history, the Natal Provincial Administration objected to the land deal because 
Ingwavuma had been part of Natal since 1897 and they had not been consulted about its 
transfer to Swaziland.  
Zulu objection (and legal action against the land deal after soliciting the backing of Natal 
authorities) was a response to seeing what had been recently given to them being offered to 
the Swazis without prior consultation or agreement. The KwaZulu authorities applied to the 
Natal High Court to rule against the inclusion of Ingwavuma in the deal. On 25 June 1982, 
the Durban Supreme Court cancelled the state‟s Proclamation R109 of 18 June 1982 on the 
grounds that the South African government had not consulted (legal obligation) KwaZulu 
authorities before making the decision and the South African government‟s response was to 
issue a new Proclamation under a different law which placed Ingwavuma under government 
control. The state also referred the case to the South African Appeal Court in Pretoria. By 30 
June 1982, the question of the land deal was reaching crisis proportions and at a special 
sitting, the Provincial Council of Natal passed a resolution urging the South African 
government to hold a referendum in Natal and in the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu 
regarding the proposed land deal. The Supreme Court in Natal granted an order to the 
KwaZulu government to further stall the incorporation of Ingwavuma and on 6 July 1982, 
officials of the Department of Cooperation and Development began withdrawing from the 
disputed Ingwavuma area. On 30 September 1982, the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein upheld 
the decision of the Natal Court that the Presidential Proclamation R109 issued on 18 June 
1982, purporting to restore Ingwavuma to Swaziland‟s jurisdiction was null and void because 
the State President had acted beyond/over-stepped his powers or jurisdiction (ultra vires) and 
as such, the inclusion of Ingwavuma in the deal was illegal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:62-
63). In October 1982 the Appeal Court upheld KwaZulu government contention that the land 
deal/ proclamation was unlawful and in November of the same year, Pretoria announced that 
it had accepted the court‟s decision and settled the matter with the KaNgwane government 
(Grundy, 1986: 79-82). 
On 18 June 1984, KwaZulu‟s Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi was summoned to Cape Town 
by Dr. Piet Koornhof, South Africa‟s Minister of Cooperation and Development, and was 
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informed that the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry which had been investigating the claims of 
the different parties had been disbanded but it never issued a public report. The next day (19 
June 1984), South Africa‟s Foreign Minister gave an assurance that the government would 
not go ahead with plans for the cession of land to Swaziland, unless it had the majority 
support of the people concerned. On 20 June 1984 Dr. Koornhof announced that the South 
African government had concluded that the leaders of Swaziland, KwaZulu and KaNgwane 
would discuss the matter among themselves. However, the Swaziland government did not 
recognise the legitimacy of the Bantustans and refused to be drawn into discussions including 
them on the matter (Grundy, 1986: 79-82; Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:55). In August 1984, 
Pretoria granted internal self-government to KaNgwane. The following series of cartoons 
appeared in several newspapers in protest against the Swazi land deal of 1982. They 
caricature the deceptions, assumptions and miscalculations of the South African authorities in 
formulating the deal without consulting the people that would be directly affected by it. 
 
Figure 9: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P 
Stidolph in The Star, 29 November 1990). 
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Figure 10: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P 
Stidolph in the Natal Witness, 29 November 1990). 
 
Figure 11: Cartoon about the Swaziland-South Africa Land Deal (Abe Berry and A. J. P 
Stidolph in The Star, 29 November 1990).  
7.7.4 The Impact of the Abortive Swazi Land Deal 
Failure of the Swazi land deal gave other people hope that they too could prevent the 
authorities from running rough-shod over them. Following Mabuza‟s prevention of the Swazi 
land deal; the stymieing of forced removals in Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal, 
opposition to Moutse‟s incorporation into KwaNdebele and the rejection of KwaNdebele 
independence put the spotlight on the struggles in rural areas which, according to Claassens 
(1991:156), the urban bias of the Mass Democratic Movement and trade unions did not focus 
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adequately on. Public outcry at both local and national levels or legal challenges that dealt 
with laws such as the Black Administration Act were doomed to fail unless they were 
directed at less obviously racial clauses (Claassens, 1991). Two events that happened in 
KwaNdebele/Moutse (Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:255-258; Phatlane, 2002: 401-410, 414-
417) and Driefontein (Claassens, 1991:144-156; Mulaudzi and Schirmer, 2007:234-238) in 
the 1980s illustrate the impact or implications of Enos Mabuza‟s stand against injustice and 
the unilateral manner in which the apartheid government conducted its affairs (no 
consultation or consent). Mabuza‟s connection with these cases is slightly tenuous but the 
relative proximity of KwaNdebele and Driefontein to KaNgwane and the question of South 
African citizenship were at the root of popular resistance in both cases. Further, although the 
outcomes were varied, they ultimately denied the South African authorities what they wanted 
or tried to impose. Mabuza‟s actions in successfully opposing the Swazi land deal set a 
precedent that these communities tried to emulate and in the case of Driefontein, his 
assistance (as an ally) was directly solicited.  
The South African government‟s plans to forcibly incorporate Moutse into KwaNdebele in 
1986 were designed to consolidate and strengthen KwaNdebele in preparation for 
independence. The case has similarities to the failed KaNgwane-Ingwavuma incorporation 
into Swaziland above and Holden and Mathabatha (2007:256-257) believe that resistance in 
Moutse (and KwaNdebele) was emboldened by the KaNgwane government‟s successful 
opposition to the Swazi land deal. The rejection of independence was the result of legitimate 
fears by KwaNdebele residents that they would lose their South African citizenship (which 
was part of Mabuza‟s argument in opposing and preventing the Swazi land deal). 
Unfortunately, however, the authorities were a bit wiser after the debacle of the Swazi land 
deal and successfully imposed the redrawing of boundaries through a series of proclamations 
and statutes which forced Moutse into KwaNdebele, but not without serious repercussions, 
including violence (TRC Report Vol. 2, 1998:482; TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:652, 657; 
Holden and Mathabatha, 2007:255-258; Phatlane, 2002: 401-417).  
In Driefontein, the prospect of forced removal and the harassment that characterised it 
became was so unpalatable that it compelled the Driefontein and KwaNgema community 
leaders to request KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi and KaNgwane‟s Enos Mabuza to intervene or 
lend their support in the dispute with the South African authorities (based on their recent 
experience of the abortive Ingwavuma/KaNgwane incorporation into Swaziland). They asked 
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that Buthelezi and Mabuza refuse to accept them in their Bantustans if the removal went 
ahead as planned but KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi refused to assist stating that the tragic 
policy was not of his making or implementation. In contrast, Mabuza offered to meet with the 
leaders of these communities even though Pretoria officials had told him that the Ngemas 
were in favour of the removal. When the Ngemas contradicted this, Mabuza pledged to refuse 
to co-operate with Pretoria in any way on the matter. He subsequently told the Deputy 
Minister of Cooperation and Development that KaNgwane would not administer any land to 
which the Ngemas were relocated. Mabuza‟s refusal to cooperate with Pretoria meant that the 
South African government had to deal with a black spot that did not have proper housing 
schemes, water, schools, health facilities or structures of local government. The resettlement 
camp which was being constructed for the Driefontein and KwaNgema communities at 
Oshoek became a white elephant and Pretoria had nowhere to settle the affected people. The 
contested title deeds, permits, meetings and minutes, lawyers, publicity and special pleadings 
eventually led to Driefontein and KwaNgema being given formal reprieve from forced 
removal on 27 August 1985 (Claassens, 1991:147) and in October 1985, the government 
decided not to proceed with the removals from Daggakraal. Mabuza‟s intervention also 
forced the government to allow the two communities to remain on the land they already 
inhabited. The success of this protest meant that the disruption of extended families, 
community ties and old friendships was prevented (Claassens, 1991:144-156; Mulaudzi and 
Schirmer, 2007:234-238). 
Although the Swazi land deal would probably have involved minimal physical movement 
since it was essentially a boundary change (and change in government), the net result would 
have been the same as what was proposed in the two cases below - alienation against their 
will or what was reasonable and legally permissible. The common experience or predicament 
of the residents in the two cases discussed in this section made them fellow travellers with 
residents in KaNgwane and Ingwavuma who were also confronted with the nefarious 
schemes of the apartheid state which wanted to make them victims of bitter, divisive and 
enduring land (and cultural) disputes. These experiences united them and strengthened their 
resolve to fight to determine their own destinies. 
7.8 KaNgwane vis Escalation of Violence in the Transvaal in the Decade 1985-1995 
The majority of the Bantustans fell in the Transvaal (parts of Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu, 
Lebowa, KwaNdebele and KaNgwane) and it is reported that violence and torture in the 
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Transvaal was perpetrated by the SAP, the Bophuthatswana security police and hit squads 
linked to the secret police and other intelligence organisations. In the absence of Bantustan 
armies (for self governing, as opposed to independent territories), the 1980s saw the 
emergence of conservative vigilante organisations, such as, Imbokodo, Inkatha and Kabasa. 
The confrontations mainly involved conflicts with the government which used the Bantu 
Authorities Act to impose chiefs amenable to its policies by deposing popular chiefs and 
Bantustan residents who opposed them. This happened in Venda and Bophuthatswana where 
some residents and chiefs were banished or deported from the Bantustans to remote areas 
where they were allowed minimum contact with others in order to neutralise them (TRC 
Report Vol. 3, 1998:549-552). Violence erupted in the urban areas on a regular basis from 
1984 onwards and it began to manifest in the Bantustans from about 1986 with the spread of 
UDF and COSAS activities to the Bantustans.  
Everyone who represented government authority (black policemen in the townships, 
community councillors and chiefs) became the target of widespread violence during the 
1980s and in theory, Mabuza and his government were vulnerable to attack. Most attacks on 
government representatives and alleged informers were carried out through petrol-bombing 
of homes, arson (beer halls, buses, cars and administration board buildings) and neck-lacing 
in which the victim is doused with petrol and set alight. Such intolerance was advocated 
within a general climate of mistrust and fear generated by state violence and disinformation 
campaigns and victims also included those perceived to be beneficiaries of the apartheid 
system (business people or teachers antagonistic to school boycotts) (TRC Report Vol. 3, 
1998:599). In the Transvaal, violence was most pronounced in Bophuthatswana, 
KwaNdebele and Lebowa with the most reported cases in Bophuthatswana and KwaNdebele 
where the ruling elites tried to quash political protest through widespread detention and 
torture. The amount of repression in turn led to cycles of retaliatory violence between 
Bantustan security forces and youths under the banner of the South African Youth Congress 
(SAYCO) and the UDF. In KwaNdebele, for example, students, teachers and civil servants 
held successful stay-aways in protest against the KwaNdebele cabinet‟s policies and the 
detention of various resistance leaders. Violence in KwaNdebele peaked in May and June 
1986 and only abated when the call for „independence was abandoned in August 1986 (TRC 
Report Vol. 3, 1998:656). Chiefs, like community councillors in the urban areas, targeted in 
these skirmishes because of their implementation of government policy, for instance in 
Lebowa and KwaNdebele. 
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Several massacres were recorded in the Transvaal between 1990 and the period after the 
historic 1994 democratic elections. These included a massacre in Sebokeng on 22 July 1990 
(27 people killed), the Tembisa Vusimuzi hostel massacre on 12 September 1990 (25 hostel 
residents killed), the Jeppe Station train attack on 13 September 1990 (twenty-six commuters 
killed) and the Thokoza Hostel attack on 2 December 1990 (thirty killed).  The Sebokeng 
Funeral Vigil attack followed on 12 January 1991 (13 people killed) and a few months later, 
the Swanieville squatter settlement (Kagiso) massacre took place in which twenty-eight 
people were killed on 12 May. The Gobizitwna Beer Hall attack in Sebokeng on 23 May 
1991 left thirteen people dead. This cycle of violence continued into 1992 with the 
Crossroads squatter camp massacre (Katlehong) on 3 April 1992 (21 people killed).This was 
followed by the Alexandra Funeral Vigil massacre on 12 May in which fifteen people were 
killed. The 17 June 1992 Boipatong massacre (Vaal) left forty people dead. Further afield, the 
Bisho killings on 7 September 1992 claimed the lives of twenty-nine protesters and one 
soldier and left about 200 others wounded after months of violent conflicts between Ciskei 
Bantustan government supporters and ANC supporters. There was yet another Thokoza 
hostel attack in May 1993 which left sixteen hostel residents killed dead (TRC Report Vol. 3, 
1998:675-676). 
The Storm before the Calm: Violence and/or Its Relative Absence in KaNgwane 
This section briefly outlines how Enos Mabuza became politicised and tries to trace why he 
seemed to adopt a moderate, open minded approach in his dealings with people regardless of 
who they were, black or white. The section chronicles the political transition from the 
experience of students and individuals in KaNgwane from the mid 1980s when the stage was 
set by the States of Emergencies which triggered concerted resistance and violence which 
was also felt in KaNgwane. Although Mabuza was not directly involved in any of the 
violence, he was found to be culpable, in his official capacity, for some of the deaths at the 
hands of the police. However, KaNgwane experienced very low to negligible levels of 
violence compared to the other Bantustans. The transition was a time of great, long-awaited 
change and it was accompanied by much jockeying for position, opportunism and changing 
attitude, some genuine and others merely expedient. Mabuza addressed the Annual 
Conference of the QwaQwa ruling party at a crucial time in December 1989 and his 
assessment of Bantustan leaders and what they had contributed in the past and what they 
could, realistically contribute in the future is worth some consideration. 
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The first State of Emergency was declared in 1960 immediately after the Sharpeville 
Massacre and the banning of the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress and 
in the wake of the 1976 Soweto Uprising, the government widened police powers of 
detention even without trial in lieu of a State of Emergency. However, by the mid-1980s, a 
popular uprising was underway with militants advocating that the townships be rendered 
ungovernable. Increasing civil unrest and township violence led to the government declaring 
a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts41 on 20 July 1985 to allow the regime to 
crack down opponents when resistance was heightened. Organisations as well as meetings 
were closely monitored and disrupted and could be banned and thousands of people were 
detained. The police could detain anyone for vague reasons of public safety without the 
option to appeal to the courts. The Commissioner of Police could impose a blanket 
prohibition on media coverage of the Emergency and the names of people who had been 
detained could not be revealed (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172).  
Another countrywide State of Emergency was declared on 12 June 1986; four days before the 
tenth anniversary of the Soweto student uprising. The provisions of this State of Emergency 
were broader than previous ones but anti-apartheid mobilisation continued unabated. The 
president could rule by decree without referring to the constitution or to parliament. The 
government amended the Public Security Act thereby expanding its powers to include the 
right to declare certain places unrest areas. About 2 436 people were detained under the 
Internal Security Act which gave the police and the military sweeping powers to crush 
protests in unrest areas. The government restricted political funerals, imposed curfews to 
control the movement of people and banned certain indoor gatherings. Television cameras 
were banned from unrest areas to prevent international as well as national coverage of the 
township rebellion (the rent strikes, „people‟s education‟ in the schools, consumer boycotts) 
and police repression. Instead, the state broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) provided propaganda in support of the government and its version of 
reality was challenged by a range of pro-ANC alternative publications. The Emergency 
succeeded in putting the trade unions, township and youth organisations (mass democratic 
movement) on the defensive and the state responded by renewing the Emergency and 
bringing more white troops to the townships to the point where a state of civil war existed in 
all but name. In the first half of 1986 labour-organised strikes reached new proportions with 
                                                 
41 The Eastern Cape and the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region. The Western Cape was included 
three months later. 
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half a million days lost mostly through the activities of the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) and the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). The formation and growth of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) induced further panic in the ranks of the 
white regime and fascist groups such as the AWB became disillusioned with the National 
Party and led dissatisfied white workers and petit bourgeois, even penetrating the armed 
forces (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172). 
The apartheid state used its most repressive measures between 1985 and 1990 and more 
human rights were violated during this period than ever before. It was a criminal offence to 
threaten someone verbally or possess documents that the government perceived to be 
threatening. It was illegal to advise anyone to stay away from work or oppose the 
government. It was also illegal to disclose the names of those arrested under the State of 
Emergency until the government saw it fit to release such names and individuals could be 
imprisoned for up to ten years for these offences. External sanctions were imposed and 
foreign companies stopped new investments and some even sold their operations in South 
Africa (General Motors, Honeywell, Barclays, Xerox). The 1986 Emergency was extended 
until 1990 when F.W. de Klerk became the State President and lifted the 30-year ban on the 
African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist 
Party (Kruss, 1987:173-186; Webster, 1987:141-172). De Klerk also made the first official 
public commitment to release Nelson Mandela, to return to press freedom and to suspend the 
death penalty. 
As the conflict in South Africa deepened and escalated in the mid 1980s, gross human rights 
violations became increasingly generalised, drawing in an ever-widening range of sectors, 
organisations and individuals as perpetrators, including the ANC, MK and individuals 
associated with the UDF. Individuals aligned to the UDF and frequently referred to as 
comrades engaged in a range of violent actions against local representatives of the apartheid 
government and anyone perceived to be a beneficiary of the apartheid system. Councillors, 
police and government-appointed chiefs in rural areas were the main targets but individuals 
who owned businesses and those perceived to have unfairly amassed wealth in poor 
townships were also vulnerable to attack. Teachers and school principals who opposed the 
wave of school boycotts which were sweeping the country were also targeted. Black local 
authority offices, schools, homes and businesses were frequently attacked and „People‟s 
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Courts‟ were set up in some townships as a rudimentary form of alternative governance to 
deal with informers („impimpis‟) and other matters. 
KaNgwane was not insulated from the political upheavals in Johannesburg or the rest of the 
country. Although movement was limited because of influx regulations and pass laws, people 
worked outside the Bantustans and were influenced by events elsewhere. However, although 
there could not have been complete harmony, KaNgwane is not known to have been marked 
by political violence; a characteristic which distinguished it from the South African 
government and the other Bantustans. According to Nkosi‟s testimony, the community‟s 
attitude towards the police at that time was that they were merely doing their job and there 
were few running battles with them because people were generally free to do as they pleased. 
The policemen could walk around freely in the community without being attacked for merely 
being policemen (Hlanga‟s testimony). They did their job and People who committed crimes 
were arrested by the police when victims laid charges.42  
1986 Student Unrest 
The States of Emergencies which were declared from the mid 1980s led to mass resistance 
countrywide, including sustained student unrest. These events prompted the creation of the 
Soweto Parents Crisis Committee and the consultative conferences which followed soon after 
leading to the birth of People‟s Education (Muller, 1987:18-32). These developments 
contributed to an escalation of tensions in KaNgwane by the end of 1985. Development 
Board offices, a school and police vehicles were stoned and petrol-bombed at Kabokweni on 
14 January 1986 and the crowd was eventually dispersed with birdshot. Violence flared up in 
the Nsikazi region, claiming the lives of at least two leading businessmen, a trade unionist 
and a chief.  In February 1986, education-related protests and boycotts led to sustained 
conflict lasting well into the year. The Lowveld Youth Movement, a UDF affiliate, was partly 
responsible for the protests. On 22 February 1986, about 4 000 youths set fire to Khumbula 
High School and two shops, one of which belonged to a school inspector. A week later, 
twenty-three vehicles and a number of buildings were burnt in further unrest in 
KaNyamazane. Twenty-six pupils appeared in the Kabokweni Magistrate‟s Court on charges 
of public violence. Thousands of fellow pupils marched to court to attend the trials and 
pushed down a courtyard fence to get in. The lawyer for the students that were appearing in 
court stated later that the police opened fire on the students without provocation and without 
                                                 
42 http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm 
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giving them any warning to disperse. The police fired repeated rounds of live ammunition 
into an unarmed crowd killing at least three pupils and injuring eighty, including Ms 
Elizabeth Mdluli. It was later revealed that most of the pupils had been shot in the back whilst 
fleeing. The shootings later came to be known as the Lowveld Massacre (TRC Report Vol. 3, 
1998:662). The court shooting was followed by several incidents of unrest, including an 
attempt by a group of 200 pupils to hijack seven buses. In February alone, at least four people 
died in violent clashes and damage estimated at R2 million was caused in the townships of 
Kabokweni and KaNyamazane/Louieville (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:659-660). 
Restrictions were placed on the funeral of the three students killed in the Lowveld Massacre 
and hours before the funeral on 22 March, there was further confrontation between students 
and police as mourners returned from the night vigil. Mr Msongelwa Amos Maseko was 
walking back home from the night vigil with a group of friends when they met the police and 
the police opened fire from a vehicle without warning. Maseko was shot and injured, one 
youth was shot dead, another was run over by a police vehicle and four were seriously 
injured. In another incident, a boy was killed when police dispersed a group of alleged stone-
throwers.  At Kadisiki school, another boy was seriously injured by police firing birdshot at 
400 pupils who were allegedly intimidating other scholars (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:659-
660). 
The Kabasa Gang 
A vigilante group known as Kabasa was formed in 1986 and operated in the areas around 
Nelspruit.43  It was first mobilised in response to violence associated with the February 1986 
school boycott and student unrest outlined above. Kabasa emerged as a powerful and violent 
conservative force opposing the general wave of solidarity (triggered by or in response to 
events in the cities and other political hotspots) protests in KaNgwane. According to TRC 
reports, the Kabasa gang had about seven members and was formed to fulfil the needs of a 
group of elite businessmen known to the community as Sibaya S‟khulu (meaning the main or 
central kraal). Prominent members of Sibaya S‟khulu were Mr D. R. Mazibuko and Mr Julius 
Nkosi and part of the gang‟s modus operandi was attacks on rival businesses. The TRC also 
received reports of joint activities between the South African security forces (the SAP, the 
                                                 
43 KaNyamazane, Pienaars Trust, Luphisa Trust and Kabokweni. 
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SADF and the security branch44) and the Kabasa gang in June 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 3, 
1998:659-660).  
Neville Shabangu was a founding member of the Lowveld Youth Movement which was a 
UDF affiliate. He and told the TRC that Kabasa members were involved in burning down his 
home. He suffered severe burns and was hospitalised for more than four months. He was 
questioned by police whilst he was in hospital and he was detained and tortured for three 
months the day after he was discharged from hospital. Mr Shabangu told the TRC that 
members of the Kabasa gang openly worked with the police and were often seen helping in 
the police station. His nephew had also been shot dead by police outside the Kabokweni 
Magistrate‟s Court during the student protests in early 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:661). 
The Murder of David Lukhele 
According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission‟s Reports, in April 1986, David 
Lukhele [JB00646/02PS], a prominent former cabinet minister in the KaNgwane government 
was framed in a bogus pamphlet associating him with anti-ANC sentiments. A few days 
before his death, Lukhele had met with chiefs to discuss the unification of KaNgwane and 
Swaziland. This meeting was allegedly an attempt to resuscitate the failed 1982 attempt by 
the South African authorities to cede KaNgwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland, a move 
which Lukhele had been in favour of and one which Mabuza successfully prevented. Lukhele 
had split from Mabuza‟s Inyandza National Movement in the fall out of the 1982 aborted 
land deal and formed his own party, Nsika. Instead of Mabuza or those closely connected to 
him in the Inyandza National Movement or KaNgwane government being held responsible or 
being implicated in the murder, ANC members Mr Neo Griffith Potsane [AM7159/97], Mr 
Jabu Obed Masina [AM5886/97] and Mr Frans „Ting Ting‟ Masango [AM7087/97] and 
Joseph Elias Makhura applied for amnesty for Lukhele‟s murder as well as a bomb blast at a 
bus stop in Silverton, Pretoria which injured 17 people in 1986 (TRC Report Vol. 2, 
1998:336). All four men testified to having been members of the ANC‟s former military wing 
UmKhonto we Sizwe‟s “elimination unit” which was established to assassinate people the 
ANC considered „collaborators‟ including Bantustan leaders and members of the security 
forces. Potsane stated that Lukhele fell foul with the ANC in exile after he had written and 
distributed a document which called, among others, the incorporation of KaNgwane into 
Swaziland. 
                                                 
44 Brigadier Visser and Captain van Loggerenberg of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch.  
Page | 268 
 
Lukhele was gunned down in his home in Mamelodi on 6 June 1986 together with his sister-
in-law, Mrs. Busisiwe Dludlu while watching television. Lukhele‟s wife, Elizabeth, was also 
wounded. Potsane, then member of the National Intelligence Agency, testified before the 
TRC at the Telkom Club outside Pretoria and described how he burst into the Lukhele home 
and sprayed them with high-calibre gunfire (machine-gun) and left Lukhele‟s bullet riddled 
body in a pool of blood while he escaped with his accomplice Masina (TRC Report Vol. 2, 
1998:3360. Potsane and Masina drove to Lukhele‟s home and left their vehicle a short 
distance away and walked into the yard armed with an AK47 with two magazines. Masina 
stood guard outside while Potsane: 
I knocked at the front door, someone opened the door and I burst inside with 
my AK47 already drawn. I fired at least 31 rounds at Mr. Lukhele who fell on 
the floor. While lying dead on the floor I continued pumping his body with 
more than 31 rounds of ammunition. His wife was also hit in the leg as she 
was crawling towards the door apparently attempting to escape. 
Potsane said that Bantustan leaders were perceived as legitimate targets for elimination and 
“Mr. Lukhele was targeted by our unit and killed by me only after the specific authorisation 
of the ANC was sought to eliminate him.” Potsane added that after the ANC had sanctioned 
Lukhele‟s assassination, he was deployed to reconnoitre the Lukhele‟s movements and 
ascertained that he would be at home on Friday June 6. 
In the mid 1980s, there were reported cases of UDF and ANC activists being given booby-
trapped limpet mines and hand grenades („Operation Zero Zero‟) on the East Rand by covert 
units of the SAP, Vlakplaas and the SADF Special Forces in collaboration with askaris and 
Vlakplaas police informants posing as MK operatives. The operation was designed to 
eliminate activists and make them appear incompetent, whilst also undermining the 
credibility of the ANC‟s armed wing (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:628-629). In contrast, 
Potsane stated that Enos Mabuza was regarded as an ANC sympathiser so he was safe from 
elimination. Mabuza reportedly had a good working relationship with „comrades‟ in the area 
and either assisted or turned a blind eye to their movements to and from Mozambique and 
Swaziland. He did not use this information to entrap them for ambushes and elimination by 
the security forces as was common in other Bantustans. Consequently, there were never loud 
or persistent calls for Mabuza‟s resignation or that of members of the KaNgwane cabinet and 
legislative assembly since they were believed to act on a popular mandate. 
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10th Anniversary of the Soweto Uprising – 16 June 1986 
A meeting of students commemorating the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto Uprising on 16 
June 1986 was violently dispersed by members of the SADF and Kabasa. Fifteen year old 
Bethuel Mthethwa and Sydney Ndlazi were killed when members of the SADF and Kabasa 
opened fire on the gathering. Ms Phindile Mavis Ngobe was also shot and was taken to 
Temba hospital with three other injured students. According to reports, they were followed 
by members of the SADF to the hospital and the SADF refused to allow the students to be 
admitted. Instead, the SADF called the police in Nelspruit to come and detain them and they 
were assaulted further and denied medical treatment whilst in detention. Bethuel Mthethwa‟s 
sister, Ms Mildred Mthethwa, recounted to the TRC what happened before her brother‟s 
funeral: 
When the hearse arrived, the police were following… they were questioning 
where Bethuel is… until they found him. They kicked him even though he was 
dead, they continued kicking him. When they were busy kicking the corpse, 
my father was becoming very angry. He tried to fetch something which we 
could use to fight the police because he was angry at what they were doing to 
the corpse. He questioned them, how can they kick somebody who is already 
dead? He therefore asked the police to kill him and when we all saw that our 
father was angry we also decided to help our father to fight against the police. 
We fought against them (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:661). 
The Murder of Dumisa Christopher Mabika  
Keshla Timothy Nkosi (33 years old in 1996) was a card-carrying member of the Inyandza 
National Movement and he was convicted of the murder of Dumisa Christopher Mabika on 
16 October 1991 by a Circuit Supreme Court that was sitting at Lydenburg and sentenced to 
18 years imprisonment. There were six accused at the trial and Nkosi was applying for 
individual amnesty (Application No: AM1860\96) for his involvement in the murder of 
Dumisa Christopher Mabika (an allegedly aggressive council policeman) near St John‟s 
school. An angry mob attacked and killed Mabika with stones and sticks; stabbed him, 
kicking him with the intention of burning him alive (neck-lacing). Mabika was attacked in 
retaliation for the shooting of Nkosi‟s elder brother in Tlaza J, eLukwatini, a rural area in the 
former KaNgwane Bantustan. Mabika‟s sister, Sibongile Hlanga, was a policewoman in 
eLukwatini since 1986 (the time of the killing). She was a witness at the hearing and testified 
that she was a member of Inyandza like Nkosi. Nkosi‟s brother had also been a member of 
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Inyandza but worked in Johannesburg and was therefore not directly involved in the daily 
activities of the organisation45. Although Nkosi was a member of Inyandza, his actions were 
not based on the organisation‟s policies or instructions but a response to personal tragedy (his 
brother‟s murder). Nkosi‟s testimony before the TRC revealed that his brother had had an 
altercation with Mabika over an alleged girlfriend (Selinah Jane Bembe) so, on the surface, 
both killings were not politically motivated.  
Nkosi‟s testimony, however, notes that Inyandza took the decision to kill Mabika following 
an incident in which he allegedly shot at Mandla (an active comrade within Inyandza) at a 
taxi rank. Mabika was not arrested for the shooting despite an organised march to the local 
magistrate‟s court to demand that action be taken. It is alleged that Inyandza‟s Chairman, Mr 
Solly Mhlule, suggested that they take this matter into their own hands (advocated vigilante 
justice). Nkosi reports that they planned the killing around June 1990 and went to Mabika‟s 
house a few times but they could not find him so they broke the windows to his house at No 1 
Ntlazashe (as a warning) and left. Mabika was killed almost four months later on 14 October 
1990. 
Nkosi explained during court proceedings (examination by his counsel Ms Makhubele) where 
Inyandza fitted into national politics or the organisations it was aligned to. Nkosi began his 
testimony by noting that Inyandza operated in Mpumalanga Province (the former Eastern 
Transvaal) and that it was dissolved and became part of the ANC under the leadership of 
“Comrade Zitha.”Nkosi is asked to comment on the political climate which prevailed in 
KaNgwane and his response is that “The situation was not a very bad because the Inyandza 
organisation is the one that fought the then government against oppression.” Nstika was 
another political party or grouping that existed in the KaNgwane area but he only refers to it 
in passing. Nkosi identifies himself as a comrade and is therefore asked to elaborate on what 
he was fighting for and the activities that he was involved in. He begins by highlighting that 
KaNgwane was basically a rural “…where there was no water, no electricity. We were 
struggling so that the apartheid government could provide us with such resources as water 
and so forth.” He adds that “The police would assault you or even kill you if they saw you 
engaged in demonstrations or protest activities like toyi-toying. However, the police was not 
controlled by Bantustan governments in the self-governing territories. These were deployed 
by Pretoria and acted according to its directive, by-passing the jurisdiction of local authorities 
                                                 
45 http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm 
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and as such the Bantustan governments could not be held responsible for the police‟s actions, 
except for those that called for Pretoria‟s support to quell unrest and other disturbances. 
Nkosi denies that Inyandza had any allegiance with the white government in Pretoria. He 
stresses that Inyandza fought against Pretoria‟s oppression of blacks and lack of service 
delivery46. Nkosi mentions the relationship between Oliver Tambo and Enos Mabuza and 
their meeting in London and the one in Lusaka Zambia in 1986 to show that the ANC and 
Inyandza had a common understanding because Mabuza was more progressive than other 
Bantustan leaders47. 
7.8.1 Mabuza’s Culpability: The TRC’s Findings 
The TRC found the students responsible for the arson attack on police vehicles and 
Development Board offices in Kabokweni in January 1986 as well as attacks on Khumbula 
High school and two shops on 22 February 1986. It also found the Minister of Law and Order 
(Adriaan Vlok) and the Chief Minister of KaNgwane (Enos Mabuza) responsible (in their 
official capacities48) for gross violations of human rights in the police attack at the 
Kabokweni Magistrate‟s court on 11 March 1986. 
7.9 Greed, Class and Corruption in the Bantustans 
The apartheid regime‟s own bureaucracy was corrupt at all levels and the situation was worse 
when you added the mismanagement which was rampant in the Bantustans. Almost everyone 
turned a blind eye to the embezzling of public funds into Swiss and other foreign bank 
accounts (capital flight to tax havens) which led to the depletion of budgets for social 
security, health and public works, thereby further impoverishing the African population 
which already lived in dire circumstances. Local authorities routinely and illegally levied 
numerous taxes, institutionalised bribes for site, residence permits, work seekers‟ and other 
permits and withheld or stole social security payments and this bred more poverty, 
resentment, repression and more extortion49 (Keenan, 1987:123-124; Van Vuuren, 2006). 
One example is that of local authorities, especially the traditional variety, imposed livestock 
taxes because they were anxious to squeeze more money out of the people for their 
                                                 
46 Strictly the responsibility of the KaNgwane government which was, however, reliant on resources or budget 
allocations from Pretoria. Pretoria was ultimately in charge and homeland authorities were regarded as its 
surrogates. 
47 http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99110812_jhb_991111jb.htm 
48 As a nominally self-governing territory, KaNgwane did not have its own security forces.  
49 Denial of employment, withholding of social security, eviction and land seizure. 
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development projects and threatened to confiscate livestock people failed to pay the taxes 
(Rogers, 1980:109). 
Independence was the logical extension of the Bantustan system but six of the ten Bantustans 
never became independent. This issue led to particularly bloody conflict in KwaNdebele in 
the 1980s when traditionalists were strongly in favour of independence and the rest, the 
majority, opposed (Phatlane, 2002). Local chiefs succumbed to pressure from Pretoria to 
accept independence in the four Bantustans and in the Transkei and Bophuthatswana alone, 
this meant that about six million people lost their South African citizenship and whatever 
rights they had. Arbitrary official decisions made them foreigners with no legal recourse 
(Roger, 1980:17). Approximately 80% of the Bantustans‟ budgets were supplied by Pretoria 
in various ways, one of the inducements used by the South African regime to get Bantustan 
politicians to accept independence, or accede to any other demand, included the threat to 
financially cut off Bantustans which were uncooperative (Rogers, 1980:33). This proved to 
be a potent enough threat to keep most Bantustan elites in check and it was used on 
KaNgwane and KwaZulu‟s governments when they acted like prodigal sons and refused to 
accept what was then an irrevocable step – independence- which would make the Bantustan 
governments desperately unpopular with the people.  
Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Enos Mabuza of KaNgwane refused to relinquish their 
people‟s birthrights as South Africans or to forfeit their share of the South African 
economy/wealth which the exploitation of Africans had helped built. As punishment for the 
slight, it is reported that KwaZulu had R4 million cut unexpectedly from its South African 
subsidy for 1977 and this meant that fewer people received pensions, the Bantustan could 
afford less teachers and it had to abandon some of its agricultural schemes (Rogers, 1980:33). 
In KaNgwane case, it was a commonly held belief that Mabuza was being punished for his 
“his steadfast refusal to accept independence or to participate in government‟s proposed 
National Council.” In an interview with the Financial Mail in 1989, Mabuza added to this list 
the fact that he did not think that Pretoria had forgiven him for his stand against the proposed 
incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. He went against the government‟s 
wishes and as a result, KaNgwane was financially neglected by Pretoria compared to other 
self-governing territories. Mabuza made written submissions about this discrepancy in 
budgetary allocations to the then Education and Development Aid Minister, Gerrit Viljoen, 
impressing upon him the fact that KaNgwane was not getting an equitable share of the central 
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government‟s annual allocation  and that what it did get was insufficient to meet its needs 
(Financial Mail, 12 May 1989:53-54; Van Eeden, 1984:126-141).  
Mabuza‟s complaints in this regard were also contained in an annexure to Mabuza‟s policy 
and budget speech which was delivered on Tuesday 9 May 1989. The Minister of Education 
and Development Aid (Gerrit Viljoen) was apparently sympathetic to the problems facing 
KaNgwane and had visited the Bantustan on three occasions to assess the situation for 
himself but had to operate within the parameters which were set by Pretoria (his mandate). 
Mabuza stated that when KaNgwane submitted its budget to Pretoria, it was told by 
government officials that it did not have the “capacity” or the executive authority to use the 
funds requested and its proposed budget would be cut to suit Pretoria‟s definition of the 
Bantustan‟s administrative capacity and constitutional status (Financial Mail, 12 May 
1989:53-54). Mabuza had to seek outside assistance to supplement the budgetary allocation 
that KaNgwane did get from Pretoria, for example, Paul De Bruyn raised R98 million for 
Mabuza for low cost housing/development in KaNgwane in 1988 (http://www.nacsa.co.za/). 
7.9.1 Mis/management in KaNgwane 
This section briefly outlines the bureaucracy which overlapped with Mabuza‟s Inyandza 
National Movement and the KaNgwane government to constitute the political elite, in 
addition to the many chiefs that existed there. Chief Ngomane (Mangweni area), Chief 
Mashego (Nsikazi) and chief Dlamini (Mlondozi), for example, were all installed by Mabuza 
as President of Inyandza and Chief Minister of KaNgwane in 1989 (Inyandza National 
Executive Report, 1989:5). Inyandza‟s structure is shown as having three basic levels – the 
national executive committee50, seven regional executive committees51 and branch executive 
committees (Inyandza National Executive Report, 1989:2).  In 1991, Inyandza‟s National 
Executive Committee was as follows52: 
Mr E J Mabuza – President 
Mr M C Zitha – Deputy President 
Mr E N Ginindza – National Chairman 
Mr E .N Mango – Deputy National Chairman 
                                                 
50 Elected by Congress to implement decisions and the general affairs of the Movement. 
51 Mlondozi North, Mlondozi South, Nsikazi North, Nsikazi Central, Nkomazi East, Nkomazi West and Greater 
Transvaal. 
52 A conspicuous absence of women on the Committee. 
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Prof S S Ripinga – Secretary General 
Mr N S Ngozo – Deputy Secretary General 
Mr D S Mkhwanazi – National Treasurer 
Mr M S Gininda – Administrative Secretary 
Dr. P M H Maduna – Assistant Administrative Secretary (Records) 
Mr J M Matsana – National Organiser (field worker) 
Mr D Z Makhubela – Assistant Secretary-Information 
In addition to these individuals, the organisation had a secretary/typist, two Information and 
Publicity Secretaries (one would be based in Johannesburg), a Press Liaison Officer to work 
in conjunction with the Information and Publicity Secretaries. The ruling Inyandza National 
Movement‟s financial statements contained in the 1988/89 National Executive Report were 
handled by its treasurer, D. S. Mkhwanazi. Mr M. S. Gininda was the organisation‟s 
Administrative Secretary. Expenses for the party include motor vehicle expenses (R4 
290.38), salaries (R9 065) stationary (R5 508.18) and travelling/entertainment (R15 978.49) 
which is by far the biggest draw on resources because Mabuza and/or some of Inyandza‟s 
other members travelled to Switzerland, United Kingdom, Egypt and the USSR in the 
1988/89 financial year (National Executive Report, 1989:10-12). How much truth is in 
Inyandza‟s insistence on it financial independence from the KaNgwane government as such; 
one cannot say but in 1986, the organisation made the following statement: 
Inyandza does not want to depend or lean on the KaNgwane Government for 
its survival, but wants to exist and survive completely independent of any 
government-created structure. In order to achieve this, we need the manpower 
with the necessary brainpower to man our offices and organisational initiative 
(Inyandza National Movement, 1985:3). 
It is not clear whether or not Inyandza‟s finances were partly derived from the KaNgwane 
government‟s budget but Inyandza‟s founding members in paid  roughly R1 000 each as 
affiliation fees in November 1977 when the movement was established (Inyandza National 
Movement, 1986:2). Due to the recession and inflation rate of approximately 18.45%, 
increasing cost of living and low exchange rate f the Rand, Inyandza estimated that it needed 
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approximately R300 000 to finance its operations53 in 1986 (Inyandza National Movement, 
1985:3 & 5) Of this estimate, R10 000 would go towards Mabuza‟s operational expenses (as 
President) and R30 000 would be for travel and subsistence (hotel and air fares). The money 
was to be raised from donations, self-generated income and joining/subscription and 
affiliation fees. However, as mentioned above, „donations‟ is a very ambiguous tem and in 
practice, it is difficult to ascertain what is or is not a donation from whatever source 
(Inyandza National Movement, 1985:6). 
During his Presidential address at the official opening of the second ordinary session of the 
fourth KaNgwane Legislative Assembly54, Enos Mabuza made the following remarks 
regarding his government‟s management of the resources at its disposal: 
…our administrative history is not one to be ashamed of. In the past we have 
suffered the indignity, year after year, of being punished financially for our 
political views…because this leadership advocated the dismantling of the 
Bantustans. We have, however, maintained our integrity. Despite our people 
having to bear the brunt of inadequate bulk infrastructure, such as lack of 
purified, reticulated water, an acute housing shortage, overcrowded and 
inadequately staffed schools, and a mediocre health care service, we have 
managed our meagre resources well (Mabuza, 1990:2). 
Alluding to the wastage of other Bantustans, by implication compared to the prudence of his, 
Mabuza commented in 1990 that “we do not have to face the question of what to do with 
extravagant and ostentatious buildings that will be veritable white elephants in a new South 
Africa” (Mabuza, 1990:2). However, the lack of such structures does not equate to a lack of 
excess. All it really alludes to is the fact that culpability or complicity in the rampant 
corruption was a matter of degree for different constituencies, some benefiting more than 
others. Professor Antonie, Nadine Gordimer and others who have defended Mabuza in the 
face of corruption allegations agree with his own assessment, admittedly biased, that as a 
government and ruling party, they “endeavoured to keep our administration clean and lean, to 
practice frugality with public money, to channel what little development funding we had into 
                                                 
53 Mobilisation and its contribution to the Mass Democratic Movement which it firmly believed it was a part. A 
further concern was to stave off Swaziland backed “reactionaries” in the aftermath of the failed incorporation of 
the Bantustan into Swaziland a few years earlier. 
54 8 May 1990. 
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meeting the enormous needs of our displaced and often un- or underemployed people” 
(Mabuza, 1990:2). 
While proclaiming that there were no skeletons in KaNgwane‟s cupboards, Mabuza also 
acknowledged that there were “problems, shortfalls, inadequacies, bureaucratic foot-
dragging, idleness, misuse of government vehicles and property, even questionable „deals‟”. 
He reiterated the general view of the authors cited here that corruption was a virus which 
plagued almost all bureaucracies in the country to a lesser or greater extent. He then takes a 
more reticent or modest approach and concludes that KaNgwane‟s record is “reasonable” but 
that they should not become complacent and strive for a corruption-free and honest 
administration (Mabuza, 1990:3). 
In spite of the squeeze on KaNgwane‟s finances by Pretoria, Egero reports that the 
KaNgwane government received official assistance from the British government to help 
support the thousands of Mozambican refugees that lived in the Bantustan (1991:10). In late 
October – early November 1988, Mabuza travelled to the United Kingdom for consultations 
with the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Godfrey Howe. He also held consultations 
with officials in the Overseas Development Agency (National Executive Report, 1989:8). 
The British Ambassador visited KaNgwane in October 1989 to officially open the 
Community Centre at Schoemansdal which was built with British assistance for refugees in 
the area (Mabuza, 1990:29). 
Egero is sceptical about the exact nature of KaNgwane‟s dealings with the British and posits 
that Mabuza‟s political connections with Britain alluded to broader motives, at least on 
Britain‟s part.  The Thatcher government was ambivalent or reluctant to speak ill of Pretoria 
or impose sanctions on it and yet Mabuza had these arrangements with it and claimed to be 
pro-the liberation struggle. Egero (1991:12-13) maintains that the British government‟s aid 
schemes to KaNgwane amounted to a virtual de facto recognition of Mabuza‟s government 
and was therefore tacit endorsement of Pretoria‟s separate development policy, a reality 
which made Mabuza‟s position a contradictory one. 
The realignment of political power from the transition period created a thick enough 
smokescreen or confusion which led to a frantic scramble to plunder as much as possible just 
before the 1994 elections. Mabuza (as cited above in speeches to his cabinet or party) gives 
the impression of a self-sacrificing martyr full of his own importance or paragon of virtue 
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who had to be the reasonable one against all odds but the next section below shows a 
different, more self-serving side to him and members of his cabinet. It is reported that 
KaNgwane politicians and civil servants, like all the others, took advantage of the final 
measures instituted by the Bantustan parliament to buy their official vehicles at bargain 
prices. Beneficiaries of the scheme included the speaker of the new regional legislature, the 
MEC for Environmental Affairs, ANC member of parliament Professor Ripinga and Mrs 
Yvonne Phosa, wife of the new premier, Matthews Phosa. Further, the KaNgwane 
government divested itself of several publicly owned farms, selling them to political 
incumbents for prices equal to the transfer costs (Lodge, 1998:172-173). 
7.9.2 Allegations of Corruption Levelled Against Mabuza 
Money and power generally have a corrupting effect on most people and corruption is 
something that shadows every government (any organisation in fact) at some point, some 
more than others. One of the many legacies of the Bantustan civil services is the reputation 
for stealing food from the mouths of poor people because of the endemic corruption involved 
in trying to maintain lavish lifestyles within a sea of poverty. Service delivery was non-
existence or very poor and there was no end to the backlogs in many of the departments. The 
Heath Special Investigations Unit (the Special Investigations Unit after Willem Heath‟s 
departure) investigated acts of corruption before 1994 and concluded that, as a system, 
apartheid was sustained by the endemic corruption (from 1652 to the rise of crony capitalism 
and beyond) within the dominant class political and economic classes (Van Vuuren, 
2006:25). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also dealt with the issue of 
institutionalised corruption in South African politics and business in its hearings. Where any 
of the Bantustan elites innocent or where they all complicit in one way or the other? Was 
what was discovered and exposed just the tip of the iceberg? 
The Bantustan policy was hated not just for its racially divisive purpose but also for the 
obvious class differentiation that it created within the African population.  Greed and 
violence were the hallmark of most Bantustan leaders. The Bantustans were in serious debt 
by 1994 but their debt was incorporated after 1994 when they were reintegrated into SA. 
Several authors have commented on the large-scale and systematic corruption, extortion and 
self enrichment which went on in the Bantustans by those in government, the bureaucracies 
and different hierarchies of the ruling political parties.  Abject poverty co-existed with the 
opulence of the ruling elites, especially in the „independent‟ Bantustans. Patronage was used 
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to gain and maintain the political support of the petty bourgeoisie who were dependent on 
and supportive of the Bantustan authorities. It was also used to maintain influence over local 
administrative control which was usually in the hands of traditional tribal or community 
authorities (Keenan, 1987:123-124). 
Dishonest practices resulted in patronage and favouritism, fictitious tenders and awards of 
contracts to relatives/nepotism „under-the-counter‟ fees for advice, referrals and 
appointments, the misappropriation of pensions and disability grants, filing false expense 
claims, overpayments to suppliers, unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for 
private ends and unexplained or imprudent pay rises. In the independent Bantustans in 
particular, political office was the main route to personal wealth and officials used public 
funds to pay for holidays for their families. The situation was somewhat different though not 
necessarily better for the six self-governing territories whose purse strings were directly 
controlled by Pretoria (van Vuuren, 2006:78). To add to this picture of endless plunder, audit 
records are sketchy or non-existent (for the central government and the two categories of 
Bantustans which existed) which makes the tracing of all the financial impropriety, 
irregularities and lack of transparency difficult to quantify such that the full extent of 
corruption in the Bantustans might never be known (Bank, 1994; Holden and Mathabatha, 
2007; Lodge, 1998, Van Vuuren, 2006). Further, those implicated will not be prosecuted, 
notwithstanding the pseudo-clean slate they got with the transition, reintegration and 
reconciliation (concerted nation-building). 
Mabuza‟s Farm Controversy 
Mabuza comes across as either a self-righteous/sanctimonious individual or a highly 
principled public officer opposed to any kind of self-aggrandisement, misappropriation of 
funds, financial malpractice, embezzlement and nepotism but the farm scandal exposed the 
double standard or the fact that he was not above reproach (Mabuza, 1989). Lodge reports 
that in the final years of Bantustan administrations mass corruption was motivated by the 
realisation among officials that their powers and privileges were soon coming to an end or 
would be severely curtailed (Lodge, 1998:169).This observation rings true for what is 
believed to have happened in KaNgwane in the early 1990s. Justin Arenstein is the bureau 
chief and founding editor for African Eye News Service in Nelspruit. Mpumalanga. It is an 
independent news agency with a reputation for investigative journalism with particular focus 
on social justice, rural development and anti-corruption issues especially in government. 
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Arenstein is also chair of the Association of Independent Publishers (AIP) in South Africa 
and winner of several awards including the 1997 South African Award for Courageous 
Journalism which is sponsored by the Ruth First Memorial Trust and administered by the 
Rhodes University‟s Department of Journalism and Media Studies (Rhodes Journalism 
Review No. 15, November 1997:20).  
Mabuza was investigated for a 19 hectare farm in Louisville which he bought for R6 000 
from the Mpumalanga Provincial government in 1991 under allegedly irregular conditions. 
Three other farms were sold to former KaNgwane politicians who were serving politicians. 
These were the then ambassador to Mozambique, Mangisi Zitha (Mabuza‟s successor as 
Chief Minister of KaNgwane), national parliamentarian Professor Simon Ripinga and 
member of the Mpumalanga House of Traditional Leaders Chief Tikhontele Dlamini. Zitha‟s 
5.7 hectare farm in the former KaNgwane Bantustan included two houses ad was bought for 
R5 795. It is alleged that Mabuza mortgaged his farm for almost R500 000 two years later. 
Then State President Nelson Mandela ordered Judge Willem Heath to investigate the sale of 
the farms concurrently with Mpumalanga‟s Department of Local Government following 
queries by the Auditor-General. The report which was compiled by the Auditor-General was 
handed out to the Mpumalanga government‟s Standing Select Committee on Public Accounts 
during a session which Arenstein attended. According to the Auditor-General, the sale of the 
farms violated existing tender board regulations and the land should have been put on public 
auction. In his audit report, the Auditor-General noted that no attempt had been made to 
verify the market value of the farms and that the politicians involved were only charged the 
legal transfer costs of the farms (Arenstein, 1997; Arenstein, 1996; Lodge, 1998:172-173; 
Rantao, 1996; The Citizen, 1996). Former Mpumalanga Premier Matthews Phosa and De 
Laevelder (a Mpumalanga newspaper) took issue with Arenstein‟s accusations of corruption 
in the 1990s and this resulted in two separate defamation court cases.  Arenstein was accused 
of racism and pursuing a sinister reactionary agenda in some of his work and targeting the 
alleged corruption of blacks while ignoring whites who were guilty of similar offences. 
Whether or not the farms worth hundreds of thousands of Rand were „gifts‟ with a nominal 
fee attached exchanged between the outgoing and incoming governments; the issues seem to 
have quietly disappeared in some form of cover up. 
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7.10 Preparing for the Transition: Can A Leopard Change Its Spots? 
The people who worked closely with Mabuza who did not belong to Inyandza included 
Professor Francis Antonie who was Enos Mabuza‟s political advisor and consultant for four 
years of his tenure as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister. Beverly Johnson was his personal 
assistant at the Johannesburg office and Ms Rosemary Smuts55 who worked with Enos 
Mabuza in the KaNgwane government and was later the Social Secretary to the British High 
Commissioner in Cape Town and Pretoria for almost nine years, which might also explain 
why the British government was willing to make financial contributions for the welfare of 
Mozambican refugees in KaNgwane (Ms Rosemary Smuts, email communication March 
2009). Professor Antonie has lectured in political science at the universities of the 
Witwatersrand and Natal and he was also a council member of the South African Institute of 
Race Relations56 (SAIRR) in 2000. Professor Antonie is a senior economist and policy 
analyst at the Standard Bank with Dr. Conrad Strauss who was also a colleague of Mabuza‟s. 
Professor Antonie tried to initiate a trust in Mabuza‟s name after his death in order to collect 
and preserve all his documents. He has defended Mabuza‟s integrity throughout and in 
particular over the farm scandal discussed below (Ms Rosemary Smuts, email communication 
March 2009). Notwithstanding such protestations, however, Van Vuuren (2006:79-80) 
reports that the Mpumalanga Provincial government inherited a debt of over R118 million 
(about R260 million in 2005 figures) from KaNgwane in 1994 because Enos Mabuza‟s 
government had gone on a multi-million Rand spending spree which was badly accounted to 
the extent that the Auditor-General could not complete reports for the financial years 1992–
1993 and 1993–1994. However, without meaning to shift the blame, for most of the 
unaccounted period, Mabuza had handed over power (April 1991) to his successor, Mangisi 
Zitha.   
The post-1994 governments have been rocked by corruption scandals of all manner and 
magnitude.  Southall (2004) discusses the prospect and characteristics of black capitalism in 
post 1994 South Africa and cautions against the old evils such as irregular loans and undue 
influence on decisions regarding tenders and other favours. Lodge refers to the ruling ANC‟s 
“apparently indulgent attitude to corruption within its own ranks” (1998:185). It is alleged 
that in 1994 the ANC accepted a secret R500 000 campaign donation from Sol Kerzner, the 
                                                 
55 She is co-founder, director and fundraiser for the Caring Network South Africa which operates in greater 
Cape Town since 2001. 
56 The institute stands for human rights, constitutional and economic liberalism and is known for its publications 
and consultancy work. 
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hotel and casino chain proprietor who faced bribery charges - which he denied (Lodge, 
1998:184). 
Corruption was and remains a big problem but the corruption of former Bantustan elites was 
not an isolated experience born by their association with the apartheid state. Their corruption 
was no better or worse than that which is happening today in high public office and in senior 
levels of management in the public sector. In 1991, Nelson Mandela publicly forgave Nelson 
Ramodike, leader the Lebowa Bantustan or his “past mistakes”, including documented 
corruption, at a Soweto Uprising commemoration (Lodge, 1998: 185). By extension, all the 
other Bantustan leaders were forgiven for whatever mistakes they had made in the past 
(reconciliation) because the ANC was keen to attract allies before the 1994 election 
(expediency). As KaNgwane‟s leader for just over a decade, Enos Mabuza was clearly 
implicated in the corruption that took place in his Bantustan even though nothing was ever 
pinned on him by way of legal action. Could this have been because he had friends in high 
places to protect him as is typically the case with offenders who seem to escape the net all the 
time? Mabuza had worked closely with Mpumalanga‟s first Premier, Mathews Phosa who is 
believed to have pulled strings to shut down the probes into the farm controversy involving 
Mabuza and other former KaNgwane leaders. Only one post-1994 commission of enquiry, 
the Skweyiya Commission, focussed on corruption in a former Bantustan - the abuse of 
power in Bophuthatswana and not that of other Bantustans. 
The ANC is no stranger to seemingly corrupt ventures and other controversies according to 
Randall (1996:672). He uses Thebe Investments as one instance in which influential black 
South Africans misused their political influence by manipulating the image of the ANC as a 
conduit for business purposes (a means to an end) and succeeded in creating a high media 
profile. Thebe was one of the first black-owned and black-run companies in South Africa 
which was set up to foster, promote or empower black businesses. As the country moved into 
the transition period, the ANC needed alternative sources of funding as it changed from a 
liberation movement to a political party and this metamorphosis was accompanied by a 
Drying up of international assistance which it had received while in exile. Vusi Khanyile was 
head of finance in the ANC from 1990 until he founded the Thebe Investment Corporation in 
July 1992 – and investment arm of the ANC in which the ANC would have a majority share 
holding. Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Tokyo Sexwale, amongst other ANC notables, 
were invited to sit on the Batho-Batho Trust which was set up to oversee Thebe Investments 
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and some of its business contracts were, according to Randall (1996:672), obtained through 
the use of blackmail/political leverage and promises of favourable consideration once the 
ANC became the government in power. By the end of 1992, Thebe had handled a portfolio of 
30 projects across various sectors including telecommunications, financial services, 
transportation, property, distribution and travel.  
At its inception, Thebe was chaired by non-executive ANC-aligned Enos Mabuza and 
included Tokyo Sexwale and Mr T T Nkobi on its board of directors (Southall, 2004:317) but 
it soon ran into problems with the way it was conducting business and eventually started 
putting some distance between itself and the ANC in order to stand or appear to stand as an 
independent body (Randall, 1996:681). Despite Thebe‟s initial controversies, however, the 
inclusion of Mabuza in Thebe, and many other ANC-linked businesses (see business chapter 
– Kagiso Trust, New Africa Investments Limited), was a vote of confidence in his abilities 
and principles regardless of the allegations of corruption that surfaced in the press. These 
organisations did not owe Mabuza anything, especially if he was as traitorous and 
incompetent as Bantustan leaders were generally believed to be. He proved to be an astute 
and competent businessman, in spite of his questionable political past and they were able to 
accept him as a comrade and see beyond past blemishes. They had a use for him; and he for 
them so their partnerships were ultimately for mutual benefit, with profit or viability being 
the bottom line. They trusted him and it does not appear like he disappointed them since he 
followed a script which was ready-made when he got on board. Their common purpose was 
black economic empowerment as the next logical step after political freedoms and 
transformation was achieved. As chairman of Thebe, Mabuza made the following statement 
regarding Thebe‟s role and vision: “It is our duty to be a business role model and pioneer new 
routes … to stimulate broader business cooperation between people from the disadvantaged 
communities and those who have the expertise and resources.”57   
In politics generally (business too), an apparent selflessness (service, duty, sacrifice) is put in 
the foreground but self-interest and self-serving behaviour (the potential to abuse 
power/authority) does not die out completely as has been shown with the general character of 
black business elites post 1994 (Lodge, 1998:183). Someone will always have their hand in 
the cookie jar (hand-greasing/bribes, kick-backs, „gifts‟ and cronyism) but the consequences, 
or lack thereof, depend on who catches them. Corruption was extensive in the apartheid 
                                                 
57 (http://thebeemployeebenefits.co.za/TEB/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=23) 
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regime, both in central government and in Bantustan administrations where local chiefs and 
other Bantustan functionaries thrived on various rent-seeking behaviours. Corruption in the 
Bantustans snowballed out of control because „power‟ and financial resources were vested in 
reactionary local leaderships that were prepared to accept Pretoria‟s patronage to build 
Bantustan apparatuses - police, army and administration/bureaucracy. This can be traced back 
to the initial corruption of the institution of traditional leaders/chiefs in the planning stages of 
the apartheid and Bantustan system/separate development.  
Mabuza‟s „winning hearts and minds‟ approach to his politics is evident in his speeches and 
addresses to the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly or the Inyandza National Movement but 
trying to be all things to all people also has the potential for damaging corruption scandals as 
Phillips and Coleman (1989:6) caution. The scourge of corruption in whatever form is no 
trifling matter but its pervasiveness helps to show the interconnections between various forms 
of capital (habitus) identified by Bourdieu (see theory chapter) as well as the networks that 
can be woven through individual or group agency to form new structures and power 
dynamics. A different set of circumstances (field) – parameters, goals and means help to 
channel individuals in certain directions (Bourdieu, Accardo et al 1999; Bourdieu, 1998; 
Bourdieu, 1977). The introduction of the Bantustan system presented an opportunity for such 
a realignment or adaptation and different Bantustan elites rationalised their participation in it 
in different ways, some more convincing than others. Similarly, the political transition in the 
1990s, always with new class dimensions and inequalities (differentiation) brought with it 
different forms of corruption although continuities are also evident.  
Scandal is nothing new to politics, the ruling ANC in South Africa and even its governing 
National Executive Committee (NEC) according to an article by the Mail & Guardian‟s 
Adriaan Basson (2008) entitled “ANC Rogues‟ Gallery”. The article was compiled after the 
ANC‟s December 2007 Polokwane Conference and the election of 80 individuals to the NEC. 
Among these were individuals58 that have had run-ins with the law for crimes ranging from 
fraud, theft, corruption,  nepotism, departmental investigations, irregular tenders, 
racketeering, money laundering, drunk driving, dodgy drivers‟ licences, contempt of court, 
                                                 
58 Tony Yengeni, Jacob Zuma, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, Bathabile Dlamini, Enoch Godongwana, Ruth 
Bhengu, Jackson Mthembu, Ndleleni Duma, Blade Nzimande, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, Billy Masetlha, Nyami 
Booi, Thaba Mufamadi, Playfair Morule, Jessie Duarte, Angie Motshekga, Sibongile Manana, Baleka Mbete, 
Malusi Gigaba, Siphiwe Nyanda, Ncumisa Kondlo, Mathole Motshekga, David Mabuza, Joyce Mashamba, 
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, Ayanda Dlodlo and Sicelo Shiceka. 
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kidnapping  to culpable homicide. Many of these people were investigated, cleared by the 
courts or commissions of inquiry, convicted or remain under a cloud of suspicion because of 
unanswered questions concerning their dealings. However, many of them have never been 
formally charged and have been internally disciplined, moved or have resigned from the posts 
they held when the scandals broke. This situation shows that no organisation, or individual, 
even the revered ones are immune to corruption and questionable dealings. It was not 
something that was unique to the Bantustans and their functionaries although it was deeply 
rooted. 
There was much talk about reforms in South Africa from the mid 1980s onwards – political, 
social and economic reforms by people from all political persuasions. The writing was on the 
wall for the apartheid regime and its repression was proving untenable, especially with the 
introduction of sanctions and increasing international condemnation. Radicals, conservatives 
and moderates alike wanted to be part of this restructuring or realignment. For better or 
worse, they wanted to be part of the process and to have history look on them favourably. 
Alliances were forged as a means to access political and other forms of power no matter what 
the outcome of the conflict or realignment turned out to be. The black middle class is one 
group which positioned itself in the middle to avoid becoming outsiders and in that process it 
tried to ensure that there was a buffer from the political storms that were being waged beyond 
its control (Glaser, 1987:383-392). It is within this context that Mabuza and the Inyandza 
National Movement‟s actions are examined. Black Consciousness philosophy was not 
regarded as being incompatible with that of the ANC or the PAC even though they were 
different (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:590). The similarities in purpose or intention are spelt out 
in the extract below:  
Even within the Black Consciousness organisation there was a general 
understanding that our role … is to keep the home fires burning, because we 
understood that those liberation organisations that were banned were going to 
eventually come back one day. And we saw our role as continuing on where 
they left off and preparing the ground for their eventual return into the 
country. So, within the Black Consciousness organisation there was general 
acceptance that you could belong to either of the liberation organisations: it 
was a matter of your individual choice (TRC Report Vol. 3, 1998:591). 
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The same argument was made time and again by Enos Mabuza and the Inyandza National 
Movement and they tried to live this thinking out in their day to day affairs. Mabuza‟s speech 
was not intended to be a comfortable solidarity note-comparing session. He referred to it as a 
process of “self-flagellation, for having failed to participate in our people‟s longed-for 
liberation more effectively than we have done…” It was designed to draw attention to the 
pertinent issues of the day and Mabuza sent out the warning that:  
“Those who believe that they can isolate themselves from this process and 
seek immunity from dirtying their hands and entering the fray at this stage in 
the proceedings, reliant  on the conviction that they can come in at the end and 
find themselves a place, are deluding themselves most fearfully. The train is 
about to leave the station for a new South Africa, and even if all the tracks are 
not yet in place along the line, we in the Inyandza National Movement are 
ensuring that we secure our ticket to the future and earn our place on board, as 
a non-racial, democratic political party which ascribes to freedom of 
association on a non-racial and non-ethnic basis” (Mabuza, address at 
Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989). 
Enos Mabuza was invited to address the annual conference of QwaQwa‟s ruling 
Dikwankwetla party and used the opportunity to preach the message that a single unified 
South Africa was in the best interests of all. This could not have been a very popular view 
amongst Bantustan elites but he made the point regardless. The cold war which was premised 
on democracy versus communism was coming to an end and so was apartheid rule in South 
Africa. There was a political reconfiguration happening locally and abroad and Mabuza 
advised the other Bantustan leaders to take heed of this and act accordingly and avoid trying 
to forge another confrontationist balance of power. His belief, and rightly so, was that there 
was no more room for hardline totalitarian regimes because the masses had defied their 
ruthlessness and illegitimacy in other countries, thus setting the stage for South Africa‟s own 
transition to democratic rule. In September 1989, the Conservative Party failed to win the 60 
seats it had expected to win and the Democratic Party won more seats than it had dared 
predict and political prisoners had begun to be released. Mabuza began his address by saying 
„We live in stirring times” and proceeded to reflect on where Bantustan leaders had come 
from (created as the cornerstones of Grand Apartheid) and the litany of apartheid 
discriminatory laws, forced removals and underdevelopment in the Bantustans in abandoned 
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rural areas. He deplored the division of blacks along ethnic lines and the fact that they often 
found themselves at odds with each other. He did not sugar-coat the realities of apartheid or 
Bantustan leaders‟ role in this oppressive system. He admitted that the Bantustan system was 
“a perpetuation of the old divide and rule policy of British colonialism” which had “served its 
purpose all too well.” He described Bantustans as unwitting bed-fellows to the policy of 
divide and rule saying that they allowed themselves to be “used, abused and discarded.” The 
crux of his address was a consideration of where Bantustan leaders were and where they were 
heading (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 1989). 
Instead of distinguishing himself or KaNgwane as a special case, separate or different from 
the other Bantustans, Mabuza saw all Bantustan leaders including himself, as having 
collective responsibility for the shame of the Bantustan system. He stated that  “Our apparent 
acquiescence to and, at times, all too ready absorption into the poor-relation system of self-
governing territories, has given the white minority government the „justifiable‟ excuse to 
exclude blacks from participating in the central legislature.” 
He referred to how Bantustan elites had fallen “for the trappings of power” such as 
“grandiose government buildings, extravagant vehicles, and the pseudo-privilege of our 
office.” He added that “we have been willing if unwitting puppets, ready to dance to the 
master‟s tune. In the process we have left many of our people behind, the poor, the 
undeveloped, those without opportunity, those without hope to attain even the most basic and 
simple standard of living.” In a bold, candid, remorseful and self-critical and chastising 
mood, Mabuza distinguished between the leaders of the independent Bantustans and those of 
the six self-governing ones, the latter being regarded as a lesser evil because the former‟s 
complicity with apartheid seemed so final and complete.  He sounded like a man who had 
had an epiphany of some sort - urging a change for the better, towards unity, peace and 
development for all. He strongly advised that Bantustan leaders reinvent or redefine 
themselves so that they did not land “on the rubbish heap of history in the new South Africa, 
along with the many politicians who have collaborated with their oppressor in the short 
term.” He accepted the failures of Bantustan administrations - corruption and incompetence 
and acknowledged the very circumscribed role that they could play in a democratic South 
Africa. He was realistic about the consequences of their [Bantustan leaders] actions when the 
power balance shifted; a consequence and position which traditional leaders also had to 
accept when all the structures were reintegrated into the new South Africa. He stated that 
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Bantustan leaders had a choice to make; they could either hold on to the old and go down 
with the sinking ship or they could seriously consider where they would fit in and what role 
they could play „to bring to its resolution, our people‟s long, bitter and costly struggle for 
justice and liberty in the land of their birth” (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 
December 1989). 
In typical political rhetoric, Mabuza put forward the questions: 
Where are we today, if not in disarray? What role have the „Bantustans‟ 
played to achieve not only the upliftment and socioeconomic development of 
the people under our care, but the emancipation of our people as a whole? Do 
we have a political track record to be proud of? Have we cooperated and 
worked together, sharing the few skills and resources we may have for the 
common good? What happened to black unity? It would seem that Dr. 
Verwoerd‟s vision has, in many instances, been realised. We are caught not 
only in the trap of race; but also of ethnicity. The divisions between black and 
white are appalling, and tragic. But what of the divisions and distance between 
black and black? Is Dr. Mopeli, your leader, really my brother, or is that no 
more than a cliché we have come to use carelessly through habit? In what way 
have the different tribes, and geographically demarcated ethnic groups of 
South Africa attempted to bridge these artificially maintained and fostered 
barriers? Are we going to be politically categorised forever as Southern Sotho, 
Swazis, Zulus and Xhosas?...Will we be able to defend ourselves 
convincingly? (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, QwaQwa 2 December 
1989). 
There are several ways to interpret Mabuza‟s speech - simple posturing or an opportunist‟s 
way out of a sticky situation - a way to redeem himself, sanitise what he had done and 
possibly present a way for the other Bantustan leaders to try and do the same out of a selfish, 
self-serving fear of being condemned by history and the people. There is almost a sense of 
desperation which conjures the image of rats scurrying off a sinking ship. He concluded his 
speech by noting that “given our experience as leaders of our own people and in 
administration, we have a modest role to play in the future, if we can show that we are 
genuine representatives of a constituency.” 
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Throughout his address, Mabuza refers to „us‟, „we‟ and „our‟ not to refer to Swazis or 
Bantustan elites or blacks but to all South Africans. He uses collective to indicate that this 
was not only a personal or class issue for him but an attitude that everyone needed to adopt 
on an issue which required serious and concerted effort. He added that Inyandza believed 
“that at this critical juncture in the history of our struggle, one has to take the plunge and 
jump in at the deep end with all the others - and swim for the winning line. We will get left 
behind if we do not take this plunge.” The country was entering unchartered territory of 
negotiation, dialogue and peaceful solutions to the constitutional and power-sharing impasse 
but it was not clear who was to participate in the negotiations and whether or not Bantustan 
elites qualified to participate given their history. Perhaps he was preaching to an already 
converted opportunistic audience. Mabuza suggested that all the Bantustan leaders, 
individually or together, meet or make contact with the leaders of these movements in line 
with calls by recently released ANC leaders for those serving in government-created 
structures to join the struggle. Mabuza saw the role of Bantustan leaders in the transition as a 
consultative one where they would not initiate, dominate or set the agenda for any 
proceedings because they were not really in a position of power and were not, strictly 
speaking, legitimate representatives of the people (Mabuza, address at Phutaditjhaba, 
QwaQwa 2 December 1989). 
The liberation movement in South Africa was not a monolith and although white South 
Africans were privileged over the other groups, white political formations emerged which 
were sympathetic to the black man‟s struggle. These included, among others, the African 
Resistance Movement (ARM), the Congress of Democrats, the white women‟s group Black 
Sash and the Progressive Party (with Helen Suzman) which was renamed the Progressive 
Federal Party (PFP) after the 1977 merger with former United Party members of parliament. 
Their rise and contributions to the struggle, no matter how modest, were considered positive 
developments in the country‟s struggle history because of the imperative for unity and joint 
or concerted action which became apparent as the struggle dragged on (Frederikse, 1990). 
The period 1977-1987 is referred to as the reform era in South Africa‟s apartheid history. The 
apartheid regime and white big businesses painted a positive picture of the reforms which 
were by all accounts shallow and led to more conflict and contradiction but it also led to 
different alliances and cooperation involving a wide range of groups. The Institute for 
Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA), for example, was formed in early 1986 by 
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Progressive Federal Party (PFP) members Frederick van Zyl Slabbert59 and Alex Boraine 
who responded to the UDF‟s call for whites to pull out of the sterile environment of 
parliament. Boraine went on to become the vice-chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Mabuza referred to Frederick van Zyl Slabbert as “one of the most prominent 
redeemed Afrikaners” in his briefing at the first ordinary session of the fourth KaNgwane 
legislative assembly in May 1989 following his trip to the Soviet Union with the IDASA 
delegation in April 1989 (Mabuza, 1989a:5).  
Mabuza travelled to the Soviet Union with Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, his wife Jane and 
Prof of Philosophy Johan Degenaar from Stellenbosch University on the invitation of the 
Afro Asian Solidarity Committee. The IDASA delegation held meetings and discussions with 
South African students that were studying in Moscow, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Institute of the World Socialist System, professors and students at Leningrad University, 
the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University and the Africa Institute of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR. Mabuza notes that at the press conferences he was repeatedly asked 
how he justified his position as homeland leader and a politician within the tribal and regional 
authorities to which he said “...involvement affords us the opportunity to politicise them, 
educate them politically and then absorb them into the political mainstream of our own 
movement. In KaNgwane we have succeeded in doing just that” (Mabuza, 1989:7).  
Mabuza was asked where he had been before 1986 when he led a delegation to meet with the 
ANC in Zambia to which he commented that political activity was not as visible before 1986 
so general members of the public did not know what was going on politically in KaNgwane, 
except for the Swaziland land deal but this changed with the institution of the tri-cameral 
parliament (Mabuza, 1989:8-9). Further, he was asked about the relationship between his 
Inyandza National Movement and Chief Buthelezi‟s Inkatha to which he responded, “The 
Inyandza National Movement accommodates and cooperates with all political organisations 
which are committed to a democratic and non-racial society in this country” (Mabuza, 
1989:7). When asked about the future of the homelands, Mabuza stated that he believed that 
they would be stripped of their geo-political status and would eventually disappear because 
they had been rejected by the people. Mabuza was also asked how he reconciled his dual 
political role within and outside government-created structures (Mabuza, 1989:7).  
                                                 
59 On 7 February 1986 Frederick van Zly Slabbert resigned as leader of the Progressive Federal Party, rejecting 
the white political structure. 
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IDASA went on to send several delegations to meet with the ANC in exile in Zambia and 
Senegal (Frederikse, 1990:223 & 225). At the same time, much went on in the Bantustans 
which was publicly unnoticed and unrecorded (Keenan, 1987:117). Mabuza was interviewed 
with the Financial Mail (1989:54) shortly after he returned from an IDASA trip to the former 
Soviet Union in 1989 where they had been invited by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee 
and representatives of the Africa Institute in Moscow and had met with among others, two 
top members of the Central Committee – Dr Andrei Urnov and Dr Vladimir Shubin, South 
African students at the Patrice Lumumba University and ANC representative in the USSR, 
Simon Makana. This was during the States of emergency, restrictions on extra-parliamentary 
organisations spawned by the tri-cameral parliament, the impending retirement of P W Botha 
and the ascendency of F W de Klerk. The Soviet Union had suspended diplomatic ties with 
the South African government which was set on reaching a settlement on its own terms, for 
example, making the release of Mandela conditional upon the release of an SADF prisoner in 
Angola, the release of a Soviet dissident or the renunciation of violence by the liberation 
movements. Part of the mission was to assess the Soviet Union‟s attitude towards South 
Africa and the ANC as well as the liberation movement in general. They discussed the way 
forward and Soviet preference was for a political solution to South Africa‟s political impasse 
as opposed to armed struggle. The Soviet Union was not putting pressure on or prescribing 
any particular course of action to the ANC (Mabuza, 1989a:5-6). 
The Five Freedoms Forum (FFF) was founded in late 1986 as a broad alliance comprised of 
twenty-five organisations ranging from human rights groups to religious, political, 
professional and student organisations. It was formed in response to a call from the black 
community for whites to respond to the State of Emergency. Individual activists such as 
David Webster were instrumental in the founding of the FFF and it gained prominence in the 
debate over white participation in the 1987 parliamentary elections and in 1989 it led 
probably the largest delegation of whites to meet with the ANC. The delegation represented 
the white power bloc comprised of business people, trade unionists, academics, activists, city 
councillors and students as well as politicians from the newest parliamentary grouping, the 
multi-racial Democratic Party which was formed in April 1989 as an amalgamation of the 
Progressive Federal Party, the National Democratic Movement formed in 1988 by breakaway 
PFP parliamentarian Wynand Malan60 and the Independent Party led by a former ambassador 
to the United Kingdom, Dennis Worrall who had resigned from the National Party. This 
                                                 
60 He later served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
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group met with approximately half of the ANC‟s National Executive Committee (NEC), 
including Oliver Tambo himself and was widely regarded as a precursor for future 
negotiations. The FFF‟s main objective was a campaign to heighten awareness of the five 
basic freedoms against which the policies of parties participating in the 1987 white elections 
could be measured - freedom from want, freedom of speech and association, freedom from 
fear, freedom of conscience and freedom from discrimination. Apart from striving for these 
five freedoms, the FFF opposed the Group Areas Act and committed itself to drawing whites 
into tangible anti-apartheid action such as defiance campaigns and supporting the Freedom 
Charter (Frederikse, 1990:223 & 225). 
In addition to working with the ANC, UDF, MDM, IDASA, FFF and other „progressive‟ 
groups, the KaNgwane government consulted an organisation called Interlink Training 
Consultants in the mid-late 1980s in order to orient and position itself as a capable and 
willing change agent. The aim was to train or equip leaders to be change agents because 
meaningful change must be managed (initiated, directed). According to Interlink Training 
Consultants‟ Ronnie Matthews, their philosophy was that real change is found in the not so 
obvious places (unpredictable and unexpected) and sometimes all it takes is for someone to 
reframe the problem/s or issues and re-engage all stakeholders in a non-adversarial or 
constructive way. This applies to relations families, between trade unions and management, 
in business or politics. According to Vusi Nkosi of Interlink Training Consultants (1988), 
their business ran workshops in cross-cultural understanding and interaction. The training 
workshops were designed for a wide range of applications including use by individuals, 
groups, organisations and economic or political systems.  At the interface level between 
supervisors and their subordinates in the workplace, these workshops were designed in 
response to increasing concerns by companies to enrich cross-cultural and intergroup 
relations among their employees so that they could discover and come to respect each other‟s 
personal values and views, thereby creating a foundation for future cooperation and 
understanding (team-building) within organisations.  Companies including Volkswagen 
South Africa, Mobil, Tongaat Sugar, Johannesburg Hospital, Sentrachem and Eskom were 
coming to the realisation that creating a climate of openness and honesty was necessary to 
effectively manage conflict across ideological biases in the workplace and were taking 
advantage of Interlink‟s industry and commerce equity programmes. Interlink‟s programmes 
were not just focused on relations in the workplace but also at youth and community groups. 
Interlink‟s Equity Youth Course was primarily directed at Standard 7-10 and post-Matric 
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students in South Africa. Interlink Training Consultants‟ directors included P. J. van der 
Westhuizen, J. R. Matthews, B. M. Chalmers and J. A. Gon. 
For any kind of movement or organisation to be successful, it must have founders, competent 
leaders and organisers, a name, slogans, goals/programmes such as change and the means to 
achieve it, a sizeable membership or constituency with specific problems or interests held in 
common (collective consciousness), resources and realistic expectations for it to be effective. 
Overlapping or competing social and political positions are part and parcel of any political 
undertaking and can easily lead to conflict and discord but Mabuza was magnanimous 
enough to put his ego aside for the greater good. Whilst it was not always clear if he was 
playing offence or defence, he was deemed decent enough an individual for these groups to 
engage and solicit support and ideas from. It was a leap of faith and Mabuza/Inyandza 
lobbied locally and internationally for change in South Africa, did fundraising work, 
delivered speeches that hit the right notes and granted interviews to the media (Mayibuye, 
Financial Mail etc). Mabuza was being accountable and pro-active in righting whatever 
wrongs he had done in the past. He tried to avoid entrenching hierarchical relations of 
domination, subordination, exploitation or paternalism as if the people were incapable of 
making their own decisions or responsible behaviour. Mabuza‟s administration in KaNgwane 
passed several laws which were considered to be progressive for their time given what was 
going on in the other Bantustans and the country generally. 
1986 - KaNgwane: Labour Relations Repeal Act No. 6 (Commenced: 25 June 1987) 
1988 - KaNgwane: Police Act No. 4 (Commenced: 27 January 1989) 
1988 - KaNgwane: Local Authorities Act No. 9 (Commenced: 17 March 1989) 
1989 - KaNgwane: Public Service Act No. 5 (Commenced: 16 March 1990) 
The Freedom Charter is a document which was designed for intense politicisation or 
propaganda and the word „people‟ is fused into its inclusive spirit (The people shall govern; 
land to the people). According to Steve Tshwete (cited in Frederikse, 1990:160), the word 
„people‟ was used in this document to refer to all classes and social groups irrespective of 
race, colour or creed as long as they rallied around the banner of the ANC for a non-racial, 
united and democratic South Africa. The Mass Democratic Movement and the United 
Democratic Front were largely urban-based broad fronts comprised of civic organisations, 
workers, students, youth organisations and women‟s organisations but they did not preclude 
someone like Mabuza from joining the cause in whatever way they could. The main aim of 
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the UDF as stated in its journal Isizwe in September 1987 was to deprive the enemy (the 
apartheid state) of every support base and potential ally and in the process, render some of the 
regime‟s natural allies wavering and untrustworthy (the UDF cited in Frederikse, 1990:181). 
Enos Mabuza tried to demonstrate his commitment to fighting a common enemy by 
participating in the appropriate political campaigns without leveraging his/Inyandza‟s own 
interests or demands and doing what was within his power, circumscribed as it was, to make 
the lives of KaNgwane residents more better unlike what like Buthelezi and other Bantustan 
leaders chose to do. Mabuza followed these debates and resolutions and heeded calls such as 
these and in the end he chose to be counted on the side of the people and the struggle. 
Mabuza on the International Stage: Validation or Networking? 
Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement (INM), like many others, participated in the 
struggle on the international stage, according to him, in support of the ANC‟s efforts (same 
goals), rather than trying to supplant it. Mabuza earned himself and the Inyandza National 
Movement some credibility within the liberation movement inside and outside South Africa. 
He gained the respect of some local and international leaders and networked with them to 
share views and ideas on the prognosis of political developments in South Africa, thereby 
informing himself about the realities and different perceptions about South Africa‟s situation 
in South Africa and the rest of the world. The proposed incorporation of KaNgwane into 
Swaziland in mid 1982 presented an opportunity for him to lobby support from foreign 
governments so that they in turn could put pressure on the South African government. He 
travelled to countries like Germany, Canada, America and Britain to highlight the unfairness 
of the land deal and this may have contributed to its abortion (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 
June 2007). Mabuza was a member of the Jubilee Trust which was planning the future of a 
democratic South Africa within the international context. In that capacity, Mabuza attended 
and addressed numerous conferences and held consultations with different groups including 
the ANC (Oliver Tambo, Ismail Omar, Matthews Phosa) in exile in 1986 (3-day trip end 
Feb/beginning of March). One of the interviewees, Mr M. S. Ginindza was part of this 
delegation and says that the decision to have this meeting and let it become public knowledge 
was taken at the INM‟s annual congress in 1985. There were security concerns about the 
implications of this and whether the Inyandza delegation would return to South Africa alive 
or not or whether they would be arrested at the airport upon their return. Fortunately for all 
concerned, nothing untoward happened (Mr. M. S. Ginindza - 7 June 2007).  
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Other examples of the people that Mabuza was involved with include Desmond Tutu, Beyers 
Naude, Allan Boesak, Walter Sisulu and Mkhuseli Jack of the Conference for a Democratic 
Future (CDF) which was launched in 1989 and whose conference Mabuza attended in the 
United Kingdom in the same year. Another organisation that Mabuza was involved with is 
the Newick Park Initiative which was established in 1986 to help promote peace in South 
Africa (1987-1991) and later in Rwanda. Others who took part in the Newick Park Initiative 
(South African focus) included Professor Washington Okumu, Nathaniel Masemola, Mr. Tito 
T. Mboweni and Dr. Zola Skweyiya. The Newick Park Initiative was originally an initiative 
to promote credible strategies on constructive social engagement and to search for answers to 
the problems that societies in transition were faced with. This was a peace-building 
consultative process or platform which allowed people of different faiths (or no faith) to work 
towards a common political objective (consensus) during the 1980s States of Emergency in 
South Africa under President P W Botha at a time when hostilities were at their worst and 
there was almost no contact between the ANC and the South African government. Judeo-
Christian teachings and values such as justice and stewardship and insights into social, 
political and economic life according to a biblical social model (love, law - Matthew 22:34-
40) were the foundation used to offer different social models or paradigms to address the 
issues discussed. A total of 10 conferences on the South African situation were held over a 
four-year period. The Newick Initiative has since been renamed the Relationships Foundation 
International and now Concordis International Trust. 
Yet another organisation that he was involved with is the Ditchely Foundation which was 
established in 1958 to advance international learning and to bring approximately 40 experts 
from different professions to discuss/brainstorm pertinent international policy issues and 
concerns at semi-formal conferences. Mabuza attended the Foundation‟s December 1985 
conference which was themed:  “Change in Southern Africa: How Substantial Is It, Where Is 
It Leading and Where Should It Lead?” 
The foundations of such organisations on their own, however, do not exonerate any wrong 
doing on Mabuza or anyone else‟s part. The purpose of such organisations and meetings or 
networking was to consider the alternatives, their chances of success and the means to 
achieve them but such „noble intentions can easily be abused by unscrupulous individuals, 
rendering them ineffective. However, according to people interviewed (Elias Ginindza - 8 
June 2007; Esther Mabuza - 6 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza - 5 June 2007), Mabuza 
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disseminated the insights and information that he gathered from these platforms to South 
Africans (Inyandza, KaNgwane and South Africans generally - who were open to them) as a 
way of preparing them for democracy and the rebuilding (focus, capacity) that needed follow 
the end of apartheid - not for personal gain. 
What then is the difference between Buthelezi and Mabuza (since they were both Bantustan 
leaders) or between him and the white business people that also met with the ANC on several 
occasions? These groups; together or individually had agendas to put forward; declared or 
not. Buthelezi makes this point when he comments that the international community that 
entered the fray, voluntarily or by compulsion, necessarily took positions/sides on the South 
African question because they were individually or collectively pursuing specific agendas 
instead of doing it to be helpful or constructive for the sake of ordinary South Africans. Cold 
War politics, for instance, was a big factor during this time. Mabuza once led an Inyandza 
delegation to meet with then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who was known for 
being conservative and opposed to armed struggle in South Africa as well as the imposition 
of sanctions to force the hand of the South African government61. Despite this, however, 
Mabuza was able to make an impression on Mrs Thatcher and she gradually became 
guardedly sympathetic to the South African cause (Sandile Mabuza, Interview 5 June 2007). 
South Africa‟s Struggle and the Global Dimension 
Anti-racism, anti-privatisation movements, anti-xenophobia, green and solidarity movements 
such as the global justice movement lobby institutions such as the World Economic Forum, 
the World Trade Organisation, G8, the IMF, the World Bank regarding their global policies 
through independent platforms and/or alternative public spheres which demand a lot of well-
meaning volunteers. The World Social Forum, for instance, has been meeting since 2001 as a 
gathering of representatives from various global civil society groups (Thorn, 2007:910-911). 
South Africa is not an island and contact with the outside world was inevitable as evidenced 
by the diverse groups which negotiated the country‟s fate during the struggle. The struggle 
against apartheid was fought on many fronts and travel abroad was an important conduit for 
information (Thorn, 2007:905-907). The use of alternative media forms with a global reach 
(addressing a global audience) was an important source of political influence (public opinion) 
as well as state governments, global corporations and supra-national political institutions. 
Such a strategy for the sharing of political experiences, identities, values and aspirations 
                                                 
61 See Appendix 6 for more on Mabuza‟s activities abroad 
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across national borders led to more than 100 trans-nationally integrated (Britain, India, 
Australia, Sweden, Canada, OAU, UN, EEC, the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) 
and international labour movements such as the International Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ICFTU and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), as well as globally significant 
social movements involving anti-colonial, workers‟, women‟s, solidarity, human rights, 
church/religious movements and youth organisations in countries on all continents supporting 
the anti-apartheid struggles from the 1950s to the mid 1990s. The different formal and 
informal networks of organisations and individuals engaged in information gathering and 
dissemination (collective action/solidarity with the oppressed and exploited black majority) 
both through private and public means (letters, briefings, memoranda, meetings or 
conferences) for a common cause (Thorn, 2007: 896-918). Many South Africans in exile 
became the public faces of the struggle abroad as a way of getting the message to the rest of 
the world, whilst also evading censorship, repression, laws and bannings which made 
political engagement difficult inside South Africa. This type of visibility on the international 
stage carried great risk to individuals because the apartheid regime could target them for 
elimination through different means such as parcel and letter bombs.  
The ANC was the pre-eminent liberation movement but it also relied on allies who were not 
necessarily part of it to articulate the conflict/grievances against apartheid and aims to 
transform South Africa‟s social order. The ANC began to consciously engage in concerted 
media politics in the early 1970s when it established the Department of Information and 
Publicity in London (headed by Thabo Mbeki). The ANC‟s efforts were supported by the 
United Nations‟ Special Committee against Apartheid which financed short-wave anti-
apartheid radio programmes (Radio Freedom) that reached people in different parts of the 
world, including South Africa. The ANC was also given airtime by radio stations in countries 
such as Tanzania Zambia and Ethiopia (Thorn, 2007: 896-918). Academics, journalists and 
activists were invited to conferences organised by various groups, for instance, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (co-sponsored by the Association of British Editors, Harvard 
University and the African-America Institute) in London in 1988. A similar conference was 
held in Berlin in 1981 and another one in Lime in 1988 (Thorn, 2007:914-915). The efficacy 
of economic (disinvestment by some global corporations) and diplomatic sanctions (by the 
EEC, OAU and individual countries) against the apartheid regime, sports boycotts and other 
issues were debated and contributed to the eventual demise of apartheid (Thorn, 2007:913). 
Producing and distributing information through self-controlled channels which addressed 
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both national and global audiences was also a key way to get the message out through news 
bulletins (AA News in Britain or Africabulletinen in Sweden), magazines, films, performance 
art, street theatre, books, photographs, posters, leaflets, pamphlets, t-shirts, stickers, badges, 
cultural events such as drama and music concerts, for example, the Amandla and Mayibuye 
cultural groups which toured Western Europe, the Soviet Union and North America enacting 
dramas. Two „Free Mandela‟ concerts were held in 1988 and 1990 at the Wembley Stadium 
and they were broadcast globally by the BBC (Torn, 2007:909).  All this, according to Thorn 
(2007:896-918), was a good thing but it can be argued that it practice was also hijacked by 
opportunists who were not necessarily fighting the same fight (Maré and Hamilton, 1987: 
135-179). 
 
Figure 12: Enos Mabuza and Oliver Tambo circa 1990. 
Galvanising support for the struggle was important for the struggle so the strategy, in itself, 
was not objectionable since it was an avenue for dialogue between and among different 
groups towards a solution to the worsening humanitarian crisis in South Africa but who 
decided who could represent or champion South Africa‟s black aspirations to international 
audiences? Who initiated the meetings and what did they accomplish?  Maré and Hamilton 
(1987: 135-179) argue that the apartheid regime‟s divide and rule apartheid strategy to 
antagonise and undermine the struggle (black solidarity) was demonstrated on the global 
arena as functionaries in state-created structures such as the Bantustans also took to the 
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campaign trail for personal resource mobilisation and to gain visibility. When all this was 
happening KwaZulu‟s Buthelezi also took the power struggle abroad. Buthelezi travelled 
extensively abroad in attempts to influence reports and views, establish influential contacts 
with sympathisers62. He produced/wrote numerous materials designed specifically for 
journalists, including letters to newspaper or magazine editors. This was ostensibly done to 
highlight the plight and injustice suffered by South Africa‟s black majority but, often times, 
his actions did not reflect favourably on South Africans or the liberation movement 
(Buthelezi, 1986c:5). However, Buthelezi maintains that Inkatha was “truly democratic” 
because its leaders were appointed by the people and were held accountable to the people by 
Inkatha‟s constitution at annual meetings of ordinary members (1986c:4). 
7.11 Conclusion 
As Radcliffe (1994:7) has noted, individual identity or self-concept is layered and complex 
and Mabuza‟s career shows this clearly. Some of the roles he assumed appear incongruous 
and others overlap but they all existed in one person and adapted over time to match changing 
circumstances. Behaviour demanded on one level was often inconsistent with the behaviour 
that was expected on another. The political arena is a treacherous field with many variables 
and possible outcomes. Politics is a popularity contest, it is a game of winners and losers, 
selling ideas and maintaining the right alliances at the right time. Personality also goes some 
distance in maintaining the appeal of politicians, even when they do not always hit the right 
chords. Every leader exposes himself/herself to criticism such that even those that are 
celebrated are not without blemish. Leaders are often put a pedestal or others (circumstances) 
thrust them there but there is no guarantee that they will stay there. Popularity waxes and 
wanes and the fall from grace can be a non-event or it can be a spectacular public scandal. 
The political arena is synonymous with greed, competition, self-interest, rivalry and 
contempt, dishonesty. All the Bantustan leaders have defended, justified and rationalised their 
actions stating that they did not set out to exploit and manipulate the people‟s suffering for 
personal gain. However, there is no doubt that the majority of them actively took advantage 
of the opportunities for graft which were integral to the Bantustan system. 
                                                 
62 US President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher, Israel‟s Shimon Peres, West 
Germany‟s Helmet Kohl and France‟s Jacques Chirac. 
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Mabuza was essentially a trustee or custodian for his constituency since he entered the 
political arena through election by some Swazi chiefs because he was literate when the 
majority of them were not. It arrangement allowed the chiefs to gain an advantage which they 
would otherwise not have had, for example, in handling the land deal. Mabuza‟s position was 
one in which he was supposed to implement the unpopular policies of the apartheid regime 
but he modified it through his cooperation with leaders of the ANC and UDF. His position 
gave him access to resources and contacts that ordinary people did not have. He will never be 
a bona fide or „consecrated‟ struggle icon in the eyes of many because he occupied such a 
compromised position within apartheid administrative structures. However, Mabuza appears 
to have been more circumspect in his dealings with the South African authorities than other 
Bantustan leaders. Accepting the responsibility given to him by the Swazi chiefs may have 
been a misjudgement on his part but if one takes the KaNgwane government and the 
Inyandza National Movement‟s stated objectives to be an accurate reflection of his motives 
and intentions, his faults are not insurmountable. 
Defending Mabuza seems like a misnomer but would KaNgwane have been the same place if 
a different leader was in charge? Would inaction have been a more moral, responsible, 
acceptable or honourable alternative? No one individual is inherently good or bad. It is a 
subjective judgement based on assumed or real motives and intentions and their 
consequences in relation to certain ideals. It is difficult to determine with any degree of 
certainty which of Mabuza‟s decisions, actions or utterances were genuine and which were 
not. The sentimentality of Mabuza‟s family is to be expected but he actually had some 
redeeming qualities. He dealt with conflicting interests and expectations, negative 
perceptions, suspicions and hostilities but was optimistic. The Swazi chiefs who elected him 
to Bantustan politics and the ANC which forged an alliance with him both took a risk with 
the hope that he would do what was mutually beneficial for them. He was authorised by the 
chiefs to articulate their hopes and aspirations. Although trust is a contract which carries 
many unspoken conditions, it was implicit in this arrangement that Mabuza would act on 
their behalf and do so in good faith. In making these associations, Mabuza risked the wrath of 
the apartheid state on himself, his family, his government and Inyandza.  
With regards to the abortive land deal, Mabuza did not resort to violence to resolve the 
dispute. He pursued justice through the courts. In retrospect, opposing the land deal was a 
blessing for the thousands of  South African Swazis who might never have experienced 
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democracy in South Africa had they been handed over to Swaziland in the early 1980s 
(Woodson, 1991:392). De Vos and Romanucci (1975:366) state that “ethnic identity can be a 
positive affirmation containing a negative potential for becoming a hysterical or paranoid 
defence” used to deny the humanness of others. The land deal was a divisive ploy by 
apartheid authorities who, as with the Bantustans, tried to appeal to ethnic identity to justify 
an underhanded manoeuvre (De Vos and Romanucci, 1975:366, 378-379; Kaarsholm, 
1995:37). Mabuza‟s appeal to a common South African citizenship was both instrumental 
and compensatory. He took a stand to expand the social frame of reference for the identity of 
the people of KaNgwane. He cannot be faulted for wanting their identity to be more than just 
Swazi but to be South African as well; for them to someday enjoy the benefits of citizenship 
which they had been denied for so long. The failure of the land deal moved him from relative 
obscurity into the spotlight and may have put the jewel in Mabuza‟s political crown since it 
was debated on the international stage when Mabuza sought legal counsel on the issue.  
Mabuza‟s successful opposition to the deal was ultimately a combination of local resistance, 
legal support from legal practitioners such as Professor John Dugard that prevented the 
state‟s unlawful action in the Swazi land deal. This victory secured KaNgwane‟s borders until 
1994 when the Bantustans were reintegrated into South Africa (Holden and Mathabatha, 
2007:259-260). 
The failed land deal was not a simple issue of him relegating Swazi identity to a position of 
inferiority in favour of a South African identity but was Mabuza selfish, unpatriotic (un-
Swazi) or irresponsible in refusing the land deal when, according to Kaarsholm (1995:42) 
people were losing “belief in the necessity for a single South Africa.” The failure of the land 
deal strained relations among Swazis on either side of the Swaziland border and within 
KaNgwane. The situation created enemies for Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement 
among those that had been promised positions in the leadership of the new territories once the 
incorporation was finalised. The Swazi Tribal Council was also upset and the media in 
Swaziland repeatedly attacked Mabuza as a prodigal son who had turned his back on his 
motherland. His detractors in Swaziland could not understand why he had „denied‟ them land 
which was rightfully theirs. The alternative would have been for him to comply with Pretoria 
and Swaziland‟s wishes but South African Swazis were subjected to the same apartheid 
abuses as other African „groups‟ and their suffering would have been in vain if they accepted 
the deal (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991:61-62). Mabuza‟s resistance was an assertion that black 
South Africans, including Swazis, were entitled to rights and citizenship in South Africa. 
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Mabuza had professional and personal contact with white progressives such as Frederick van 
Zyl Slabbert, Frank Raimondo, Nadine Gordimer, Francis Antonie and Conrad Strauss. They 
all had their own agendas but they had enough common ground to sustain their contact over 
an extended period of time. Mabuza also had contact with many respected black politicians, 
businessmen and religious people at various stages in his career and their motives do not get 
scrutinised as being genuine or not. Mabuza‟s ability to amicably interact with all these 
personalities and form mutually beneficial bonds is a testament to his character. Mabuza 
enjoyed the acceptance of key figures in the ANC, PAC and UDF and it was some 
consolation for the scrutiny that his politics subjected him to. His name might always be a 
footnote in South Africa‟s struggle history but he was able to overcome the contradictions of 
his politics and reconcile with the groups that would hold the reins when apartheid ended.  
Unlike other Bantustan leaders that tried to maintain a strangle hold on power, Mabuza 
recognised and accepted from the outset that his position in politics was not permanent. As 
such, he tried wherever possible to have the confidence of key influential figures. It was a 
strategy that served him well as his transition from politics to business in the next chapter 
shows. He did not become persona no grata as one might expect. His cooperation and 
friendship, such as it was, was welcomed by those that he reached out to. Instead of being a 
puppet of the apartheid state, Mabuza showed initiative in a positive direction. According to 
Holden and Mathabatha (2007:259), Enos Mabuza saw his role as that of using the Bantustan 
structures and his relative influence to protect those under his control while also trying to 
urge the South African government to abolish the Bantustan system in order to create a 
unified and democratic South Africa. 
To conclude, power is easily perverted by self-interest which in turn creates conflict (Held, 
1991:50-51; Beetham, 1991:104). Berlin (cited in Held, 1991:49) makes the flowing 
comment about how conflict is inherent to society:  
“…an intrinsic, irremovable element of human life…we are faced with 
choices between ends equally ultimate and claims equally absolute, the 
realisation of some of which inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. The 
ends of man are many and not all of them are in principle compatible with 
each other.” 
Social spaces are negotiated through legal and other means. Mabuza‟s government could 
have been replaced by the apartheid government or overthrown through a coup but this did 
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not happen. By and large, KaNgwane, as a constituency sanctioned Mabuza‟s by keeping him 
in office for over a decade. They would have devised ways to depose him if he was a 
monster. National symbols such as anthems and flags express people‟s ideologies, patriotism 
and loyalty to a particular identity and history (De Gruchy (1995:57, 67). When most of the 
ten Bantustans adopted their own flags and national anthems (tacit acceptance of the 
Bantustans being separate from South Africa), Mabuza‟s KaNgwane used the South African 
flag and anthem (Die Stem). This was a conscious decision and act of resistance or defiance 
of apartheid policies. It was a statement saying that KaNgwane was not content to be shut-off 
from the rest of South Africa. KaNgwane belonged in South Africa and having its own flag 
would have signified a claim to its own sovereignty, which was not Mabuza‟s wish. Several 
elections were held in KaNgwane and Mabuza and Inyandza retained the voters‟ trust and 
confidence. This endorsement, in turn, this gave Mabuza some degree of credibility and 
respectability.  
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Chapter 8: Mabuza’s Rise to Corporate Prominence 
8.1 Introduction 
The entrenched unequal, disempowering and exploitative economic relations which existed in 
South African before 1994 are the justification or rationale for the implementation of 
economic re-dress and development policies such as Affirmative Action (AA) and Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa post-1994 and of the companies that 
benefited from apartheid policies acknowledged their complicity to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (see for example Gevisser, 2007:14-15, 28-29, 589; Department 
of Trade and Industry SA, 2003; Greenberg, 1998; O‟Meara, 1983; Davenport, 1995; Lipton, 
1986; UNESCO, 1988:10-20; May, 2001:302-326; Callinicos, 1985:7-25; Wilson et al, 
2001:22; Barker, 1999:133, 186-189, 239-240; UNDP, 2000:8-11; Maylam, 2005:148-150; 
Moerdyk and Coldwell, 1990:17; van Niekerk and Heath, 1984; Mufson, 1990; Alden, 
1996:58-59; Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report Volume 4, 1998: 27-50).  
There were varied reasons and fears why white corporate South Africa was changing its 
management culture and philosophy, investing in training and developing human resources, 
corporate restructuring, black advancement, broadening the ownership and management base 
of the economy. Underneath all this, there was also concern over nationalisation and the 
imposition of an undefined taxation formula on wealth. In apartheid South Africa, specific 
notions of development were crucial to deliberate, systematic policies of domination. The 
South African authorities‟ over-arching need to separate blacks from whites and to dominate 
and exploit the black population eventually crystallised in the form of separate and inferior 
development for the black majority. These policies fundamentally altered their life trajectory; 
giving whites all the possible political and economic advantages (Fischer, 1988:127-132). 
Enos Mabuza entered the economic arena when most of these policies were still in force and 
he contributed to their transformation. South Africa‟s political transition in the 1990s was a 
time of uncertainty and possibility for different stakeholders, including Mabuza who had a 
meteoric rise in the corporate sector after resigning as Chief Minister of KaNgwane. Between 
May and December 1991, Mabuza was appointed to the corporate boards of the companies 
below as a non-executive director: 
Anglovaal Limited 
Foundation of African Business 
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Gola Investment (Pty) Ltd 
Metro Cash and Carry Limited 
The Premier Group 
Shell South Africa Limited 
Standard Bank Investment Corporation 
Thebe Investment Corporation 
Times Media Limited 
 Volkswagen South Africa 
For strategic reasons, Mabuza was a part-time executive director for the Independent 
Development Trust Finance Corporation and accepted a position on the State President‟s 
Economic Advisory Council in 1993. At the time, the State President‟s Economic Advisory 
Council was dominated by members of the Afrikaner corporate sector and the Pretoria 
Bureaucracy which did not think that political change would necessarily translate into 
corporate transformation. These company directorships and business involvement entailed 
travelling from Johannesburg to Cape Town twice or thrice a month, attending business 
seminars and conferences. As a board member, he met, usually quarterly, with the other 
board members and was required to give his expertise, time and energy into the businesses or 
organisations that he was attached to. Mabuza commented that his sixteen years in education 
had prepared him for the business of politics but politics had not quite prepared him for “the 
complex world of the politics of business” (Mabuza, 1992:2). Mabuza‟s appointment to 
several company boards “triggered off a series of similar appointments such that black non-
executive directors serving on hitherto white company boards increased from ten to forty 
within a period of six months” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 
1992:3). 
Economic entities or businesses are socially constituted and „embedded‟ within a broader 
socio-political context (Bourdieu, 2005:205,210; Stokman and Wasseur, 2002; Scott and 
Griff, 2002; Hamilton, Orru and Biggart, 2002). Social and historical factors determine the 
environments in which organisations operate and this affects how they respond to changes in 
those environments and the 1992 King Commission and subsequent reports and 
recommendations63 are a concrete expression of this view within the South African context 
(Stokman and Wasseur, 2002; Scott and Griff, 2002; Hamilton, Orru and Biggart, 2002; 
                                                 
63 King Report I (1994) and King Report II (2002) 
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Newton-King, 2004:27-29). The new South Africa entailed many changes and the ANC 
Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (Draft for internal discussion 22 April 1992) 
put on the transformation agenda priority list the new constitution which was  being drafted, 
economic policy and the unbundling of company shareholding, credit and development 
finance, land, a system of local government, housing and basic services, social welfare, 
health, education, human resources, science and technology, environmental issues, arts and 
culture, the police and army as well as international relations. This list covers divergent issues 
and problems which needed urgent redress and these are the same issues that Mabuza‟s 
consultancy kept a close eye on.  As a consultant with useful connections, Mabuza had access 
to sensitive political information in the 1990s, for instance, IDASA‟s Public Opinion Service 
papers (POS Reports) No. 1 of October 1997 (The Evolution of Party Support Since 1994) 
and POS Report No.2 of November 1997 (Public Opinion and the Location of Parliament). 
IDASA‟s surveys analysed the reconfiguration of the main political parties - African National 
Congress, National Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, Freedom Front, Democratic Party, Pan-
Africanist Congress, ACDP, NCF and others and the support they enjoyed after the 1994 
landmark elections. Former Bantustan leaders such as Bantu Holomisa and his United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) in the Eastern Cape stayed in politics as part of the opposition 
after 1994 as did Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The IFP was 
retained its reputation as an ethnic organisation whilst the PAC and AZAPO struggled to 
shake off their racist images. Constand Viljoen‟s Freedom Front focused on white Afrikaner 
interests in Gauteng, the Free State and Northern Cape and was regarded as a right-wing 
element which was resistant to change and was therefore not progressive enough such that it 
also had trouble reinventing itself. The Freedom Front lobbied for an Afrikaner Volkstaat as 
opposed to the nation-building aims of the all-inclusive democratic society or new rainbow 
nation. The survey also highlights defections to other parties, for example, Musa Myeni, Ziba 
Jiyane, Frank Mdlalose and Walter Felgate of the IFP defected to the ANC although partisan 
support for particular parties remained strong. Further, the survey showed high support for 
the ANC and IFP64 respectively among the Swati who constituted the majority in the former 
KaNgwane Bantustan (Mattes, Africa, and Jacobs, 1997:15 - IDASA‟s Public Opinion 
Service papers No.1). IDASA‟s Public Opinion Service Press Briefing No. 2 (November 
1997) follows the debate over where the seat of parliament was to be. It shows significant 
                                                 
64 Mpumalanga shares a border with KwaZulu-Natal. 
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support for the seat of parliament to remain in Cape Town instead of moving it to Pretoria or 
elsewhere (Midrand, Bloemfontein). 
The theoretical orientation for the analysis of Mabuza‟s business career is informed by the 
interactionist theories put forward by Langford (1971:1-10, 19, 25, 36, 42), Granovetter 
(1985), Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Bourdieu (1977; 1998; 2005:16, 193-222, 299), 
Bringheti (2007:335-336) and Giddens (1991; 1984). Social capital (networks) is essential to 
the functioning of the economic field and the economic practices of agents. In turn, the 
strength of these networks depends on the position occupied by the agents within a given 
field (Mills, 1956). Individuals form different types of associations or networks and the 
composition of these networks changes over time to reflect new interests and situations 
(Mills, 1956). Businesses and other entities also form groups and associations for similar 
reasons because economic relations are embedded in networks of social relations which 
depend on trust and also generate it as opposed to being atomistic or mechanistic.  
Individuals assume multiple executive or board-level posts in different organisations to 
reinforce their influence, power or authority (Brint, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Palmer, 2002; 
Scott and Griff, 2002; Naidoo, 2007). Koenig and Gogel (1981) refer to this as a class 
hegemony model which facilitates direct interaction and communication of values and beliefs 
among directors and creates a business elite or capitalist class culture which guides the 
behaviour of business leaders and socialises new directors. Multiple directorships, 
prominence and power among the business elite or capitalist class generally correlate to the 
individuals‟ positions in other social groups or networks, for instance, exclusive social clubs, 
business or government policy groups (Palmer, 2002:263-264; Scott and Griff, 2002:329; 
Bunting and Barbour, 2002; Mills, 1956). The extent to which the interests of directors 
coincide with those of the organisations which they are affiliated to determines the 
effectiveness or mutual benefit derived from the inter-organisational links. The phenomenon 
of interlocking directorships is not usually a coincidence but an orchestrated long-term goal 
within a given network. Individuals with multiple board memberships become recognised and 
respected captains of industry and opinion leaders and through their respective organisations, 
cliques or clusters, business executives are afforded opportunities to create matrices of social 
transactions with similar-minded capitalists65 and thus perpetuate the privileges of a dominant 
                                                 
65 Tokyo Sexwale, Matthews Phosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, Patrice Motsepe and others. 
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class (Emirbayer, 2002:140; Bunting and Barbour, 2002:186, 194; Scott, 1997; Dippenaar, 
2004:159-161). 
Multiple directorships allow individuals to influence socio-economic and political issues 
regarding policies by virtue of their positions and the performance of their firms. Several of 
South Africa‟s political or business leaders are related to each other and have economic 
interests in numerous corporations. Lunsche, Naidoo, Radebe, Bisseker, Hlengani, Honey and 
Ryan  (2006:26-33) comment on a survey of South Africa‟s most influential power-couples 
which include politicians, trade unionists, parliamentarians (cabinet ministers) and business 
people, among them Trevor Manuel and his partner Maria Ramos, Sam Shilowa and Wendy 
Luhabe as well as Brian and Portia Molefe. 
The network or web metaphor (Granovetter, 1995; 1998; Castells, 2000) and risk-trust 
theories (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Sztompka, 1999; Boon, 2004; Dippenaar, 2004; 
Ekberg, 2007) illustrate that Mabuza‟s rise to prominence in the corporate sector was not an 
accident. Trust is crucial in any sustained relationship and it was vital to the negotiations and 
compromises which led to South Africa‟s political transition. Mabuza‟s prominence in the 
corporate sector illustrates the link or intersection between an individual actor‟s interests (the 
need for validation derived from symbolic capital in the form of membership to a particular 
group or club, seniority, status and respect) and those of a group or class in the business field. 
It is not unusual for directors or the highest ranking officers of companies to sit on at least 
five different boards of big corporations at any given time through a system of co-optation 
which creates possibilities for policy co-ordination and information sharing (Stokman and 
Wasseur, 2002:340; Williams, 2006:20-24).Visibility within the public domain was 
empowering and beneficial in the long-term for Mabuza because key economic and political 
players valued his reputation as an even-handed person. He was useful to them in spite of his 
controversial and ambiguous position in the Bantustan system. Many of the companies (blue 
chip) which Enos Mabuza served as a director were (many still are) registered on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and others, such as, Anglo-Vaal were registered on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
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8.2 Enos J Mabuza & Associates: Vision and Objectives  
Mabuza launched his own fledgling socio-political consultancy business66 at the beginning of 
August 1991with Beverley Johnson as his was personal assistant. The business had its offices 
on the third level of the Premier Group Centre in Killarney, Johannesburg and it analysed 
South Africa‟s changing socio-political environment. An undated document entitled The 
Strategic Direction of Enos J. Mabuza & Associates states the firm‟s aim as that “to 
understand industrial and regional political structures and developments” taking into account 
the broad spectrum of political players. The mission or objective of the consultancy firm, in 
his own words, was “to influence the process and outcome of political change to a peaceful, 
democratic and prosperous country through the organisations in which I am involved; and to 
influence the policies and strategies of these organisations to position themselves to prosper 
throughout the transition and in the post-apartheid era.” Mabuza was able to influence 
organisations through the power of knowledge (the relevant knowledge at the right time) by 
familiarising himself with the policies and strategies of client organisations, understanding 
their rationale in order to address inadequacies and keeping abreast with current affairs 
during South Africa‟s transition and beyond. He researched, read and discussed all the issues 
highlighted in this chapter in meetings and conferences which allowed him to establish an 
information network of contacts that could support him when he put forward ideas in board 
meetings. Some of the people he shared ideas with included Jeremy Horne (Deloitte and 
Touche), Conrad Strauss (Standard Bank Investment Corporation Limited), Don D. B. 
Mkwanazi (New Empowerment Trust) and Rob Cox (HL & L Holdings). 
Mabuza‟s objective with Enos J. Mabuza & Associates was to learn from and add value to 
the corporate sector by attending as many conferences and business forums as he could to 
gather as much information as he could about the changing business environment. In the 
early 1990s, the main focus was on issues regarding affirmative action and the issue of token 
private sector appointments from a small pool of black professionals because of the lack of 
managerial and technical skills among blacks; reform in the education sector to address the 
skills deficit; the enrichment of individuals as opposed to prosperity on a broad-based front; 
the creation of a new black elite and the increase in black directors; corporate governance 
(practices, ethics, global trends and competitiveness); the privatisation of state-owned assets, 
unbundling the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, trade unions and pension funds, emerging 
                                                 
66 Enos J Mabuza and Associates (P O Box 1553 Parklands 2121). 
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black businesses such as New Africa Investments Limited (Nail), Real Africa Investments 
and NAFCOC and the public sector. The role of banks (the financial sector) in development 
was also a major focus with regards to the extension of finance for small medium and micro 
enterprises. 
To begin with, Mabuza‟s consultancy firm had Anglovaal, the Conservation Corporation, 
Deloitte & Touche and French-based Digital Computer Group as its clients. Through his 
consultancy business, Mabuza was able to stay on the pulse of corporate strategic planning 
and human resources development 67. Mabuza was invited to numerous public speaking 
engagements and participated in local and international conferences, for example, he 
travelled to the United Kingdom in September 1989 and had a meeting with the Prime 
Minister. He also visited the Soviet Union in 1989 with an IDASA delegation led by Dr 
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, University of the Western Cape Rector Professor Jakes Gerwel 
and Professor Johan Degenaar of the University of Stellenbosch‟s Philosophy department. 
This visit made Mabuza the first Bantustan leader to visit the Soviet Union. Mabuza and his 
wife also attended a luncheon in Phalaborwa hosted by the RTZ mining company and a 
dinner in Johannesburg hosted by Johan Rupert, both in honour of Britain‟s Margaret 
Thatcher in early 1991. In all this, Mabuza was surprised and concerned by the fact that he 
was usually the only black businessman travelling and attending such business conferences 
and seminars (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:3). Mabuza 
managed to carve a modest niche for himself in the corporate sector and over time some of 
Mabuza‟s major clients included Anglo-American, Anglovaal, Gencor, Premier, SAB, 
Edgars, Eskom, Telkom, Standard Bank, Southern Life, Sanlam, Fedsure, JP Morgan, 
Morgan Stanley, the Ministry of Finance, Trade and Industry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
and some provincial departments, the office of the President and that of the Deputy President. 
The changes that were taking place enabled Mabuza to run his consultancy. They also 
showcased the power of personal ambition and having the right connections or capital. 
Enos J. Mabuza & Associates offered political commentary and permutations for South 
Africa in the early 1990s. Through his consultancy firm, Mabuza compiled a series of 
political updates which outlined the progress of the CODESA talks; the political alliances and 
realignments that were forming, the risks, compromises and gambles, boycotters, dark horses, 
                                                 
67 At various times in the 1990s, Enos J Mabuza & Associates had Dr E. J. Mabuza, Ms B. A. Mabuza (one of 
his daughters), K. Shubane and F.G. J. Antonie as partners and  I. M. Melamed, K. Shubane and Dr. F. van Zyl 
Slabbert as associates. 
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stalemates and ultimatums which were made by the key players including the ANC, NP, IFP, 
SACP, PAC, AZAPO, COSATU, the Conservative Party, the Afrikaanse Volksfront and the 
Democratic Party. In a February 1993 update, for instance, Mabuza highlighted that Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi wanted the question of a federal constitution to be non-negotiable. 
The same update also touched on the importance of voter education and the role of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (Mabuza, 26 February 1993a, South Africa – A Political 
Update). Another briefing dated 18 June 1993 focuses on the Multi Party Negotiating Forum, 
the positions of left and right-wing political groupings, the South African 
government/National Party, the ANC and the security establishment including the police and 
army and the implications of their respective positions for the political transition. There were 
insiders and outsiders, front runners and the rest and this was accompanied by much 
posturing and political flirtation such that any changes in the positions of the main players 
had to be monitored closely (Mabuza, 18 June 1993b, South Africa - A Political Update). 
Appendix 5 lists the contents of some of the other briefings produced by Mabuza‟s 
consultancy as he continued to monitor the transition. 
Mabuza served on several educational, environmental and community trusts including the 
Independent Development Trust, University of the Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians 
College Council, Promat Colleges68, the National Parks Board, Trees for Africa and the State 
President‟s Advisory Economic Council. He comments that although the adjustment was 
challenging, it was also a rewarding experience which made “the remaining term of my 
national service” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:3). 
During his tenure as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister, Mabuza had participated in numerous 
leadership development programmes in Africa, North America and Europe, for instance, he 
was an alumnus of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University in Washington DC and is listed under the class of 1990 in the programme sheets 
for the alumni reunion which was held in Helsinki Finland in June 2005 (Edmund A. Walsh 
School of Foreign Service, 2005: 26). Mabuza also attended the Georgetown School of 
Foreign Service Alumni Conference in East Berlin in 1992. 
Almost a year after Mabuza resigned as Chief Minister of KaNgwane, he updated former 
members of his staff who had emigrated to Munich Germany about changes in South Africa, 
his new career in the “challenging and stimulating” world of business. He reflected on the 
                                                 
68 Mabuza travelled to New York, Washington DC and London with John Rees in September 1992 on a Promat 
Colleges fundraising trip. 
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messages and letters of support and encouragement that he and his wife Esther had received 
from friends in South Africa and abroad upon his resignation from politics as follows:  
The generals and captains of industry academics, advocates, community 
leaders and the press were spontaneous and generous in their expression of 
appreciation for the modest contribution I had made towards the political 
changes that are currently taking place in our country. Although some 
members of the present government establishment, especially the bureaucrats 
and the security establishment, were pleased to see me go, two senior Cabinet 
Ministers pleaded with me  to reconsider my decision and I had no reason to 
doubt their bona fide. The State President, Mr F. W. De Klerk, wrote me a 
nice and encouraging letter in which he thanked me for the contribution I had 
made to the current political transformation of our country. The National 
Executive of the African National Congress (ANC) sent a high-powered 
delegation to plead with me to rescind my decision. Although they did not 
persuade me, to change my mind, I was of course flattered that they thought so 
highly of me! On the other hand, I was puzzled that they wanted me to 
continue to lead a Bantustan government, indeed a structure which they had 
opposed so vigorously during the past thirty years (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly 
Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:2). 
Mabuza comments on the speculation at the time of his resignation that he was “going to join 
and serve on the National Executive Committee of the ANC” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly 
Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:4). Mabuza adds that “At no stage did I consider such 
a move, and in any event, it would have compromised my venture into the world of 
commerce” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:4). He claims 
that he wanted to be politically non-aligned whilst maintaining his relationships and contact 
with the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the National Party (NP), 
the Azanian People‟s Organisation (AZAPO) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose 
confidence and trust he was privileged to enjoy.  
Within a period of about five years (from his retirement from politics in 1992 until his death 
in 1997), Enos Mabuza had served on the boards of no less than a dozen predominantly 
white-owned companies including Volkswagen SA, Shell SA, South African Breweries, 
Times Media Ltd, Gascor, the Premier Group Limited, Metro Cash & Carry, the Anglo-Vaal 
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mining group, Standard Bank SA, the South African Parks Board and the President‟s 
Economic Advisory Committee. Most of these positions, however, were non-executive but 
this was quite a coup for a black person since it was rare for a black person to occupy such 
positions at the time. He was already an influential public figure in his own right and thus had 
one foot in the door by the time the political changes were felt in the economic sphere.  
Enos Mabuza had the support of moderate whites (particularly those in business) and the 
ANC leaders that he had worked with or assisted over the years when he was Bantustan 
leader. Mabuza‟s achievements in business no doubt roused much admiration, suspicion and 
controversy. It can be argued that his involvement in business was purely for personal gain 
and ambition but happened to fit into a bigger strategy which was designed to benefit the 
country or the previously disadvantaged population. In this analysis, the first question that 
comes to mind is: what qualified Enos Mabuza for these positions? Was he the victim of 
white capitalists (as an extension of the apartheid state) or did he deliberately redefine 
himself and carve out a new niche in the public sphere, thus consolidating the power and 
influence that he had enjoyed as KaNgwane‟s Chief Minister (Cheater, 1999; Friedmann, 
1992)?  
The immediate conclusion would be that these arrangements stood to benefit all the parties 
involved for strategic reasons (motives and intensions), given his previous position within the 
Bantustan structures. However, Enos Mabuza also had more active roles on the boards of 
investment companies which were aligned to the ANC, such as the Independent Development 
Trust, the Kagiso Trust, Thebe Holdings and New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL). 
According to his son, his role was to advise them and facilitated links between them and 
established white businesses on whose boards he sat (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 
2007). This seems rather odd at first glance given Enos Mabuza‟s association with the 
apartheid state through the despised Bantustan structures. Bantustan leaders were regarded 
with suspicion as greedy sell-outs or traitors so why did the ANC‟s leadership trust him 
enough to give him such positions and responsibilities when his profile was sullied by this 
association?  
This chapter answers these questions by arguing that although Enos Mabuza had been part of 
the Bantustan structures, he had more to offer and both white capital and ANC businesses 
compromised and accommodated him based on their strategic and long-term goals.  Bourdieu 
(2005) argues that politics and business strategies within a capitalist system involve some 
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degree of greed, selfishness, opportunism, manipulation and risk-taking (by operational 
definition or practice). Braithwaite (cited in Langford, 1971:87) states that circumstances are 
“causes or part-causes of an agent‟s goal-directed activities at the time when an external 
occasion for the action arises.” A disinterested act is not possible because individuals 
consciously (usually deliberately, although such decisions can be made under duress) invest 
their time and energy and often risk their reputations based on probable outcomes and utility 
maximisation. Based on the assumption that individuals think in terms of (or are Driven by) 
specific intentions, motives and goals and the uncertainty entailed by South Africa‟s political 
transition to democracy, one ultimately comes to the conclusion that all the parties (including 
Enos Mabuza) stood to gain from the arrangement in some form (Cheater, 1999; Freidmann, 
1992). The conditions were ripe for many stakeholders to re-assess their positions and make 
the necessary changes (means-ends, win-win trade-off) to keep in step with the changing 
socio-political environment. These changes were driven by individual greed and ambition in 
some instances and in others; they were influenced by consideration of the long-term goals of 
different constituencies (Nattrass, 1994).  
The African National Congress realised the limits of change and the need for co-operation in 
rebuilding and sustaining the economy. Delivering on promises that were made to all South 
Africans in a democratic dispensation and reconciling the needs of white capital and those of 
the black businesses required balance and long-term strategic planning. According to 
Bourdieu (2005:196), the information (as a form of capital or resource) that individuals who 
occupy prominent positions are privy to in the economic field, for example, through their 
presence on company boards allows them to improve their position by capitalising on 
changes in the environment. South Africa‟s transition following the unbanning of the ANC 
and other organisations in 1990 created enough room for individuals like Mabuza to re-invent 
themselves.  
The continuities in Mabuza‟s career; first in education, then politics and later in business, 
shows that he either had good timing or that he was a versatile and adaptable opportunist who 
was able to capitalise on different situations and draw on different sources of support to 
endorse his transitions from the different spheres. By the time he joined the corporate sector, 
he knew from experience how the political game was played (who wins or gains and how 
they do it) and he applied those rules to his foray into business.  At the same time, the ANC 
was transforming itself into a negotiating partner and government-in-waiting and its attitude 
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and the tone of its debates and negotiations, especially with regard to political and economic 
issues, is described by Nattrass as “pragmatic and accommodating” (1994:343). However, the 
ANC did not lose sight of one of its goals which was the political emancipation of the 
majority of South Africans who were excluded from the economic mainstream by apartheid. 
In realise this goal, one of the ANC‟s strategies was to cultivate black economic advocacy 
and forging partnerships with leading white businesses (McNulty, 1994:24-26).   
The ANC groomed some of its leaders for business and the corporate sector so that they 
would be sufficiently equipped to control and defend the political and economic freedoms 
that were fought for in the struggle against apartheid (Gqubule, 2006). This strategy led many 
of COSATU‟s prominent leaders, including Jay Naidoo, Alec Erwin, Sam Shilowa and 
Marcel Golding to leave the labour movement in order to further the interests of labour as 
politicians (Nattrass, 1994:357-358). Although their reasons for embarking on a new career 
path most likely differed from Mabuza‟s, the example serves to highlight the fact that 
profound change marked the transition. Today, many politicians are resigning or retiring from 
positions in government to join the business sector and become „captains of industry‟. The 
distinction between personal ambition and greed is never a clear one. Whilst it is possible that 
Mabuza became an influential corporate figure for personal ambition and recognition, his 
own more pragmatic explanation is that he accepted these positions with the endorsement of 
ANC leaders in order to lay the foundation for the eventual benefit of South Africa‟s 
previously economically marginalised people (Mabuza cited in Randall, 1996:670). 
8.3 Mabuza as a Valuable Ally for White Capital 
The ANC‟s Oliver Tambo‟s commented as follows on a Radio Freedom broadcast from 
Addis Ababa on 5 October 1985 regarding whether or not businessmen and industrialists had 
a role to play in the struggle: 
There is room for their participation. They assess the apartheid system in 
terms of the profits or losses it yields…If they reach the conclusion that the 
apartheid system is going to destroy their interests, destroy their business, the 
whole economy, at that point they will want to remove the apartheid system 
and will even join with forces that are set out to destroy the system, provided 
they are sure that the system will not be replaced with something worse for 
their economy, for their pockets, for their profits. But to the extend that our 
Page | 315 
 
struggle has demonstrated that there is no future for them or even for the 
economy to that extend they will begin to move out of South Africa promptly 
against the regime, because within limits, because they are still part of it, it 
means that they can be an additional lever, a position which favours our 
struggle…if it serves the purpose of weakening the ability of the regime to 
resist, if it helps to destroy the system, then we welcome that (Tambo cited in 
Buthelezi, 1985b:4). 
The quote above alludes to the self-interests involved in the transaction as well as the 
changeable nature of the political terrain that everyone was treading. Afrikaner intellectuals 
and white business people were in favour of constructive engagement. They were concerned 
about the instability and damage which armed struggle would cause and thus approached the 
ANC mission in exile (Lusaka) to seek the suspension of armed struggle in favour of 
negotiation. Anglo American‟s Gavin Relly and Tony Bloom were among those who went on 
this mission. 
South Africa was undergoing a political transition when Enos Mabuza entered the economic 
sphere and his services were sought after to facilitate the transformation objectives of 
historically white businesses in terms of the representation of blacks, business attitudes and 
policy, for example, when he was with the National Parks Board and when former President 
De Klerk appointed him on the board of the South African Broadcasting corporation; a 
position which Mabuza did not accept in the end. Transforming the economy was beginning 
to be accepted as inevitable and necessary and this attitude was starting to be mirrored in the 
business or economic sector to some degree in the early 1990s. White businesses were 
making a conscious commitment to business ethics, moral behaviour and accountability in 
labour relations, thereby contributing to reconciliation and development. A change in 
mindsets based on moral arguments which acknowledges business‟s social responsibility was 
necessary because as the TRC Report notes, “morality is an important ingredient of viable 
business” (TRC Report Volume 4, 1998:54) and businesses could no longer afford to dismiss 
social concerns. 
Mabuza was a moderate politician (potential to be flexible and thus to unify through 
compromise), and was a good candidate to act as the vehicle for tentative image change for 
white corporates when the demise of apartheid was imminent. One can argue that Mabuza‟s 
acceptance of numerous corporate board appointments was not selfless but was fuelled by 
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personal ambition and the need to maintain his prominence as a public figure (status, 
influence and power) (Granovetter, 1985; 1995; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Castells, 2000; 
Bringheti, 2007). It is possible that he was merely a stooge board member for white capital 
but he was able to exploit useful personal connections to his own ends.  
Bourdieu maintains that the real is relational and people negotiate social space or positions in 
all spheres of life (contexts and social constraints). Social spaces are differentiated positions 
which are defined by the place they occupy within a given field and the distribution of 
different types of capital (Bourdieu, 1998:3-9, 15). As such, there is nothing inevitable about 
the constraints and inducements which are introduced in the economic field by dominant 
firms and such constraints and inducements should be seen as conscious, deliberate or 
considered actions (Bourdieu, 2005:201-202, 206). People generally choose their associates, 
as well as those that they do not want to associate with and this entails a deliberate thought 
process or premeditation based on objective and subjective reasons which are not necessarily 
malicious but ultimately include or exclude one alternative or another from a given set of 
options. The social rules of association work on evolutionary, Darwinian rules of natural 
selection and are essentially alliances for mutual benefit. These „marriages of convenience‟ 
are most evident in the lives and careers of Hollywood celebrities (movie actors, musicians), 
politicians or when countries are at war and need allies, business people, everyday „normal‟ 
friendships and marriage. Individuals pick partners, spouses or business associates with 
certain qualities or connections and this is based on a calculation of how much they can each, 
or collectively, benefit from the association. Such an outcomes-based utility maximising 
behaviour can have positive (status, fame, sex appeal, power, money or reviving a career that 
has stagnated, perhaps even changing careers) or negative consequences, although the 
benefits normally outweigh the risks or negatives. The relationships are a function of 
ambition (career moves), opportunity and timing; provided it suits all the parties involved. 
These relationships of convenience or expediency benefit the weaker individuals who hitch a 
ride on the coat tails of the stronger or more successful ones, resulting in an instant upgrade 
in their credentials or profiles, which in turns gives them access to things they would 
otherwise have been excluded from (it opens doors). 
This section considers why white capital was partial to Mabuza as demonstrated by the 
number of board-level positions which he held in historically white-owned and controlled 
companies in the early 1990s. Before the debacle of the incorporation of the KaNgwane 
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Bantustan into Swaziland in the mid 1980s, it would not have been difficult to imagine or 
project a future in which Bantustan politicians would have formed some sort of alliance with 
white businesses in a democratic South Africa. However, Mabuza‟s refusal of the apartheid 
government‟s incorporation plan created fractures in that relationship and led to the 
temporary suspension of KaNgwane‟s self-rule status and the imposition of N.J. Badenhorst 
as its administrator between 18 June and 9 December 1982. It is not improbably that his 
actions (non-co-operation) would have been seen as biting the hand that feed or becoming the 
prodigal son in some respects and alienated him from white capital too since it played an 
integral part in maintaining the apartheid system. Despite this, however, Mabuza was 
accepted back in the fold (so to speak) and became a prominent player in the high stakes 
economic game which was key to deciding South Africa‟s future once the political 
negotiations and transition was over (good corporate governance, responsibility, 
accountability and sustainability). The term „Uncle Tom‟ is derogatory and it is commonly 
used to describe black people whose political views or allegiances are considered by their 
critics (normally from the same group) to be detrimental to the groups aspirations by being 
deferential to white authority, usually with the promise of reward in kind (Stowe, c2007). 
Mabuza‟s sudden rise to prominence in the economic field, partly on the shoulders of 
established white capital can be analysed in this way but as the rest of this chapter shows, he 
capitalised on other factors which were at play at the time (opportunity cost). 
Mabuza‟s rise to prominence within the upcoming black business elite was probably 
unforeseen by many but it has also been documented that the apartheid government actively 
tried to create a black business or middle class in the 1980s so that this group, because of its 
class interests, would act as a buffer between the state and the masses (Gevisser, 2007:133). 
Mabuza found himself on a new path which effectively gave him a new lease in the public 
sphere. At the time, white corporate South Africa had an opportunity to „voluntarily‟ redefine 
or transform itself by changing its practices and profiles and Mabuza was one of the few 
individuals that were seen as neutral within the political firmament of the 1990s. However, 
according to Bourdieu (2005:201-202, 206), there is nothing inevitable about the constraints 
and inducements which in the economic field, whether they are introduced by individuals or 
dominant firms. Most actions are deliberate and considered.  
Among the explanations offered for Mabuza‟s nominations, acceptance and appointments to 
these positions are his biographical information (black male, educated, politically moderate 
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or ambivalent) and the contacts that he made with „moderate‟, „liberal‟, „progressive‟ or 
„sympathetic‟ whites. He was already privileged and part of an elite by virtue of being the 
leader of one of the ten Bantustans. During South Africa‟s political transition, the onus was 
on white capital to show its commitment to change (goodwill) by involving people across the 
colour bar in directorships as well as creating the „right‟ work environment for employees to 
ensure that the economy did not suffer adversely (Wilkinson, 1998: 45; Vogt and Murrell, 
1990). Essentially, the so-called progressive white companies needed black board members 
because as Williams (2006:20-24) notes, non-executive directors were the exception than the 
norm because former executives (white) served a company boards in the 1990s. Black 
directors were in short supply such that it was common for the few individuals operating at 
that level to hold several directorships or chairmanships simultaneously, provided their other 
commitments allowed it (time constraints in terms of board and committee meeting 
attendance) and as long as no obvious conflicts of interests arose between the different 
companies which they represented. As a retired politician, Mabuza could afford the time to 
serve on several boards in a non-executive capacity at any one given time and his board 
appointments consolidated the status that he already had. South Africa‟s shortage of black 
directors still persists and many of the current ones hold numerous board positions (Williams, 
2006). 
In respect of contacts or networks being used to facilitate mobility, it is worth noting that 
retired politicians/civil servants are no strangers to the corporate world or company boards 
because they use this need for balance, together with the influence and social capital which 
they accumulate whilst still in public office, to propel themselves into new careers 
(Granovetter, 1995; Bourdieu, 1990). The contacts or networks created (who you know who 
already occupies a position/s of influence) are important resources (Mills, 1956). Mabuza‟s 
son Sandile notes that his father used to host business breakfasts with moderate whites in the 
business community during his tenure as Chief Minister of KaNgwane (Sandile Mabuza 
Interview, 5 June 2007). Mabuza used his accumulated social capital to create links with 
influential business-people who assisted his entry into the corporate sector. Dr. Frederick van 
Zyl Slabbert (of white opposition parties such as the Progressive Party and later the 
Progressive Federal Party in the 1970s and 1980s) was one such contact. Van Zyl Slabbert 
later became the Director of Policy and Planning for the Institute for a Democratic South 
Africa (IDASA, now the Institute for Democracy in South Africa), co-founded the black 
investment trust Khula in 1990. Another examples of influential political and business 
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contacts that Mabuza made when he was Chief Minister of KaNgwane was Dr. Conrad 
Strauss of Standard Bank South Africa and Rembrandt‟s Anton Rupert who became a close 
friend (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007; Adam, van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley, 1997; 
Lazerson, 1994). Mabuza maintained these contacts with influential business leaders after he 
set up his own business consultancy firm when he retired from Bantustan politics. 
According to Scott and Griff‟s (2002:331) distinction, the fact that Mabuza was black, a 
teacher and politician for most of his career means that he was an outsider to the white-
dominated corporate system (the odds for success were against him). In practice, however, 
Williams argues that a mix of directors from inside and outside an organisation brings varied 
and valued input and expertise (in areas such as labour/HR, finance or sensitivity to the socio-
political environment) in order to benchmark and evaluate strategies which affect the bottom-
line (profits) and how the organisation is perceived (2006:20-24). Many South African 
businesses were high risks for investors because of sanctions and blacklisting at the height of 
apartheid. Change was necessary in order to create and boost investor confidence from the 
transition onwards (Newton-King, 2004:27-29). It became expedient for white businesses to 
adopt an inclusive common-purpose approach which created opportunities for mutual gain. 
Since then, manifestations of corporate responsibility and voluntarism have been based on 
this utilitarian win-win mentality and Ubuntu philosophy of collectivism - I am because we 
are (Newton-King, 2004:27-29). 
During the TRC‟s institutional hearings, influential white businesses or business groupings 
including the South African Chamber of Mines, the South African Chamber of Business 
(SACOB), the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), the 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd, 
Rembrandt International Group Ltd, the Council of South African Banks (COSAB), Shell 
South Africa and South African Breweries agreed that a racist corporate culture was a major 
impediment to the success of affirmative action and that steps needed to be taken to remedy 
the situation. They acknowledged that the failure of their businesses to allow black people 
into senior positions had obstructed economic growth and that a new framework that 
recognised and promoted black unions (job positions, wages, medical schemes, pensions and 
other benefits) was necessary to improve industrial relations. However, they did not reach 
consensus on how all this was to be achieved (TRC Report Vol 4, 1998:40).  
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The relationships in South Africa‟s economy were characterised by a high level of mistrust as 
the diagram below illustrates, with projections of the ideal or desired state as the ultimate 
goal: 
 
Figure 13: Levels of Trust in the South African Economy (Boon, 2004:294) 
There were a few things that Mabuza brought to the table in the general milieu of South 
Africa‟s political and economic transition. For starters, he was a political moderate or 
reformist who did not take extreme or radical positions. Instead of this fence-sitting or luke-
warm approach making him a risky option, it made him attractive to both established white 
businesses and emerging black ones during the transition because he was flexible enough to 
transcend boundaries on either side. If one uses the utilitarian approach, it is easy to see why 
Mabuza was a „natural‟ candidate to be used by both white corporates and the ANC to 
mediate or act as a broker by sitting on the boards of white-owned businesses and black 
economic empowerment businesses which were affiliated to the ANC. Balancing the interests 
of both camps and being accountable to both might seem like a conflict of interest but it 
would also have made it difficult for him to be merely a proxy (window dressing) for white 
capital and doing its bidding. Mabuza‟s position in the intersection of these two groups 
(because of the political and economic connections he had created) provided him some sort of 
security. His success was, therefore, the result of actively sustained relationships of mutual 
interest and reciprocal trust. That, combined with his own personality and competencies gave 
him enough currency to carve a new niche for himself. David Wylde‟s description of Mabuza 
sheds some light on the personal qualities and other reasons why Mabuza became so 
prominent in business in such a short space of time (Wylde, 2007, Interview 2 August). 
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Wylde first met Mabuza in a professional capacity when Mabuza was Chief Minister of 
KaNgwane. They worked together with others, mainly white donors from the corporate 
sector, to found Penryn College in Nelspruit and eventually became friends. In an interview, 
Wylde (2007, Interview, 2 August) expressed great respect for Enos Mabuza because he was 
a “dignified leader, teacher, husband and father.” Wylde believes that people respected 
Mabuza and listened when he spoke because he was “inspiring in his quietness…insightful, 
philosophical, never aggressive or antagonistic and he was seldom judgmental” (Interview 2 
August, 2007). According to Wylde, Mabuza was a “substantial human being” who “had a 
huge calmness about him, a wisdom, a profundity and humility.” He did not regard all whites 
as the enemy simply because they were white (Wylde, 2007, Interview 2 August). Wylde‟s 
account describes Mabuza as a soft-spoken, even-handed, objective, rational and calm person 
whose arguments and views in meetings or discussions were balanced and not clouded by 
radical political or racial views. Mabuza could focus on the real issues instead of attacking 
perceived adversaries or posturing. Although this is Wylde‟s personal and subjective memory 
or impression of Mabuza, which many might contest, it reflects to some degree how some 
liberal whites regarded him and why they trusted and confided in him enough to use him as a 
conduit to facilitate dialogue or negotiations between them (historically white-owned and 
controlled businesses) and other parties along the political spectrum during the transition of 
the 1990s. This, however, does not necessarily mean Mabuza‟s interests and those of white 
capital were different or that white corporates valued his input or put it into practice if indeed 
it differed with their own views. 
To the passing observer, Mabuza‟s appointments to numerous company boards look easy 
(and perhaps suspicious) because he was, strictly speaking, an outsider to both established 
white-dominated corporate South Africa and the circles of upcoming black business people 
(many of whom had strong links to the ANC). The charm of his personality alone could not 
have been enough to catapult him into the sort of prominence that he enjoyed in business, 
which leads one to conclude that other factors, including his competencies and abilities as a 
seasoned politician and negotiator had a part to play in his success. According to Sandile 
Mabuza, whilst still in politics, Enos Mabuza had shares in Imbali Bakery which was owned 
by a local businessman but he did not own any businesses himself. The story goes that he 
used to insist that as civil servants, him and his ministers could not have business interests on 
the side because they needed to focus on serving the people and not on pursuing personal 
interest and enrichment (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007). When Mabuza retired from 
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active politics in 1992, his logic was that the political struggle was almost over, the ANC was 
unbanned and it had enough competent people to lead the political transition but the next 
stage or challenge was economic transformation and he felt that he could make a positive 
contribution there (Sandile Mabuza Interview, 5 June 2007; Elias Ginindza Interview 8 June 
2007).  
Mabuza opened his own business consultancy firm in Johannesburg (an entrepreneurial 
capitalist) to assist black business people because, according to Esther Mabuza (Interview 6 
June 2007), he believed that addressing South Africa‟s gross socio-economic disparities was 
the next logical step once the country‟s political issues were resolved. The consultancy firm 
can be seen as groundwork for the economic transformation and empowerment agenda which 
was to follow. In 1995 Mabuza and Peter Vundla founded an investment company called 
New Seasons. Like Mabuza, Vundla has held numerous board positions, for instance, he was 
an executive at NAIL in its early days and serves on the boards of Santam, WesBank and the 
Mail & Guardian and is a trustee of a number of non-governmental organisations. He has also 
served on the boards of National Chemical Products, Sentrachem and Sanlam and is an active 
member of the Black Executive Circle. Vundla was a student activist in Black Consciousness 
circles at the University of Fort Hare and later worked to attract black people into the 
advertising industry as owners of businesses in the industry and not just employees or targets 
of advertising messages. In 1991, Vundla and his colleagues Happy Ntshingila and Dimape 
Serenyane had set up their own advertising company (HerdBuoys; later HerdBuoys McCann-
Erickson following a merger with global advertising agency McCann-Erickson in 1997) and 
became proponent of transformation in the industry. In 1996 he joined two Soweto 
entrepreneurs to form the empowerment investment house Pamodzi which acquired a stake in 
the African Merchant Bank which was founded as the first empowerment bank from the 
stable of NAIL. Vundla become the executive deputy chairman of the bank (now AMB 
Holdings, a boutique investment advisory and private equity house, without the banking 
licence). As an educated black male (ethnic minority in terms of the unequal race and power 
relations under apartheid), Mabuza‟s entrepreneurial spirit and connections with other 
prominent black business people qualified him for nomination, recommendation and 
appointment to white corporate boards. However, in the beginning, Mabuza did not have the 
wealth of experience that such positions usually require because he had not been in business 
for too long when he was suddenly appointed to the boards of a wide variety of companies in 
different economic sectors. Despite this shortcoming, however, his interest in business 
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worked to his advantage because it showed that he had similarities with both groups (class, 
ambition and goals, possibly competence) which cannot be overlooked. White capital and 
upcoming black business people both identified with him (and his business acumen) in their 
own right, depending on their needs and the changing circumstances (Randall, 1996; 
Nattrass, 1994). 
Firms that are considered market „first movers‟ or leaders have the capacity to actively shape 
or influence situations in the markets (production, marketing, research) by initiating what, 
when and why things will change (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002). In this respect, the 
organisations which nominated Mabuza onto their boards can be considered as first movers 
because they set the tone or opened the door for others to eventually get more blacks into the 
mainstream economy. They made tentative steps towards aligning corporate behaviour with 
socio-economic and environmental imperatives through dialogue, participation, collaboration 
and partnerships with their black counterparts. The Black Business Council and Business 
South Africa eventually merged to form Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) to help realise 
the country‟s vision for growth, development and transformation. Other business groupings 
which share this vision include the Big Business Working Group and the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). White businesses wanted to rebuild their 
reputations to consolidate democracy by making positive changes to their profiles to rebuild 
trust with their clients and investors as well as improve employee morale and productivity 
and this process is not over yet (Newton-King, 2004:27-29). 
Actions demand or attract reactions and once individuals like Mabuza were in the system, 
other historically white firms gradually followed suit in making tentative steps to reflect the 
country‟s changing socio-political environment. However, it is important bear in mind that 
even at firm-level; individuals are instrumental in bringing about these outcomes, directly or 
indirectly (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002). A field‟s boundaries are not absolute and decisions 
taken within the field do not depend on a single actor or variable. Different things are at stake 
for different people and power relations determine by struggles within the field. Decision by 
different firms to nominate Mabuza to their boards could not have been made by individual 
actors. It is also unlikely that the directors of the various firms were unanimous in their 
decisions to have him serve on their boards because of their different dispositions, 
experiences or the weight of their trade unions. Consensus, or lack thereof, brings up the 
question of whether Mabuza was a compromise candidate (and the reasons if indeed that was 
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the case) and who else could have been a possible substitute or alternative for these positions 
at the time. 
Whilst it is important to note that the in-coming ANC leadership (at least some of them) 
regarded Mabuza as a fellow comrade, if not in the political struggle per se but in the 
economic one. It is understandable that ordinary people outside this elite group would have 
regarded Mabuza‟s association with white capitalist interests with suspicion (an Uncle Tom) 
and interpreted his involvement as selling-out by fraternising with and ingratiating himself 
with the enemy (again, see the chapter on his political career). This might be regarded as a 
marriage of convenience on Mabuza‟s part enter and stay in a preferred socio-economic 
group or class in order to acquire a certain status and resources (Bourdieu, 1998:10-13). 
These class aspirations could have been seen as pursuing self-enrichment at the expense of 
principles or considerations that resonated with the marginalised black majority, which he 
was part of. It should be born in mind that Bantustan leaders, black council workers, black 
policemen and spies were labelled traitors (many were killed) for this reason. 
In the corporate sector, a big linker such as Mabuza could be regarded as affirmative action 
and BEE beneficiaries because they typically held multiple board positions by virtue of 
belonging to a minority ethnic group (Africans/black). Corporate big linkers can also be 
created based on their gender through policies geared to allow equal opportunities (see the 
section below on black economic empowerment).  A host of policy interventions can result in 
greater numbers of people from designated or target groups in certain positions or 
occupations, including those that eventually create board-level interlocks which are discussed 
in Chapter 4 above (Stokman and Wasseur, 2002:353). Mabuza, was not the only black 
leader, ex-politician or business elite to hold several corporate board positions in the early 
1990s. However, as with such policies in any other sphere, some organisations tend to merely 
go through the motions by filling stipulated quotas in order to give the appearance of change 
when in actual fact such appointees are not allowed to do anything substantial in the 
organisations (window dressing/impression management). Empowerdex admits that fronting 
operations (window dressing without real transformation) still exists in South Africa‟s 
corporate sector (Empowerdex, 2004:10). Another problem is that people from the targeted 
groups do not benefit equally from such policies and the policies come to be despised 
because they are unfair or do not apply equally to all people - in the targeted groups and those 
necessarily excluded from them, thereby creating more problems and resentment. 
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8.4 Mabuza and Black ANC-Affiliated Businesses 
The state is a major player in the economic sphere (Bourdieu, 2005:204). It is not simply a 
regulator that maintains order and confidence or an arbiter in disputes between firms. The 
state actively contributes to the supply-demand logic of the market by intervening and 
regulating the operations and interactions of firms. On the other hand, business lobby groups 
try to get the state to pass laws or concessions in the form of policies which work in their 
favour (preferential tariffs, trade licences, funding or subsidies for job creation, research and 
development funds, public sector contracts and exports etc) (Bourdieu, 2005:204). However, 
the growth of indigenous business classes in Africa (Zaire/DRC, Kenya, Nigeria) attracted 
much interest, disparaging stereotypes and criticisms in the 1980s and early 1990s (Randall, 
1996:661-662) because the main beneficiaries of economic „indigenisation‟ were political 
notables who assumed the role of “sleeping partners, manipulating the bureaucracy, and 
buying protection in return for a share of the profits and a range of other improperly acquired 
advantages” (Randall, 1996:684). The dominant argument in the early 1990s was that black 
capitalists were not genuine capitalists because many of them were people with stature and 
money but that they had no real interest in business and relied on their political connections 
and leverage (networks) to stay in the game (Randall, 1996:663). In many instances, the 
indigenous bourgeoisie class emerged straddling the private and public sectors and taking 
advantage of opportunities for political manipulation, corruption and rent-seeking activities 
for its survival.  
Black capitalists in South Africa have not escaped similar criticism and many are generally 
perceived to have no independent financial base or to have risen on “expedient structures” to 
become the “tools of the old establishment” (Sam Shilowa 1994 cited in Randall, 1996: 662). 
This „necessary‟ relationship between the state and businesses was very influential in 
determining the ANC‟s outlook during the political transition and led to the formation of the 
Consultative Business Movement between business and labour (COSATU). The United 
Democratic Front (UDF) brokered the deal in its capacity as the secretariat for the National 
Economic Forum. 
Economic policy debates in ANC documents and statements in the 1940s and the 1956 
Freedom Charter were influenced by a moral demand for compensation and centred on 
demands for redistribution of wealth from those that had benefited from apartheid to those 
that had been exploited. The Freedom Charter, for example, demanded that the mines, banks 
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and monopoly industry “be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole” (Nattrass, 
1994:344) through nationalisation because unfettered free market forces were considered 
inadequate for such purposes. ANC leaders such as Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada 
initially argued that strong state intervention was necessary to create a more equitable and 
acceptable economic system (economic rationalisation) but these radical positions began to 
soften in the early 1990s. Nattrass (1994) believes that this was necessary because, as a 
government-in-waiting, the ANC was attempting to broaden its appeal without alienating its 
traditional political support base.  
South Africa was emerging from international sanctions in the early 1990s and the new ANC 
government needed all the help it could get because it had inherited enormous debt from the 
outgoing government and the economy needed to stay afloat. Effective diplomacy was crucial 
(a delicate balancing act at the best of times) at all levels in order to gain access to 
international finance institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, as well as to attract and retain foreign investments to ensure that the economy did not 
collapse (Gevisser, 2007:668). The previously disadvantaged population also had great 
expectations for the new government which were necessarily opposed to most of the rational 
economic arguments which would advance the former. The result was a mix of neo-liberal 
and pro-socialist policies, which the politicians argued was the only way to handle the 
dilemma. Several changes were initiated which generated controversy within the organisation 
as its economic policies became more “business-friendly and less structured by the trade 
union agenda” (Nattrass, 1994:344). The Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) was 
aligned to the ANC (with a left-wing orientation). During the transition, the ANC‟s 
Department of Economic Policy was headed by individuals such as Trevor Manuel (the 
incumbent Minister of Finance) and Tito Mboweni (the incumbent Reserve Bank governor) 
(Gevisser, 2007:587) and Enos Mabuza‟s personal documents include copies of several 
MERG/ANC economic policy papers and addresses by Trevor Manuel. However, MERG and 
its policies fell victim to the lack of consensus over economic policy which plagued the ANC 
in the early 1990s (Gevisser, 2007:663-671).  
The contradictions and tensions within the ANC‟s economic policy discourse are evident or 
magnified by the orientations of two the policies below. The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP, 1994) reflected the socialist leanings of the ANC, SACP and 
COSATU and called for an active developmental state. On the other hand, the Growth 
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Employment and Redistribution (GEAR, 1996) and its recent revision in the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (Bell, 2006) were underpinned by 
strong neo-liberal capitalist ideologies which necessarily constrain the role of the government 
(Gqubule, 2006a:5; Gqubule, 2006b:39-81). 
The ANC wanted black business people to add value to the corporate sector and not just to 
rubber stamp what others decided for them. Black board members essentially acted as 
watchdogs for the CEOs (checks and balances/accountability) and they were expected to be 
proactive, not just reactive. This meant that black board members were duty-bound to act in 
good faith and with skill and diligence (Williams, 2006:20-24). Organisations such as 
NAFCOC (aligned to the ANC) were associated with the struggle for black economic 
freedom and were the early advocates of what is now known as BEE (Gqubule, 2006a). Some 
of NAFCOC‟s members included Archie Nkonyeni, Marina and Richard Maponya, Sam 
Motsuenyane and Enos Mabuza. Archie Nkonyeni, for instance, was one of the biggest black 
property moguls of the 1970s despite repressive apartheid legislation preventing black people 
from doing business. NAFCOC argued that economic growth, development and black 
economic empowerment were complementary and related process within the broad 
transformation agenda. A new value system was needed to restructure South Africa‟s socio-
economic order and to deracialise the economy. As early as 1988, NAFCOC demanded 
concrete or tangible articulations of BEE similar to those set out in Malaysia‟s successful 
bumiputra programme. The organisation wanted quotas to be introduced in order to increase 
black ownership of companies, black board membership, the number of blacks in senior 
management positions and the allocation of procurement contracts (Gevisser, 2007:584).  
The Black Management Forum (BMF) was comprised of the emerging black middle class in 
the early 1990s and desired to make its mark on South Africa‟s transition as a counter balance 
to white monopoly capital. Under the leadership of individuals such Eric Mafuna - co-
founder and former President of the Black Management Forum and the National Black 
Business Caucus, Wiseman Nkuhlu (1994) and others, the organisation had an Africanist 
outlook (passionate about Black Nationalism) but was also pragmatic about South Africa‟s 
political and business future. These individuals were strongly influenced by Biko‟s Black 
Consciousness ideology which advocated self-determination, personal advancement and self-
fulfilment as virtues or ideals to aspire to (Gevisser, 2007:583). In fact, the Black 
Management Forum and the National Black Business Caucus are credited with devising 
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Black Economic Empowerment and affirmative action in South Africa. This advocacy was 
not a one-way street because the ANC actively wooed the black business class in its bid to 
create a “loyal black intelligentsia” within the professional classes (Gevisser, 2007:588-589). 
However, black entrepreneurs also needed knowledge about corporate governance, 
legislation, stock exchange rules, sectoral as well as macro-economic and other policy issues 
from established big businesses, which were predominantly white.  
Several consultative forums came into being to facilitate dialogue between the government 
and the private sector during South Africa‟s transition. The Consultative Business Movement 
(CBM) was formed as the businesses and was funded by the Anglo-American Corporation 
and other liberal corporations (Gevisser, 2007:577). Conrad Strauss of Standard Bank South 
Africa was the chairman of the South African Foundation (a lobby for big business) which 
was the predecessor of the Business Trust (established in 1988). Both formations were 
comprised of the country‟s leading corporations and the Business Trust was led by the ANC‟s 
Saki Macozoma (who was head of Transnet. The Business Trust had a mandate for 
employment creation, among others (Gevisser, 2007:688).  
The ANC‟s investment companies, as well as other newly established black businesses 
needed allies in the corporate sector. They needed partners with integrity and good business 
sense to help their businesses off the ground and they showed their vote of confidence in 
Mabuza by appointing him to serve in various capacities on their company boards. He might 
have seemed like an unlikely candidate because of his history in Bantustan politics and he 
was certainly not owed a golden handshake by the ANC for having resigned from his 
political post since he had been employed by the apartheid state. It was even more unlikely 
that the more radical liberation movements would do him such favours or extend him an olive 
branch. Mabuza was respected in some circles as a rational and even-handed leader, as well 
as a skilled negotiator. His personality and charisma appealed to them enough to 
accommodate him and they put their faith in his business competence for mutual benefit. 
According to Sandile Mabuza (Interview, 5 June 2007), the ANC requested Mabuza to sit on 
the boards of its empowerment companies such as the Independent Development Trust, 
Corporate Africa Ltd, Thebe Investments where he was a founding Non-Executive Chairman, 
the Kagiso Trust and New Africa Investments Limited and he worked with respected black 
entrepreneurs such as Thato Mothlana, Wiseman Nkuhlu, Eric Molobi, Sam Motsuenyane, 
Archie Nkonyeni, Richard Maponya, Ashley Mabogoane, Peter Vundla, Zwelake Sisulu, 
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Vusi Khanyile and Saki Macozoma; people with unquestionable struggle credentials. Mabuza 
also worked with Dikgang Moseneke who was one of very few black advocates and the 
Deputy President of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), later became an influential 
industrialist and Deputy Chief Justice (Gevisser, 2007). 
Mabuza found himself yoked with the ANC‟s hand-picked and groomed economic power 
brokers and elite entrepreneurs who were deployed into the business sector to initiate 
transformation by devising a workable compromise (reconciling competing interests and 
goals) with white capital to rebuild and sustain the economy whilst also trying to restructure 
it to benefit the previously marginalised. In this crusade, New Africa Investments Limited 
(NAIL) held shares (equities) in The Sowetan, New Africa Publications, New African 
Communications, MTN and Metlife Investment Holdings (in the form of black pension and 
provident funds) (McNulty, 1994:24-26). Metropolitan Life (Metlife), for example, is part of 
Metropolitan Holdings (Methold) and is a major player in the life assurance and 
communications industry. Metlife had ANC-aligned black businessmen on its board by the 
early 1990s and in 1994, Methold was the largest black controlled company listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Greig, 1994). Dr. Nthato Montlana (well known political 
activist from Soweto, medical advisor to Nelson Mandela and prominent black business 
entrepreneur) was the chairman of the Prosper Africa Group and Corporate Africa. He served 
on the board of the Development Bank of South Africa and was chairman of Methold where 
individuals such as Franklin Sonn, Sam Motsuenyane, Pal Gama and Enos Mabuza were on 
the board of directors. 
Elias Ginindza defends Mabuza‟s entry into the economic sphere as having been driven by 
the same objectives that underpin BEE today (Elias Ginindza Interview, 8 June 2007). 
Ginindza insists that Mabuza‟s ultimate aim was to increase the participation of blacks in 
South Africa‟s economic mainstream and his presence on numerous company boards was 
meant to signify that apartheid (and policies such as job reservation) had no place in a 
democratic South Africa; that  change was necessary and inevitable. Mabuza‟s rise to 
prominence demonstrated that the opportunities that blacks were previously denied were 
becoming available. Elias Ginindza is now a businessman in his own right and he maintains 
that Mabuza did not enter the business arena for his own self-interest but as a way of charting 
a new course for others and many black people were eventually appointed to similar positions 
(Elias Ginindza Interview, 8 June 2007). In his address to the board on 12 May 1998, then 
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Acting Chairman of South African Breweries, Cyril Ramaphosa said the following about 
Mabuza; “The untimely passing of the highly respected Enos Mabuza is recorded with 
sadness and our deepest sympathy is extended to his wife and family. SAB is extremely 
fortunate to be able to call on the services of such able and committed people.”  
Mabuza‟s links with ANC leaders seems unlikely at first glance because of his history in the 
Bantustan system. Ironically, however, these links were forged while he was still involved in 
Bantustan politics. If Mabuza‟s political career was the sensitive or sore point that many 
would like to believe it was, how then was he able to jump onto the gravy train which was 
being driven by the politically connected (elite) black business class? Why would the ANC‟s 
leadership give him positions and responsibilities in its own investment companies at this 
crucial time when he was clearly not an ANC blue-blood and had questionable struggle 
credentials? The fact that Mabuza had access to many influential people, ANC policy 
documents and was privy to other information which might be labelled confidential alludes to 
the fact that he was trusted and permitted such access because he was considered important 
enough by those that made the key decisions even though he might have entered this arena 
for purely selfish reasons. The other alternative explanation is that he entered this arena to 
save face after the controversies of his political career, thereby redeeming himself. Whatever 
the answer might be, his ascendance to these positions shows that he was not as insignificant 
as the limited literature about him suggests, neither was he merely a capitalist crony. Well 
known politician and businessman Matthews Phosa lists Mabuza as one of the people who 
inspired him to venture into business. The transition seemed to offer limitless possibilities 
and it seemed like there was enough space in the economic pond for the new black business 
class to swim in. The result was relatively muted knit-picking, posturing and resentment 
amongst the fledgling black business elite on the economic front compared to what was 
unfolding in the often violently contested balance of power in the political arena.  
Mabuza had resigned or retired from politics without making unreasonable demands and it is 
possible that he was regarded by both white and black business elites as being „harmless‟ 
since no malicious intent is evident from his actions („self-sacrifice‟ in a sense). If the general 
consensus was that he was not going to pose much of a threat on a company board then 
perhaps some of his board appointments were an acknowledgement of his „quiet‟ retirement. 
In this way, his actions would be kept in check by other board members and the procedural 
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constraints of rules that govern the conduct of board members (containing or neutralising 
future threats). 
South Africa‟s business environment has changed, together with the dynamics that bind the 
major players in the BEE milieu. There are more candidates vying for the same opportunities 
at board level than in Mabuza‟s time and individuals such as Tokyo Sexwale, NAFCOC‟s 
Patrice Motsepe, Cyril Ramaphosa and Mzi Khumalo have risen to become some of South 
Africa‟s most prominent black captains of industry. Their dominance and political clout has 
been so pronounced that it has led to much criticism and earned them labels such as the 
“usual suspects” or “black oligarchs” in reference to the self-interest and the enrichment of a 
few individuals which has resulted from South Africa‟s economic transformation agenda so 
far (Ryan, 2006:53-54). These labels would also apply to Mabuza because of the monopoly 
that he enjoyed as far as board appointments were concerned, the ambition and appetite for 
power that Drove it, at least in part, regardless of whether or not he had real power when all 
the fluff, frantic realignment and confusion of the transition is taken out of the equation. 
8.5 The Strategic Aims of Cooperation between Black and White Businesses 
The late 1980s were a time of change, transition and the immediate goals for business were 
somewhat unclear, as were the methods to achieve them. South Africa was in a poor 
economic climate, the Rand value was down, the gold price was sluggish, inflation was 
soaring and tourism was declining. This economic recession coincided with the imposition of 
international sanctions against apartheid policies and the absence of meaningful political 
reform. Many investors, for instance, wanted the Group Areas Act to be repealed - to 
desegregate residential, commercial and industrial areas to allow their businesses more 
freedom or access to markets and labour. It was argued that integrating the black and white 
business sectors was the ideal and preferable option but the South African government was 
reluctant to introduce such reforms months before elections. Consequently, major foreign 
based multi-national companies such as General Motors, Barclays Bank, Kodak and the Bata 
Shoe Company were cutting links with South Africa and this disinvestment was causing 
panic because it was believed that many more would follow. This led to a realisation that the 
economic agenda could not be divorced from the political situation which prevailed and 
transformation was necessary; inevitable in order to boost investor confidence and reassure 
the rest of the world that South Africa was not oblivious to the problems it faced and that was 
willing to listen and commit to some changes in the direction of government policies, albeit 
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tentatively. It would have been reckless not to acknowledge the extent of the crisis and try to 
ascertain where South African goals and projections for 1987 would fit from a global 
perspective (Financial Mail Supplement, 28 November 1986).  
A business conference themed “Forward in Confidence” was held on 7 November in Pretoria. 
The conference was hosted by State President P W Botha and members of his cabinet 
including the Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, Trade and Industry Minister Dawie de 
Villiers and the Reserve Bank Governor, Dr. Gerhard de Kock. Approximately 200 
businessmen attended and a total of 420 individuals registered for the conference. It provided 
an opportunity for government and business to consider future options - where to and how? 
The Margo Commission of inquiry into the tax structure of the Republic of South Africa 
(1986) was one of the issues discussed at this conference because the recommendations 
contained in its report did not sit well with many people. The Commission undertook a 
review of fiscal policy during a period of rampant inflation and foreign disinvestments, a 
result of international pressure against the apartheid regime. Decreased tax burdens are 
strongly associated with increased economic growth potential in the same way that decreased 
indirect taxation relative to direct taxation is strongly correlated with increased economic 
growth potential (Margo Commission Report, 1987; Koch, Schoeman and van Tonder, 2005). 
The Margo Commission Report, for example, recommended that the primary rebate be 
increased to its correct level and that child rebates be retained until such a time when the state 
provided child grants. It further recommended that company dividends be exempt from taxes 
with the effect that the poor became a great deal poorer and the wealthy a great deal wealthier 
- rent seeking, economic efficiency. The Margo Commission also recommended fringe 
benefit taxation, lower and fewer personal income tax rates with fewer deductions, equal 
treatment of men and women (especially, marriage neutrality), no capital gains taxes, a 
modification of GST, a capital transfer tax, and retention of the source basis of taxation. 
Based on these recommendations, general sales tax was dropped in favour of invoice-based 
value added tax (VAT). Company tax rates were reduced to 35 per cent as part of incentives 
designed to encourage companies to retain earnings for investment purposes. These 
recommendations were similar to the proposals of the Franszen Commission which 
recommended: a reduction in the progressiveness of the direct tax structure, abolishment of 
the source basis of taxation, a shift toward indirect taxation, a broadening of the income tax 
base through redefinition (Koch, Schoeman and van Tonder, 2005).  
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Mabuza was a member of the President‟s Council and one of the people who addressed the 
delegates at this conference (Financial Mail Supplement, 28 November 1986). However, as 
the photograph below clearly shows, Mabuza was one of very few blacks involved with white 
business people and the despised government of the day (two pillars of oppressive white 
power) at that level and this undoubtedly brought the spotlight of suspicion on him.  
 
Figure 14: 1987 International Investment Conference, Enos Mabuza in the Foreground (Financial 
Mail Supplement 28 November 1986:5). 
Blacks generally had very negative perceptions of white businesses and it was widely 
believed that the expectations of the two could not be reconciled. The topics discussed at the 
conference ranged from the impact of financial and other sanctions, the world energy market 
(oil price -  supply and demand) monetary policy and proposals for recovery in 1987 as seen 
by the South African Reserve Bank Governor, Dr. Gerhard de Kock, to the state of gold and 
gold share prices and the role of speculators as perceived by Warren Myers of Merril Lynch 
Capital Markets, property investment and/or development, labour relations, business and 
society (social responsibility to customers, employees, shareholders and the communities in 
which businesses operate – education, welfare), the economic impact or potential benefits of 
new technology, equity markets, interest rates in 1987, the American securities industry 
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(being the most dominant, capital intensive and liquid). In terms of labour relations, the 
recognition of black labour unions from the mid 1970s led to more organised representation 
when bargaining with employers in the determination of wages and other benefits. Industrial 
strikes had the power to disrupt production and reduce profits on one hand and could lead to 
loss of pay and/or employment on the other. It became quite apparent that the need to 
maintain dialogue and cooperation in industrial relations was imperative for responsible 
decision-making and the benefit of all parties (Financial Mail Supplement, 28 November 
1986). 
Pragmatic, long term strategies for cooperation and partnerships had to be forged between 
government and business but this was uncharted territory in many respects for South African 
businesses, many of which were built on the back of apartheid. Naturally, many business 
people were circumspect about some of the proposed changes but this was no time for 
sentimentality (nothing ventured, nothing gained). Both business and government needed to 
get out of their comfort zones to ensure political stability and economic growth. They were 
aware that embarking on this type of change posed many risks but also great opportunities for 
reward. Businesses were encouraged to be part of the solution, not the problem because the 
previous tendency towards adversarial relationships in business was proving unworkable and 
untenable. The conclusion was that everyone had to be resourceful to stimulate economic 
growth, restore prosperity and help create jobs at a rate commensurate with the country‟s 
population growth. Despite these challenges, however, there was general optimism regarding 
changing fortunes for South Africa in 1987 (Financial Mail Supplement, 28 November 
1986).  
Further, the legacy of discriminatory apartheid economic policies and other extra-market 
forces created illiteracy and deficiencies in technical skills, income disparities, poverty, 
unequal employment practices such as job reservation, labour market inequality, 
unemployment and exclusion (Kraak, 2006:128-159; Barker, 1999:186-189, 257-270; 
Ronnie, 2006:5; Dasgupta, 1993:189-201; Greenberg, 1980; Moerdyk and Coldwell 
(1990:21) which necessitated the implementation of the ANC‟s welfare-oriented 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), affirmative action (AA), black 
economic empowerment (BEE). Black economic empowerment was pioneered by black 
companies such as new Africa Investments Limited (NAIL) and Real Africa Investments and 
in April 1996 individuals like Cyril Ramaphosa left politics to join business and steer this 
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transformation process. Ramaphosa, for instance, immediately became Deputy Executive 
chairman of NAIL (Gqubule, 2006c; Ronnie, 2006:3). These redress policies are supported 
by laws such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 
1998 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act of 1996 
which safeguard the interests of all workers by preventing unfair discrimination and 
exclusion based on race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, or political affiliation (May, 
2001:302-326; Romm, 2001:145; UNDP, 2000:8-11; Wilson et al, 2001:22; Standing et al, 
1996). 
Economic transformation was the responsibility of all stakeholders in partnership (businesses, 
labour and government) and this led to the formation of the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was formed in 1995. Employers are represented by Business 
South Africa (now Business Unity South Africa), FABCOS69, NAFCOC, the Black Business 
Forum and labour is represented by the main federations - the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and the 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). Other stake holders include the National 
Economic Forum (NEF), the National Manpower Commission (NMC), the National Training 
Board, the Unemployment Insurance Board, the Compensation Board for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA), the Business Trust, the South African Foundation (Newton-King, 2004:27-29; The 
BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:23-27; DTI, 2003:13; Conger and Kanungo, 1988:471-482; 
Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom, 2005; Barker, 1999:217, 252, 274-288; Crankshaw, 1997; 
Ntsele, 2004:178; Randall, 1996). 
Interventions which target or benefit the previously disadvantaged majority have not been 
without criticism and controversy because their current application appears to be inconsistent 
with their conception (theory and practice). Much criticism has been levelled against the 
implementation of BEE policies. It is argued that they have not been effective in job creation 
and they are simply not broad enough because it was benefiting a few individuals (Ronnie, 
2006:1-11; Gqubule, 2006a:3-36; DTI, 2003; Ntsele, 2004:177; Gevisser, 2007:584-586; The 
BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:11, 29; Anderson, 2004:258; Wilkinson, 1998:40-56). This 
situation led to the Black Management Forum (BMF) calling for changes to the policy in 
                                                 
69 FABHOLD (a holding company for FABCOS) had a ten-member board of directors who were appointed 
by the FABCOS national executive council and Mabuza served as chairman of its board.  
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November 1997 and the Black Economic Empowerment Commission was established in May 
1998 under the auspices of the black Business Council to discuss proposed revisions. The 
commission was chaired by Cyril Ramaphosa and the result was the introduction of the Broad 
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (Gqubule, 2006a:17; Ntsele, 2004:177). 
The new black middle class is evidence of the upward mobility that has happened since the 
introduction of these policies but the excesses of this group have also attracted the criticism 
of many (Bisseker, 2007:36-37; Naidoo, 2007:42; Gqubule, 2006a:79; Bell, 2006, Radebe, 
2007:38-40). 
8.6 Conclusion 
Sztompka (1999) notes that risk and trust have an inverse relationship (low trust-high risk, 
and vice versa). The adaptability of individuals, organisations or institutions improves when 
they have adequate information or when new knowledge is acquired. However, trust among 
individuals or within groups can be a substitute for knowledge in situations of uncertainty 
because it provides a sense of security. Legitimacy, integrity (good faith) and credibility are 
expressions or demonstrations of trust within associations or networks (Giddens and Pierson, 
1998:108; Giddens, 1991; Giddens, 1990; Ekberg, 2007:343). Trust and good faith were 
crucial requirements during South Africa‟s political transition and this culminated in the 
formation of the Consultative Business Movement, comprised of both white and black 
business interests (McNulty, 1994). Established white businesses had to liaise with black 
business groupings such as the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC), the Black Management Forum (BMF), the Foundation for African Business and 
Consumer Services (FABCOS founded 1988) and the Black Business Council (founded 
1996) (Gqubule, 2006a). Mabuza was able to insert himself in business during this 
challenging and exciting time and interfaced with both black and white businesses.  
The Empowerdex Report (2004:1-9) lists some of South Africa‟s most influential black 
directors and they include Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, Sizwe 
Nxasana, Phuthuma Nhleko, Konar Deenadayalen, Roger Jardine, Patrice Motsepe, Eric 
Mafuna, Franklin Sonn and Eric Molobi and several them worked in different companies 
with Mabuza. Agents are positioned in fields by virtue of their access to power and resources 
within particular fields and what they say or do assumes its significance as a consequence of 
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the structure of the field - its codes, schemas and norms (Crossley, 2005:81). The people he 
was involved with in business trusted him and thought that he was reliable and competent. 
In the South African context of apartheid mistrust and the shift to tentative institutional trust 
through negotiations, policies such as BEE and affirmative action were both a risk and an 
opportunity for all the stakeholders or players (strategic concessions in modern societies or 
those in transition). Mabuza evaluated the benefits of reinventing himself by creating a new, 
more legitimate power base in the economic sector (representing blacks or black economic 
interests) instead of trying to hang on to political power like his colleagues in the Venda, 
Ciskei, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu Bantustans. In an interview, Esther Mabuza 
noted that she was concerned about her husband‟s corporate appointments and what the white 
businesses, in particular really wanted from him. She asked him what the shift from 
Bantustan politics to the economic arena meant, as well as why he accepted so many of them 
and his response was that he wanted to demonstrate to the white corporates that a black 
person is equally capable and that they should, therefore, admit more black people to top 
positions in their companies (Esther Mabuza, Interview 6 June 2007). Judging by the number 
of board positions that he held over a period of approximately five years, Mabuza indeed 
seized the opportunity and succeeded in achieving his objective of proving that a black 
person is just as capable as any other. If he was good enough, more black people were just as 
capable. He presence on white company boards convinced other white business interests to 
start implementing change in their organisations, thus paving the way for more black people 
who were subsequently appointed to similar positions (he tried to be exemplary in his trail-
blazing). The impact of Mabuza‟s input in this regard (before and soon after 1994) were not 
obvious or measurable by current BEE sector scorecards (outlined above) because a focused 
and official BEE strategy did not exist at the time and he did not have the mandate or 
capacity to undertake such an intervention in his individual capacity.  The sheer force of his 
personality, competence and negotiation skills/persuasion had to suffice. 
The figures of black directors or executives on JSE listed companies seem disappointing at 
first glance but Empowerdex explains them partly in terms of de-listings and disinvestments 
by several companies on the JSE. Empowerdex also maintains that economic transformation 
should not rely on JSE figures as the only measure of economic transformation. The issue of 
economic transformation is an on-going project or agenda, especially since its real efficacy 
Page | 338 
 
depends not on official policies, laws or quotas but attitudinal changes at group and 
individual level (Empowerdex, 2004:10). 
BEE was a deliberate, goal-directed intervention (Barker, 1999:257-270) but South Africa‟s 
economic transformation was always going to face a crisis of expectations (realistic or not) 
because policies never satisfy or get the approval of everyone and not everyone benefits in 
the same way. If Mabuza is guilty of milking the BEE cash-cow, he did not do so alone 
because his contemporaries, and new black economic power players of his time, continue to 
benefit from it. Those that worked with him benefited from their business involvements just 
as much as he did and their successors continue to benefit from the selective access they have 
to influential company boards via a variety of affirmative action policies and through new 
BEE deals. They did not, and are not, apologising for their „success, whether it was realised 
through their connections, elite networks and affiliations or it was because of their own 
competencies and abilities. Using such connections to further one‟s own interests and 
ambitions or those of a group is a common practise in politics, business and any other sphere 
of human interaction as the theoretical framework section above has shown. People use such 
links to catapult themselves into different orbits (utility maximisation) such that criticising 
Mabuza‟s business interest and involvements based on that alone or the assumption that his 
motives were bad or the opposite of what everyone was aspiring to at the time would be 
tantamount to arguing that everyone else that he worked with was more entitled to get those 
opportunities than he was; which is not true. Such an argument would mean that George 
Orwell‟s satire Animal Farm (1972) is accurate in the crudest sense and that some animals 
are indeed more equal than others. While it is highly likely that Mabuza‟s motives are not 
entirely selfless and that some amount of duplicity cannot be removed from the equation, no 
one‟s motives are entirely selfless and devoid of a degree of hypocrisy in a capitalist 
economy, regardless of whether they publicly admit it or not. While the idea of a few 
individuals getting obscenely rich at the expense of the majority is repugnant to those of a 
socialist persuasion (an orientation which informed the ANC, the SACP, the labour 
movement/COSATU and other struggle organisations‟ discourses) it does not make Mabuza 
more of a villain or a Shylock than others who benefited from such pursuits.  
The SACP‟s Secretary-General, Blade Nzimande, has commented that most BEE deals have 
had no impact or have negatively impacted South Arica‟s economic transformation 
challenges (cited in Ronnie, 2006:8). This sentiment is shared by various parties, but not 
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everything about Mabuza‟s rise in the corporate sector is analysed within this broad appraisal 
of BEE. His rise to prominence in the economic arena can partly be attributed to the 
“revolving door syndrome” that Ronnie refers to (2006:8) because he had the social capital or 
networks and used them to charter a course in South Africa‟s changing socio-economic 
landscape in the early 1990s. South Africa‟s political transition necessitated a corresponding 
transition in the economy and this change brought together different individuals, groups and 
businesses (a predominantly white private sector, a militant civil society and the incoming 
black ANC government). These groups had competing interests, goals and agendas, which, 
according to Dippenaar (CEO of FirstRand) led to economic policy discussions which were 
characterised by low trust and created significant potential for mistrust (2004:159-161). 
Dippenaar points out that individual, cultural and institutional trust is fragile and cannot be 
bought (2004:159-161).  
Honesty and sincerity builds trust, even when the truth is unpleasant to hear and people can 
normally discern the intentions behind certain behaviour/actions and words. These groups 
had to gradually develop respect for each other‟s opinions, honesty, openness, consistency, 
competence, fairness and integrity to establish some congruency between what was said and 
what actually happened regarding issues of mutual interest that affected or had the potential 
to affect business futures. By extension, whatever his shortcomings, Mabuza‟s mainstay was 
that he forged and sustained relationships (networks) with influential or connected people 
based on considerable levels of trust and goodwill. However, as George Orwell‟s (1972) 
Animal Farm illustrates; yesterday‟s oppressed can easily become today‟s oppressors, not just 
in a political sense but also economically and this is the crux of the criticisms levelled against 
current applications of BEE and its beneficiaries. Cyril Ramaphosa was a politician who was 
allegedly seduced by the possibilities that BEE opened into business and new forms of 
power. Members of the ANC‟s leadership were redeployed into the private sector and 
pioneering BEE companies such as NAIL were created and the debate regarding how genuine 
all this was continues alone class lines (Gevisser, 2007:641-643). Mabuza had a fairly high 
profile in business circles in a short period of time and his apparent dominance or monopoly 
(as an outsider because of his Bantustan connections) probably caused anxiety and attracted 
criticism from different quarters (the public in general, black business people and black 
politicians with supposedly more bona fide claims to the economic opportunities that 
democracy - socio-political change opened) who saw it as a blatant power play propelled by 
ambition and greed. His family and confidantes, for example, long-standing friend Roland 
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Kreher of Cargo Motors Johannesburg, his former personal assistant Ms Rosemary Smuts 
and Reverend Dr Frank and Ida Raimondo, do not share this view but it is one which will 
always linger in people‟s minds. 
The early 1990s was a time of widespread change and negotiation, compromises. The 
economy was undergoing a restructuring or rebirth through various affirmative action 
measures, including early forms of BEE. The new democratic dispensation which was being 
ushered in was also a rebirth for all South Africans across the board, a renaissance. There was 
no easy or one way to meet the expectations or goals of an entire society and the dynamics 
and character of South Africa‟s transition conditioned the means by which individuals, 
groups and the state set about achieving these goals. Gqubule (2006a:10) criticises the 
„Minimalist‟ BEE approach as being “politically unworkable” but he also questions or has 
reservations about whether or not the „maximalist‟ or broad-based approach is even feasible 
in a globalising capitalist system where market mechanisms are used, as in the South African 
case, to achieve empowerment objectives. Tensions, conflicts and incompatibilities naturally 
arise and require tactical compromises (The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:27-29). BEE 
tries to integrate economic and social criteria in commercial activity such that it has been 
criticised for its reliance on government‟s regulatory support as well as financial support 
from government and white businesses. Further, its emphasis on colour, race and good 
political connections instead of knowledge, business skills and good business plans tends to 
perpetuate rent-seeking and entitlement mindsets instead of encouraging self-reliance (The 
BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:9). Although society and/or policies are not static or 
immutable, the outcome of interventions such as BEE might never be ideal (zero-sum or win-
win but not in the same proportions/equally) because someone or a class or group will always 
benefit more and this is a function of many variables as Mabuza‟s experience demonstrates. It 
was not new or unique/isolated one since several variations on the theme can be shown from 
both a personal and a corporate point of view.  
The fact that Mabuza was able to straddle the divide between white and black businesses 
might make him look like a calculating, shrewd Shylock who got to have his cake and eat it 
too, regardless of whether or not he actively solicited his board appointments on either side of 
the divide. He might have had the competencies and capacity required for such positions at 
the time but this does not take away from the fact that these were ultimately quid pro quo 
(gentlemen‟s agreements) arrangements from which all the parties benefited personally and 
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as groups (classes). His family was proud of his achievements, he got status and some 
influence out of the arrangement, white businesses gained some legitimacy because of the 
„reform‟ and numerous other BEE candidates found an entry into the economic mainstream. 
Quid pro quo arrangements are common in political and economic spheres (means-ends 
debate, what is instrumental, expedient, fair or feasible). The terms or conditions of his 
appointments might not have been explicit on this but it is easy to see why and how Mabuza 
became a prominent, and perhaps an indispensible broker, in business circles during the 
transition.  
Mabuza might not have been as prominent or notorious as other Bantustan politicians or as 
respected as „bona fide‟ anti-apartheid leaders but he was prominent and respected enough in 
some circles by people on either side of the political divide to be allowed to participates in 
these processes during the transition. As outlined in Chapter 4, multiple board memberships 
are usually derived from financial dependence between firms, stock ownership arrangements 
or family connections but this was not the case with Mabuza so one can speculate that his 
influence and clout lay in the strength of the personal networks that he maintained with the 
„right‟ people. However, there are limits to what an individual can contribute. Institutional 
change is generally a slow, gradual process because of risks, uncertainty and mistrust 
(Ekberg, 2007) such that, even today, black captains of industry remain an elite minority and 
still have to play the role of brokers and trailblazers. Further, the issues (improved industrial 
relations, social corporate responsibility) that were high priority areas for redress during Enos 
Mabuza‟s tenure as a key corporate player are still relevant today. This though does not 
necessarily mean that he did not contribute to corporate transformation in South Africa. 
Mabuza was not predatory or malicious but he was without a doubt an astute businessman 
and regularly addressed influential business gatherings such as the South African British 
Trade Association (Mabuza, 1986). Mabuza‟s corporate positions benefited him as an 
individual in the short-term but the benefits of his input would have eventually been felt more 
widely through the now discredited trickle-down effect. In the early 1990s, his board 
appointments can be interpreted or evaluated essentially as representative participation during 
the transition since most of them were non-executive and meant that he could not vote on 
major decisions. If the ANC had Mabuza as its ally in the economic struggle, the debate 
regarding who he was representing (as a former Bantustan leader) is merely academic, not 
political.  His ambiguous connections and associations suggest conflict of interests and 
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contradiction but both sides committed to breaching the frontiers of apartheid/white 
economic control through reform, not revolution (by degrees/moderation) although possibly 
positive associations. He could easily have been bogged down in management discourses 
which maintained the status quo as has been argued by critics of BEE but he could just as 
easily have contributed more beyond mere rhetoric. Admittedly, this approach and his 
contribution, whatever it was, would not be enough today as the introduction of broad-based 
BEE (revisions of the original BEE blueprint) and other measures have shown, but it sufficed 
at the time when he entered the corporate sector. Broad-based BEE combines various 
elements including ownership, employment equity, training, affirmative procurement and 
small business development in the financial services, energy, mining, information technology 
and government sectors. The broad-based nature of investments is currently achieved through 
business consortia and ownership channels such as employee share-ownership schemes or 
community ownership in the mining sector are “a political palliative” to counter the sting of 
the elitist outcomes of earlier attempts (The BusinessMap Foundation, 2003:15).  
Mabuza‟s personal papers on economic policies (ANC papers) which he used to write some 
of his speeches show that he consulted with the ANC, black business people and white capital 
regarding the economic transformation agenda- pertinent issues regarding the ways or means 
(what, how, when) to achieve this objective. He used personal and professional links to act as 
a bridge or broker for future (inevitable) black economic empowerment strategies. His 
contribution was small but it is acknowledged by his business colleagues on either side of the 
divide. As part of the early BEE agenda, Mabuza‟s involvement does not appear to have 
eroded or taken away from the general or original BEE agenda and it subsequently gave way 
to more empowerment reforms. It is not uncommon for people in different professions, 
including politicians, to change careers or hold numerous corporate board-level positions 
simultaneously and the questions remains; How many boards of big companies (executive or 
non-executive) can one person serve on and still make a meaningful contribution (spreading 
yourself thin as well as conflicts of interests that might arise)? 
Mabuza was not the only black person to hold multiply board positions or make the switch 
from politics to business. Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa was an ANC National Executive 
Council member for over a decade and he is CEO of Shanduka Holdings, chairperson of the 
Bidvest Group, MTN Group and SASRIA Limited. His other non-executive directorships 
include Macsteel Holdings, Alexander Forbes, Standard Bank and SABMiller. He was 
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appointed as the non-executive joint Chairman of Mondi in March 2007. Sakumzi J. 
Macozoma (Saki) is also a political activist turned businessman and is currently the Deputy 
Chairman of Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd as well as Chairman of STANLIB and Andisa 
Capital. He is a member of the ANC‟s National Executive Committee and was a Member of 
Parliament after the 1994 elections until 1996 when he resigned to become Managing 
Director of Transnet. Mosima Gabriel (Tokyo) Sexwale heads Mvelaphanda Holdings and 
Mvelaphanda Resources (he is executive chairman for both) which owns shares in 
Moneyweb. He also chairs the boards of companies such as the Trans Hex Group Ltd and 
Northam Platinum Ltd. He is also a director of companies such as ABSA Group Limited, 
Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd (Altech) and Gold Fields Ltd (the latter two positions are 
non-executive). Patrice Tlhopane Motsepe is the non-executive chairman and largest 
shareholder in Africa Rainbow Minerals (approximately 43%) which has interests in gold, 
ferrous metals, base metals, and platinum mining. Motsepe is non-executive chairman of 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd, chairman of Naledi Mining and Future Mining. He is 
also a non-executive director of ABSA Group Limited and Sanlam. The business careers of 
these individuals demonstrate the intersection between the political and business elites. The 
main difference between Mabuza and individuals such as these lies in the details of how they 
got to where they are. Most of the individuals mentioned above were always aligned with the 
ANC (perceived to be legitimate) and Mabuza was seen regarded as being on the wrong side 
because of his association with the Bantustans. 
Mabuza‟s credibility as a competent facilitator, mediator or broker is what kept him in the 
corporate arena. He had the personal qualities to encourage moderation, consultation, 
consensus-building through joint decision-making. He had the right temperament to manage 
tensions and determine acceptable proposals for negotiated solutions amidst the apprehension 
of the transition and it made good business sense for a political moderate like him to join the 
corporate world when he did.  He was a relatively influential public figure in his own right 
and his entrance into the corporate sector was initiated (through nominations and subsequent 
appointments) by „progressive‟ white businesses so that he could serve their specific agendas 
(tentative transformation of their corporate images, cultures or public perceptions thereof). 
The early 1990s was a time full of possibilities for those that rose to the challenge, whether it 
was for personal gain or for the benefit of a particular constituency (Nattrass, 1994). Mabuza 
was part of this shuffling and reshuffling; presumably for personal gain and as a 
representative of a particular constituency, the emerging black business class. His foray into 
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the business sector might have embarrassed and angered fellow blacks who felt betrayed by 
his past involvement in Bantustan politics and the fact that not many blacks made up the 
business elite at the time.  
Mabuza was known for his pragmatism and that is why he was integrated into business by the 
ANC (a calculated, strategic risk). The ANC could have been paranoid and suspicious about 
him but instead took a chance on him; trusted him to be one of the individuals to carry its 
vision for South Africa‟s economic transformation. He was not shunned or ostracised as one 
would have expected and there is no evidence to suggest that he antagonised the 
transformation agenda in any way. He was roped in by both sides to facilitate and/or manage 
economic transformation and his being accepted as a valued partner was a function of the 
dynamics of socio-economic and political change in pursuit of specific imperatives. It was by 
both design and coincidence that Mabuza found a new niche for himself in the corporate 
sector.  
Mabuza‟s legacy in the business arena lives on in his daughter Busi who works in South 
Africa‟s highly competitive, demanding and male dominated R56.2 billion private equity 
industry. She works as a venture capitalist and is a partner in Ethos Private Equity which is 
one of the private fund management firms that dominate the industry. Other major players 
include Brait South Africa Ltd, Pamodzi Investment Holdings, Sanlam Private Equity, Sphere 
Holdings and the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation and Public Development 
Corporation. Fund managers or investment professionals need business savvy in order to 
create and maintain strong business networks in volatile markets. According to an interview 
with Destiny magazine, Busi Mabuza was attracted to the equities industry by its potential to 
contribute considerably to the black economic empowerment (BEE) or economic 
transformation agenda. She moved from Cape Town to Johannesburg and worked with 
Wendy Luhabe‟s consortium, the Women‟s Private Equity Fund, which had a joint venture 
with Glenhove Fund Managers. Ethos Private Equity invests (capital injections) in BEE 
empowered companies to allow them to grow and succeed. In turn, these investments create 
an interface which allows  BEE empowered companies to acquire meaningful control of 
companies which they later invest in once they themselves are well established - the 
cornerstone of affirmative action and BEE policies which are aimed at black South Africa 
(Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:80-85). 
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Busi Mabuza is one of very few black women who hold high level, powerful positions in the 
industry. Busi holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics from the City University of New 
York (Hunter College) and an MBA from the Stern School of Business (New York 
University). She has a background in information technology (IT) and asset management 
(Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Busi Mabuza shares the same passion for business and 
empowerment which her father had when he entered South Africa‟s business arena to help 
restructure it for the benefit or participation of all South Africans, particularly the previously 
marginalised black population.  It is worth noting ,however, that regardless of Busi‟s 
qualifications, competence, ambition and commitment to making a difference in the world of 
business in South Africa (and for women‟s empowerment), there can be no doubt that her 
father‟s business credentials have worked to her advantage in some respects. It also goes 
without saying that nothing in business is ever 100% selfless. 
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Chapter 9: Mabuza: Family and Community Man 
9.1 Introduction 
A life is given meaning in the religious, political and legal doctrines of a society; within the 
matrix of power relations (cultural and historical) which shape and constrain freedom and 
choice (Denzin, 1989a:29). This in turn defines the individual (the events, processes, causes 
and effects which relate to them) in a particular group and at a given time. Enos Mabuza 
began his adult life on one path as a simple family man, teacher and lay preacher and ended 
up on a different trajectory as controversial politician, businessman and conservationist. 
According to Goffman (1968), a person‟s moral standing, acceptability, propriety, integrity 
and respectability is reduced when their identity is spoiled by being placed in disvalued or 
discredited social categories contrasted with the valued status enjoyed by conformists. 
Mabuza found himself stuck between two antagonising camps which meant that he placed 
himself and his family in considerable danger especially if the balance tipped too much in 
one camp‟s favour or he fell foul of one camp for whatever other reason. He navigated a 
complex web of personalities and power interests (political and economic) and managed to 
come out the other side relatively unscathed; in spite of the rather prescriptive or restrictive70 
political lexicon of the time which cast him and others in similar positions as unredeemable 
turncoats. Like all of us, he was not above reproach but the words cunning, vicious, vengeful 
or petty have not been used to describe him even though he was, without a doubt, a driven 
and ambitious man.  
Religious leaders, journalists/ the media in whatever form, teachers, politicians and activists 
influence or shape public opinion (Schur, 1980:19).In South Africa, these forces adopted a 
zero-tolerance approach in which they convicted the notoriously unpopular Bantustan leaders 
because of their link with the apartheid state and their role in curtailing the efforts of the 
liberation movement. Mabuza was not immune to, or insulated from, the stigma and spoiled 
reputation because he was part of the „powerful‟ Bantustan elite and that status left him 
vulnerable to harsh criticism. Politics is often an exercise in discretion and Mabuza might 
very well have been a lesser evil, a rebel with a cause, but his „fraternising‟ with the enemy 
led to his demonising along with the rest of the Bantustan leaders. The dislike for Bantustan 
leaders was not personalised as such so there was no conspiracy to single him out for 
                                                 
70 Definitions, roles, expectations and perceptions. 
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criticism. The criticism itself was, by and large, based on accurate or objective assessments 
and was necessary. Some Bantustan leaders were used by the state to quell or neutralise 
radical elements in their constituencies and in doing so, they strongly discouraged the masses 
from resorting to violent protest (read as disorder). Rather than force cooperation, the state 
co-opted black leaders in the councils, police force, Bantustans and Traditional Authorities to 
help protect its interests.  
Mabuza gave his pledge to the local Swazi chiefs (and the people by extension) and records 
of his speeches do not deviate from this pledge to serve the people as diligently as he could. 
He opposed the Bantustan system and apartheid at least in principle. Was he friend or foe? 
Was his allegiance to the people of KaNgwane and the liberation movement fact or plain 
fiction – a convenient ruse designed to confound the passing observer by playing at false 
modesty and humility?  According to those that knew him (Esther Mabuza, Interview; 
Sandile Mabuza, Interview; Margaret Mabuza, Interview; Elias Ginindza, Interview, Simeon 
Gininda, Interview), he believed that he could make a difference from within the system but 
how realistic was that vision and how significant a different would that have been in what 
was essentially a David and Goliath battle of unequally matched opponents? 
Connelly (2002) observes that politics and ideology, power, ambiguity, morality, rightness, 
justice, the relationship between personal (as well as social or group) identity and democratic 
politics in relation to a set of differences are ubiquitous in modern life and create pressures 
that cannot be ignored. In this regard, Ross (2002) notes that the „right act‟ is determined by a 
plurality of self-evident prima facie duties. This chapter is based on the assumption or 
assertion that social capital or networks in the family, community, church or work are 
relevant because humans as social beings, regardless of the frequency of contact or closeness 
(Putnam and Goss, 2002:3-19). The nuclear and extended family, friends and associates 
represent a form of social capital, as does the neighbourhood association to which one 
belongs or the civic organizations of which one is a member (Granovetter, 2002:60-80; 
Wuthnow, 1998). They constitute an important asset which can be called on in times of crisis 
(poverty vulnerability, disputes), enjoyed for their own sake or leveraged for material gain. 
The conflict environment created by apartheid and resistance to it led to a range of divisions 
and intra-community dynamics arising from secrecy, silence and suspicions regarding spies, 
black community councillors, black policemen, police informers, collaborators, double agents 
and internal power struggles within the liberation movement. Piven and Cloward state that, 
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“It is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of 
their demands and points out the targets of their anger” (1979:20-22). The deprivation, 
persistent poverty, unemployment and frustration fostered by blatant racial discrimination 
created anger, irrationality and aggression.  
The term mpimpi (Zulu for spy) and its many variations and usages - in politics (and 
industrial action/strikes) strips the person so labelled of their humanity. Individuals so 
labelled become the enemy and targets of mob violence. The TRC hearings dealt with, among 
others, patterns of violence, its causes, motives and the perspectives of victims as well as 
perpetrators. As part of its destabilisation strategy, especially in the 1980s, the state did 
manipulate and exploit existing inter-community rivalries - rural-urban and conservatives-
progressive divides which were usually articulated through intergenerational conflicts - 
through the security forces, intelligence agencies, covert projects and informer networks but 
often times, innocent people were labelled (creating perceptions) as collaborators and 
marking as legitimate targets to be killed (the neck-lacing phenomenon) (TRC Report 
Volume 5, 1998:160, 299, 424, 446). This included, among others, individuals who defected 
to the state and became informers or state witnesses in political trials. Also included in this 
set and witch-hunting expeditions were often political opponents with no links to the state 
apparatus and this experience has created a challenge of reconciliation in some black 
communities between those who fought against apartheid and those who were seen as 
collaborators because they participated in state structures and thus helped to enforce apartheid 
(Bantustan leaders/ some chiefs, black councillors or black police/„kitskonstabels‟ and 
askaris) (TRC Report, 1998:362). 
According to Goffman (1968:129), a distinction can be made between social and personal 
identity; the personal identity being the individual‟s subjective sense of their own situation, 
continuity and character obtained through various social experiences. Despite all that he 
achieved in his lifetime as a politician, educationist, businessman or entrepreneur, 
conservationist and part-philanthropist, Mabuza liked to think of himself as a simple family 
man. His family and friends where his anchor, sanctuary and support in coping with his 
peculiar and precarious circumstances because he could rely on their acceptance and 
compassion even when they did not understand, had misgivings did not agree with what he 
was doing.  
Page | 349 
 
9.2 Kith and Kin Loyalties 
Different registers are evoked when people differentiate between legitimate members of a 
moral community and those who hold no such claims even when membership to the moral 
community is negotiated or reconfigured at intervals according to ethnicity, race, nationality, 
class, gender or age. Moral status is normally achieved through marriage, home ownership 
and being gainfully employed. In the South African context, gender and marital status 
generally allows men and married women privileges over women (single mothers and 
widows). By naming, shaming or excluding certain individuals from the group, authority or 
power can be ascertained by those that conform to the standard (Jensen, 2007:194). 
Bourdieu‟s (1998) fields in the habitus-field analysis are fluid and dynamic - made up of 
relatively autonomous social worlds which include the family, church/religion, 
schools/education and the community at large. Mabuza fulfilled the traditional expectation 
that one will marry and have children and assume various family responsibilities early in his 
life (Finch and Mason, 1993). Between 1960 and 1976, Mabuza taught at various schools in 
the Lowveld region‟s White River Circuit (KaBokweni). Enos married Esther Thokozile 
Mabuza (nee Miya) in 1963 and they had six children together - daughters Busisiwe (the 
blessed one), Nekeziwe (the one who is a gift)/Grace and Nompumelelo (the successful one) 
and sons Vusumuzi (the one who revives the family), Sizo (the helpful one) and Sandile (we 
are now a big family)/Christopher. He had a conventional two-parent family with children by 
the time he was twenty-one years old. He took on the extra responsibility of helping to raise 
his siblings, including the others from his father‟s second wife (Brannen, Moss and Mooney, 
2005, Zelizer, 1994; Giddens, 1991; Durkheim, 1984). In a letter to Beverly Johnson, 
Mabuza comments that “the family unit is the anchor of our lives” (Mabuza, Letter to 
Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 November 1992:2). 
Mabuza became Deputy Headmaster at Emjindini Secondary School, Barberton in 1964; 
Headmaster at Khumbula Secondary School, White River in 1968 and Inspector of Education 
for the White River East Inspection Circuit in 1972. Whilst taking up these various teaching 
posts, Mabuza furthered his education via correspondence and received his Matriculation 
Certificate in 1964, studied for a Bachelor of Arts degree with the University of South Africa 
which he obtained in 1969, with distinction. After that, he completed a Bachelor of Arts 
Honours degree with the University of South Africa which he obtained in 1973, also passed 
with distinction. He topped the qualifications by completing the Executive Development 
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Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand‟s Graduate School of Business in 1989. 
He also spoke fluently in siSwati, English and Afrikaans. Mabuza was inspired by the 
examples of leaders such as Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther king Jr. and Nelson Mandela 
who defended basic human rights and the oppressed. He enjoyed reading, listening to 
classical music, playing chess and activities related to nature conservation (Esther Mabuza, 
Interview; Sandile Mabuza, Interview). 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the emotional cost and anguish which his family 
lived with because of how the public received them. It is also generally that people like him, 
and their families, had it easy because they jumped on the apartheid gravy-train. Mrs Mabuza 
(Esther Mabuza, interview) recalled several incidents when the political intruded on the 
personal and they received crank calls presumably from security operatives who were 
keeping an eye on Mabuza in the dead of the night. This generated a lot of anxiety and 
general reluctance to answer the home phone, especially at night but Mabuza also received 
important calls from ANC leaders (Esther Mabuza, Interview). Sandile, Mabuza‟s son recalls 
that as children they knew not to wake their father after a certain time at night but when the 
ANC calls came, he would bolt out of bed to take the calls (Sandile Mabuza, Interview). 
Most of the people interviewed note that Mabuza was a devout Christian and believed in 
destiny and prayer played a big role in his life. Mabuza‟s consultations with his family and a 
close friend Dr. Nyathi (a colleague in the teaching profession) regarding whether or not to 
take the position of Bantustan leader meant that he did not make the decision lightly. 
Education was his first passion and he wanted to improve the lot of marginalised people. His 
sister says that it was a difficult and sad decision for him. He was reluctant to leave the 
teaching profession but he did not want to disappoint his elders either. It was possible that the 
ordinary people would not accept him in that position so was this as selfless as this suggests? 
Highly unlikely but he apparently prayed with the family every evening and morning because 
of the potential dangers that lay in his way. Esther Mabuza describes her late husband as a 
God-fearing, just and humble man. She believes these qualities added to his ability to lead; 
his charisma. People put their faith and trust in him and he took his job/responsibilities very 
seriously (Sztompka, 1999).  Sometimes, his wife would find him kneeling and praying for 
guidance in the middle of the night. He also began most meetings with a prayer. He made a 
contribution; some would argue a valuable one, to his community despite being a „middle-of-
the road black leader‟. His family is proud of the legacy or heritage he left them because he 
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tried to make a modest difference to the lives of the people he touched (Sandile Mabuza; 
Margaret Mabuza; Esther Mabuza - interviews). 
Mabuza believed in something bigger than himself and his faith had kept him going through 
all the highs and lows of his life and it informed his non-violent approach to politics, his 
sense of justice and fairness. He liked to see the good in all people. Commins (1996) 
discusses the use of pacifism or non-violence in struggles in America (Day, Muste, King Jr, 
Merton). A similar approach was taken by religious groups and individuals in South Africa 
(Beyers Naude, Desmond Tutu, Frank Chikane and many others). Mabuza was a politician 
with a strong religious upbringing which was influenced by his paternal grandmother and he 
made a modest contribution to debates in the church. He became a registered lay-preacher in 
the Methodist Church of South Africa early on in his life (van Wyk Smith, 1993:11; Mabuza, 
1992; Mabuza, 1991). Mabuza was an active member of, and a lay preacher in, the Barberton 
Methodist Church and later the KaBokweni and KaNyamazane/Louieville branches when he 
lived and worked there. He was also a member of the Methodist Young Men‟s Guild. These 
congregations were fairly small because they were segregated and based in the townships.  In 
an interview with Julie Frederikse (undated), Mabuza recalls that scripture became really 
important to his life when he was Standard 6 and made up his mind to become a minister of 
religion and try to lead his people out of the suffering that he saw around him like the stories 
in the bible - “...the God of David and the God of Moses made a very strong impression upon 
me in terms of our life.” He believed this was his calling and he would be able to reach a 
greater audience as a minister of religion. He was also convinced God would eventually 
deliver his suffering people (Frederikse interview with Mabuza, undated). 
His religious convictions were a source of emotional strength for Enos and his family. Enos 
believed in the equality of all human beings before God, and thus saw apartheid as an 
injustice against not only the black people in the country but also as a doctrine that was 
fundamentally wrong and immoral before God (Email Correspondence with Sandile Mabuza, 
April 2008). Mabuza had contact with prominent figures in the Christian community both 
locally and internationally, for instance, Bishop Mvume Dandala, Rev. Peter Storey, 
Reverend Stanley Magoba (former head of the PAC), Justice Dikang Moseneke71, Dr. N. 
Motlane, Reverend Solomon S. Nyoni and businessman Archie Nkonyeni who encouraged 
his faith.  Mabuza did not use religious ideology as a weapon in the political struggle to 
                                                 
71 Who also served as deputy chairperson of the Nelson Mandela Children‟s Fund. 
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counter the apartheid state‟s theology which called for church leaders to “bless injustice, 
canonise the will of the powerful and reduce the poor to passivity, obedience and apathy” 
(Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986:17).  However, Mabuza participated in 
international prayer events such as the Washington Prayer Breakfasts which were a moral 
challenge to Apartheid when Christians from around the world and from different 
denominations and racial backgrounds gathered to pray for an end the injustice that was in 
South Africa (Email Correspondence with Sandile Mabuza, April 2008).  Mabuza attended 
church services as often as he could, which meant travelling between Johannesburg to 
Nelspruit for Sunday church services or funerals at his home parish even though he was 
based in Johannesburg for most of the 1990s. He kept up with his tithing and often 
commented that failure to do so for whatever reason felt like starting the day without his 
breakfast (Esther Mabuza, Interview). It was Mabuza‟s desire to see a school that would be 
open to students of all races and creeds and to actively promote Christian principles and 
values (but not impose or advocate a specific denomination) - unity in their diversity in a 
school setting as a sort of pilot for South African society as a whole. He did not want the 
school to have a Methodist orientation necessarily, although it did turn out that way at Penryn 
College which he helped co-found.  
The relationship between Penryn College and the Church is governed by a Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Church exercises influence over the affairs of Penryn through 
participation in its governance structures (representation on both the Board of Trustees and 
on Council) as already mentioned. The church‟s representatives ensure that its views and 
interests in all matters pertaining to the governance of the institution are properly represented 
and voiced. When disagreements arise, they are resolved through dialogue with the office of 
the Presiding Bishop. The final resolution in such matters, however, is left to the Board of 
Trustees or the Council but with due consideration given to the Church‟s position as 
articulated by the Presiding Bishop (Penryn College Organization and Governance Guide 
page 9). A maximum of four and a minimum of one member of the Penryn Board of Trustees 
is nominated by the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa. The 
Penryn School Council members include the Presiding Bishop of the Conference of the 
Methodist Church of Southern Africa or his nominee or proxy and a maximum of two other 
members proposed by the Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa (Penryn 
College Organization and Governance Guide page 6). 
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The school curriculum at all times includes religious education and instruction therein is 
given according to principles determined by the Council. Penryn College and the Methodist 
Church also have an agreement that preference be given to filling any vacancy in the 
Chaplain‟s position with someone from the Methodist Church. The procedures for this are set 
out in the Memorandum of Understanding which governs the relationship between the church 
and the school. There is also a provision for an annual formal review with the office of the 
Presiding Bishop (Penryn College Organization and Governance Guide pages 5, 6 & 9). 
Further, as a quasi-private mission school, Penryn College has devotion every morning which 
is overseen by a Methodist Minister/Chaplain but the church is not the overall authority. 
Between Mabuza and his wife, their children did not want for parental interaction, 
supervision or support.  Enos identified closely with his Swazi culture and the concept of 
Ubuntu (shared humanity togetherness and interdependence). As parents, Enos and Esther 
transmitted these values to their children so that they too would know and respect their 
cultural heritage. Mabuza was proud of his Swazi identity and did not try to disguise it as the 
photograph below shows (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007; Sandile Mabuza, 
Interview, 5 June 2007; Esther Mabuza, Interview, 6 June 2007). 
 
Figure 15: Mabuza in traditional Swazi dress. 
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As a family, they tried to lead a normal life as much as was possible and meals times were a 
particularly good bonding time. They cultivated a happy, nurturing, loving and harmonious 
home environment and made time to relax with friends to counterbalance the stresses that 
were part and parcel of his position. They felt safe in their home most of the time and the 
community also protected them because they (most of them) supported Enos‟/Inyandza‟s 
vision or goals (Esther Mabuza, Interview). He was recognised in public especially in 
KaNgwane and people generally showed deference to him and his family. Enos and Esther 
Mabuza were both teachers and they understood that a good education could open 
opportunities that would otherwise not be available. They taught their children to make the 
most of their abilities and not to take their education for granted, especially in a society that 
was structurally rigged to discriminate and disadvantage them from the onset (structure). 
Their children were not coddled or allowed to sit on their laurels as the series of letters 
between Enos Mabuza and his son Sandile between 15 January 1987 when he was in 
Standard 8 at St Stithians College in Johannesburg and 23 November 1990 when he was 
returning from the United Kingdom after completing high school shows (see Chapter 5). 
The Mabuza children have done well for themselves in their chosen careers and he would 
have been proud of their achievements because he did not want them to endure the same 
deprivations that he did as a child. The eldest child, Busisiwe, works in South Africa‟s highly 
competitive and male dominated private equity industry as a venture capitalist. She is a 
partner in Ethos Private Equity which is one of the major players in the industry. She has a 
degree in Mathematics from the City University of New York (Hunter College), a Computer 
Science degree from Spelman College in Atlanta (USA) and an MBA from the Stern School 
of Business (New York University) (Bouwer and Dyantyi, 2008:84-85). Nekeziwe is an 
attorney and Nompumelelo is a researcher and holds a postgraduate Diploma in marketing 
and Management from UNISA. Vusumuzi holds an LL.B degree from the University of the 
Witwatersrand and is an attorney in Nelspruit and still lives in KaNyamazane. Sizo holds a 
Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Witwatersrand and trained as a teacher but 
is currently working in publishing. The youngest child, Sandile, obtained Bachelor of Arts 
degree in Sociology and Law from the University of the Witwatersrand and is working in the 
horticultural sector in Nelspruit ((Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 
November 1992:4; Sandile Mabuza, Interview June 2007). 
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Mabuza‟s individual identity and reputation was inextricably linked with theirs and he tried 
to shield his children from too much negativity or discomfort. However, there was one 
incident in which the family was brought under scrutiny after Mabuza resigned from 
Bantustan politics and was running his consultancy business in Johannesburg. Chief 
Tikhontele Dlamini, a member of the KaNgwane cabinet, could allocate land and houses to 
people who had been displaced by the white farmers and Mabuza was allocated one of the 
dilapidated farm houses in Louisville but, although he kept the Louisville property, the 
Mabuzas did not live in Louisville when Mabuza was Chief Minister. Instead they lived in 
KaNyamazane Township. Later, after resigning from politics, Mabuza demolished the old 
Louisville house and built a double-storey house on the old foundations. This is where Esther 
Mabuza still lives in Louisville and Enos Mabuza is buried there. Journalist Justin Arenstein 
wrote an article regarding this property (and other farms owned by former KaNgwane 
officials including Mongisi Zitha) alleging that corruption or serious irregularities were 
involved in their purchase. According to Sandile (Interview, 2006), the matter deeply upset 
his father because it questioned his integrity. Nadine Gordimer, who was Enos‟ friend, was 
also upset by these allegations because when Chief Tikhontele Dlamini re-allocated land or 
small holdings in the Louisville area, approximately forty individuals or families benefited. 
As chief Minister, Mabuza was entitled to bodyguards but he felt uncomfortable being 
shadowed by them all the time and would often move around by himself. This might have 
seemed reckless for a person in his position but Mabuza did not think that he was invincible. 
He simply believed in a higher power and put his trust and faith in God - that he would 
protect him from any harm that might come his way. It was also meant to show that he was 
really just one of them at heart but sometimes the bodyguards complained to Mrs Mabuza 
that he prevented them from doing their jobs and they feared that they would be blamed if 
anything bad happened to him. The guards were also concerned because they thought that he 
did not trust them enough but Esther Mabuza insists that he never really felt in any kind of 
danger, at least not when he was in the community. Of course there were dissenters and those 
that whispered behind his back; raising concerns about his safety - and theirs. Mabuza‟s 
slogan was; “in everything God is there…leave things in God‟s hands.” 
Mabuza‟s eldest child, Busisiwe, was the only one who ever took an active interest in politics 
when she was studying at the Turfloop campus of what was then the University of the North 
which was one of the most vocal centres in terms of student activism. Contrary to 
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expectations, Busisiwe was involvement in the student representative council and was vocal 
to the point where she was detained a couple of times and was put under house arrest during 
her final year of a Bachelor of Science degree. She was banned from the university a few 
months before she was due to sit for her final examinations and Enos and Esther were 
worried for her safety. They suspected that she might go into exile and join the armed 
struggle and pre-empted this by applying to schools in America after Busisiwe had been 
detained the second time and so she went into a family imposed exile of sorts (Sandile 
Mabuza, Interview; Esther Mabuza, Interview).  
9.3 Mabuza’s Legacy in the Former KaNgwane Area 
There is no contrary evidence to indicate that Mabuza was viewed as a liability and not an 
asset in KaNgwane. He had a reputation for being open, caring and fair, not indifferent, 
authoritarian and acting with impunity. He believed that trust and good faith where the most 
effective political tool, not force. He was an ally, not an adversary. His treatment of the 
people and their support of him gave him a good alibi during the transformation period and 
beyond. 
Many prominent leaders/politicians have been accused, vilified, stigmatised and marginalised 
as sell-outs. A determined and ambitious politician, therefore, needs a tough skin as part of 
the trade. In the United States, for example, historical definitions of what a sell-out is or what 
constitutes racial betrayal have varied over time, not least because of changes in definitions 
of who is black and who is not. According to Kennedy (2008:7) “blacks who attain success in 
a multiracial setting will always sooner or later encounter whispered insinuations or shouted 
allegations that their achievement is attributable, at least in part, to selling out”, until proven 
otherwise. Former United States Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice is an example of a 
successful black person who held a powerful and respected position yet instead of being 
admired by most fellow blacks/African Americans she is denigrated. The Editors of the Black 
Commentator in the United States have gone so far as to charge her of being “the purest 
expression of the race traitor” (cited in Kennedy, 2008:66). Blacks have reservations about 
her as a role model because she did not comply with the dignified maternal silence generally 
expected of black women. She is educated, ambitious and patriotic yet in the same breath 
some would say ruthless, coldly efficient and war mongering. Her motives have been 
questioned in terms of the Uncle Tom notion of blacks merely doing the bidding of their 
white „superiors.‟ She is not alone in this as Colin Powell and incumbent president Barack 
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Obama have also been criticised for their positions on several issues. As blacks, their class 
positions (privilege) is often cited as the reason why they seem to neglect struggles for group 
elevation; looking black but thinking and acting like whites. Their loyalty to blackness is 
questioned either because of mixed ancestry, privileged upbringing or the support they 
receive from whites in their political careers.  Whether this preoccupation or particular 
experience in the American context is justified or not, parallels can be drawn between the 
hostility directed at these African American leaders and that which was generally directed at 
Bantustan politicians in South Africa.  
In Mabuza‟s case, how could he have reassured his constituency that he was still one of them 
and how long would that reassurance have sufficed without tarnishing his identity, and at the 
same time maintaining community solidarity? There are legal and biblical/moral/ethical 
approaches to determining what is good (freedom, justice, peace) and why but good (for 
whom?) and evil are never absolute conceptions. There are many faces and expressions of 
wickedness in historical perspective but how do societies respond to wrong doing? 
Addressing such questions was part of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa where ideology, politics and religion was corrupted and „good‟ people 
become villains, the lines between good and bad became blurred and group violence became 
endemic. 
The topic of Bantustan politics still makes some people nervous and agitated but in 
KaNgwane itself, it appears that Mabuza managed not to burn bridges with his constituency. 
There is no denying that some Bantustan politicians were responsible for horrific actions and 
violence against their own people and were despised with good cause.  It is only logical to 
hold top leaders to account and as Chief Minister, Mabuza was ultimately responsible for 
whatever happened in the Bantustan, good or bad but no wrong-doing has been proven in his 
case and this raises the question whether or not it is possible to play down his culpability to 
such an extent if it existed.  He was not an interloper or usurper because his way was 
smoothed over by the Hhoyi chiefs (the gate-keepers) who gave him the mandate to enter the 
fray. As a leader, and in a sense the custodian of the KaNgwane people, Mabuza was 
committed to alleviate the suffering of his people in small, ordinary ways wherever it was 
possible, given the limited resources dispensed to the Bantustans for development projects 
compared to the populations they supported. Today we take clean water, clinics and decent 
schools for granted but the rural constituencies were not guaranteed such services under 
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apartheid. It can be argued that providing these was his given mandate or responsibility but 
the people there generally agree that he went over and above the call of duty to ensure that 
the people had access to these basic services.  
Mabuza‟s legacy, especially at a national level is justifiably a matter of opinion and debate 
but according to Goffman (1968:81), “no matter how big a scoundrel a man is, no matter how 
false, secretive or disjointed his existence, or how governed by fits, starts and reversals, the 
true facts of his activity cannot be contradictory or unconnected with each other.” Rassool 
(2004) refers to arenas of knowledge creation and instruction as spaces in which identity is 
not only performed or demonstrated but also constituted discursively (as a by-product). He 
notes that during the anti-apartheid struggle, various political labels were generated and 
attached to individuals in both public and private spaces based on different points of 
emphasis and contradictions of nationalism and protest politics (Rassool, 2004:323). Some 
incongruencies are inevitable because of the multiplicity of selves or role identities and 
conflicting responsibilities that individuals assume but they need not be incompatible even 
when fulfilling some roles violates others. The apparent continuities and discontinuities do 
not have to be discrediting. To this end, Goffman (1968:81, 92) argues that the important 
thing is the effective management of role and audience separation or delineation in the 
sustenance of the different selves which constitute different facets of the individual identity. 
Different people (spouse, siblings, children, colleagues, subordinates) had different 
experiences of Mabuza but those interviewed all hold positive memories of him. His family 
(wife, sister, children) and others who worked with him at some point (Wylde, Elias 
Ginindza, Rosemary Smuts, Jeunesse Park, Mathews Phosa, Dr. Conrad Strauss, Dr. Frank 
Raimondo, Jacob Zuma, Professor Francis Antonie, Beverly Johnson, Nadine Gordimer) 
have commented about how humble and modest he was, for example, he was not given to 
conspicuous consumption compared to other Bantustan leaders who flaunted their flashy cars, 
big houses and entourages of body guards.  
Dr Frank Raimondo and his wife Ida of Bishops Court, Cape Town were family friends with 
the Mabuzas and regularly exchanged letters72, cards and advice updating each other 
regarding their views on the country‟s transition, their mutual friends the Renwicks, 
                                                 
72 Personal correspondence from Enos Mabuza to Frank Raimondo dated 24 January 1989, 3 March 1989, 18 
December 1989, 26 February 1991, 8 August 1991 and 2 March 1993.There is also letters from Frank 
Raimondo to Enos Mabuza dated 11 March 1991, 9 April 1991, 23 August 1991, 11 February 1992 and 16 May 
1993. 
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Mabuza‟s resignation from homeland politics, his subsequent directorships73 and consultancy 
business which was launched at the beginning of August 1991, general family news, their 
children‟s74 progress in school and in life75, their travels and Mabuza‟s honorary LLD degree 
by the decision of the Senate and Council of Rhodes University in 1993. The Raimondos and 
Mabuzas often had lunches, dinners and took scenic drives together. Mabuza and his wife 
travelled to the USA for their daughter Busisiwe‟s graduation at the City University of New 
York at the end of May 1991. Mabuza and Raimondo talked about books and classical music 
(Bach and Handel). Frank Raimondo worked at the University of Cape Town and the 
Raimondo family often hosted Mabuza on his business trips to Cape Town so that he would 
not endlessly suffer putting up in hotel all the time. 
Trust is important to social organisation in the family between parents and children, between 
spouses and between neighbours in the community. Communities and good neighbours exist 
because of patterns of group life based on shared customs, language, manners, values, 
meanings, beliefs, sentiments, shared memories and a sense of common destiny - local 
patriotism and sense of belonging loosely based on common experiences (Ossewaarde, 
2007:373, 378). It is relatively easy to trust people within a family, neighbourhood or small 
community because knowledge them has been established over a period of time (one knows 
which neighbours can be trusted and under what conditions). Mabuza was positioned within a 
specific historical and institutional context which generated particular social networks, 
suspicions and hostilities. However, despite the pariah status of Bantustan leaders, Mabuza 
was reportedly very neighbourly and was never actively alienated in his community. People 
who knew Mabuza well are not preoccupied with what some might call his professional 
transgressions. They do not think of him only as a man with a tainted legacy and his name, at 
least in the former KaNgwane Bantustan, does not evoke feelings of betrayal, humiliation or 
embarrassment. 
According to a colleague and friend of Mabuza‟s, Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007) he 
made an effort in the area of social development and general community upliftment despite 
                                                 
73 For strategic reasons, Mabuza was a part-time executive director for the Independent Development Trust and 
accepted a position on the State President‟s Economic Advisory Council in 1993. 
74 The Raimondo‟s children were Michael, John, Joseph, Christina and Domitilla. 
75 In the Mabuza camp, son Vusimuzi had completed and LLB degree at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Sizo was teaching and the youngest; Sandile was completing his BA degree at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. Daughter Nikeziwe was doing a Postgraduate Diploma in Marketing and Management with the 
University of South Africa. Nomphumelelo had just been admitted for a BA degree at the University of Natal‟s 
Durban campus from St Stithians‟ College in Johannesburg. 
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serious odds.  In Mr Ginindza‟s view, Enos Mabuza conceptualised something similar to the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was to be later implemented by 
the ANC government as a deliberate effort to help the poor.  Mabuza use the resources that 
his government had/was given by the Pretoria government to improve the lot of the 
KaNgwane people even though the small size of the Bantustan translated to a limited amount 
of resources allocated to the Bantustan as shown by the table below.  
It was a commonly held belief that Mabuza was being punished for his two main sins; “his 
steadfast refusal to accept independence or to participate in government‟s proposed National 
Council.” In an interview with the Financial Mail in 1989, Mabuza added to this list the fact 
that he did not think that Pretoria had forgiven him for his stand against the proposed 
incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland in 1982. Although Mabuza was in state structures 
(the Bantustans) he refused to participate in the new ones. This went against the 
government‟s wishes and to some degree earned him some credibility with the masses. 
Mabuza maintained that his political stand was taken in the interests of the country with both 
the short and long term in mind. As a result of these refusals or disobedience by Mabuza, 
KaNgwane was financially neglected consistently by Pretoria compared to other self-
governing territories which received sizable shares of the income generated by GST and other 
taxes. Mabuza made written submissions about this discrepancy in budgetary allocations to 
the then Education and Development Aid Minister Gerrit Viljoen, impressing upon him the 
fact that KaNgwane was not getting an equitable share of the central government‟s annual 
allocation  and what it did get was insufficient to meet its needs (Financial Mail, 12 May 
1989:53-54; Van Eeden, 1984:126-141). This complain by Mabuza‟s complaints in this 
regard were also contained in an annexure to Mabuza‟s policy and budget speech which was 
delivered on Tuesday 9 May 1989. 
When interviewed by the Financial Mail regarding this matter Mabuza noted that the 
Minister of Education and Development Aid (Gerrit Viljoen) was sympathetic to the 
problems facing KaNgwane and had visited KaNgwane on three occasions to assess the 
situation for himself. However, Mabuza added that the Minister “has to operate within certain 
constraints” even though the same could not be said about some of Viljoen‟s officials. 
Whenever KaNgwane submitted its budgetary needs to Pretoria, it was told by government 
officials that it did not have the “capacity” nor executive authority to use the funds requested 
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and its proposed budget would be cut to suit Pretoria‟s definition of the Bantustan‟s 
administrative capacity and constitutional status (Financial Mail, 12 May 1989:53-54). 
This situation (the State‟s passive aggression towards Mabuza and his government) was 
compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in the area too. According to the Financial 
Mail, there were 49 manufacturing concerns, 1 759 employed people in KaNgwane and 
R17.8m had been invested in the Bantustan by the Development Corporations by 30 
September 1988 (Financial Mail, 1989 Vol. 112 No. 3:55). However, despite these setbacks, 
Mabuza was able to secure funds by other means and built schools such as the Elijah Mango 
College. He expanded health facilities such as clinics and hospitals and build tarred roads. In 
addition to this, Mabuza initiated a programme to harness water from the Crocodile River 
into the rural areas or reserves which were not serviced before so that the people would have 
access to clean water and encouraged locals to take an interest in agriculture beyond mere 
subsistence (Elias Ginindza (Interview, 8 June 2007). The Crocodile River is part of the 
Kruger National Park and forms its southern boundary. The river flows through Malelane 
(part of the KaNgwane Bantustan) into the perennial Nkomati River in Mozambique. 
Impoundments in the river‟s upper reaches release abnormally high and stable winter flows to 
support irrigation on the southern banks opposite Kruger. However, the Crocodile River is 
prone to being infested with water hyacinth and requires regular water quality management 
(O‟Keefe and Rogers, 2003:449 & 453). 
Co-founder and CEO of Ukwakhisana, an initiative focused on the socio-economic 
development of communities near the Kruger National Park, Paul De Bruyn, raised R98 
million for Mabuza for low cost housing in KaNgwane in 1988. Since De Bruyn was 
involved in socio-economic developments in the area, this assistance can be interpreted as a 
positive injection in the negligible coffers of the KaNgwane government for social 
developmental to benefit the people. However, it could have been a quid pro quo 
arrangement in which the benefactors expected something in return - what were the 
circumstances and who where the donors (http://www.nacsa.co.za/)? 
Most of the land in KaNgwane was devoted to pastoral and other non-productive agricultural 
use in the 1970s. Cattle farming was the main activity in the Bantustan approximately 55 500 
head of cattle being recorded, 450 sheep and 300 goats in 1975. At least 110 small dams had 
been built and 173 boreholes sunk to water the livestock. Dipping tanks and sale pens were 
also constructed for the sale of livestock (Association for Rural Advancement - Reel KK/Reel 
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38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm Collection). In the 1980s, plans were drawn up to boost the 
creation of an emergent black commercial farming class in Nkomazi (part of the former 
KaNgwane Bantustan) in order to increase rural production as well as alter the racial profile 
of commercial agriculture in the area. However, according to the Annual Reports of the 
KaNgwane government, the results of these attempts were quite modest (Jensen, 2007:198). 
Subsistence agriculture in most Bantustans was characterised by dry-land cultivation. 
According to the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) (Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-
Gerhart Microfilm Collection), approximately 3% of the Bantustan was irrigated and maize, 
beans, groundnuts, potatoes, cowpeas, sweet potatoes and yams were grown on a small scale 
by co-operatives and agricultural societies.  
The Nelspruit area is the second-largest citrus-producing area in South Africa and is 
responsible for one-third of the country‟s export of oranges and other subtropical fruits  such 
as mangoes, avocados, litchis, bananas, paw-paws, granadillas and guavas  as well as a 
variety of vegetables. The Institute for Tropical and Sub-tropical Crops is situated there. The 
three land masses which made up KaNgwane were generally suited to horticultural 
production and attempts were made to focus on sub-tropical fruit, particularly citrus varieties, 
and vegetables such as green beans, cabbages, cauliflowers and onions, mostly for domestic 
use. Industrial crops included sisal and sugarcane (a large sugar industry is at Malelane in the 
former KaNgwane Bantustan east of Nelspruit) which was produced under irrigation and 
followed by labour intensive processing (cutting, treating/drying). Limited areas were 
devoted to the production of cotton, wheat and tobacco. Approximately 1 376ha of 
commercial and 78 non-commercial forestry plantations had been planted in the area by 1975 
(Association for Rural Advancement - Reel KK/Reel 38 Karis-Gerhart Microfilm 
Collection). 
The comments or testimonies given by his family, friends, colleagues and neighbours portray 
him as an approachable, cheerful and respectful person who was satisfied with what he 
achieved in his lifetime. Mabuza took his commitments to his family and community 
seriously and his family has no doubt that he left his mark on the area where he grew up and 
that he touched the lives of many people there. According to interviews with family 
members, Mabuza was reluctant to discuss his work even though he worked both from home 
and the KaNgwane government offices. He often left for the office as early as 6am and 
returned home around 10pm and even then he continued to work in his study (Esther Mabuza, 
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Interview). Esther Mabuza admits that to some degree politics robbed their children of quality 
time they would have spent with their father but she expresses satisfaction with the effort that 
Enos put into maintaining some semblance of normalcy at home. She does not question his 
love for his family remembers how he would sit and talk with the children whenever he 
could. He wanted to be an ordinary father at home; not a politician. When he did find the 
time, he tried to give each child individual attention and find out what was going on in their 
life - they had their meals together, went to church, he helped the children with their 
homework and they played outside.  
It is apparent from the accounts of several family members that they only became aware of 
the full extent of Mabuza‟s relationship with the ANC in 2005 at a symposium which was 
held in Nelspruit in his honour. The fact that his political legacy stayed hidden from family 
makes it almost inevitable for ambiguity or speculation regarding his actions or contribution 
to persist amongst ordinary people who do not have ready access to this information. He is 
not a national hero but he was/is admired and celebrated by his family and those who knew 
him in various capacities. He lived a full life and opened new frontiers for his family and 
blacks generally through his varied contributions to education, politics, business and 
conservation.  Throughout his life, Mabuza could genuinely connect with people such that he 
maintained strong ties with the KaNyamazane community where the family lived, even 
though he spent most of his time in Johannesburg once he retired from politics. A charmed 
domestic circle was provided by supporters in the community who shared some of the 
criticism which was directed at him. In a sense, the community embraced his perceived moral 
blemish as their own (Goffman, 1968:43 & 46). However, although a strong support system 
can rally around the individual in times of need, it can also give them the false impression 
that they are more fully accepted by the society at large than might be the case. The support 
system creates a bubble around the individual, insulating them from the unpleasantness or 
antagonism of outsiders (Goffman, 1968: 120). 
Numerous authors (Bowden and Rooksby, 2006:241-256; Nielsen, 2006:175-197; Tabensky, 
2006:129-151; Fellman, 2006:111-125; Kumar, 2006:153-174; Gilbert, 2006:94-114; 
Graham, 2006:256-268; Mallema, 2006:168-175; Sadler, 2006:115-144; Ross, 2002) have 
commented on the tension that exists between the imperative, role and significance of judge 
and holding individuals or groups accountable for their actions - good or bad - on one hand 
and ambivalence about making efforts to understand the contexts and motives for such 
Page | 364 
 
actions, on the other. People‟s reactive attitudes are easily activated because they are quick to 
claim that they know the facts or truth about a given situation when often times it is not the 
case. The mere existence of  differences in perceptions and interpretations, therefore, means 
that struggle between free will and determinism will always exist thereby creating ambiguity 
regarding appropriate judgment and punishment/condemnation or reward (Bowden and 
Rooksby, 2006:241-256; Nielsen, 2006:175-197; Tabensky, 2006:129-151; Fellman, 
2006:111-125; Kumar, 2006:153-174; Gilbert, 2006:94-114; Graham, 2006:256-268; 
Mallema, 2006:168-175; Sadler, 2006:115-144; Ross, 2002). An understanding of the 
rationale or explanations for particular actions or decisions often leads to a different, less 
negative conclusion regarding the moral and other responsibilities of the perpetrator/s. In 
Mabuza‟s case, it appears from the accounts given of his relationship with the KaNgwane 
community that they adopted a pragmatic, humanist approach to understanding or explaining 
his involvement in Bantustan politics. The general sentiment expressed is that there was no 
malice or evident greed on his part.  
The proverb “to understand is to forgive” seems to ring true in this instance, if indeed there 
were misdeeds to be forgiven and wounds to heal. How complete is this process of justifying 
or moralising the good and the bad of what he did as a fallible human being and an obligated 
agent (because of the request of the Hhoyi chiefs)? Did he not get his just deserts because the 
community and his family saw or choose to see or remember only the good about him and 
ignore the rest - justifications to emphasise the positive consequences of certain actions or 
decisions that he made and excuses to mitigate responsibility for the bad things that happened 
on his watch? It has been argued that concentrated power (closing ranks) can shield wrong-
doers from negative legal sanctions or other harsh penalties in business, politics and other 
arenas where power is a useful currency (Schur, 1980:168-183; Mills, 1956) but Mabuza and 
those that surrounded him only had relative power which was given and controlled by the 
state. Perhaps knowing why Mabuza did what he did was liberating enough for the 
community for it not to feel anger, resentment, hatred or bitterness towards him and his 
family. Perhaps their acceptance of the treacherous political milieu of the time as well as the 
reassurances that they were given through Mabuza‟s words and deeds was enough to give 
them peace of mind and reconcile them when all was said and done. Elias Ginindza notes that 
Mabuza did not separate himself from his people or his roots when he resigned from politics. 
Their welfare remained a priority for him and he kept in touch with developments in 
KaNgwane (Interview, 8 June 2007). In his own words, Mabuza admits that resigning from 
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politics was not an easy decision but he also gives justification for his continued interest in 
politics through his consultancy and other avenues as follows: 
“It was not an easy decision for me to resign my position as the elected leader 
of my people, albeit within an apartheid government structure. In retrospect, I 
am satisfied with both my decision and the timing thereof were correct. Even 
my constituency who were saddened by my unprecedented move, finally 
accepted and respected it. However, and in spite of their having reconciled 
themselves to the reality of my resignation, they still regard me as the “Chief 
Minister” and are looking forward to the day when I shall return to lead and 
represent them in a national (as opposed to homeland) and truly democratic 
government. Although politics in not part of my agenda for the future, I do 
keep in touch with my people and continue to take interest in their welfare and 
prosperity. Whereas I value the advice of one of my close friends and 
confidantes, Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, viz. to steer clear of the kitchen of 
political parties and politics, I try to monitor closely what is happening in that 
kitchen. After all, I may find myself and my family having to eat what is 
cooked in that kitchen” (Mabuza, Letter to Beverly Johnson and Chris, 25 
November 1992:2). 
According to Fellman (2006:111-125), there are many moral complexities and 
responsibilities to be considered in times of strife so what moral standard is to be used to 
judge him and is it different supposed to be different to that applied to other black leaders? If 
so, would it be fair? Enos Mabuza was not a monster. He did not act unilaterally and he never 
sanctioned violence against his own people or leave them worse off than they were initially. 
He did not fall for the vanity of material wealth in the material. He did not want to be revered 
but to be treated as an ordinary citizen. He was approachable in his official and non-official 
capacity, be it on the streets, at church or at home and this attitude did not change when he 
resigned from active politics (Elias Ginindza, Interview, 8 June 2007). The people in 
KaNgwane did not think he was superior or that much different from them. He was their 
brother and they believed that they were in it together with him, not against him. His family 
and friends give him a very ordinary human face and character. They speak of him in terms 
of shared intentions and responsibility (collective ownership), not virtue, misdeeds, 
recriminations, blame, guilt, hostility, shame, victims, perpetrators and reparations (Esther 
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Mabuza, Interview; Sandile Mabuza, Interview; Margaret Mabuza, Interview; Elias Ginindza, 
Interview, Simeon Gininda, Interview). They claim that he was aware of the consequences of 
his actions, or the perceptions thereof, but he tried to do what was right for his people but one 
should bear in mind Durkheim‟s (1984:152) caution that “every harmony of interests 
conceals a latent conflict, or one that is simply deterred.” 
9.4 Conclusion 
The liberation movement was punctuated by ideological differences, rivalries, healthy 
criticism and in some instances, counterproductive and open hostilities. In this political 
milieu, Bantustan leaders bore the brunt of much of the criticism. They were disparaged, 
disdained and condemned in the strongest words more than „normal‟ politicians in the media 
and other forums outside their homes and immediate communities or constituencies. Mabuza 
was a man seemingly at a crossroads for most of his adult life; stuck between conflicting 
demands and loyalties. It is convenient, almost natural to say that he was involved in cloak-
and-dagger political chicanery because he was a Bantustan leader but such a generalisation 
over-simplifies the complexity of the relations he kept with key figures on either side of the 
political and social divide - it minimises the type of politician, businessman and family man 
that he was. Success is not only measured by how much you earn or who knows you but also 
by where you stand at times of crisis. One can only speculate about Mabuza‟s beliefs or 
motives, declared or secret, from what he did, said and the consequences thereof, which he 
cannot defend now. Interpretation is a subjective but some inferences can be made from the 
means he used to achieve his success or stature. His personal circumstances as a child were 
those of disadvantage and struggle but he was able to improve himself without resorting to 
the use of force or inducements. The evidence available does not suggest that he achieved 
success in the same way most of his contemporaries in the other Bantustans tended to do.  
A person has a combination of life history details or social facts (record and reputation) 
attached to their name. These facts are reported in their obituary but there are also lesser 
known or celebrated facts about them which might be known even by people who have never 
met the individual personally. Mabuza‟s life and legacy raises the questions regarding 
whether or not individuals can redeem themselves when they have done something „bad‟; 
whether they can be fully exonerated in the case of false accusations and trust and dignity can 
be restored unconditionally? He rose to prominence during a difficult period in South 
Africa‟s history. The political mood was not inclined to accommodate ideological 
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ambiguities.  In this regard, Rassool (2004:446) comments that the “process of the awakening 
of the people involved the rejection of anonymity and a conscious process of self-
identification.”  Other identities were necessarily subsumed into the national one and the 
boundaries or restrictions imposed in this way were often prejudicial. 
Mabuza could have distanced himself from all these complications by declining the request 
of the Swazi chiefs but he did not. It could not possibly have been an easy choice given the 
very real possibility of retaliation by the more radical elements within the liberation 
movement. He was no saint and his claim that he was working for the good of the black 
people from within the system is regarded by some as a smokescreen for a more sinister 
double agenda. He participated in the state structures because he believed that he could make 
the best of a bad situation but he did not strike other accommodations with the oppressor. He 
did not accept segregation but working within the system made sense to him and presented 
the one advantage of not attracting the state‟s wrath. The direct approach had led to the 
banning of many liberation movements in the 1960s and the state did not tolerate incidents 
when the masses asserted themselves. Mabuza was not a revolutionary but he was one among 
many others who encouraged understanding, mutual respect and goodwill for the benefit of 
all. For the attainment of a shared dream of freedom and equality, the liberation movement in 
South Africa depended on the support of or alliances with groups that had different 
ideological persuasions and class compositions. 
It is difficult to say with any certainty that greed was or was not involved. The accounts given 
by family members portray Mabuza as having reluctantly accepted the request (patronage) of 
the Hhoyi traditional leaders to guide them through the minefield of Bantustan politics 
mainly because of the negative perceptions it would create for the casual bystander, whether 
or not he zealously enforced his own people‟s oppression. He took a controversial line from 
the outset which he has been castigated for and others which he has been given credit for but 
is he worthy of any mention as an individual who contributed to the liberation struggle 
alongside other struggle heroes? Some audiences have welcomed his contribution (the family, 
his immediate community, the Swazi chiefs who co-opted him into Bantustan politics, some 
members of the ANC and UDF leadership and other sympathisers) while some (more radical 
black nationalists) have been understandably hostile and critical because they do not see 
anything praiseworthy in what he did, especially as far as his politics is concerned.  
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The business of politics can be a fickle enterprise characterised by greed, fear and anger so 
what is the truth about Mabuza‟s legacy or contribution? Did the people of KaNgwane, 
broadly defined, distrust Mabuza or was he accepted as their legitimate, though not elected 
leader? There was some social distance between him and the people he led in terms of 
education, class and outlook but a workable truce existed. There are personal consequences 
and challenges of leadership at all levels in all institutions which the public and critics tend to 
overlook or ignore because of the preoccupation about what the individuals gain. There are 
risks and sacrifices involved in political transactions in terms of the costs to the individuals 
and their families, for example, unjust characterisations, distortions and even plain lies. Even 
though Bantustan elites were seen as implementing facilitating or implicitly supporting 
oppressive policies, Mabuza always made it a point in his interviews and speeches to 
articulate the grievances of blacks in South Africa, not just his constituency. I have not come 
across any record of him advocating any action that was detrimental to the welfare of blacks 
as a group. However, the existence of informers, spies and the like, both real and alleged, was 
highly effective in creating a climate of suspicion and breaking down trust within and 
between families and communities and the consequences of being exposed as an informer 
were social isolation and physical danger. Bantustan leaders, including Mabuza, were 
generally regarded in the same light and their links to the state were not as tenuous. They 
were seen as sell-outs linked to the apartheid system and were thus, not immune (including 
their families) to retaliatory violence the masses. As far as the black public was concerned, 
fault had little to do with blame for someone in Mabuza‟s position. He, and the other 
Bantustan leaders, represented a line of defence for the apartheid state, an impediment to the 
aims of the liberation movements. 
Mabuza might not be significant in the national public memory but he remains in the fibre 
and lives family, friends and colleagues who survived him. Coser (1967:106-107) notes that 
by their nature, political structures cannot accommodate all political demands and violence is 
resorted to especially by those that have an interest in suppressing opposition or dissenting 
voices. Mabuza‟s strengths, competencies, personal qualities (willingness to listen, 
congenial), worth and legacy depend on what he did and said and the degree to which he 
uplifted or empowered those around him, not just in terms of his commitment to his family‟s 
welfare or that of the people of KaNgwane.  
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Enos Mabuza passed away on Saturday 13 December 1997 at the age of 58. He succumbed to 
pancreatic and liver cancer at his Johannesburg home approximately two months after he was 
diagnosed. A memorial service was held for Mabuza at the Central Methodist Church in 
Johannesburg on Thursday 18 December and he was buried at his home in Louieville near 
Nelspruit on Sunday 21 December 1997. The family held an intimate funeral for close friends 
and family and Samora Machel‟s wife Graça (now married to Nelson Mandela) attended 
Enos Mabuza‟s funeral in 1997. As his colleagues have testified, he was a humble man and it 
was fitting that his funeral was not turned into a huge political production despite the public 
profile he had. Religious (prayers, hymns and eulogies) as well as Swazi rituals were part of 
the service. In his address to the board on 12 May 1998, then Acting Chairman of South 
African Breweries, Cyril Ramaphosa said the following about Mabuza; “The untimely 
passing of the highly respected Enos Mabuza is recorded with sadness and our deepest 
sympathy is extended to his wife and family. SAB is extremely fortunate to be able to call on 
the services of such able and committed people.”  
Mabuza‟s story fits the clichéd rags to riches mould. He came from under class roots but rose 
above that, became a well-connected man, influential and respected man who was loved by 
his community, even though he might have exercised questionable judgment at times. His 
sister Margaret maintains that he was not politically inclined as a young man and he had no 
aspirations of becoming a political figure, let alone a controversial one. She insists that he did 
not do it for prestige, power or wealth but to serve his people. He did not become a Bantustan 
leader by „right‟ like other Bantustan leaders who came from a line of chiefs but he accepted 
the position out of duty and respect for the chiefs who requested him to do so (Margaret 
Mabuza - Interview, 2007). As the various Mayibuye (ANC publication) interviews with and 
articles about Mabuza in the 1980s show, he was not the worst thing that could have 
happened to KaNgwane. He might not have been the best thing that happened to it either but 
his leadership did not herald a bleak era for the Bantustan. Instead, it represented hope for 
many people there, including the Mozambican refugees whom it sheltered. His constituency 
never rejected him or revolted again him but this does not mean that he was a Pied Piper who 
had mysteriously cast a spell on them to make them docile? Not at all. 
When asked if she thinks her brother has been given the sort of recognition he deserves, 
Margaret Mabuza unequivocally says that he has not because whatever recognition he has 
received has been confined to the Nelspruit- KaNgwane area of Mpumalanga Province. It 
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must be small consolation though that the Mabuza family is still respected as a residual effect 
of Enos‟ commitment to the people of KaNgwane, his sincerity, warmth and compassion. 
Although it has been over a decade since Mabuza‟s passing, his widow was honoured by then 
President Montlanthe when he delivered the State of the Nation address in February 2009. 
One Eminent Person nominated by the Provincial Speaker from each of the nine provinces is 
honoured in recognition of outstanding results in a particular field or contribution to society 
during this address. Mrs Mabuza was the nominated Eminent Person from Mpumalanga 
Province in recognition of her community and business leadership (The Daily News, 4 
February 2009). 
While the Mabuza family might have preferred to have Mabuza‟s name cleared a lot earlier, 
they felt relieved and vindicated after  his activities and alliances with the ANC and UDF 
were laid bare and acknowledged/ celebrated at the April 2005 symposium which was 
convened in his honour and proving that he was not the enemy. It was also mentioned that 
Nelson Mandela visited the Mabuza home several times and that Mabuza visited Mandela on 
Robben Island when other, more prominent leaders, could not get access to him. 
To conclude, charting a political middle course was a dangerous gamble which had the 
potential to backfire. This chapter has deliberately sought to tell Mabuza‟s story as his 
immediate family remembers him - how they have memorialised him. It therefore reflects 
their sanitised or sentimental view of him compared to anything that even the kindest of 
critics might hold. The family makes no apology for their views and one would not expect 
them to because he was their beloved son, brother, husband or father. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
A reading of the literature on South Africa‟s struggle against apartheid oppression reveals 
pre‐determined categories or notions of black popular resistance from 1976 through the 
highly volatile 1980s. Resistance, political mobilisation and black political expression 
focused on formal, highly structured, political organisations. Such history is told through the 
“experiences and opinions of political leaders, particularly at a national level” and centred on 
the ANC and its political strategies and traditions (Rassool, 2004:119, 138) and generally 
neglect individual or local histories.  At the core of this thesis on Enos Mabuza‟s life and 
career are questions about agency and responsibility or individual action and accountability 
within specific structural constraints on one hand; and our reactions to certain actions; 
judging and condemnation vis-a-vis explanation and understanding, on the other. The thesis 
considers the specifics of Mabuza‟s character, his history or circumstances, upbringing, 
family situation, education and the socio-political climate against which his formative years 
were spent because all these factors combined prompted certain views and actions and 
provided the setting for his actions. The aim is not to exonerate, condone or justify what he 
did or did not do but to contextualise the type of “reformist accommodationism and middle 
class moderation” (Rassool, 2004:119) that Mabuza represents. He cannot be exempted from 
responsibility for his actions but an understanding of his motivations for them helps our 
understanding of the dynamics or nuances that were involved. There was nothing inevitable 
about Mabuza‟s career. This thesis has tried to establish Mabuza‟s place in the tapestry of 
South African history, particularly with regards to his links with the apartheid state and 
liberation movements and organisations such as the ANC and UDF. Mabuza did not go out of 
his way to set the record, his record straight. Either people knew what he stood for and did 
and valued that contribution or they did not. We can speculate and debate what Mabuza ought 
to have done but the ideal and the practical do not always overlap. 
Mabuza has detractors and those that despise what he represented but he also has 
sympathisers and admirers who accept or appreciate what he was able to achieve and the 
sacrifices that he made. He might be identified as a quisling but the disdain is not universal. 
History is replete with heroes and villains; stories of betrayal, courage and hope set in 
different eras and locales but such stories do not mean the same things to everyone or for all 
time. Any number of motivations, ideologies, the quest for wealth, status and power inform 
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our actions and decision. As people, we have a tendency to over-simplify and stereotype 
people that we like or dislike but their lives are often intertwined with our own or those of 
individuals that we admire. It is natural for us to judge others but in reality there is no saint 
without a past or a sinner without a future. Reference systems and values are not calcified, 
static, fixed or stable.  Instead, they are prone to interpretation, adaptation, modification, 
invention or manipulation, decomposition and re-composition. In turn, relativism creates 
particular brands of historical moralism, hypocrisy and historical consciousness.  
Contested historical accounts, records, legacies and reputations exist even in the political 
mainstream where individuals have been branded many negative labels alongside good ones. 
Rassool (2004:247) acknowledges the fallibility of political and moral greatness and 
considers whether the negative aspects outweigh the positive. Also, former uMkhonto we 
Sizwe (MK) Commander and former Minister of Defence and ANC member Joe Modise is 
believed to have “made many enemies and lost the respect of many soldiers” (Rassool, 
2004:245). Other well-known South African politicians who have been accused of having 
spied or being corrupt include Peter Mokaba, and Tony Yengeni. There was and still remains 
some turmoil controversy surrounding Reverend Allan Boesak‟s status as a struggle hero. 
The 2003 Hefer Commission of Enquiry investigated allegations that former Director of 
Public Prosecutions (and former UDF leader) Bulelani Ngcuka had been an apartheid era spy 
(Rassool, 2004:247). Also in 2003, former President Thabo Mbeki attended the funeral of 
Kaiser Matanzima who was buried as a hero of the liberation struggle despite his 
contradictory reputation as a Bantustan “stooge” and “quisling chief” who had colluded with 
an oppressive regime (Rassool, 2004:247). 
A politician, or anyone for that matter, cannot be all things to all people. Life and careers are 
about finding or creating opportunities to advance oneself whilst winning hearts and minds in 
the process. The career of a politician begins with great promises and expectations and 
unfortunately, experience has shown that many fall short on delivery and eventually become 
irrelevant, unpopular or both, depending on how they use or abuse political power. The cycle 
of political change and continuity is born as people search for alternative leaders who speak 
to the issues of the day. Individual politicians become too enamoured with the structures of 
power, do not prioritise the right issues, miss opportunities and make rash decisions. Before 
they know it, they are in political limbo or battling to survive professionally. As a Bantustan 
politician, Mabuza and others were de-cried as frauds or front-men that lied, deceived and 
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cheated long-suffering people of South Africa on behalf of the apartheid regime. They were 
not democratically elected but in Mabuza‟s case, he was hand-picked and groomed to suit a 
particular agenda by the Swazi chiefs (effectively his immediate handlers). They needed him 
to be a stop-gap contingency measure so that he would lobby for them and the people of 
KaNgwane. 
Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006) employ case studies to examine the relationships 
evolving between new regimes and their predecessors including the post-presidential years of 
the iconic Mandela in South Africa, Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, Nyerere in Tanzania, 
Rawlings in Ghana, Charles Taylor in Liberia (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). 
In Africa, the debate about constitutional term limits regarding the number of terms of office 
that an incumbent leader can serve, leaders who overstay in power or personalise power is 
situated in the context of military regimes, one -party states, multi-party democracies, 
parliamentary and presidential political systems and as well as the hybrids in between76. 
Museveni‟s bid for a third term in office in Uganda was unsuccessful as was Frederick 
Chiluba‟s bid in Zambia and Bakili Muluzi‟s in Malawi. Sam Nujoma‟s bid for a third term 
in Namibia was successful and Robert Mugabe has served more than five terms (over a 
quarter century) to date. Mozambique‟s Joachim Chissano did not try and get re-elected a 
third time, which is rare for an African leader. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela did not seek 
re-election after one term but there were rumours that his successor, Thabo Mbeki, wanted to 
make a bid for a third term (Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). Few politicians are 
realists who truly see things as they are and do not wait to be forcibly ejected from power. 
Many are short-sighted and dig their heels in, get embittered, combative, confrontational77, 
issue inflammatory statements, have bouts of irrational megalomania and are reluctant to step 
down or retire peacefully and gracefully. Whilst some leaders do leave office, they often 
retain too much power and influence over those that remain in power from the old regime or 
even within the new power blocs. 
Most leaders, not just on the African continent, have chequered reputations, questionable 
principles, virtue and integrity but many manage to remain relevant in their countries or 
regions and assume constructive roles internationally as mediators, peace brokers in conflict 
resolution and as advocates for development. They continue being the locus of power and are 
immortalised in various philanthropic foundations and organisations which they found 
                                                 
76 Nigeria has had numerous military and civilian rulers. 
77 Different manifestations of violence and sabotage, for example, Ghana‟s Jerry Rawlings. 
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themselves as well as the naming or dedicating of buildings, roads and other landmarks but 
this depends on their record in power; how they conducted themselves or the regimes over 
which they presided whilst in office, their successes and failures, for example, human rights 
abuses and other excesses and their consequences. A balance sheet is necessarily drawn up  to 
weigh the good and the bad (judgment, assessment, appraisal), needs for justice, stability, 
peace and accountability when a head of state leaves office and often times granting 
immunity or amnesty from prosecution to the individual78 is the price a country pays to 
maintain peace and order. Whether or not punitive measures or vengeance is taken is a 
delicate or sensitive matter involving a lot of speculation, trade-offs and the massaging of 
egos and accommodating the vicissitudes of elite alliances in presidential succession79. 
However, it does not always happen in a dignified manner which avoids political polarisation 
because the leaders involved are contentious, belligerent and erratic to the point where they 
negate any magnanimity which could be extended to them by their successors. However, 
through different compromise arrangements for political convenience, many countries 
constitutionally allow former leaders to retain their diplomatic and other privileges or special 
benefits (homes, assets, recognition, prestige, stature, personal assistants, physical security) 
when they retire quietly and get out of the political limelight (become passive or honorary) 
out of respect and gratitude for service to their country ((Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel, 
2006:1-23). 
Since 1994 and the dawn of democracy in South African, there have been many changes, but 
many things have also remain the same, for instance, poverty and inequality seem to be 
increasing rather than decreasing. One can point to structural and ideological limitations in 
post-apartheid South Africa and the contested terrains of its politics which make prioritising 
matters of redress problematic and insufficient, thus breeding discontent regarding 
distributive and social justice or the rights and entitlements of citizens. 
This thesis on Enos Mabuza‟s life and career focuses mostly on his politics and it is important 
to take everything in context. It is also important to keep in perspective the fact that political 
opinions and attitudes change over time. Compromises and accommodations are made in 
response to changes in circumstances and other imperatives. Many Bantustan functionaries 
were accommodated into the national post-apartheid bureaucracy even though they were the 
subjects and instruments of agitation in their respective Bantustans and did not share or 
                                                 
78 Chiluba in Zambia for corruption and Charles Taylor in Liberia and Sierra Leone for human rights abuses. 
79 Masire-Mogae-Khama in Botswana. 
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support the national-liberation discourse, ideology and rhetoric. The situation was no 
different for Mabuza and his case demonstrates these compromises and accommodations, 
especially with his transition from Bantustan politics to the business world. He was regarded 
as a maverick Bantustan politician in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of his relatively 
benign rule in KaNgwane and the fact that he actively danced to the tune of the ANC. He was 
able to ingratiate himself with the right crowd at the right time and was thus able to be of 
„assistance‟ on the business front during the transition at a time when the majority of the 
other Bantustan kleptocrats were planning violent exit strategies, being insolent or pursuing 
secession as an option through hardball bargaining. Mabuza used his years of experience in 
politics to extend an olive branch instead and he benefitted immensely from the networks that 
he was able to build with both politicians and businesspeople. 
10.2 The Means-Ends Dilemma 
Mabuza took advantage of his positions and relative power or influence because it served him 
and others well, for instance, in his fund-raising efforts for the Penryn project (education) or 
his conservation interests. However, there is no evidence to suggest that he was a ruthless or 
vicious man who used his position or influence to do harm, despite general perceptions. From 
a philosophical standpoint, moral judgment and evaluation pertaining to what is right, good, 
bad, controversial or ambiguous about an individual and their contribution to society are 
closely entwined with how biographies are written or how lives are interpreted. According to 
Maurois (1929:120), biographies have some moral influence on the reader. This influence is 
often salutary or profound because the lives that we read about are the lives of people who 
have done great things in our social or political history; actions which differentiated them 
from others and made them stand out. The actions of such people are usually worthy of 
admiration and inspire us to become better people, for example, an individual like Mother 
Theresa (1910-1997) who dedicated her life to the service of the poor and dispossessed and 
became a global icon for selfless service to others. Through her Missionary of Charities 
organisation, she cared for thousands of sick and dying people in Calcutta and was awarded 
the Nobel Peace prize in 1979. Our moral attitudes are responses to perceived goodness and 
rightness. As such, moral terms such as good, bad, right, wrong, valuable, ought, duty, fitting, 
appropriate, or merited are value judgments. Moral judgments encompass and express 
positive associations and moral beliefs and certain empirical facts make an act right or good. 
Doing something good or bad can be regarded as an objective in itself and this brings into 
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question the nature of goodness and value in relation to other things or people and as relations 
or objectives. Ross‟s book The Right and the Good (2002) focuses on rightness and goodness 
and their relation to one another. It examines the difference between right, duty and moral 
goodness as its central theses by debating how and when the right can be derived from the 
good. It points to the essential normativity of moral discourse, certain moral propositions and 
evaluative judgments. Ross (2002) considers Immanuel Kant‟s views on the desire to do 
one‟s duty, conscientious or virtuous actions, scales of moral goodness (or badness), as well 
as bad and good actions. Duty can be a motive in itself but it can also be an observance of the 
rights and a furtherance of the interests of others, even if it benefits the agent in the process. 
However, principles of duty cannot ultimately be grounded in a single foundational principle 
as consequentialists and Kantians believe. Consequentialism attempts to ground the right in 
the good; in the value of their outcomes or their instrumental goodness. 
Society generally defines and evaluates what is right in terms of that which is productive of a 
certain positive outcome - the greatest good or the best possible consequences. This view 
raises the question of whether deeds or actions and their consequences are commensurable - 
measurable in degrees as well as comparable (the balancing of virtuous actions and 
dispositions against one another). Ross (2002) suggests that what makes actions right is that 
they are productive of good. However, he further notes that the right act cannot be derived 
from the moral value of the motive from which it is done and that rightness is not entirely 
determined by the value of the consequences of one‟s action, whether the value is of some 
benefit to the agent or an agent-neutral good. There is ambiguity inherent in any definition of 
the meaning of right because of the subjective judgment it entails. What we say or do has 
implications for possible beneficiaries or victims and this creates a dilemma about meanings 
and consequences as it creates a morally significant relation in which we stand in relation to 
others. Ross (2002) maintains that the significance of what we say or do is derivative and 
contingent.  
The right act is determined by a plurality of consequence-based considerations and self-
evident prima facie duties. Prima Facie duties are defined as responsibilities to ourselves and 
to others which are contrasted to what we should do (duty proper). The distinction between 
what seems to be our duty and what really is our duty is determined by the balance of these 
responsibilities. Ross (2002) regards prima facie duties as seven intrinsically (moral) reason-
giving features of actions from which all other moral features derive their reason-giving 
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force. They are considerations of fidelity, of reparation, of gratitude, of justice, of 
beneficence, of self-improvement, and of non-malfeasance (Ross, 2002:21). However, 
considerations of justice, beneficence and self-improvement can be subsumed under the 
promotion of intrinsic value (Ross, 2002:27) because happiness, virtue and justice are 
regarded as intrinsic goods which promote what is good and non-malfeasance (avoidance of 
bad). America‟s Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X were human, flawed, different but 
also heroic. The character and limitations of their respective contributions and the way they 
complemented each other in their differences have greatly influenced Black Americans and 
their politics (ideological heritage). Their periods of popularity waxed and waned when they 
were alive and possibly peaked after their martyrdom. Both were religious men with different 
upbringings and religion was crucial to their personal philosophies, dispositions, moral vision 
and leadership styles in the fight for dignity and justice at a time when black Americans were 
in search of messiahs. King is admired for his graceful humility, progressive civil 
protest/disobedience, social compromise and his optimistic integrationist strategy for 
achieving black equality through moral suasion and legal argument. His accommodationism 
is often compared to that advocated by Booker T Washington and Frederick Douglas. In 
contrast, Malcolm X represents social rebellion, dark, rabid, radical and corrosive black anger 
at American prejudice. Malcolm X rejected King‟s non-violence and integration and is 
remembered for his resurgent racism and separatist nationalism for black survival. Numerous 
biographies have been written on both of them in attempts to set the record straight regarding 
their contested legacies (Rassool, 2004). 
Much criticism has been levelled South Africa‟s former Bantustan leaders and it seems like 
they did their characters, images and reputations irreparable damage. Most of the authors 
cited in this thesis reflect the general sentiments of ordinary people and portray South 
Africa‟s former Bantustan rulers as traitors, sell-outs, collaborators, outlaws or renegades that 
betrayed their people by fraternising with and aiding the enemy (the apartheid state) by 
serving in puppet governments which were part of the divide and rule strategy. Homeland 
leaders were the prostitutes and the apartheid state was their pimp or promoter. Each man had 
a price (some questionable or easy virtue) which allowed their interests to intersect or collide 
with those of the apartheid state. For many observers or commentators, the means did not 
justify the ends and vice versa and these individuals should be haunted by their deeds and 
choices forever. Whatever their motivations for participating in the system, it was virtually 
impossible for them to undo or reform the apartheid policy and the Bantustan system from 
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within, as Mabuza would have us believe. It was an exercise in futility because the system 
was internally rigged to fulfil the apartheid regime‟s aims. The image of an animal in 
captivity; vulnerable, weak, hopeless and powerlessness comes to mind and one almost feels 
pity for them, not so much because they were also victims in a sense, but because of the 
delusions which they sold to themselves about what they were doing or what they could do. 
The die was cast when they put themselves in a compromised, precarious position and for 
most of them the chickens came home to roost when the political transition began. They 
might have been thrill-seeking but they were not invincible. The false grandeur which came 
with their positions as the apartheid government‟s lapdogs ultimately crumbled around them. 
It is up to individual interpretation whether there is or should be gradations of dishonour for 
the men who served as homeland rulers during the dark and volatile days of apartheid. 
The literature and analyses individualise, personalise or singularise the position of Bantustan 
leaders but there were deeper structural factors at work long before these individuals assumed 
these positions. These „leaders‟ did not appear in a social or political vacuum and it can be 
argued that, for a while, a perverse equilibrium or order was achieved in terms of the 
apartheid state‟s design, despite the stigma that was attached to participation in Bantustan 
structures and loss of faith in the moral fibre of the individuals that chose to participate in 
those structures. Mabuza‟s decisions or actions were creative, not passive, and depended 
more on his ingenuity and charisma than on following conventions or propriety (moral 
norms, technical correctness, ritual prohibition or taken for-granted routine). 
South Africans had already endured many years of apartheid when Mabuza joined the 
Bantustan structures. The violence, rights abuses, insecurity and instability that accompanied 
apartheid and entrenched the political and financial interests of the ruling party and its 
beneficiaries or supporters created and perpetuated a deep sense of frustration and 
powerlessness among the oppressed. A social and political paralysis or fatigue was setting in 
because of the unpredictable yet assuredly violent character of apartheid and for Mabuza, 
who did not have a violent disposition; working against the system from the inside out was 
his way of trying to beat it when everything else seemed to be failing. The decision to 
become a functionary of the Bantustan system could not have been one taken merely for 
entertainment to cure boredom or simply to get off the beaten path. He found himself in an 
unenviable situation which seems to defy conventional logic, although it was not random or 
lightly entered into. The real question is whether or not there were limits to what Mabuza was 
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prepared to do vis a vis what his position in relation to Pretoria demanded. Coincidence and 
ambiguity might have played a significant role and paved the way for him in some respects 
but Mabuza‟s personal integrity was always going to be at stake; questioned, However, there 
was also the opportunity for prosperity in the harsh social, economic and political reality that 
was apartheid; provided one was at the right place at the right time and played the right cords. 
No one grew up aspiring to be a Bantustan functionary or leader and for many it was 
undesirable to be associated with them but someone had to serve in those positions once the 
institutions were created. Debates raged on among and within different movements, political 
affiliations, classes and generations about the proper solution to the apartheid crisis but until 
that solution was found, the Bantustan system was not going to miraculously disappear 
because people wished it away. The contradictions in Mabuza‟s life were borne of conflicting 
values. On the one hand he wanted to sincerely serve or fulfil the duty and responsibility put 
on his shoulders by some of the Swazi chiefs and that meant dealing with certain risks and 
drawbacks. One the other hand, he had to do what would best serve the material and other 
interests of himself and his immediate family whilst maintaining some honour and 
respectability. 
The major theories and concepts in sociology, for instance Bourdieu, Putnam and Touraine 
cited above, aim to explain the relationship between the individual and society at large by 
demonstrating agency, free will and their limitations as well as by highlighting some 
comparative aspect across different time periods and contexts. Mabuza‟s career was a process 
and not an event. He knew what his handicaps were and could circumvent them by being able 
to anticipate changes in the political and economic mainstream and responding accordingly. 
He invested in his career through the networks that he created. The mutual trust and 
confidence between him and those he worked with allowed them to share delicate 
information with him throughout his career and in turn made him part of South Africa‟s 
emerging black middle elite. 
People are not one dimensional but have many facets. In this thesis, Mabuza‟s life and career 
have been used to demonstrate this. Everyone has interests to protect in order to advance 
themselves but there does not need to be a conspiracy behind such action even when 
concessions are made in pursuit of such interests. Mabuza showed resilience, emotional and 
social intelligence in protecting his economic and political interests but it was not a symptom 
of a diabolical plan to destroy everything in his path. He was self-serving to a point but his 
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agenda was not to be at war with his own people. The Inyandza National Movement was 
committed to non-violent means of struggle after the 1-3 March 1986 meeting of their 
leadership in Lusaka, Zambia agreed to hold regular consultations on issues of common 
concern between itself and the ANC. This showed commitment to cooperation, not 
competition, with the rest of the democratic movement in South Africa and in a December 
1990 interview with Mayibuye Magazine, Mabuza stated that he believed that the letter and 
spirit of the 1986 joint communiqué between Inyandza and the ANC had been adhered to. 
Despite the biased assumptions about him as a person and as a leader, as well as some 
misplaced expectations about what he could achieve once he was elected, he took his 
responsibilities seriously and understood the risks, costs and incentives that it entailed. 
...it has always been a sacred duty as well as a privilege for me to serve the 
people of KaNgwane...As we know, there is no school or seminary for Chief 
Ministers. I have had to live and learn in the hard school of life. In carrying 
out my responsibilities, I have tried to employ honesty and consistency, as 
well as faith in Almighty God, as my guiding principles. Where I have failed 
by omission or commission, I would like it to be known that this was not by 
intention or design. We all, frail mortals that we are, fail sometime, 
somewhere (1991:15). 
He was not oblivious to the assumptions and judgements which were often made about him 
and he was willing to take responsibility for his mistakes. In his resignation speech which 
was delivered to the Special Session of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly on Thursday 7 
March 1991 (1991:2), Enos Mabuza states that “it is my firm belief that leadership is not a 
lifetime occupation.” In the speech, Mabuza acknowledges the patience and stoicism of his 
family throughout his tenure as Chief Minister (1991:6 & 14). He singles out his wife Esther 
for her “support, patience and fortitude” and his children for their understanding and 
tolerance of his preoccupation with work. Mabuza thanked his Departmental Secretary and 
office staff as well as paid tribute to Chief Ngomane as the oldest serving member of the 
KaNgwane Cabinet at the time of his resignation. He describes Ngomane as amiable, humble 
and loyal. He also thanked KaNgwane‟s former Minister of Education and Culture Mr E. C. 
Mango and Mr M. C. Zitha who he described as an outspoken colleague, confidante and 
friend. Mabuza had seriously considered tendering his resignation in 1983 (after the 1982 
incorporation impasse) and 1988 and he says it was Zitha who dissuaded him from doing so 
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(1991:14). Mabuza thanks his father for his “Spartan and yet caring upbringing of me”, his 
late mother who taught him to “endure suffering and still be able to love and care for others” 
(1991:14). By resigning from homeland politics of his own accord, Mabuza was able to cut 
the strings and end or reduce the co-dependence which the system fostered. 
Governing fractious populations faced with many challenges including addressing racial and 
socio-economic inequalities and poverty led most Bantustan leaders to employ different 
strategies or combination of strategies80 with varying levels of competence to neutralise 
political threats and manage perceptions within the confines of the system. Different interests 
and agendas had to be balanced out from the moment that ascended to positions of „power‟ 
but this is common to any position of political power where individuals put their reputations 
on the line, contend with rivals, have to address internal tensions and strife, loyalties and have 
to consider future relations with successors. The complexities of power in practice are that 
there are no elegant, swift or permanent solutions and for his part, Mabuza expressed that he 
wanted to be judged on the basis of having tried to make a difference.  “It is our submission 
that we could not all go to prison, or into exile or engage in extra-parliamentary means of 
struggle. Some of us took  the gap offered at the time  and with the basic principles of our 
mission statement as our goal, gave our best, in the interests of not only the Swazi speaking 
people in KaNgwane; but all oppressed and disenfranchised South Africans” (1991:12). 
Mabuza‟s resignation was effective from 15 April 1991 and the speech is a reflection or 
summary of the failures and successes, challenges and rewards that he faced in thirteen years 
of serving in political office. His resignation speech has the following section headings: 
Inyandza‟s Mission Statement; Difficulties and Hardships of Office; Achievements; Friends, 
Inspiration and Support; and The Future based on President F.W. De Klerk‟s announcements 
on 2 February 1990 and 1 February 1991. Mabuza was not cynical but optimist about the 
future of South Africa‟s politics and business. 
Mabuza participated in numerous leadership development programmes in Africa, North 
America and Europe and he piqued the interest and enjoyed the goodwill of some politicians 
and business executives who were major contenders in their spheres of influence. Bourdieu 
(1994:5) defines habitus as predispositions and resources (material and intellectual) acquired 
and developed through socialisation, cultural integration and the social reproduction of 
                                                 
80Elitism accommodation, patronage, widespread corruption and patrimonialism among people with connections 
to centres of power direct confrontation, backroom bargaining or isolating difficult individuals, reconciliatory 
bargaining, appealing to morality and patriotism, addressing minority interests, imposing or negotiating 
solutions. 
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values, norms, customs, kinship, identity and expectations of filial loyalty from generation to 
generation (Bourdieu, 1993). Social conditions or contexts mould the habitus over time and 
by being able to adapt his habitus or way of thinking and being, Mabuza survived the 
Bantustan system for thirteen years despite the prejudice, labelling and stereotyping that his 
position attracted. Instead of being written-off, Mabuza rose above it to eventually rub 
shoulders with the economic heavy-weights of the time. The political, social and economic 
capital that Mabuza was able to accumulate opened more doors for him than it shut. Mabuza 
was not antagonistic or confrontational and he derived relative power from the relationships 
that he was able to nurture through collaborative, consultative and other processes with those 
that wielded real power. Whether such interactions were genuine or contrived is irrelevant 
because by his association with them, Mabuza was able to acquire similar capital for himself 
and the networks that he created ultimately benefitted his children and their education 
ensuring that they went to good schools and derived all the benefits they could from them. 
Mabuza‟s connections possessed what Bourdieu terms social, economic and political capital. 
Mabuza became well-connected because of or in spite of his participation in the Bantustan 
system. In spite of the odds, Mabuza was trusted by many people and that trust served as a 
bridge between what was known and what was unknown during South Africa‟s political 
transition.  
There were risks but based on his past conduct, his colleagues and associates could afford to 
take a chance on him. Mabuza enjoyed the favour of established white business as well as 
upstart black businesses which were affiliated with the ANC and he could act as a liaison 
between the two since a significant part of the country‟s political transition was on terms 
defined by whites because they held the economic power. Yet, the path the Mabuza‟s career 
took cannot simply be reduced to mere functionality, duty or necessity. His cultivation of 
patronage relations or networks which helped create opportunities, facilitate what he did next, 
where he went and who his audiences were over time. The major liberation movements were 
focused on the bigger picture, the greater good and a larger horizon. Although these were 
important to ordinary people too, more pressing or immediate demands and opportunities 
usually took precedence. Mabuza‟s sincerity, pedigree and legitimacy as a Bantustan 
politician is questioned because of what the institution represented. He is not exulted and will 
always be under scrutiny as different prejudices and assumptions are brought to bear. 
Consequently, little focus is put on his roles as an educator, conservationist and businessman.  
However, his sincerity and humility as a person – son, husband, father, friend and colleague 
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is acknowledged by those who knew him. Whether or not he got his just deserts is a 
subjective, political evaluation. 
10.3 Memorials and Commemoration in Honour of Mabuza 
Monuments and memorials are recognitions and celebrations of political contributions and 
meritorious service in other fields but they also mark complex and controversial 
representations or image making. The creation of national, provincial and local heroes who 
have served their country or community with distinction is a selective, often partisan and 
hierarchical process. According to Rassool (2004:270), public and private recollections and 
commemorations of historical pasts in South Africa are mainly told (evaluated) through 
hegemonic constructions of „great lives of resistance and reconciliation.‟ What immediately 
comes to mind are national heritage frameworks which have turned Nelson Mandela‟s 
biography into the national story (Rassool, 2004: 506)?  Individuals such as Alfred Nzo, Z. 
K. Matthews, Alfred B Xuma, Sol Plaatje, D.D.T. Jabavu, Oliver Tambo, Albert Luthuli, 
Steve Biko, Robert Sobukwe, Govan Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Ruth First and Walter Sisulu have 
easily recognisable names, faces and established resistance credentials and they are held up as 
role models and icons to be emulated. Their construction in resistance biographies has 
become the template for triumphant national heroes and martyrs on whom grand narratives 
are based (Callinicos, 1993 cited in Rassool, 2004:168; Rousseau (1994 cited in Rassool, 
2004:204).  
Underneath all this is an assumption that lives, actions or careers are coherent, ordered, 
linear, harmonious and without contradiction but a person‟s intentions or motives are not 
knowable in any ultimate or objective sense. In the case of the struggle against apartheid, a 
particular moral code, vocabulary or activities were used to identify, name and conceptualise 
the „enemy‟ through juxtaposition but Rassool (2004:321) points to collaboration, for 
example,  as a survival strategy or necessity for some individuals under difficult 
circumstances which violated the idealised „indivisibility‟ or commonality of the struggle. 
Mabuza occupies a peripheral position in the public memory because of his association with 
the apartheid state. Recognition and legitimacy in the form of accolades, praise and tributes is 
given for “the heroic and pioneering deeds and public careers of national leaders.” War 
heroes and others who have sacrificed some aspect of their life gain access to political 
patronage (Rassool, 2004:76, 143). Monuments and memorials give affirmation to the people 
they are named after, for example, living memorials like the Steve Biko Foundation or the 
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Nelson Mandela Foundation. John Vorster Bridge over the Buffalo River in East London has 
been renamed the Steve Biko Bridge (Rassool, 2004:226) which make one wonder if this 
means that Biko and Mabuza‟s achievements, contributions or sacrifices are comparable. 
The Journal of Southern African Studies is a special issue entitled Writing in Transition in 
South Africa: Fiction, History, Biography (2006 Vol.32 No.4) which reflects new theoretical 
approaches to the study of heritage in Southern Africa and covers how we can overcome 
contradictions and challenges in the way the past is represented. It suggests ways in which 
communities can get closure regarding neglected strata of local history and narratives81. The 
journal is dedicated to finding new ways of imagining and marketing public culture and 
history. 
Politics is brutal, adversarial, contingent and contradictory by nature and it carries very real 
risks in the form of coups, secessions, assassinations and general skulduggery but not all 
leaders are tyrannical and strangle the life out of a country or people. However, most have 
blemishes on their records too. Some former leaders are revered heroes and others are feared, 
harassed, denigrated, humiliated, incarcerated or banished and exiled when they eventually 
get out of office, for example, Liberia‟s exiled despot Charles Taylor. Southall,  Simutanyi 
and Daniel (2006:1-23) write about the role, status and legacies of former African82 
Presidents or statesmen when they leave public office, especially given the myriad problems 
faced by the African continent. The authors focus their comparative study on the post-
independence period 1960-2004 and the consolidation of democratic governance. Individuals 
including Mandela, Daniel arap Moi, Charles Taylor, Jerry Rawlings, Julius Nyerere and 
Robert Mugabe are variously categorised as despots, visionaries and nationalists in 
accordance with how they conducted or conduct themselves and how they will be 
remembered. It is noted that many African leaders, predominantly men, try to cling to power 
by any means necessary and entertain notions of life presidencies whilst others avoid or crush 
succession debates altogether. The reality is that few African leaders voluntarily retire 
because they grow accustomed to a life of power, authority, purpose, position and privilege 
and would rather die on the job if they are not pushed out of office by coup (Southall, 
Simutanyi and Daniel, 2006:1-23). Many leaders are not pragmatic enough to accept that it is 
                                                 
81 Postcolonial identities, alienation, community relations, monuments, landscapes and natural heritage, art and 
architecture. 
82 South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, 
Liberia. 
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inevitable that their reign will eventually end. Perhaps they are simply not flexible, able or 
willing to adapt to changing political terrains. 
There are limited options open to retired politicians, especially those with misdemeanours 
and misdeeds to answer for because they face the very real possibility of being displaced and 
made redundant. The treatment of former leaders is complex and contested as the varied 
experiences surveyed by Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006:1-23) highlight. The political 
arena is marked by obvious and not so obvious vulnerabilities, guilt, ambition, strategy, 
gratitude, sentiment or nostalgia, resentment, vengeance, disdain, sympathy and loyalty. In all 
of this, some politicians manage to rise above the politics (and oftentimes pettiness) to 
become eminent persons upon their retirement. By examining the arena of institutionalised 
political power in Africa, one can see the continuities and discontinuities in past, present and 
future political practice in the different countries. We see how transitional politics and justice 
as well as the need for political stability reconstitute the political playing field in different 
contexts where former leaders are granted immunity or held accountable for the crimes they 
commit while in office. Moi in Kenya was given conditional immunity provided he stays out 
of active politics as a way of diffusing political tensions. Exiles include Uganda‟s Idi Amin in 
Saudi Arabia and Milton Obote who was in exile in Zambia, Liberia‟s Charles Taylor in 
Nigeria and Ethiopia‟s Mengistu Haile Mariam in exile in Zimbabwe (Southall, Simutanyi 
and Daniel, 2006:1-23). 
People tend to exaggerate their own achievements but Mabuza was modest about his. The 
gestures and accolades bestowed on him by others show that he left his mark, made some 
positive contributions and someone noticed. Mabuza‟s work and contribution to South 
African history, particularly in his home area of Mpumalanga has been acknowledged by 
some quarters including the ANC, Mbombela Municipality, Penryn College, Georgetown 
University and Rhodes University but first, it is interesting to note that none of the bridges, 
community centres or halls that were built by the KaNgwane government are named after 
Mabuza as was generally the trend in the other Bantustans. According to his wife Esther, it is 
not because people did not want to name then after him but because he refused. He did not 
want to be worshipped in anyway and there are no effigies of him strewn across South Africa. 
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In 1993 Rhodes University conferred an honorary Doctor of Laws (LLD) degree on Mabuza 
(van Wyk Smith, 1993:11). Between 1990 and 1999, a total of 2383 (3 women and 20 men) 
honorary LLD degrees were conferred by Rhodes University which suggests that Mabuza‟s 
credentials might not be equal to but are similar to those of these individuals and their 
obvious link to the law, equality and human rights. Gavin Walter Hamilton Relly was the 
Chancellor of Rhodes University and Derek Scott Henderson was the Vice Chancellor when 
Mabuza was awarded the degree, themselves recipients of honorary LLD degrees from 
Rhodes University in 1991 and 1997 respectively. Those that nominated Mabuza saw it fit to 
give him such an honour and make him part of a club of esteemed individuals who have 
made remarkable contributions to their professions and exemplify Rhodes University‟s motto 
“Where Leaders Learn” (Rhodes University Calendar, 2008:23-26). The South African 
Department of Education produced a report in November 2008 entitled  Report of the 
Ministerial Committee on Transformation and Social Cohesion and the Elimination of 
Discrimination in Public Higher Education Institutions which put the on-going 
transformation agenda for higher education to undo the racist colonial and apartheid past in 
the spotlight. A scathing report entitled SA Universities of Shame on described Rhodes 
University as a historically white institution with an enduring colonial, male and elitist 
culture (Philip, 2009). The same year that Mabuza was awarded his degree by Rhodes 
University, Thomas Rodney Hope Davenport was awarded a DLitt and Bennett Alexander 
Jacobson was awarded an MPha by the same institution. All three recipients were male and 
Mabuza was the only black person. In the same decade, honorary doctorates were awarded to 
distinguished people including Govan Archibald Mvunyelina Mbeki but the majority of them 
were white males (Rhodes University Calendar, 2007:25). 
One wonders whether Rhodes University nominated Mabuza for the honour out of genuine 
respect and recognition for his contributions and achievements and whether those 
achievements compare to those of the individuals that have had similar honours bestowed 
upon them by the institution. The awarding of the degree gives Mabuza a place amongst other 
distinguished Rhodes honorary graduates such as black educator and politician Davidson Don 
                                                 
83 Wycliffe Mlungisi Tsotsi, James Martin, Colin Legum, Anthony O‟Reilly, Gert Johannes Gerwel, Alexander 
Lionel Boraine, Aron Bacher, Derek Scott Henderson, The Hon Mr Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Kader Asmal, 
Frene Noshir Ginwala, Allan William Buchanan Gray, Alexander McGregor, Alastair James Kerr, Michael 
Conway O‟Dowd, Nganani Enos John Mabuza, Peter Malcolm Searle, Chester Arthur Crocker , Gavin Walter 
Hamilton Relly, Helen Suzman, Gwendolen Truda Brock and The Hon Mr Chief Justice Michael McGregor 
Corbett. 
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Tengo Jabavu, former director of the Christian Institute Reverend Alpheus Hamilton Zulu, 
trade unionist Lucy Buyaphi Mvubelo, teacher and novelist E‟skia Mphahlele, novelist Cyril 
Lincoln Sibusiso Nyembezi, educator Miriam Toba Dakile, veteran ANC politician Govan 
Archibald Mvunyelina Mbeki, Theocritus Simon Ndziweni Gqubule, anti-apartheid activist 
The Most Reverend Winston Hugh, Njongonkulu Ndungane, actor, director and playwright 
John Kani, businesswoman Nombasa Nini, renowned diplomat  Nigerian Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku, Judge President of the South African Land Claims Court  Fikile Charles Bam, 
former president Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, veteran musician Miriam 
Makeba, Honourable Justice Lex Mpati, Eastern Cape Premier Nosimo Balindlela, Dikela 
Ndwebisa of the Grahamstown Civic Association, photographer Peter Magubane, former 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, businessman and entrepreneur Dr Reuel Khoza and Chief 
Justice Pius Langa. It seems highly unlikely that Mabuza would have had such an honour 
bestowed on him by a historically black university in 1993 (before the landmark 1994 
democratic elections) since KaNgwane did not have its own university. 
Perhaps the awarding of the degree was connected to Mabuza‟s links with the 1820 
Foundation. The Settler Monument is situated on Gunfire Hill in Grahamstown and it is 
associated with change and reconstruction. The Monument was officially opened on 13 July 
1974 and was rededicated in 1996 following a devastating fire on 13 August 1994 which 
destroyed part of it. The 1820 Monument is administered by the Grahamstown Foundation 
and both are synonymous with the arts, culture, science and education through various annual 
festivals84. The Monument serves as a reminder of the past and commemorates the 
significance and heritage of the British settlers in South African history. At the same time, it 
also implores everyone to look forward with hope and has become a centre of creative 
thought and activity with the aim of encouraging the ideals of freedom of speech, press and 
association (principles and ideals enshrined in the South African Constitution) through social 
interaction, free debate and open discussion. The monument was envisaged as a living 
monument promoting the English language, art, literature, poetry and music and this has led 
to the establishment of highly successful educational and cultural projects which are inclusive 
of all South Africans. The value of these projects makes them, and the Monument, part and 
parcel of the cultural heritage and educational enrichment of all South Africans, thereby 
forging a shared South African culture and identity (Neville, n.d.; personal communication 
                                                 
84 The Sakhisizwe Project, the National Arts Festival, the De Beers English Olympiad, the South African 
Schools Festival of English, the Shakespeare Society of Southern Africa, The Village Green Fair, The Eastern 
Cape Eisteddfod and SciFest Africa.  
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with Ms Zenobe Vosloo of the Grahamstown Foundation, Grahamstown 17 March 2009; The 
Grahamstown Foundation website85). As an educator at heart, Mabuza shared the vision of 
these projects and what the Monument represents. He was a life member and served on the 
1820 Foundation‟s Board of Trustees. Although Mabuza passed away in 1997, his 
membership only expired on 31 March 2006.The records held by the Grahamstown 
Foundation do not, however, indicate when he actually became a member of the foundation. 
Apart from the historical, cultural and educational links to the 1820 Foundation, there is a 
colonial connection which is difficult to ignore, especially given Mabuza‟s participation in 
Bantustan structures and the fact that he was also a member of the Royal African Society 
(London) and the Gold Shield Award. 
However, Penryn College in Nelspruit named the Enos Mabuza Administration block after 
him and proudly has a bust of him at the entranceway. On 4 August 2001, Enos Mabuza‟s 
friend Nadine Gordimer paid tribute to him on the occasion of the opening of the Enos 
Mabuza Centre at Penryn College in Nelspruit. Penryn College has also created the Enos 
Mabuza Character Award in his memory. Penryn College acknowledges Mabuza‟s 
contribution to education in the lowveld for 16 years, as well as his part in the establishment 
of Penryn College itself.  
An understanding of the provincial or regional politics of Mpumalanga sheds some light on 
how much Mabuza has been accepted by the ruling ANC even though his relationship with 
the party was covert for the most part. Mpumalanga, which covers the former KaNgwane 
Bantustan, has had an ANC government since 1994 and it‟s past Premiers Mathews Phosa 
and Thabang Makwetla are ANC members as is the current Premier David Mabuza. Thabang 
Makwetla was deployed by the ANC from Johannesburg and he has also been active in the 
KwaNdebele Bantustan. Makwetla referred to Mabuza as “Comrade Mabuza” at a 
symposium held on Saturday 9 April 2005 at the Emnotweni Arena to celebrate Mabuza‟ s 
contribution to the region even though the two probably never met. Although the recognition 
was posthumous, the ANC deployed then Vice President Jacob Zuma to give the keynote 
address at the symposium on his return from Pope John Paul XV‟s funeral in Rome. Other 
national ANC dignitaries and government officials included the University of South Africa 
vice-chancellor and principal, Professor Barney Pityana and then ANC Secretary-General 
Kgalema Mothlanthe. There was tension within the ANC leadership in Mpumalanga at the 
                                                 
85 http://www.foundation.org.za/about/index.php (accessed 12 March 2009). 
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time and there was an ANC congress being held at one of the colleges but instead of heading 
straight for the congress like many people expected, Jacob Zuma attended the symposium and 
he took time to talk to ordinary people who had attended the gathering and have lunch with 
them. 
Mabuza‟s assistance in whatever form helped the ANC‟s mobilisation efforts in the Eastern 
Transvaal at a time when the ANC was banned and overstretched. Zuma explained that the 
ANC was operating in KaNgwane (KaNyamazane, Barberton, Nkomazi, Matsulu, Malelane) 
at various times when the ANC had bases in Mozambique and Swaziland but lacked adequate 
resources. The ANC was also keen to use the Swazi border for its operations and it was 
necessary for KaNgwane/Mabuza to turn a blind eye to the ANC‟s activities in the area. 
Mabuza had KaNgwane government resources at his disposal and a favourable alliance with 
the ANC would be beneficial to both parties in the long term. The ANC local leadership 
heard that Mabuza was sympathetic to the liberation cause and contacted him. Million 
Mahunyela was a local businessman who belonged to the ANC. Mahunyela facilitated the 
first meeting between Mabuza and the ANC whose representatives explained the 
organisation‟s vision. Once Mabuza had struck this symbiotic relationship with the ANC, he 
was in a sense sub-contracted to carry out its work and was given the underground codename 
Jonathan. It is believed that then president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, requested Mabuza to 
remain as leader of KaNgwane because he had this crucial strategic role to play even though 
the position meant that he had to consort with the enemy. Thus, Mabuza continued in his 
position as leader of KaNgwane with the tacit approval of, and on the advice of the ANC‟s 
top leadership to facilitate its work. Mabuza had a close relationship with the ANC‟s 
Matthews Phosa when Phosa was an attorney in Nelspruit. When the special branch of the 
security forces found out about Phosa‟s activities with the ANC, Mabuza and Inyandza 
helped to spirit him out of the country into exile in Maputo, Mozambique to avoid arrest. 
After that, Mabuza made several trips to Maputo to meet with Phosa/the ANC. Even Thabo 
Mbeki who was the ANC‟s Secretary-General at the time used to call Mabuza at his family 
home in KaNyamazane to discuss matters of mutual concern. 
Perhaps the symposium was the ANC‟s way of bringing Mabuza, the prodigal son, into the 
fold of individuals that advanced the struggle against apartheid. Mabuza was described as a 
comrade who stood up for what was right and just during trying times and the issues he 
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promoted and advocated when he was in public office continue to be relevant to the ANC as 
a political party and government today, more than a decade after democracy. 
It probably came as a surprise to some people that ANC stalwarts including Jacob Zuma and 
the militant Peter Mokaba of the student wing of the ANC‟s youth league86 publicly 
acknowledged Mabuza by attended his funeral in December 1997. Nelson Mandela sent a 
letter of condolence to Mrs Mabuza because he could not be there in person. Then President 
Thabo Mbeki gave the keynote address in which he explained or contextualised Mabuza‟s 
contribution and significance by stating that “the history of South Africa has not been written 
by the people who made it.” 
Mabuza‟s sister, Ms Margaret Mabuza noted that some local people did not accept Mabuza‟s 
role in the KaNgwane Bantustan, especially those that identified closely with the ANC. 
However, she believes that her brother‟s name and reputation were cleared when ANC 
heavyweights attended the April 2005 symposium and explained what Enos Mabuza did, 
including things that the Mabuza family was not privy to, for example, that Mabuza used to 
regularly visit ANC camps. Many people did not know this and used to say bad things about 
him because they were suspicions of his motives. According to Margaret Mabuza, after the 
symposium, some of Enos‟ critics admitted that they had perhaps judged him hastily when 
there were redeeming qualities about him (Interview with Ms Margaret Mabuza 6 June 2007). 
The process of renaming of cities and roads to remove remnants of the colonial and apartheid 
past; to revise the country‟s history in a bid to include the majority of the people‟s history and 
honour individual contributions has been fraught with challenges but it has been welcomed 
by many as a way of rewriting the African heritage and culture which was suppressed for a 
very long time. Unfortunately, disagreements will always exist in such circumstances. Such 
renaming processes have been criticised by mostly Afrikaners who feel that their own history 
and legacy is being discarded or considered irrelevant under the new political dispensation 
because of the political justifications given for most name changes. They argue that 
everyone‟s history must be celebrated equally in the interests of unity, nation building and 
reconciliation (Swart, 2007; Delivery Magazine, 2007). However, specific processes are 
followed when a provincial or city council decides to rename a street or place. The relevant 
authorities placing adverts in newspapers or the government gazette inviting the public to 
                                                 
86 The KaNgwane government had a relationship with the ANC youth movement because it used to give them 
and other student bodies venues to hold their congresses. 
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submit proposals in writing (to motivate/support the suggestion). A committee is then 
selected to discuss the proposals and decides which names to accept. After that, the names are 
and advertised in the newspapers and government gazette. The public is given 30 days to 
comment and objections have to be submitted to the authorities in writing. Further proposals, 
comments and suggestions are considered by the authorities before a final decision is 
announced and the change/s takes effect (Swart, 2007:89). 
Swart (2007:88-89) notes that the changes to city and road names across the country has not 
been well received in some parts of the country for two main reasons. Firstly, some 
opposition politicians or parties and their supporters feel like it is only the ruling ANC‟s 
struggle icons that are being honoured in these exercises. This reason is given as the 
precipitating factor in the protest marches that occurred in Durban in May 2007 over 
proposed changes to street names. It was argued, among other things, that the proposed 
changes glorified ANC struggle icons at the expense of Zulu heritage. The second reason 
relates to the costs entailed by the changes in terms of changing the relevant street signs at the 
expense of the tax payer. Jan Smuts International Airport, for instance, was renamed 
Johannesburg International Airport. It was subsequently renamed yet again to O. R. Tambo 
International Airport. Pretoria is now being referred to as Tshwane and Pietersburg as 
Polokwane and so on. Some sectors of the public feel that this is an unnecessary expense 
when there are more pressing issues that need to be addressed, such as, service delivery but 
the politicians or powers that be equally argue that recognising iconic figures in our history is 
also a necessity left we forget what they have done (Swart, 2007:88-89). In many towns and 
cities across South Africa new streets names reflect the changing political and social 
environment. At present, nearly every municipality has a Nelson Mandela and an Oliver 
Tambo drive or street, though, in some cases, leaders with connections to an area have been 
favoured. It is often a case of out with the old and in with the new, as far as political figures 
are concerned. In Johannesburg, there has been a call for new names for streets in Randburg 
which are named after apartheid-era Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Strijdom. The 
Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) said it wanted proposals for names to replace 
those of Hendrik Verwoerd and Hans Strijdom Drives. According to the JDA, an initial study 
showed that most South Africans found the names offensive. Verwoerd, who was Prime 
Minister from 1958 until his assassination in 1966, is remembered as the architect of 
apartheid. Hans Strijdom, former National Party leader and Prime Minister, was among other 
things the man behind the establishment of a separate voters‟ roll for Coloureds, the 
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extension of pass laws to African women, and the end of multi-racial trade unions. At the 
time, the JDA Development Manager Ursula Ntsubane said the association was encouraging 
full public participation in the highly emotive issue. People in Randburg would be 
interviewed over the telephone and face-to-face and their views would be analysed in depth 
before the final determination was made. The City of Johannesburg‟s full council would 
make the final decision and the new names would be announced in November (Swart, 2007, 
Delivery Magazine, 2007). 
To return to Mabuza, in July 2007 the ANC-led Mbombela Local Municipality in 
Mpumalanga approved the change of three street names in Nelspruit, one in White River and 
another in Hazyview. At the time, Mbombela spokesperson, Vusi Sibiya, said the streets 
would be renamed after struggle heroes including Enos Mabuza and the late Mozambican 
president Samora Machel. John Vorster Drive in Nelspruit was subsequently renamed Dr. 
Enos Mabuza Drive in Nelspruit87 as homage for his contribution to the politics, conservation 
and education of the area. According to Mabuza‟s family, this initiative met with resistance 
(debates in the papers after the new road signs were put up) from Afrikaners who felt that 
their heroes88 were being disrespected, discarded and forgotten and some of the new road 
signs with Mabuza‟s name were vandalised. These people questioned Mabuza significance 
and whether he deserved it, which alludes to the fact that Mabuza‟s connection with the ANC 
was not apparent to ordinary people outside the ANC‟s top leadership. Such objections from 
the white community are nothing unique in South Africa since it was generally them that 
objected to the renaming of Pretoria (to Tshwane), Jan Smuts International Airport (to O. R. 
Tambo International Airport) or the transformation and renaming of some universities 
(Delivery Magazine, 2007). However, the black people in the Nelspruit area and his home 
areas of Barberton and Louisville/KaNyamazane who knew Mabuza and respected him 
welcomed the initiative because they felt that it was high time that his contributions received 
the recognition they deserve. 
The South African government was the architect and patron of the Bantustans which the 
ANC was vehemently opposed to but instead of putting distance between themselves and 
Mabuza and his „reprehensible‟ past, Nelson Mandela, for example, wanted to appoint 
                                                 
87 Fourth (2006) Ordinary Meeting of the Mbombela Local Municipality held on Monday 31 July 2006 at 17:30 
in the Council Chambers, Civic Centre, Nelspruit pp22 of  the council meeting minutes Section A (25) with the 
heading Social Transformation: Renaming of Streets and Other Place Names in Mbombela (16/3/7)(10162925), 
Subsection (b). 
88 Vorster succeeded Verwoerd from 1966-1978 
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Mabuza as South African ambassador to Bonn, Germany during his presidency. When 
Mandela was in prison, Mabuza was allowed to visit him when other leaders were denied the 
privilege and upon his release, Mandela visited the Mabuza home several times because he 
had been briefed by Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders that Mabuza was an ally. Mabuza 
and Mandela held several meetings together. In early 1990, Mabuza was among those that 
met with Mandela at a SAYCO congress in KaNgwane. In September 1990 and March 1991, 
Mabuza arranged President Mandela‟s holiday breaks at Bongani Lodge and Londolozi 
Game Reserve in the Eastern Transvaal. During the militant 1980s when the ANC youth‟s 
mandate was to make South Africa ungovernable, there were only a few clashes between the 
ANC youth and the KaNgwane government at street level (KaNgwane government officials‟ 
cars were burnt etc) when there were marches and huge groups of incensed people. However, 
KaNgwane was generally shielded from the type of violence which gripped the other 
homelands. Although KaNgwane was a symbol of apartheid, the people‟s anger was not 
directed at him. To use Bourdieu‟s (1998:102-104) term, the recognition that Mabuza did get in the 
end can be understood as symbolic capital which secures his place in the history of the 
Mpumalanga lowveld in particular and South Africa generally. Mabuza‟s life and work 
demonstrates that identity can be sectional and exclusive but it also overlaps (Bourdieu, 
1998:75-91). Although Mabuza walked the slippery slope of Bantustan politics, the testimony 
to his good faith cannot all be fabrication. He is not without blemish and the public‟s 
ambivalence towards him is understandable but the ANC‟s symbolic gestures in the spirit of 
truth and reconciliation have vindicated him; cleared his name and reputation somewhat. 
Perhaps the Mabuza family would have preferred to have such people to have spoken up 
earlier and publicly defended Enos when he was still alive but at least they eventually did it 
and assuaged the insinuations that abounded about him. To some, Mabuza was worthy of all 
this and to others it might be construed as an insult. Given its commanding position in South 
African politics today, the ANC would not have felt compelled to pay tribute to Mabuza if he 
was the sell-out that his participation in Bantustan politics pigeon-holed him as. That 
unfortunate turn of events was but one dimension or facet of his complex character. Maybe 
Mabuza was not an honourable man. Maybe was Janus-faced double-agent or he was a 
hypocrite because of the contradictory aspects of his character but there is no one 
dimensional politician. Politics as a game is characterised by deceit, duplicity and double-
dealing. In a country that is still rising from the ashes of apartheid and making concerted 
efforts to reconcile the varied histories of its people; subjectivity, contestation and ambiguity 
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remain part of South Africa‟s historical reconstructions and reinterpretations regarding 
identity and difference, reimagining the other, agency and patriotism. 
10.4 Conclusion 
There is no simple check-list for lived experienced so who is Enos Mabuza and what is his 
place in post-apartheid South African history? He was a son, brother, husband, father, 
community leader, educator, politician, business man, conservationist and lay-preacher. 
Perhaps what stands out the most about him or the different roles that he assumed is his 
involvement in Bantustan politics. Here, he was not quite the sensation that he became in 
business in a short space of time. At best, his participation in politics was unconventional 
(working for the state in order to work against it). Enos Mabuza is certainly not a familiar 
name to South African audiences, especially those born after1994 and for older generations, 
it might be synonymous with a political sell-out, betrayal or fence-sitter that lacked political 
conviction. However, the name has resonance in the Mpumalanga lowveld and in older 
generation business circles but is relatively unknown elsewhere. Unlike the other people that 
have been written about, there is no readily accessible or extensive critical writing which 
focuses on Mabuza‟s life and work.  This thesis is a reflection on what shaped the person that 
he was. It is an evaluation of Mabuza‟s life and achievements - his deeds, passions, 
relationships, fears, anxieties, frustrations, paradoxes and controversies in a particular 
historical context. The chapters are arranged thematically for convenience but are not a rigid 
compartmentalisation. 
Every person has needs for achievement, participation, competence, power, autonomy as well 
as affiliation/intimacy to give purpose or meaning to their existence. Mabuza‟s life and career 
fits the clichéd rags to riches mould from an early life of deprivation and few prospects as a 
black person in apartheid South Africa. He was undoubtedly an ambitious and success-
oriented individual but he was not hostile, spiteful or arrogant. Despite poverty and an 
inferior education being major handicaps for the majority of black South Africans, he rose to 
make noteworthy contributions in different fields which earned him the respect of his 
contemporaries. Mabuza‟s life and career demonstrates how protagonists and villains come to 
be, how power can be attained, exercised and maintained through agency, personal and 
professional networks, influence and bargaining capabilities. As a leader, he cultivated and 
nurtured strategic relationships which helped him cope or navigate the treacherous seas that 
he found himself in. He did not give up or allow himself to be discouraged when he was 
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criticised. He was resilient grabbed the opportunities which presented themselves. Being 
ostracised by some did diminish his drive or initiative. He refused to stagnate and be defined 
as a one dimensional or inept leader. What he could not enjoy in status in the political 
structure of the society, he reclaimed to some degree in the business sphere. The changes he 
made in his career were always for something bigger, better or higher than the previous and 
in this way, change was a positive thing in his life. 
Mabuza occupied a curious position which was associated with greed, patronage and a 
propensity for violence, upping the ante wherever possible and taking shortcuts to fame and 
fortune. Consequently, Mabuza is a problematic figure in South African struggle history and 
is not immune to generalised withering, destructive analyses of Bantustan functionaries 
which put their weaknesses, hypocrisy, infractions (the most common being corruption, fraud 
and pillaging from the already inadequate homeland coffers) and self-deceptions in the 
spotlight. However, he was not merely a caricature for the black man who wished to climb 
the social ladder at any cost and toadied up to the apartheid state. His position, ambiguous 
though it was, was a risk that others would not have readily taken against larger structures of 
power and control which had a long established history and genesis. 
Mabuza was a mistrusted Bantustan politician, an outsider or a pariah on the fringes of 
mainstream South African politics but in the end he became a respected member of society. 
The apartheid machinery was well-oiled, determined, brutal and efficient and the Bantustans 
were created as regional-ethnic-political compartments. His decision to participate in 
Bantustan politics was unpopular because it went counter the general expectation for 
someone who claimed to be patriotic and loyal to the suffering black masses. However, 
Mabuza was not the only person in a compromised position. Many people were „torn‟ over 
their allegiances and found different ways to rationalise them to themselves and others. 
Maybe Mabuza would have been better off as part of an anonymous, faceless crowd but he 
tried to mitigate its effects to the people of KaNgwane by participating in Bantustan 
structures. It was a path least trodden and disdained as the easy solution for greedy and 
unprincipled individuals with a populist impulse but he believed that he could make a 
difference. In reality, he was hamstrung or limited in his abilities from the beginning so there 
was a limit to what he could do to make a real difference. However, this does not excuse 
whatever bad decisions, errors in judgement, miscalculations or ill intentions that he might 
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have had. His belief that he could make a difference may have been naïve and the position he 
assumed was ambiguous in that he rejected white domination whilst benefiting from it.  
Mabuza could not have changed the fate of KaNgwane but those that knew him believe that 
he did what he could and was not an apathetic witness or by-stander. Contrary to the 
prejudice against Bantustan functionaries, Mabuza did not have a single-minded interest in 
riches and power. His approach to politics, and later business, was a mix of optimism and 
realism and it allowed him to playing devil‟s advocate. He could have let a fear of failure 
cripple him into inaction but he did not. Mabuza was effectively a civil servant with limited 
latitude or discretion to act provided he did not openly contradict the state and its policies. 
The state did not coddling dissenters and agitators but deposed, prosecuted and neutralised 
them in myriad ruthless ways, yet he carried on a clandestine alliance with the ANC/UDF for 
many years. He has been described by those who knew and regarded him favourably as 
polite, honest, proud without arrogance, obliging without insipidity.  However, this can be 
interpreted as a deft mix of flattery, confidence, cheek, sincerity, charm and falsehoods. 
Mabuza‟s election to the position of Chief Councillor came on the heels of the 1976 Student 
Uprising and this major event was closely followed by the apartheid state‟s declaration of the 
Total Onslaught and Total Strategy to combat endemic unrest in the country. The Inyandza 
National Movement was a means for Mabuza to create a separate, perhaps more enduring, 
power base from the „power‟ that was conferred on him by the state through his position as 
Bantustan leader. The main question, therefore, is whether or not he should be given credit 
for what he was able to accomplish even though he was complicit, by association, in the 
atrocities of the apartheid state which employed him? If he was alive today, would he be 
accepted and trusted unconditionally? Without the benefit of interviews with the subject, one 
cannot say if in hindsight there are things he would have changed about his life or choices. 
One can only assume that he accepted his life as it was and happy with what he achieved 
personally and professionally. One can be critical of the numerous roles that he played or the 
apparent lack of unity and wholeness as ambivalence or lack of occupational or ideological 
commitment but it can also be regarded as testament of his ability to reinvent and keep 
himself relevant by examining the occupational, ideological and interpersonal opportunities 
around him. 
Mabuza was fifty-six years old when he resigned from politics but he could have continued 
working in that position until the Bantustans were dissolved and reintegrated into South 
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Africa. Instead, he pursued a career in business which afforded him the opportunity to make a 
modest contribution towards black rights and economic empowerment. His stint in business 
was cut short by his untimely death when he possibly could have continued working into his 
mid 60s or early 70s. Enos Mabuza died in 1997 aged sixty-one. According to Levinson 
(1978), at this stage, individuals tend to question or reassess their values, beliefs, goals and 
the means for achieving them. As people get older, they make peace with their career 
decisions. Mabuza searched for opportunities and outlets for personal fulfilment. He was 
actively involved in social programmes and engaged with his peers, church, community and 
other groups.  
A lot was sacrificed in the compromises reached during South Africa‟s transition to 
democratic rule and the co-existence of unelected traditional authorities which were hijacked 
by colonial and apartheid regimes alongside democratic principles is an example. Parallels 
can be drawn between Enos Mabuza‟s precarious position as a Bantustan leader and the 
different faces and roles of traditional chiefs from colonial times, the dishonour of Bantu 
Authorities to the present as discussed above in chapter three above. The ANC actively 
courted traditional leaders and made them partners in the anti-apartheid alliance and this 
ensured that they did not become relics. The extension of this olive branch by the ANC 
afforded traditional leaders the space to emerge as a political force, whether they deserved it 
or not. Traditional leaders were able to turn the situation to some advantage from being active 
tools of oppression to being actual or perceived progressive agents in the liberation struggle. 
The chieftaincy and traditional leadership has shown its resilience and persistence by 
retaining some of its prestige and integrity as an institution. Enos Mabuza and other so-called 
progressive or cooperative Bantustan elites also entered into loose alliances with the ANC in 
the mid-late 1980s for similar reasons and such alliances afforded them opportunities to some 
reinsert themselves in difference niches once the political transition got underway. 
To conclude, historical context provides the background for any dissection of a life and 
career because they are products of a particular time and place. Public figures have detractors 
and admirers as well as those that remain indifferent to or ignorant of their contributions. In 
terms of Bourdieu‟s fields of practice discussed in the chapter four above, history and politics 
provides many terrains or bounded spaces of relations, positions, struggles over power and 
resources as well as possibilities to pool such resources for mutual benefit. These fields are 
structured by rules and success, domination, exploitation or basic survival within them 
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depends on different forms of capital, including claims to authority, cultural, social, economic 
and symbolic capital. Rather than edit or sanitise Mabuza‟s memory to make it more 
palatable, this thesis has tried to reconcile his character, roles, public and private personas 
within the context of apartheid politics and the transition and the limitations or opportunities 
they offered. 
Decisions or choices (human action and agency) are not always explained by necessity alone, 
irrespective of the circumstances that constrain or facilitate such action. There is no evidence 
to suggest that Mabuza was a particularly irresponsible person or leader or that he sought the 
help of the apartheid state to safeguard his position of privilege. Despite the moral ambiguity 
of his participation in the Bantustans, he did not abrogate his responsibility to the people of 
KaNgwane in terms of the mandate he was given when he assumed office in 1978. Like co-
opted chiefs, Mabuza occupied a precarious position where he was mandated to implement 
unpopular government policy but he tried to be sensitive to the aspirations of the people of 
KaNgwane and risked brutal reprisals when he rejected the state‟s 1982 Swazi Land deal. It 
was not always practical to scoff at ethnic politics when the Bantustan system was hinged on 
the notion of ethnic identity and loyalty but Mabuza was able to tap into the creative potential 
of politics during the transition. He resigned and paved the way for a democratic transition 
which would include KaNgwane and show it in the best possible light under the 
circumstances. Mabuza‟s agency was constrained but he did use his position, as far as was 
possible, to ward off the excesses of the apartheid state and to negotiate. 
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Figure 16: Enos Mabuza (Financial Mail Supplement 28 November, 1986:39) 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule 
The focus of the study is Enos Mabuza‟s career in politics; particularly his contradictory or 
unconventional role as a Bantustan leader within apartheid administrative structures on the 
one hand, and in the struggle against it on the other, as well as the implications of this 
complex and ambiguous situation. A wide range of people will be interviewed in an attempt 
to paint an accurate, candid and complete account of Mabuza‟s life- what he did, why, where, 
when and with whom. Apartheid laws and violence, both physical and psychological, 
constrained people‟s actions and identity politics is at the heart of this enquiry. The study 
seeks to identify the dynamics (power, conflicts, constraints and alternatives) that were 
available to individuals in this context and to obtain different perspectives from those who 
knew Enos Mabuza in a professional and personal capacity. 
 
Potential Interviewees 
Family: Mabuza‟s widow and children (Vusumuzi, Sizo, Sandile, Busisiwe, Nikeziwe and 
Nompumelelo).  
 
Colleagues and friends in different fields: white opposition leader Dr Frederick van Zyl 
Slabbert (close friend and confidante), writer Nadine Gordimer (close friend), George Bizos, 
Dr Reuel Khoza, Dr Matthews Phosa, David Wylde, Rob Snaddon (Penryn Trust), Conrad 
Strauss, Professor Barney Pityana, leaders of the ANC‟s Youth League at the time, for 
instance, Mac Maharaj as well as Mr M C Zitha who succeeded him as Chief Minister of 
KaNgwane in from April 1991-April 1994 when the Bantustans were reincorporated into 
South Africa.  
 
Introduction 
How do you know Enos Mabuza? Was he a colleague, friend etc?  
What were his principles, beliefs or ideals? Did Mabuza have a specific philosophy that 
influenced his character, conduct and decisions?  
Mabuza played significant roles in education, conservation and politics. How would you 
describe his conduct as a politician, businessman, educator and as a family man? In what 
context did his life and career unfold and with what results? How did people react to it? 
Page | 460 
 
What were his personal aspirations or motives for his actions?  
Where there specific precipitous events that influenced his life and work?  
 
Family/Domestic Life 
Enos Mabuza was a busy man but he has been described as a religious, caring, giving, family 
man. Mabuza has also been described as a humble and peaceful man who was committed to 
non-violence. Was he as selfless as this suggests? Did religion influence his work and general 
conduct? Did he hold any office positions (leadership) within the Methodist church?  
What was like he like as a husband or father? Did he spend a lot of time at home when his 
work commitments permitted it? Did he have hobbies or interest in sports like other 
dads/husbands? Did he have a lot of friends or admirers? 
How did you feel about his political career? Did you support him unconditionally? 
How did having a political figure in the house affect life at home? Did you endure any 
hardships as a result of his political involvement? Were you ever ostracised/marginalised, 
harassed or victimised in any way (death threats, arbitrary searches, arrests) because of his 
work? Did you fear for his life or the safety of the family? 
Was life difficult or were there advantages to having a prominent father/husband? 
Would you say that Enos Mabuza‟s life and career was fulfilling and rewarding to him in 
terms of the ideals or principles he held? 
 
Politics 
How or why did Enos Mabuza become a Bantustan leader when he did not belong to a ruling 
house or chieftaincy? What mandate, authority or legitimacy did he have? Was he elected 
(democratic, consultative) and if so by who? Enos Mabuza refused to take the job initially so 
was he coerced/was pressure applied on him to accept the job in the end? Do you think he 
was motivated by power and the possibility of material gain? What promises, if any, were 
made to him? How much real power and influence did he have and how did he exercise it?  
Enos Mabuza, like other Bantustan leaders who were regarded as corrupt and against their 
own people, was often criticised, discredited and condemned because of his participation in 
apartheid structures (the despised Bantustan system) but he was also admired and respected 
by captains of industry, academics, advocates, community leaders and the press, both in 
South Africa and abroad. Why do you think this was the case? Would you say he was 
corrupt, ambitious, opportunistic or self-serving as is generally believed of Bantustan leaders 
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such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi who was Chief Minister of KwaZulu or Kaiser Matanzima 
who was Chief Minister of the Transkei? Was Enos Mabuza ever accused of actively 
persecuting anti-apartheid leaders/activists like these two leaders have been?  
Enos Mabuza often said that his leadership role and political career was inspired by the 
wisdom and vision of people like Abraham Lincoln, Dr Martin Luther King Jnr and Sir 
Winston Churchill, as well as the ANC leaders, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. How did 
Mabuza navigate his way through his contradictory roles in the political sphere; as a 
Bantustan leader and president of the Inyandza National Movement who was also aligned 
with the African National Congress? 
In an interview with Mayibuye in 1990, Mabuza said that he was a member of the ANC and 
supported the principles and objectives that the organisation stood for. He was the second 
Bantustan leader to open discussions and establish a working relationship with the African 
National Congress. Do you think he was genuinely patriotic despite his precarious position? 
Unlike the other Bantustans, KaNgwane did not adopt its own distinctive flag. Instead, it flew 
the then national flag of South Africa. What did this mean? Was this a form of protest 
through which the KaNgwane leadership symbolically identified itself/its people as part of 
South Africa at a time when the government‟s ultimate aim was the total removal of the black 
population from South Africa so that it would not have to accommodate them politically? 
KaNgwane was the least populous of the ten Bantustans, with an estimated 183,000 
inhabitants. Did the size of the territory make any difference in terms of political 
significance? Did his position as president of the Inyandza National Movement add to his 
clout as a leader to be reckoned with despite of the size of KaNgwane? What were the main 
objectives of Inyandza and were they achieved? Did his leadership of this organisation give 
him political leverage? 
KaNgwane territory was claimed by King Sobhuza of Swaziland as part of the Swazi 
monarch and the apartheid government tried to use it as a buffer zone against guerrilla 
infiltration from Mozambique. However, attempts to incorporate parts of the Bantustan into 
Swaziland in 1982 failed following protests. Enos Mabuza became quite prominent (locally 
and internationally-Canada etc) as a result of his role in those protests and the apartheid 
government retaliated by temporarily suspending KaNgwane‟s autonomous status between 
18 June 1982 to 9 December 1982, restoring it in 1984. Mabuza was also suspended as Chief 
Minister and N.J. Badenhorst was put in his stead as an Administrator for the same period. 
What was the reaction of the KaNgwane people? What was his reaction? 
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Mabuza resigned from active politics in early 1991.The apartheid security apparatus must 
have been relieved because he was critical of white right-wing political groupings and the 
violence that was endemic to the apartheid system. However, other parties objected to his 
resignation. The ANC, for example, sent a delegation to plead with him to reconsider but he 
declined. Why was there such a vote of confidence in him by the main anti-apartheid 
movement despite the ambiguities or controversies of his associations with the „enemy‟? Did 
they trust him completely even though his political positions were unconventional? 
Mabuza was involved in the first multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) interim/transitional constitutional negotiations in November 1991. The talks 
brought together the apartheid government, Bantustan leaders and liberation movements to 
discuss South Africa‟s future (power sharing) and Mabuza acted as a political advisor. What 
were his positions in this debate? Would you say he was politically non-aligned or neutral 
about the main players on South Africa‟s political scene (ANC, PAC, NP, AZAPO and the 
IFP)? 
Did Mabuza keep in touch with the welfare and other interests of the KaNgwane people after 
withdrawing from active politics? What was the overall impact of his political 
career/engagement? 
 
Education 
Before becoming a political leader, Enos Mabuza‟s career spanned 16 years in the education 
sector, first as a teacher (several teaching posts in Barberton, in KaBokweni at Khumbula 
High School where he later became a headmaster) and later as an education inspector in the 
Eastern Transvaal. Mabuza co-authored several literature and Swati grammar books 
including, A Grammar of the Swati Language (siSwati) with D. Ziervogel which was 
published in 1976 and Sifundza siSwati: Libanga 1 with S. S. Mahlasela and E Posselt. He 
also helped to translate the bible into siSwati with Mr E. N Gininda and others. He served on 
several educational boards such as the University of Witwatersrand Council, St Stithians 
College Council and Promat Colleges.  
In 1992, Mabuza and several others including yourself (then headmaster of St Stithians 
College), Bill Carter (then Vice-Chairman of the St Stithians Council), Professor Selby 
Ripinga (then KaNgwane‟s Minister of Education), Dr Lynn Hurry and Peter Laburn) 
founded Penryn College in Mpumalanga.  
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What were the reasons behind such an undertaking? Was it a political decision? If so, what 
were the political objectives?  
Who runs or owns the college?  
What are the college‟s founding principles? 
How was this educational initiative received by the apartheid government and the black 
community given the situation in the education sector at the time? What sets the college apart 
from others in the country? 
Where did the funding for the establishment of Penryn College come from? How is the 
college funded today and have its original objectives changed over the years? 
How many people benefited/continue to benefit from the establishment of Penryn College? 
What is its scope and impact? 
 
The Corporate Sector 
By December 1991, Mabuza became the first black person to be appointed to several, mostly 
white, corporate boards (Anglo-Vaal Limited, Foundation of African Business, Gola 
Investments (Pty) Ltd, IDT Finance Corporation, Metro Cash and Carry Limited, The 
Premier Group, Shell SA Limited, South African Breweries, Standard Bank Investment 
Corporation, Thebe Investment Corporation, Times Media Limited and Volkswagen SA) as a 
non-executive director. He was also on the State President‟s Advisory Economic Council. 
How were his appointments on these boards viewed by his contemporaries, both black and 
white? Was it interpreted as patronage?  
What benefits were derived from this by ordinary people? 
In the first six months of Mabuza‟s appointments to these boards, almost forty other black 
men were appointed to white company boards. Was this a genuine attempt by white 
companies to increase black participation in the economic mainstream if these positions were 
non-executive?  
How much power or influence did the new appointees have on these boards? Could this have 
been the beginning of today‟s Black Economic Empowerment? What was the result of his 
involvement with these big, predominantly white controlled corporations? 
 
Conservation 
Mabuza served on several environmental and community trusts, including the National Parks 
Board, Trees for Africa, the Independent Development Trust and the 1820 Foundation. He 
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was instrumental (particularly in his home area in Mpumalanga where he helped establish 
two nature reserves) in driving environmental conservation initiatives to counter aggressive 
or careless developmental agendas. What was the content of this apparent need to prioritise 
ecological balance?  
Did he lobby for environmental legislation to define the parameters for technological 
development or advocate the use of natural resources in a bid to conserve natural and other 
resources such as vegetation, catchment areas, wildlife and the ozone/atmosphere? If so, who 
did he lobby (big business, politicians and professional conservationists) and with what 
results? 
 
Conclusion 
As a member of a political „minority‟, did Mabuza‟s loyalties to his family (as a father, 
husband etc), specific political parties or the region (South African, black, Swati) have an 
identifiable hierarchy?  
People cope with adversity in different ways but do you think that Enos Mabuza could or 
should have done anything differently? Would you say he was a man of integrity?  
How did Enos Mabuza evaluate or assess his own virtues and vices, accomplishments? Did 
he have frustrations, disappointments or regrets? 
As a man who played many, often incongruous roles, would you say that Mabuza‟s life and 
career had a positive or negative impact overall? Do you think things could have been more 
clear-cut than they turned out? Did Mabuza‟s objectives and interests converge or vary 
significantly with those of KaNgwane people, anti-apartheid movements or black South 
Africans in general? 
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Appendix 2: National Parks Board Affirmative Action Placement March 1995 (benchmark) to March 1996 (placement) for specific 
occupational categories. 
 
Job 
Grade 
March 1995 March 1996 March 1997 
 Black White Total % Black Black White Total % Black Black White Total % Black 
C 38 325 363 10.47 57 290 347 16.43 95 264 359 26.46 
D 7 100 100 6.54 16 113 129 12.40 33 134 167 19.76 
E 1 14 15 6.67 4 13 17 23.52 7 15 22 31.82 
F 2 5 7 28.57 2 5 7 28.57 3 4 7 42.86 
 (National Parks Board, 1995/6:57; National Parks Board, 1996/97: 90-91). 
Key 
C - Skilled/Supervisory 
D - Management 
E - Senior Management 
F - Executive 
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Appendix 3: Maps of the Bantustans  
  
Map 1: Black Homelands 1986 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/south_african_homelands.gif (Accessed 23/11/2006). 
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Map 2: Racial Concentrations and Homelands circa 1979 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/south_africa_racial_1979.jpg (Accessed 23/11/2006). 
 
Map 3: Bantustans and Black Townships (Mufson, 1990). 
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Appendix 4: South Africa’s Political History Timeline up to 1994 
A brief chronology of events in South Africa‟s struggle history from the banning of the ANC 
and the PAC on 8 April 1960 which was followed by a period of relative calm as 
organisations absorbed what had happened and regrouped. The timeline highlights the 
eruption, conditions, patterns, conspiracies and intensity of violence and the perpetrators. 
 
1963 
Seven senior members of MK were arrested at Lilliesleaf Farm, Rivonia on 11 July 1963. 
The Rivonia Treason Trial of ten people including Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki and 
Walter Sisulu follows in 1964 and the accused were defended by George Bizos. Most of the 
accused were sentenced to life imprisonment.  
 
1967  
The Terrorism Act was passed, in terms of which the police were empowered to detain 
suspects in solitary confinement for indefinite periods and with no access to visitors. Further, 
the public was not entitled to information relating to the identity and number of people 
detained in this manner. 
 
1969  
The South African Students‟ Organisation (SASO) was formed by black students led by 
Steve Biko. The organisation was a breakaway from the white-dominated National Union of 
South African Students (NUSAS). 
 
1970 
The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 striped all black South Africans of their 
citizenship by making them automatic citizens of one of the ten Bantustans.  
 
1971 
The World Council of Churches allocates R91 000 of its annual R140 000 fund against 
racism to liberation movements in Southern Africa; including SWAPO, the ANC and other 
anti-apartheid groups.  
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1972 
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Lebowa were granted self-government status. The Black 
People‟s Convention (BPC) is launched in 1972 to co-ordinate the activities of black 
consciousness groups.  
 
1973  
A wave of strikes begins in Durban and spreads to all major urban centres. 
 
1975 
The Inkhatha Cultural Liberation Movement was formed in 1975 as a predominantly Zulu 
cultural formation. It eventually became a fully fledged political party - the Inkhatha Freedom 
Party. 
 
1976 
The Soweto Uprising began on 16 June and the police opened fire on approximately 10 000 
pupils protesting against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. The resistance 
spreads countrywide and continued for several months. Approximately 575 official deaths 
were reported, including 390 in the Transvaal and 137 in the Western Cape. Over 2 000 
people were injured. Numerous arrests, trials and sudden deaths in detention followed the 
revolt and hundreds of youths left the country for training in armed resistance in 
neighbouring countries. 
Nominal independence is granted to the Transkei in October 1976 under the leadership of 
Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima.  
 
1977 
The KwaZulu Bantustan gains self-governance in February 1977.  
Former ANC member Leonard Nkosi was killed by the ANC on 9 September after he joined 
the Security Branch. 
Black Consciousness activist Bantu Stephen Biko died in detention in Pretoria on 12 
September following his detention in Port Elizabeth. Widespread protests follow 
countrywide. Numerous other deaths in detention occur during 1977 and in subsequent years. 
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1978 
In January/March, the Labour Party (Coloured), Reformed Party (Indian) and KwaZulu‟s 
Inkatha formed the South African Black Alliance under the leadership of Chief Gatsha 
Buthelezi. Its main objective was to convene a National Convention of representatives of all 
population groups to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the country‟s problems. The 
Dikwankwetla Party from the QwaQwa Bantustan was set to join the alliance but the 
organisations represented would not merge into one solid block because doing so would 
contravene the Political and Interference Act of 1968 which banned inter-racial mixing in 
political parties. 
Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster was succeeded by the former Minister of Defence 
PW Botha in 1978 following his resignation as a result of the Muldergate affair”. 
 
1979 
Venda became independent in 1979. 
In November, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was formed for high school 
students and the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) which was later renamed the 
South African Students Congress (SASCO) was formed for college students. The Port 
Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) was also formed. 
 
1980 
Expelled ANC official Tennyson Makiwane was shot dead in the Transkei in June.  
 
1981 
General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force, announced that a South 
African commando had attacked and destroyed the planning and control headquarters (three 
residences) of the ANC at Matola (Maputo, Mozambique) on 30 January 1981. Twelve ANC 
members were killed and 3 were kidnapped in the raid. On 8 February, Mozambican 
authorities proclaimed their continued support for the ANC in a statement made at the funeral 
of the twelve ANC members that were killed in the raid. Again, in reaction to the massacre, 
Mozambique‟s President Samora Machel declared his country‟s solidarity with the plight of 
the South African people on 14 February. In response, the South African Prime Minister 
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warned neighbouring states against supporting „terrorist‟ movement operations on 30 April 
1981.  
On 19 November, Durban lawyer, Griffiths Mxenge, is assassinated by security police in 
Durban.  
The independence of the Ciskei, under Chief Lennox Sebe, is proclaimed on 4 December and 
self-governing status is conferred on KwaNdebele. 
 
1982 
Warrant Officer Selepe was killed by the ANC in Mamelodi in November.  
On 9 December, the South African army raided houses in Maseru, Lesotho killing 30 ANC 
members and seven women and children who were caught in the crossfire. A chain of 
sabotage incidents on installations in South Africa were blamed on the ANC command 
structure in Lesotho and formed the pretext for the raid. 
 
1983 
On 19 January KwaZulu‟s Chief Buthelezi met President Matanzima of the Transkei at 
Tongaat, north of Durban and pledged to oppose the constitutional proposals which excluded 
blacks. 
South Africa‟s Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, announced on 20 May that 6 
districts on or near South Africa‟s borders with Swaziland and Mozambique had been 
activated under the 1982 Amendments to the Defence Act. In three of the districts, all white 
men up to the age of fifty-five had to register for commando duty. 
On 23 May the South African Air Force (SAAF) launched an air raid on 6 suspected ANC 
targets in Maputo. Five Mozambicans, including two women and two children, and one South 
African refugee were killed. Over 30 people were injured. South Africa embarked on a 
campaign to crackdown on ANC activities by curbing cross-border guerrilla activity through 
security arrangements with the governments of Lesotho and Swaziland. 
The Transvaal and Natal regions of the United Democratic Front were launched in May 1983 
and an ANC car bomb exploded outside military headquarters in Pretoria. The government 
responded with an air attack on Mozambique which killed ANC members and injured several 
Mozambican nationals.  
Page | 472 
 
On 15 August the Lesotho Foreign Ministry appeals for international help to stop South 
Africa applying an economic squeeze designed to force Lesotho to expel up to 3 000 political 
refugees. The Lesotho government announces on 8 September that an undisclosed number of 
South African refugees have decided voluntarily to withdraw from Lesotho. On 10 
September Lesotho airlifted the first batch of 22 ANC members to Mozambique and 
Tanzania and another 200 would be evacuated shortly thereafter. 
On 20-21 August, the United Democratic Front (UDF) with 575 affiliate organisations 
sympathetic to the Freedom Charter was formally launched nationally at a meeting in 
Mitchell‟s Plein, Cape Town. The meeting was attended by delegates from over 320 
community groups, trade unions, women‟s groups and students‟ organizations. The newly 
formed organisation pledged to oppose the Indian Council, then the government‟s proposed 
Koornhof Bills and the Constitutional dispensation to Coloureds and Indians; in favour of a 
single, non-racial and democratic South Africa. 
In September-October of the same year, calls were made by a variety of groups, including the 
South African Catholic Bishops Conference, the South African Council of Churches and the 
leaders of six self-governing Bantustans for the White electorate to reject the tri-cameral 
dispensation.  
The leaders of the six self-governing Bantustans rejected the new Constitution on 5 October 
1983 and their petition was also signed by a number of black business people and church 
leaders. 
South African forces again raid offices of the ANC in Maputo on 17 October. 
 
1984 
Mutinies by frustrated MK soldiers at ANC Viana and Pango camps were crushed in early 
1984 resulting in the execution of seven mutineers and the imprisonment of others at Quatro 
rehabilitation camp. 
The Million Signatures Campaign (15 February 1984) was mobilised by the ANC, UDF and 
PAC to boycott referendums to pass motions for the new constitution and tri-cameral 
parliament. The campaign also demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and other prisoners. 
P.W. Botha and Samora Machel sign the Nkomati Accord on 16 March and the Mozambique-
South Africa Joint Security Commission meets for the first time in Maputo on 26 March. This 
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time raids are carried out against ANC houses and offices by Mozambican authorities, 
marking a shift in alliances for Mozambique despite its earlier pronouncements. 
Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for non-violent opposition to apartheid on 
16 October. 
The largest stay-away in the Transvaal up until then was organised by the Congress of South 
African Students (COSAS) and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). It 
was staged on 5 November and signalled a student-worker opposition alliance.  
 
1985 
Residents in both urban and rural areas across the country began widespread attacks on 
collaborators and askaris, including police and community councillors. The killings result in 
numerous common purpose trials and death sentences are handed down for those convicted.  
Vigilante groups also emerge nationwide - groups such as the A-Team in Chesterville, 
Durban and the Phakathis in the Orange Free State. In the Durban/Natal area, vigilantes 
mostly target UDF activists. The Eagles Youth Club in the OFS (run by Military Intelligence 
from 1986) is also active in the harassment of UDF leaders and is responsible for violent 
disruptions at youth meetings. 
In February violence erupted at Crossroads informal settlement in Cape Town after the state 
declared that squatters in the Western Cape had to move to Khayelitsha. Eighteen people 
were killed and 200 more were injured in clashes with police. 
The first widely publicised necklace killing happened on 23 March 1985 when Councillor 
Benjamin Kinikini of KwaNobuhle/Langa and four of his relatives were killed by a crowd. 
The other counsellors had given in to demands for them to resign but Kinikini had refused. 
The SAP records show that 406 such necklace killings and 395 deaths by burning took place 
between September 1984 and December 1989 and a third of these took place in the Eastern 
Cape and Border regions. 
A State of Emergency was declared in 36 magisterial districts across the country on 20 July 
following close to five hundred deaths in township violence since September 1984.  
Maki Skosana was neck-laced on 25 July at the funeral of several people killed by police. 
Durban attorney and member of the UDF and who represented the Pietermaritzburg Treason 
trialists, Victoria Mxenge, was assassinated in Umlazi on 1 August and the incident triggered 
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a rapid escalation of conflict between the UDF and Inkatha in Natal. Seventeen people died in 
the Umlazi cinema killings when Inkatha supporters armed with traditional weapons and 
firearms burst into a memorial service that was held for Victoria Mxenge on 8 August. 
Shortly after that, Inkatha‟s Central Committee – its highest decision-making body of 
declared KwaZulu and Natal no-go areas for the UDF. 
American President Ronald Reagan imposed limited sanctions on South Africa on 9 
September 1985.  
Shortly thereafter, Gavin Relly of the Anglo American Corporation led a delegation of white 
South African businessmen and newspaper editors held talks with ANC leaders in Zambia on 
13 September to discuss possible solutions to the apartheid crisis. 
On 25 September church leaders issued the Kairos Document in response to increasing 
violence after the imposition of the first state of emergency in July. The emergency led to the 
killing, injuring, maiming and detention of hundreds of people. 
On 13 October, the opposition Progressive Federal Party led by parliamentarian Frederick 
van Zyl Slabbert met the ANC in Lusaka and agreed with calls for the release of Nelson 
Mandela. 
In what becomes known as in November 1985 at least twelve people died when police 
opened fire on 50 000 protesters demonstrating against rent hikes, funeral restrictions and the 
presence of the SADF in Mamelodi Township (the Mamelodi killings). In the same month, at 
least eleven people were killed in the Queenstown shootings when police opened fire on a 
meeting in a church hall. 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was launched on 30 November to 
create the largest mainly African labour federation. 
 
1986 
Residents of Alexandra clashed with police in the Six Day War in February and at least 17 
people were killed. 
On 3 March, seven MK operatives were shot dead by security forces in an apparent ambush 
(the Gugulethu Seven).  
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In the Winterveld killings, police opened fire on a thousand-strong crowd on 26 March, 
killing eleven people and wounding 200 others.  
On 19 May South African commandos used air strikes on alleged guerrilla targets in Zambia, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
In May, the vigilante group witdoeke attacked and destroyed UDF-aligned satellite camps 
around Crossroads, Cape Town. A similar attack took place at KTC in June. Over sixty 
people were killed and tens of thousands were left homeless. This was followed by a 
nationwide State of Emergency on 12 June and this was accompanied by mass detentions, 
censorship and de facto military rule such that by the end of this state of emergency on 11 
June 1987, over 25 000 people had been detained at various times (the emergency was 
renewed annually for four years until 1990). 
On 1 July the Pass Laws were repealed. 
Two other incidents involving entrapment and/or ambush were used in the killings of the 
Nietverdient Ten in June and the KwaNdebele Nine in July. 
The Eastern Transvaal Target Work Group was established by joint security forces. 
TREWITS (Teenrewolusionêre Inligtingstaakspan), a counter-revolutionary intelligence task 
group was also formed to collect intelligence in that region and KwaNdebele‟s Home Affairs 
Minister, Piet Ntuli, was killed by a security force car bomb in July. 
At least 24 people were killed in White City in August following police action against a 
crowd demonstrating against municipal rent raids in Soweto. 
The European Economic Community (EEC) imposed sanctions on South Africa on 16 
September and on 2 October the United States Congress overrode Presidential veto and 
passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act which imposed fiscal and other sanctions on 
South Africa. 
 
1987 
Inter-organisational conflict and violence broke out between Inkatha and UDF youth 
organisations in what became known as the Natal Midlands War. The violence continued 
until 1990 and resulted in many deaths and social upheaval. The home of UDF leader, Bheki 
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Ntuli, is attacked in January and 13 people, including eight children are killed (the 
KwaMakhutha massacre).  
The Alexandra Treason Trial of five UDF activists begins in January and continues until their 
acquittal in April 1989. 
Ciskei‟s President Lennox Sebe escaped an assassination attempt on 19 February. 
Israel freezes military contracts and imposes cultural and tourism sanctions on SA on 18 
March 1987. On 22 March 1987 Archbishop Desmond Tutu met with the ANC in Zambia 
and failed to convince them to abandon the armed struggle. Still in March 1987, Joe Slovo 
resigned as Chief of Staff of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. 
The „independent sates‟ of the Transkei and Ciskei signed a non-aggression or security pact 
with the South African authorities in Cape Town on 10 May which forbade cross-border 
violence. Transkei Defence Force (TDF) troops had attacked Ciskei President Lennox Sebe‟s 
palace in January/February in a failed attempt to abduct or kill him (Operation Katzen) and at 
least two TDF troops died. 
On 12 June the State of Emergency was extended for a second year. 
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, head of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa 
(IDASA), led a delegation of 60 predominantly Afrikaans speaking white intellectuals and 
journalists who opposed apartheid to hold talks with the ANC in Dakar, Senegal on 9 July 
1987 and Eric Mntoga, an IDASA official who organized the meeting is found stabbed to 
death. Several other key ANC personnel were assassinated in South Africa‟s neighbouring 
states in July. Cassius Make and Paul Dikeledi, for instance, were both killed in Swaziland. 
On 9 August 1987, the UDF adopted the Freedom Charter of 26 June 1955 and an estimated 
200 000 members of the Black National Union of Mineworkers begin a three-week strike - 
the longest legal strike in South African history. 
 
1988 
On 10 February South African troops put down an attempted coup against Lucas Mangope in 
Bophuthatswana. 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others were arrested as they tried to present a petition to 
parliament on 27 February. 
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Prominent white South African lawyer and ANC member, Albie Sachs, was critically injured 
by a car bomb explosion in Maputo on 7 April 1988. The ANC and Mozambican authorities 
blamed the South African agents. They claimed that Mr. Sachs was the latest victim of South 
African “death squads” but South African authorities denied responsibility for the attack on 
Mr. Sachs. 
On 21 April PW Botha outlined reform plans involving a form of race federation and draft 
legislation providing for new regional assemblies for Black people living outside the 
„homelands' but Black leaders such as Dr Nthato Motlana argued that such reforms would not 
attract legitimate Black leaders. 
On 27 May anti-apartheid Afrikaners led by IDASA director, Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, met 
with the ANC in Frankfurt to discuss a post-apartheid South Africa. 
On 9 June the State of Emergency was extended for a third year. 
Security forces bombed Khotso House in Johannesburg on 1 September, causing extensive 
damage and Khanya House (the headquarters of the SA Bishops Conference) was destroyed 
in an arson and limpet mine attack on 12 October. 
On 8 July the government introduced the Extension of Political Participation Bill, 
empowering the government to divide the country into a number of regions. It also called 
elections to Legislative Council for each region through which Non-Bantustan blacks could 
articulate their political aspirations. The ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party expressed their 
opposition to the reforms. 
Eleven people were killed by SAP members and special constables who stormed and fired on 
an all-night prayer vigil near New Hanover on 3 December - the Trust Feed killings. It was 
alleged that senior Inkatha leaders were involved in planning the killings. 
 
1989 
Prime Minister Botha met Nelson Mandela and agreed to work for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict in the country. Talks commenced with the ANC, prominent business leaders, the 
Commonwealth and the Eminent Persons Group. 
South Africa‟s three liberal opposition parties - the Progressive Federal Party headed by Zach 
de Beer, the National Democratic Movement led by Wynand Malan and the Independent 
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Party led by Dennis Worrall, agreed to form a unified multiracial party on 4 February. The 
new grouping was to be formally founded on 8 April and would be known as the Democratic 
Party. 
The Dutch Reformed Church unequivocally condemned apartheid for the first time on 10 
March.  
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Allan Boesak and the Reverend Beyers 
Naude met with American president George Bush on 18 May. 
Albertina Sisulu and other UDF leaders also met with American President Bush on 30 June. 
The Defiance Campaign against bannings, restrictions and segregation of hospitals and other 
public facilities was launched in July by the UDF and Mass Democratic Movement. The 
campaign lasted until September. 
A two-day strike called by the UDF and its affiliates to protest the exclusion of Black people 
from the September 6th parliamentary elections began on 5 September and hundreds of 
thousands of people boycotted work and school.  
On 24 September Winnie Mandela was formally charged with four counts of kidnapping and 
assault in connection with a reign of terror in Soweto that included the abduction and beating 
of several Soweto youths on 29 December which led to the death of Stompie Moeketsi in 
December 1988. Winnie would stand trial with seven others believed to be part of her private 
militia called the Mandela United Football Club. 
 
1990 
On 2 February President De Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC, SACP AND PAC; 
the lifting of restrictions on the UDF, COSATU and thirty-one other organisations; the 
release of political prisoners and the suspension of the death penalty. 
On 11 February Nelson Mandela was released from prison after twenty-seven years of 
imprisonment and thousands of people in South Africa‟s black townships and city centres 
took to the streets to celebrate his release. Police intervened on several occasions, firing 
teargas and rubber bullets. Ten people were shot dead and up to 20 were injured, when Ciskei 
police opened fire on a crowd celebrating Mandela's release. 
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Vigilante activities by the Three Million Gang (reported to have been active from 1989 to 
1992 in the Orange Free State) targeted UDF and ANC activists, student organisations and 
self defence units.  
Military officers headed by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo overthrew the leader of the Ciskei, 
Lennox Sebe, on 4 March while he was in Hong Kong. Gqozo and three other officers 
formed an executive committee to run the administration with civilian help until a society 
based on democratic principles could be established. South African authorities sent troops to 
restore order in the Bantustan at the request of Gqozo. 
On 5 April the Venda government was overthrown by military coup. 
At the end of their first formal talks 2-4 May, the ANC and the South African Government 
issued a joint statement - the Groote Shuur Minute- according to which a working group was 
established to address the issue of the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. 
The Group was scheduled to complete its work before 21 May. In addition, temporary 
immunity from prosecution would be considered for selected members of the ANC and the 
Government would seek to modify its security legislation to adapt it to the new situation 
developing in South Africa. The South African government also pledged to work towards the 
lifting of the state of emergency. Both parties pledged to try and put an end to the climate of 
violence and intimidation that prevailed and reiterated their commitment to stability and to a 
peaceful process of negotiations. 
The Indemnity Bill of 1990 which allowed exiles to be granted temporary immunity or 
permanent indemnity against arrest or prosecution was passed by 105 votes to 33 at a joint-
sitting of the South African Parliament on 7 May. Only the Conservative Party opposed it. 
The Indemnity Act No. 35 came into effect on 18 May as outlined above, allowing exiles to 
return to South Africa.  The Act was later repealed by s48 of the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995. 
On 5 June the chairman of the Venda Council for National Unity, Colonel Gabriel 
Ramushwana, announced the lifting of the state of emergency and the unconditional release 
of all political prisoners in Venda. 
On 7 June the South African government lifted the nationwide state of emergency in all 
provinces except Natal. 
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6-7 August, the ANC and South African Government held the second round of talks resulting 
in the Pretoria Minute which announced a cease-fire ending a thirty-year old armed struggle. 
The government pledged to release political prisoners from 1 September and to allow exiles 
to return from 1 October.  
On 18 October, the government ended emergency rule in Natal. 
On 2 November Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Mr. Andries Treurnicht, leader of the 
Conservative Party, met in Durban and issued a joint statement declaring that they were 
united in the rejection of "domination, terrorism and communism". 
In the same month, ANC supporters are arrested for allegedly plotting to assassinate 
President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana. 
Former Transkei Defence Force MI chief, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Duli who was supported 
by the South African security forces, died on 22 November while attempting to overthrow the 
military government of Major General Bantu Holomisa in the Transkei. 
 
1991 
In January 45 people were killed when a night vigil for Christopher Nangalembe was 
attacked with automatic weapons in Sebokeng, Transvaal.  
On 4 March the UDF National General Council decided to disband the organisation on 20 
August, the eighth anniversary of its foundation.  
On 26 March fifteen people were shot dead and at least eighteen others were injured in an 
attack on a funeral vigil for an ANC member who died in fighting in Alexandra (the 
Alexandra night vigil killings). 
A group of about eight hundred alleged IFP supporters attacked the squatter settlement of 
Swanieville on the East Rand on 12 May. Twenty-nine people were killed and over thirty 
were injured. 
On 5 June the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 and the Group Areas Act were repealed. 
On 17 June the Population Registration Act was also repealed.  
In the Battle of the Forest in June, twenty-three people were killed in fighting between the 
IFP and ANC supporters in the Richmond townships of Ndaleni and Magoda, Natal. The 
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Inkathagate scandal broke in July and government funding of Inkatha and its union UWUSA 
for anti-ANC activities was revealed.  F. W. De Klerk established the Kahn Committee to 
investigate secret projects such as the Esikhaweni IFP hit squad which was active in areas of 
Zululand, killing UDF/ANC and union supporters and leaders until 1993.  
 
1992  
The KwaZulu legislative assembly adopted a constitution for a future state of KwaZulu-Natal 
as an autonomous state within a federation.  
In the Bhisho killings on 7 September, Ciskei Defence Force troops opened fire on ANC 
protesters demanding free political activity in Ciskei at Bisho. Twenty-nine protesters and 
one soldier were killed and about 200 were wounded following months of violent conflicts 
between Bantustan government supporters and ANC supporters. 
The Goldstone Commission raid in November uncovered a campaign waged by the 
Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC) to discredit the ANC. Project Echo and Operation 
Thunderstorm, two extensive SADF projects aimed at undermining the ANC, were also 
exposed. 
 
1993  
The Afrikaner Volksfront was launched in May by 21 right-wing groups who demand self-
determination in a federal state. 
In July, Inkatha and the Conservative Party walked out of CODESA talks when 27 April 
1994 was confirmed as the election date. They were later joined by the Ciskei and 
Bophuthatswana and established the Freedom Alliance. The announcement of the election 
date leads to an immediate escalation in politically linked deaths.  
The IFP and KwaZulu Legislative Assembly embark on a Self-Protection Unit training 
project. Training of SPUs begins at Mlaba Camp in September with the assistance of 
Vlakplaas commander Eugene De Kock with weapons delivered by IFP member Philip 
Powell. 
 
1994 
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Amidst a widespread public revolt at his decision to withdraw from the April elections, 
President Mangope drew in the white right wing including the Volksfront to defend his rule. 
Hundreds of armed Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) members drove into 
Bophuthatswana and attacked residents. More than 45 people were killed, including three 
AWB members.  
The military ruler of the Ciskei, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, resigned in March and the 
Transitional Executive Council took over control of the Ciskei. 
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Appendix 5: Enos J Mabuza & Associates - Briefings and Updates 
Enos J. Mabuza & Associates, 1993a. South Africa – A Political Update (confidential 
briefing 26 February 1993). 
 
Enos J. Mabuza & Associates, 1993b. South Africa – A Political Update (confidential 
briefing 18 June 1993). 
 
The content of the political briefing and updates released by Enos Mabuza & Associates is as 
follows: 
 3 October 1994 – Industrial relations, education, Buthelezi and De Klerk and the 
impasse between their respective parties, Inkatha and the NP and the rate of inflation. 
 1 November 1994 – the TRC, SACP, SANDF, housing, finance, restructuring, 
privatisation. 
 1 December 1994 – land redistribution, law and order, affirmative action. 
 1 February 1995 – constitutional drafting, federalism versus centralism, revenue 
generation, taxes, the RDP, the NP after the 1994 election. 
 1 March 1995 – the IFP‟s brinkmanship and international mediation, government 
corruption, local government elections, abolishing the financial Rand, campus unrest at 
universities and technikons and the activities of COSAS. 
 1 April 1995 – the transformation agenda for tertiary education, black business and 
ownership on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, attracting foreign investment and 
making South Africa attractive, Winnie Mandela who was not towing the party line, the 
lobbying of businesses. 
 May 1995 – The labour movement and its expectations a year after the 1994 elections, 
fighting between the ANC and the IFP, getting South African businesses to invest in the 
future, the RDP and housing delivery, inflation. 
 June 1995 – the government of national unity, violence in KwaZulu-Natal, frosty 
relations between the ANC and the IFP and their rivalry and uncompromising positions, 
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the impasse between labour and business90, Afrikaans right wingers and the carving of a 
Volkstaat (separatist Afrikaner homeland advocated by the Conservative Party and the 
National Party) in the new South Africa, local elections, the RDP and home ownership. 
 July 1995 – Local elections, the new or revised role of traditional leaders, law 
enforcement, curbing crime, debate about abolishing the death penalty and the AIDS 
pandemic. Traditional leaders were accommodated in the new South Africa and became 
salaried officials but their powers were still eroded as they were under apartheid. Their 
new subservience and financial dependence of traditional leaders on Pretoria has 
peculiar parallels to their previous subservience during apartheid when the Bantustans 
existed. However, there was a realisation that chiefs have existed in our societies for 
many years and cannot be wished away. Traditional leaders dispense patronage and 
uphold cultural values but their role was to be reviewed and brought in line with 
constitutional democracy (Enos J. Mabuza and Associates, July 1995:3-4). 
 24 October 1995 – the government of national unity, political violence in KwaZulu-
Natal, crime, local government elections and the business climate. 
 November 1995 – Local government elections, cabinet reshuffle, 1995 in retrospect and 
the year ahead, the challenges and priorities for 1996.  
                                                 
90 The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), COSATU and NACTU. 
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Appendix 6: Mabuza‟s Activities on the International Stage (compiled from the Inyandza 
National Movement‟s 1990 and 1991 booklets of Mabuza‟s speeches). 
 
Group Place Date 
Embarked on a political 
and agricultural tour in 
several South American 
countries.  
Argentina, Paraguay, 
Uraguay and Brazil 
1978  
 
Held Consultations with 
members of the State and 
Federal parliaments. 
Australia 1980 
Held consultations with 
city bankers. 
United Kingdom 1982 
Went on an extensive 2-
month study tour, 
including consultations 
with the Lawyers 
Committee on Civil Rights 
whilst on a USIS visitor 
grant. 
United States 1982 
Attended the leadership 
Conference and political 
consultations in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Zimbabwe 1982 
Held consultations with 
the international 
Commission of Jurists in 
the  
 
United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and 
Switzerland. 
1983 
Held discussions with 
British Prime Minister 
(Mrs Margaret Thatcher) 
and other senior 
government officials. 
 
United Kingdom 1985 
Attended the Ditchley 
Foundation Conference in  
United Kingdom 1985 
Attended a U.S. 
Congressional Prayer 
Breakfast 
USA 1985 
Attended the American 
Bar Conference organised 
by the Lawyers‟ 
Committee for Civil 
USA 1985 
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Rights Under Law 
Held consultations with 
the Office of the Prime 
Minister (Jacques Chirac) 
and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
France 1986 
Attended a Congressional 
breakfast and held 
consultations with the US 
Secretary of State (George 
Pratt Shultz)  
 
USA 1986 
Held consultations with 
bankers in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 1986 
Led a 20-member 
delegation of the Inyandza 
National Movement for 
consultations with ANC 
leaders. 
Zambia 1986 
Attended a U.S. 
Congressional prayer 
breakfast and met with the 
US Secretary of State 
(George Pratt Shultz). 
 
USA 1987 
Addressed Zurich bankers 
and businessmen and met 
with international 
Commission of Jurists. 
 
Switzerland 1987 
Held discussions with UK 
Prime Minister (Mrs 
Margaret Thatcher) and 
members of the UK 
Foreign Office. 
United Kingdom 1988 
Was part of the Newick 
Park Initiative 
United Kingdom 1988 
Held consultations with 
Egypt‟s Foreign office. 
 
Egypt 1988 
Attended the Association 
of Western European 
Parliamentarians Against 
Apartheid (AWEPA) 
Conference. 
Zimbabwe 1988 
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Was part of a South 
African delegation to the 
Soviet Union 
Soviet Union 1989 
Held consultations with 
the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee and members 
of the Central Committee 
of the Supreme Soviet and 
African Institute of the 
Academy of Sciences. 
Soviet Union 1989 
Held consultations with 
members of the French 
Foreign Office. 
France 1989 
Addressed the 
Arbeitsgruppe Südliches 
Afrika (ASA)/the Anti-
Apartheid Movement of 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 1989 
As part of a South African 
delegation, Mabuza held 
consultations with the 
British Prime Minister 
(Mrs Margaret Thatcher) 
and attended the Wilton 
Park Conference on 
Southern Africa.91 
United Kingdom 1989 
Mabuza‟s Inyandza 
National Movement was 
invited to participate in the 
Conference for a 
Democratic Future 
United Kingdom 1989 
 
                                                 
91 Buthelezi attended and addressed this conference on the “Federal and Confederal Futures for South Africa”, a 
revival of the Buthelezi Commission‟s recommendations. 
